Pontoon Bridges at Fredericksburg

mm .. sure ! ...

does someone know the title of this paint and the name of its author ? Please let me know !

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Burnside gets across at Fredericksburg and seizes Marye's Heights ahead of the Confederates. Three possibilities from there seem most likely to me:

1. Lee takes up a position behind the North Anna River where he subsequently defeats Burnside. Perhaps a similar plan to what he used in 1864, but this time he's healthy enough and has two experienced corps commanders to execute it. AotP retreats across the Rappahannock and we're basically back to OTL.

2. Lee takes up a good defensive position south of Fredericksburg, perhaps at Spotsylvania. (A study of the road networks might reveal a likely location.) Burnside attacks, loses, retreats across the Rappahannock, and we're basically back to OTL.

3. Lee splits his army: half behind the North Anna to stall Burnside and half in/near the Wilderness. Lee attempts to replicate Second Manassas. Outcome hazier. If I had to bet I would say Lee crushes Burnside's right flank, but the AotP is able to retreat across the Rappahannock and we're basically back to OTL.

So generally I predict the outcome isn't radically different the specifics merely shift.
 
There's a few more options than Joshism has covered - a key point is when this happens, as it took weeks for the AoNV to reunify. (Historically speaking Burnside reached the Fredericksburg area on November 17 and the AoNV wasn't reunited until nearly two weeks after that.) But aside from that...


The thing is, the Rappahanock is the last place where the AoNV can really block the AotP from threatening Richmond assuming that the US administration is willing to place Washington in moderate threat.
As of December 10 1862 the total force of the Army of the Potomac (PFD) was 201,700 men. Of these 50,000 were defending Washington either directly or at the upper Potomac, and the three grand divisions numbered 119,000; the 11th and 12th corps numbered about another 26,000, and the remainder was provost guard etc.
This means that the Union has two choices -either defend Washington with 75,000 men (that is to say, a force not far off equal to the entire Confederate field army) and send the rest around on a flanking move to take up the rough position McClellan occupied in the summer of 1862 - to whit, supplied by river within a few miles of Richmond, the position which Grant ultimately reached in 1864 - or defend Washington with a mere 50,000 and use 145,000 men to go directly after Lee at the Noth Anna.
It should be pretty self evident that the historical North Anna was not a case of Lee being outnumbered 2:1, but that's what would be happening here...

Myself, I'd say the better choice during this campaign would be a bit earlier, to strike directly at Longstreet's wing in early November, but the move to Fredericksburg has huge potential if the pontoons turn up on time. It means that basically Lee can't block the Federal army from threatening Richmond, and if the pontoons are on hand straight away (i.e. by 20 November) then it's a race to Richmond between Burnside and Jackson - Jackson's faster, but he has further to go, and Longstreet can't hope to hold off over 120,000 Federals by himself.
 
There's a few more options than Joshism has covered - a key point is when this happens, as it took weeks for the AoNV to reunify. (Historically speaking Burnside reached the Fredericksburg area on November 17 and the AoNV wasn't reunited until nearly two weeks after that.) But aside from that...


The thing is, the Rappahanock is the last place where the AoNV can really block the AotP from threatening Richmond assuming that the US administration is willing to place Washington in moderate threat.
As of December 10 1862 the total force of the Army of the Potomac (PFD) was 201,700 men. Of these 50,000 were defending Washington either directly or at the upper Potomac, and the three grand divisions numbered 119,000; the 11th and 12th corps numbered about another 26,000, and the remainder was provost guard etc.
This means that the Union has two choices -either defend Washington with 75,000 men (that is to say, a force not far off equal to the entire Confederate field army) and send the rest around on a flanking move to take up the rough position McClellan occupied in the summer of 1862 - to whit, supplied by river within a few miles of Richmond, the position which Grant ultimately reached in 1864 - or defend Washington with a mere 50,000 and use 145,000 men to go directly after Lee at the Noth Anna.
It should be pretty self evident that the historical North Anna was not a case of Lee being outnumbered 2:1, but that's what would be happening here...

Myself, I'd say the better choice during this campaign would be a bit earlier, to strike directly at Longstreet's wing in early November, but the move to Fredericksburg has huge potential if the pontoons turn up on time. It means
How does the lead up to Fredericksburg relate to the Loudoun Valley Campaign? I can't find any books on McClellan's last operations, so I'm not sure what transpired between Williamsport and Fredericksburg.
 
How does the lead up to Fredericksburg relate to the Loudoun Valley Campaign? I can't find any books on McClellan's last operations, so I'm not sure what transpired between Williamsport and Fredericksburg.
Put simply, the Loudoun Valley campaign is how the Army of the Potomac got from where it ended Antietam (i.e. refitting on Union soil after a hard-fought campaign, a process slowed by inadequate supplies) to the Rappahanock. After he was finally able to get his supplies, McClellan pushed south through the Loudoun Valley, and by the middle of the first week of November he was concentrated at Warrenton with a big force (much larger than his Antietam force) while Lee's army was divided - half at Culpeper within a day or so of McClellan's army and the other half still on the wrong side of the mountains several days' march away.
McClellan's replacement by Burnside cut the campaign off at the knees because it took ages for the command switchover to be processed, letting the AoNV get out of an otherwise impossible position. Burnside then shifted to Fredericksburg, but a combination of delays in the movement of the pontoons and the long command shiftover delay let the AoNV reunite.

67th Tigers has posted about it before. It really is a forgotten campaign, and it saw some big cavalry actions and a masterful display of manoeuvre - McClellan's army was concentrated right by Longstreet and Lee hadn't a clue.


McClellan_relief.jpg



As you can see from the map, as of McClellan's relief the Confederates were in a position where their only real hope was that the Union army would just stop moving for two weeks.
 
Put simply, the Loudoun Valley campaign is how the Army of the Potomac got from where it ended Antietam (i.e. refitting on Union soil after a hard-fought campaign, a process slowed by inadequate supplies) to the Rappahanock. After he was finally able to get his supplies, McClellan pushed south through the Loudoun Valley, and by the middle of the first week of November he was concentrated at Warrenton with a big force (much larger than his Antietam force) while Lee's army was divided - half at Culpeper within a day or so of McClellan's army and the other half still on the wrong side of the mountains several days' march away.
McClellan's replacement by Burnside cut the campaign off at the knees because it took ages for the command switchover to be processed, letting the AoNV get out of an otherwise impossible position. Burnside then shifted to Fredericksburg, but a combination of delays in the movement of the pontoons and the long command shiftover delay let the AoNV reunite.

67th Tigers has posted about it before. It really is a forgotten campaign, and it saw some big cavalry actions and a masterful display of manoeuvre - McClellan's army was concentrated right by Longstreet and Lee hadn't a clue.


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As you can see from the map, as of McClellan's relief the Confederates were in a position where their only real hope was that the Union army would just stop moving for two weeks.

This is a naive reading of the situation at best.

Lee was aware of McClellan's advance up the Blue Ridge by November 5th, and by the 6th he had intuited that McClellan's whole force was approaching and had dispatched orders that should McClellan cross the Rappahannock Jackson was to ascend the Valley and unite with Longstreet's forces through Swiftrun Gap. To whit his letter of the 6th November 1862:

From advices received from Generals Jackson and Stuart, the enemy are advancing steadily from the Potomac, their right moving along the base of the Blue Ridge, and their left resting on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. They occupy the gaps in the mountains as they progress, and have already reached Manassas Gap, which at least accounts yesterday was held by your pickets. They have not yet taken possession of Warrenton, which is still held by Colonel [W. H.] Payne [Fourth Virginia Cavalry]. General Jackson's corps is in the valley, his advance being at Front Royal. I do not think they will advance very far while he is in position to threaten their flank. Should they, however, continue their forward movement, General Jackson is directed to ascend the valley, and should they cross the Rappahannock, General Longstreet's corps will retire through Madison, where forage can be obtained, and the two corps unite through Swift Run Gap. No opposition has yet been offered to their advance, except the resistance of our cavalry and pickets. I have not yet been able to ascertain the strength of the enemy, but presume it is the whole of McClellan's army, as I learn that his whole force from Harper's Ferry, to Hagerstown has been withdrawn from Maryland, leaving only pickets at the fords, and but few troops at Harper's Ferry. He is also moving more rapidly than usual, and it looks like a real advance. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the operations south of James River for the present are intended to divert and distract us, and I would not have detached Evans' brigade as yet but for the urgent call of the Department, as it is possible that the whole force of this army may yet be needed in this section. I request that every exertion may be made to re-enforce our troops south of James River by the regiments of North Carolina, so as to keep the enemy at bay in that quartermaster as long as possible.

Through his correspondence we know he was also aware of McClellan's dispositions as having his right flank guarding the passes on the Blue Ridge Mountains while his left was on the Orange and Alexandria RR.

On the 7th Lee was already preparing to fall back in the face of McClellan's advance. To say Lee "hadn't a clue" that McClellan is on his door step is just ludicrous.

That the general advance then stopped on the 7th is not particularly relevant in light of Lee being prepared for a continued advance. Heck, Jackson thought that the uncovering of Snicker's and Ashby's Gap on the 9th of November presented an opportunity to harass McClellan's rear, and Jackson did indeed skirmish in the rear of the AotP on the 13th. The only confusion Lee seemed to suffer from was why the advance stopped on the 7th as he did not realize that McClellan had been relieved of command.

We know that McClellan did not even expect Lee to offer battle before Richmond, since that is exactly what he told his wife at the end of October, and seems to have set Culpeper CH as his objective, and getting there he would realize his overland supply route is steadily lengthening and so must necessarily shift his lines, most likely to Fredericksburg.

All in all the "Loudon Valley Campaign" was a non-entity, it accomplished nothing, there were only inconsequential skirmishes fought, and Burnside simply did what McClellan would most likely have ended up doing anyways by shifting to Fredericksburg.
 
Put simply, the Loudoun Valley campaign is how the Army of the Potomac got from where it ended Antietam (i.e. refitting on Union soil after a hard-fought campaign, a process slowed by inadequate supplies) to the Rappahanock. After he was finally able to get his supplies, McClellan pushed south through the Loudoun Valley, and by the middle of the first week of November he was concentrated at Warrenton with a big force (much larger than his Antietam force) while Lee's army was divided - half at Culpeper within a day or so of McClellan's army and the other half still on the wrong side of the mountains several days' march away.
McClellan's replacement by Burnside cut the campaign off at the knees because it took ages for the command switchover to be processed, letting the AoNV get out of an otherwise impossible position. Burnside then shifted to Fredericksburg, but a combination of delays in the movement of the pontoons and the long command shiftover delay let the AoNV reunite.

67th Tigers has posted about it before. It really is a forgotten campaign, and it saw some big cavalry actions and a masterful display of manoeuvre - McClellan's army was concentrated right by Longstreet and Lee hadn't a clue.





As you can see from the map, as of McClellan's relief the Confederates were in a position where their only real hope was that the Union army would just stop moving for two weeks.

After the aop crosses the the Potomac they will get supplies from d.c.. They will then take the rail head at Frederick. Couch will take a division towards Wyerston the rail head across from H.F. relieving Slocum.
 
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