How does the lead up to Fredericksburg relate to the Loudoun Valley Campaign? I can't find any books on McClellan's last operations, so I'm not sure what transpired between Williamsport and Fredericksburg.There's a few more options than Joshism has covered - a key point is when this happens, as it took weeks for the AoNV to reunify. (Historically speaking Burnside reached the Fredericksburg area on November 17 and the AoNV wasn't reunited until nearly two weeks after that.) But aside from that...
The thing is, the Rappahanock is the last place where the AoNV can really block the AotP from threatening Richmond assuming that the US administration is willing to place Washington in moderate threat.
As of December 10 1862 the total force of the Army of the Potomac (PFD) was 201,700 men. Of these 50,000 were defending Washington either directly or at the upper Potomac, and the three grand divisions numbered 119,000; the 11th and 12th corps numbered about another 26,000, and the remainder was provost guard etc.
This means that the Union has two choices -either defend Washington with 75,000 men (that is to say, a force not far off equal to the entire Confederate field army) and send the rest around on a flanking move to take up the rough position McClellan occupied in the summer of 1862 - to whit, supplied by river within a few miles of Richmond, the position which Grant ultimately reached in 1864 - or defend Washington with a mere 50,000 and use 145,000 men to go directly after Lee at the Noth Anna.
It should be pretty self evident that the historical North Anna was not a case of Lee being outnumbered 2:1, but that's what would be happening here...
Myself, I'd say the better choice during this campaign would be a bit earlier, to strike directly at Longstreet's wing in early November, but the move to Fredericksburg has huge potential if the pontoons turn up on time. It means
Put simply, the Loudoun Valley campaign is how the Army of the Potomac got from where it ended Antietam (i.e. refitting on Union soil after a hard-fought campaign, a process slowed by inadequate supplies) to the Rappahanock. After he was finally able to get his supplies, McClellan pushed south through the Loudoun Valley, and by the middle of the first week of November he was concentrated at Warrenton with a big force (much larger than his Antietam force) while Lee's army was divided - half at Culpeper within a day or so of McClellan's army and the other half still on the wrong side of the mountains several days' march away.How does the lead up to Fredericksburg relate to the Loudoun Valley Campaign? I can't find any books on McClellan's last operations, so I'm not sure what transpired between Williamsport and Fredericksburg.
Put simply, the Loudoun Valley campaign is how the Army of the Potomac got from where it ended Antietam (i.e. refitting on Union soil after a hard-fought campaign, a process slowed by inadequate supplies) to the Rappahanock. After he was finally able to get his supplies, McClellan pushed south through the Loudoun Valley, and by the middle of the first week of November he was concentrated at Warrenton with a big force (much larger than his Antietam force) while Lee's army was divided - half at Culpeper within a day or so of McClellan's army and the other half still on the wrong side of the mountains several days' march away.
McClellan's replacement by Burnside cut the campaign off at the knees because it took ages for the command switchover to be processed, letting the AoNV get out of an otherwise impossible position. Burnside then shifted to Fredericksburg, but a combination of delays in the movement of the pontoons and the long command shiftover delay let the AoNV reunite.
67th Tigers has posted about it before. It really is a forgotten campaign, and it saw some big cavalry actions and a masterful display of manoeuvre - McClellan's army was concentrated right by Longstreet and Lee hadn't a clue.
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As you can see from the map, as of McClellan's relief the Confederates were in a position where their only real hope was that the Union army would just stop moving for two weeks.
Put simply, the Loudoun Valley campaign is how the Army of the Potomac got from where it ended Antietam (i.e. refitting on Union soil after a hard-fought campaign, a process slowed by inadequate supplies) to the Rappahanock. After he was finally able to get his supplies, McClellan pushed south through the Loudoun Valley, and by the middle of the first week of November he was concentrated at Warrenton with a big force (much larger than his Antietam force) while Lee's army was divided - half at Culpeper within a day or so of McClellan's army and the other half still on the wrong side of the mountains several days' march away.
McClellan's replacement by Burnside cut the campaign off at the knees because it took ages for the command switchover to be processed, letting the AoNV get out of an otherwise impossible position. Burnside then shifted to Fredericksburg, but a combination of delays in the movement of the pontoons and the long command shiftover delay let the AoNV reunite.
67th Tigers has posted about it before. It really is a forgotten campaign, and it saw some big cavalry actions and a masterful display of manoeuvre - McClellan's army was concentrated right by Longstreet and Lee hadn't a clue.
As you can see from the map, as of McClellan's relief the Confederates were in a position where their only real hope was that the Union army would just stop moving for two weeks.