Playing the cards yur dealt, Grant vs Lee

Let's not forget that one of Grant's major strengths was his ability to view and consider the entire sphere of operations from east to west, in formulating a winning strategy. Grant put into place "concentration of force in space and time" thereby negating the Confederate advantage of interior lines and its capacity to send reinforcements to a threatened area. That was the situation that prevailed until Grant became General-in-Chief in 1864. But after Grant planned coordinated offensives in northern Virginia, the Shenandoah Valley, northern Georgia and southeast of Richmond, the stage was set for the ultimate destruction of Confederate armies.
 
Like most of them, Grant had no large unit command experience and it showed. The difference with Grant is that he learned how to conduct combined arms operations. He learned what the telegraph could do as a command and communication instrument. He adjusted to the new reality of railroad logistics, and he eventually rebuilt the Army of the Potomac as an army of movement. Despite the expense involved, he got the politicians to pay for the big cavalry units that were vital to ending the war rapidly from September 1864 to April 1865.

I think you make the same mistake Grants foes did, you underrate him.
 
I think you make the same mistake Grants foes did, you underrate him.
Starting from being a post junior officer in California, he found out he could command a regiment. Then his tactical successes in Missouri did not involve much fighting, but he put Fremont in a position to clear the Confederates out of most of Missouri.
Capturing Paducah was just tactical speed. There was not much fighting.
His achievement at Belmont was not giving up when he had a chance to get back to the transports.
By Shiloh his tactical contribution was mainly in arranging a fall back line supported by artillery and the gunboats. After that, his plans were almost always the same. Degrade the enemy's logistics, and protect your own logistics.
As a general, his genius was common sense. As a politician he had a 10 period from 1863 to 1874 when he made few mistakes.
 
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General Lee knew he had to take enormous tactical chances and trust his subordinates as much as possible. The US mobilization was continuing to grow after October 1862 and the Confederacy had no answer to the US navy blockading and closing the Confederate ports.
Maybe if Lee had told the government the thing had been tried and could not be done, a little sooner, the southern areas would have been spared some of death and disability, and wilful destruction.
 
I don't think they would nescesarily win every time depending on the side but with great startegy and leadership as you can see below and I can name more battles where no matter howmany boys in blue they union had, no matter how outgunned the Confederates were, no matter who was better supplied, the Confederates in these battles win in all of these battles I can name.
2nd Manassas Lee: 50,000 Union: 62,000 Confederate victory

Fredricksburg: Lee: 72,000 Union: 114,000 Confederate victory

Chancellorsville: Lee: 60,892 Union: 133,868 Confederate victory
Sorry, I was looking at the big picture as to which general would win the entire war not the individual battles.
 
While I think the North's naval resources was clearly a factor in its victory, I don't think it's the defining difference between Grant and Lee. I think its useful to compare how campaigns in the Eastern theater had proceeded under various "matches". Why did McClellan, Pope, Burnside, Hooker and Meade (Mine Run) all retreat (or cease the offensive) when met with tactical reversals at the hands of Lee, whereas Grant persevered with his maneuvers around Lee's right flank - ultimately pinning Lee at Petersburg? And why was Lee able to break away from McClellan (conclusion of Peninsula), Pope (conclusion of Second Manassas) and Hooker (after Chancellorsville) to launch offensive campaigns, but didn't/wasn't able to during the Overland Campaign against Grant (setting aside his later release of Early during the Petersburg siege)? Again, while there are many factors impacting the course of these campaigns, the fact remains that Lee could not break free of Grant and seize the initiative, despite bloodying Grant pretty badly. I submit it is because Grant had a better handle on the operational art in what was emerging as the "modern" era of warfare, while Lee was more firmly rooted in an older era.


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Starting from being a post junior officer in California, he found out he could command a regiment. Then his tactical successes in Missouri did not involve much fighting, but he put Fremont in a position to clear the Confederates out of most of Missouri.
Capturing Paducah was just tactical speed. There was not much fighting.
His achievement at Belmont was not giving up when he had a chance to get back to the transports.
By Shiloh his tactical contribution was mainly in arranging a fall back line supported by artillery and the gunboats. After that, his plans were almost always the same. Degrade the enemy's logistics, and protect your own logistics.
As a general, his genius was common sense. As a politician he had a 10 period from 1863 to 1874 when he made few mistakes.

Lee didn't have a wonderful start either, Granny Lee,
The question is, was it Lee's greatness, or his combined command structure with Jackson that made him look good early on, or was it his opponents ineptness ?
Grant established himself without against the odds, even when Halleck had little or no faith in him. In that respect Grant's metal was forged and tested early in the war, operating far beyond interior lines, supported by river boats and rail roads, scavenging while occupying rebel territory.
Lee had his own challenges and was most successful when within Virginia.
 
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