I'm beginning to think that Gideon Pillow was a Union plant into the CS forces, because everywhere he was involved was a disaster for the Confederates.
Its commonly accepted that Polk made a mistake in occupying Columbus KY in early September 1861, because it appeared to violate Kentucky's neutrality and gave Grant the green light to take Paducah and Smithland, which he used as springboard for taking Forts Henry and Donelson.
What I didn't realize, is that a week before Polk made that movement on Columbus, General Pillow sent him a dispatch encouraging Polk to take Columbus. From the OR volume 3 page 685:
Its commonly accepted that Polk made a mistake in occupying Columbus KY in early September 1861, because it appeared to violate Kentucky's neutrality and gave Grant the green light to take Paducah and Smithland, which he used as springboard for taking Forts Henry and Donelson.
What I didn't realize, is that a week before Polk made that movement on Columbus, General Pillow sent him a dispatch encouraging Polk to take Columbus. From the OR volume 3 page 685:
New Madrid, August 28, 1861.
Major-General Polk :
General : I have just received Hardee’s reply to your dispatch and mine in regard to his co-operation with me. He says that he cannot advance, and will not attempt it. That point being settled, it only remains for me, with as good grace as I can,' to turn my face (now ready for the first time since I landed at this place) upon other duty, without an apparent abandonment of a forward movement. I have to-day visited the works being built above this place. To my surprise I found the battery constructed on ground subject to fully 3 feet of overflow, and about a mile above the head of the island, in a muddy, damp, and dark forest of heavy cottonwood. Opposite this battery there is a wide and flat sand bar, over which boats can float in a full river at least 1 mile, and I think 11 miles from the battery. It is built on the very brink of a soft bank already chipping off by the action of the water. The first full river will sweep away the parapet. In addition to this error in the selection of the site, the engineer is now grading down the original bank within the work fully 2 feet, so that the seep water will drive out the forces in the work before the river gets within 3 or 4 feet of high-water mark. The forest is so damp and the overflow bottom is so wet, that it is impossible for troops to live in the work. They will die like sheep of the rot.
Just at the head of the island, on the Tennessee shore, there is a good position for a battery to command the Tennessee chute, and about half way down the island, on the west side, is a very favorable position for another battery to command the western chute. The Tennessee battery can be turned and taken in reverse, and has but little advantage of position, and when taken, that channel of the river is open, and the other battery will be of no practical value. In addition to these two batteries, both of which must have a strong supporting force, you must have a strong intrenched work at this place, else that work will be liable to be cut off from its river base. My judgment therefore is, that the value of this position is greatly overrated. Less than 5,000 men could not hold this place, and an equal force on the Tennessee shore, and 1,000 on the island, which would make the position a very expensive one. Even then it will not add materially to the safety of the river. You are in possession at Fort Pillow of the only strong strategical position on the river below Columbus. My mind reaches now to that gateway into Tennessee as the only protection against an invading column into the interior as well as descent down the river. That has always been my opinion, and it was to get as far on the way to Columbus as I could go that induced me to establish the force at Union City, looking with certainty to the time that I could occupy Columbus.
That time, I think, has arrived. Kentucky is now a boiling cauldron. Lincoln forces are organized and under arms in five counties in the State. They are rapidly aggregating into military organizations and threatening a descent upon Tennessee. General Anderson is in command or on his way to take command of these forces. Every paper we meet is full of accounts of the pouring of arms and munitions of war into the State to make war upon the patriots of that State and Tennessee. Kentucky neutrality is no longer regarded, if indeed it ever was. In addition to this, it is well known that Fremont had his boats loaded with troops to take possession of Columbus when he received the news of Lyon’s defeat.
If you do not intend to let the enemy take possession of that gateway, you must take it first. If he gets possession of it once, you can never dislodge him. Its possession is a military necessity, involving the ultimate safety of Tennessee from devastating invasion. My force here being now well organized, equipped, and in hand, give me permission and I will do the work and hold all below protected and safe. With the Union City forces added to mine, I can close the door effectually against invasion of Tennessee or descent of the Mississippi. It will not hasten matters in Kentucky. As rapidly as events can hurry on the conflict it is coming, and as soon as it is possible for Lincoln to raise forces to meet other pressing wants he will take possession of this place, and from it, as a point da'ppui, he will direct his column upon Tennessee.
If you approve, send me three boats, one at a time, and make arrangements to have the Union City forces advanced when I notify the commanding officer, and authorize me to use the guns now at the works above, and to take Captain Gray with me. I will draw back my forces so gently to this place and move up there, and have everything secure before the enemy is in condition to move. If you approve, send me up the gunboats. This move will attract so much attention when made that the real object of the move here will not be thought of. It will avoid any discussion, and if any reference is made to it, the failure of Hardee to co-operate will vindicate the movement and commend the discretion of turning the object of the campaign to so good an account. If we do not move now, we never can.
If you can come up and yourself examine the works above as they are being constructed and the site of those proposed, you will see that my judgment is correct. Since I have myself examined these positions, I beg to say that my opinion of their value as a line of defense is greatly modified. This is the only position left us, and that is a paramount military necessity, and is now clearly justified by the attitude of Kentucky and the action of the Federal Government and troops, utterly disregarding her assumed neutrality. If you leave me discretion, I will be there before the object is suspected. I am willing to be saddled with all the responsibility. If I am allowed to make the move, I will send Cheatham to take possession by Union City forces first, and fix some field pieces there before I advance with the forces by water. If you send me the gunboat I may move differently. If you will allow me to make the move, and place the Union City forces, gunboat, steamers, and forces above here at my disposal, I know how to do the work.
Let me hear from you as early as possible. If you do not approve,. don’t hurry me away, as I am trying to effect a move on Cairo. I will be cautious and make no false step. I wish to aid Thompson by placing this portion of Missouri in safe position. We owe the people who have so committed themselves to our policy that much, and while we remain here threatening an advance, we are preventing a concentration of his forces against McCulloch.
Hardee did not wait until he received my dispatch, which followed Borland, and of which I gave you the substance, before he decided. He has acted in the face of his agreement, by Borland, to abide your decision.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
GID. J. PILLOW,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.