Lee Pickett Pickett’s charge, Lee should have used cold reasoning.

I have always been under the impression that Lee did not receive an adequate "hot wash" the results of the first two days of fighting had on the forces he committed to the attack on July 3rd. IIRC, upon reviewing Heth's bloodied division prior to the attack, he had commented to the effect that had he known his division was in such bad shape, he would not have included Heth in his attack plans. I wonder how many other incorrect assessments were made based on his lack information concerning the condition of his own forces, much less that of the Federals on July 3.
This was Lee's 'leave alone' leadership style. He was a charismatic leader and a great tactician. But once he spelled out his masterful plan, he left the execution totally up to subordinates. When one looks at his great successes, invariably they were achieved by the efforts of his excellent subordinates.
Anyone who has ever been in a leadership position knows that there is a crucial and difficult to define balance that must be achieved in delegating responsibility. The complex battle plan he drew up for the third day at Gettysburg required a more 'hands-on' approach. Contrast Lee's performance that day with Meade's: Meade was 'out and about', supervising troop movements.
Either Lee failed to consider the effect the previous two days had on his troops or he was very poorly served by his small staff.
 
Perhaps but even after the Confederate debacle at Vicksburg ,President Davis still gave Johnston command of the AoT after the battle of Missionary Ridge.
My point about Vicksburg is that by June 1863 Lee may not of known for a certainty that Vicksburg would fall but he knew it was a likely possibility. Knowing that Lee knew that the AnV needed to mount an offensive. The caveat is that Lee can not achieve a manpower superiority of three to one over the AoP. Yes Lee could conceivably achieve an offensive victory with less then three to one manpower superiority ratio but it becomes difficult to do so.
Leftyhunter
ok, so, bragg as I said, was BARELY addequit [sp?] when he sent off longstreet towards Knoxville,and, d.h. hill? off towards miss.? or gulf coast? point being, he lessend his forces before a union army thatwas a. actually being resuppliedand, b. growing in size and c. included in its ranks joe hooker, Sherman, and grant, not to mention, Thomas, well, bragg was an idiot. marse Robert, to the detriment of the anv, abandoned the stregtic defensive offensive strategy that had been successful, to put an end to the aotp and, maybe the war.lee knew the south couldn't fight on like this forever and took the opportunity to put away the aotp once and for all. also, by defeating the aotp in the north,maybe garnering more help from England/france. let me end with this, longstreet, was not longstreet it seems unless, in the presence of lee. then it seems he longstreet bought into lees plans/leadership wholeheartedly.[ except at Gettysburg], where,hindsight being 20/20, longstreet was right. of course, jeb stuart being gone for all that time was a big hindrance to say the least. which looking back even gives more creedence to staying on the defensive /offensive like longstreet wanted to do. have a blessed and wonderful day!
 
This was Lee's 'leave alone' leadership style. He was a charismatic leader and a great tactician. But once he spelled out his masterful plan, he left the execution totally up to subordinates. When one looks at his great successes, invariably they were achieved by the efforts of his excellent subordinates.
Anyone who has ever been in a leadership position knows that there is a crucial and difficult to define balance that must be achieved in delegating responsibility. The complex battle plan he drew up for the third day at Gettysburg required a more 'hands-on' approach. Contrast Lee's performance that day with Meade's: Meade was 'out and about', supervising troop movements.
Either Lee failed to consider the effect the previous two days had on his troops or he was very poorly served by his small staff.
I appreciate that Lee’s hands were tied with men like Pendleton, Lee knew that Pendleton wasn’t up to the task at hand and if there was one area that Lee’s ‘hands off’ approach would cause issues it was with the organisation of the artillery. I’m left with the belief that although Lee was a great tactician he wasn’t necessarily a great commander. I’ve heard it said numerous times that Lee had a ‘hands off approach’, what are we really saying when we use the term, ‘hands off!’ as a commander, Lee perhaps wasn’t fully in control of his subordinates and had poor judgment when delegating tasks to the correct people, I’m sure others won’t agree but the blame has to fall to Lee, why wasn’t Lee being fed the real facts about the weaknesses in his plan.
The day the soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership.
Colin Powell.
 
Very interesting article. But I think that the actual facts spelled out in the analysis belie the overall conclusion that Lee "blundered" or made a "mistake" in ordering the charge. I say that because the plan of attack as described in the analysis was in fact, brilliant, and could very well have succeeded had all the moving parts fallen into line. In other words, this was not an irrational throw of the dice by Lee that lacked any thoughtful consideration and preparation. As described, Lee would throw a fresh division (Pickett) against a weakened Union center, while committing other forces to simultaneous flank attacks by Ewell and part of Longstreet's corps, a force (Hill) to support any breakthrough, a preliminary artillery barrage, and a mobile cavalry force (Stuart) to create havoc in the Union rear. So the plan was good, even though it relied on precise coordination and clockwork. Lee certainly believed his troops had the wherewithal to carry it out. But the failure was in the execution by the senior command; Stuart, AP Hill, Longstreet, Ewell all contributed their own parts in causing the charge to fail. Whether the plan was too complicated for success is certainly possible, but that doesn't negate the fact that Lee put considerable care into developing the attack plan.
There is one aspect of the battle that seems to continue to be over looked.By having taken the high ground of Round Top, the Union troops could be moved into positions where needed to counter Confederate moves.FLAGMEN were the reason for this.I have not read of the CSA having this communication.Then did not they also have balloonist who performed the same duty.? If there was a battle were a communication system could been used effective by the CSA Gettysburg was that place,eps. on the first two days,
 
Interesting documentary on TV last night, it was about Pickett’s charge and it explored the assumption that there should have been far more confederate killed or wounded than there actually were. They worked out that union infantry could have been firing and reloading at a rate of 3 rounds per minute. The documentary team used Union infantry reenactors to live fire at targets which would give some idea of the damage caused to confederate soldiers. The hit rate from the reenactors was considerably lower than that of Union infantry during the CW, in-fact the reenactors only managed to fire (on average) two rounds per minute and their hit rate on the target was lower than the more experienced CW infantry. Despite the fact that the reenactors were less a accurate and slower in reloading, the documentary still put forward the argument that the Union infantry should have killed a much higher percentage, it was suggested that many confederates stopped short of advancing beyond the fence along Emmitsburg road and upon seeing the carnage inflicted by Union Infantry, many decided that the advance was pointless...this obviously is only a theory but it does go against the idea that the fence was in part responsible for slowing the advance. I’m just wondering what others think, was the fence and the heavy Union fire the reason the advance was stopped or was it just a case of many In the confederate ranks turning and heading back to safety?
 
Any study of Lee's ability for command, and his decisions for prompting his actions must include his religious doctrine of belief. Lee was desperate at Gettysburg, in fact the whole confederate system was in peril of collapsing, and his actions of looking to a higher power to help guide him, should not be scoffed at or set aside. What particularly strikes me is the essence of what was unknown, and remained indeterminate, in Lee's mind. How he dealt with his Faith had much influence on how he felt, thought, and acted. Everybody at the time was looking for European intervention. Well possibly, Lee had prayed for a like-timed sign of guidance to his own God of belief. Just possibly.
Lubliner.
 
was the fence and the heavy Union fire the reason the advance was stopped or was it just a case of many In the confederate ranks turning and heading back to safety?

Hard to imagine any of Lee's troops midway through an advance, and then turning and heading back to safety, but who knows? I have read, however, that many of advancing troops felt it safer to surrender rather than turn back (at least those who had made it almost to the wall), as fleeing might actually have made them more of a target.
 
Hard to imagine any of Lee's troops midway through an advance, and then turning and heading back to safety, but who knows? I have read, however, that many of advancing troops felt it safer to surrender rather than turn back (at least those who had made it almost to the wall), as fleeing might actually have made them more of a target.
According to the documentary, the bodies of a lot of confederate soldiers were buried where they fell and having plotted the number of KIA alongside the sunken road, the question was asked ‘why so few dead’, I guess the assumption is that many just thought that to advance would be futile, I think that makes sense, it’s not about bravery or cowardice but more about self preservation and common sense. There must have been a point where men realised that the odds of surviving were slim to none and that the chance of successfully taking the objective just wasn’t worth the risk. I suppose the days of walking slowly to certain death were fast disappearing, if you consider earlier wars, it wasn’t unusual for rows of infantry to advance into heavy fire, if the man in front fell then you simply stepped over him and filled the gap, not so with Gettysburg, sure men will advance into heavy fire providing they believe that the sacrifice is worth it but in my humble opinion, many in the confederate ranks probably thought that the charge was nothing short of madness.
 
Any study of Lee's ability for command, and his decisions for prompting his actions must include his religious doctrine of belief. Lee was desperate at Gettysburg, in fact the whole confederate system was in peril of collapsing, and his actions of looking to a higher power to help guide him, should not be scoffed at or set aside. What particularly strikes me is the essence of what was unknown, and remained indeterminate, in Lee's mind. How he dealt with his Faith had much influence on how he felt, thought, and acted. Everybody at the time was looking for European intervention. Well possibly, Lee had prayed for a like-timed sign of guidance to his own God of belief. Just possibly.
Lubliner.
Being deeply religious, Lee was possibly of the mind set that the outcome of Gettysburg was in the hands of God, defeat or victory was not his to decide, I believe that because Lee’s faith was so strong that he would of viewed either outcome as the correct one. As for guidance, from what I gather, he never really prayed for anything other than courage and strength, his prayers were normally for his friends and enemies.
 
Interesting documentary on TV last night, it was about Pickett’s charge and it explored the assumption that there should have been far more confederate killed or wounded than there actually were. They worked out that union infantry could have been firing and reloading at a rate of 3 rounds per minute. The documentary team used Union infantry reenactors to live fire at targets which would give some idea of the damage caused to confederate soldiers. The hit rate from the reenactors was considerably lower than that of Union infantry during the CW, in-fact the reenactors only managed to fire (on average) two rounds per minute and their hit rate on the target was lower than the more experienced CW infantry. Despite the fact that the reenactors were less a accurate and slower in reloading, the documentary still put forward the argument that the Union infantry should have killed a much higher percentage, it was suggested that many confederates stopped short of advancing beyond the fence along Emmitsburg road and upon seeing the carnage inflicted by Union Infantry, many decided that the advance was pointless...this obviously is only a theory but it does go against the idea that the fence was in part responsible for slowing the advance. I’m just wondering what others think, was the fence and the heavy Union fire the reason the advance was stopped or was it just a case of many In the confederate ranks turning and heading back to safety?

There is evidence that the attacking brigades were leaking men as they advanced from Seminary Ridge to the Emmitsburg Road. In addition, a portion of the men who made it to the road took cover there and did not move further. That said, most of the casualties sustained were inflicted on the assaulting troops between the road and Cemetery Ridge.

Ryan
 
Any study of Lee's ability for command, and his decisions for prompting his actions must include his religious doctrine of belief. Lee was desperate at Gettysburg, in fact the whole confederate system was in peril of collapsing, and his actions of looking to a higher power to help guide him, should not be scoffed at or set aside. What particularly strikes me is the essence of what was unknown, and remained indeterminate, in Lee's mind. How he dealt with his Faith had much influence on how he felt, thought, and acted. Everybody at the time was looking for European intervention. Well possibly, Lee had prayed for a like-timed sign of guidance to his own God of belief. Just possibly.
Lubliner.
May be someone can solve this dilemma which I find myself in; If Lee was a great general in the Union army why when he joined the Confederate army was he assigned a administrative desk job? If not for the death of Johnston at Shiloh when or how would he have been promoted to field command?This may be a large IF but I have not read of how he did receive his command of the ANV.Lee being a devote religious man he could say that Fate of God played its part in this,as to the outcome of all of his battles as it did with Jackson.The only answer could be of rank in the Union army,but the question if one has the best tool why use it digging ditches.Being a engineer prehabs he could have dug trenches along the Union and Southern lines as in WWI.Are engineers more defensive minded than infantry?Were not the battles he was most successful on defensive strategy? Imagine Lee placing his army in a defensive position with Mead on the high ground.any bets on who would either leave or be forced to attack first?What would Johnston have done?
 
May be someone can solve this dilemma which I find myself in; If Lee was a great general in the Union army why when he joined the Confederate army was he assigned a administrative desk job? If not for the death of Johnston at Shiloh when or how would he have been promoted to field command?This may be a large IF but I have not read of how he did receive his command of the ANV.Lee being a devote religious man he could say that Fate of God played its part in this,as to the outcome of all of his battles as it did with Jackson.The only answer could be of rank in the Union army,but the question if one has the best tool why use it digging ditches.Being a engineer prehabs he could have dug trenches along the Union and Southern lines as in WWI.Are engineers more defensive minded than infantry?Were not the battles he was most successful on defensive strategy? Imagine Lee placing his army in a defensive position with Mead on the high ground.any bets on who would either leave or be forced to attack first?What would Johnston have done?
You must remember that Lee had acquired his experience under General Scott's command in Mexico as part of the Engineers. Lee did not lead men there en masse. Later in Indian country, he gained slowly the rank of leadership with limited actual experience. He was a qualified engineer, and a great mediator, and was used to bolster the southern coast at the outbreak of Civil War. (John Brown's raid aside, he proved his competence there.)
You could say that organizing the recruits and performing his duties under the President (Davis) were very skilled and meticulous procedures, and with so much clamor among generals for rank, his character would not allow him to bray along with others. He was quiet and patient and very observant, and the wounding of Johnston had occurred on the evening he and Davis together, had decided to visit the battle front. Timely and possibly a strong point of influence in his own beliefs, and others. Thanks,
(hoping my memory isn't faulty here).
Lubliner.
 
May be someone can solve this dilemma which I find myself in; If Lee was a great general in the Union army why when he joined the Confederate army was he assigned a administrative desk job? If not for the death of Johnston at Shiloh when or how would he have been promoted to field command?This may be a large IF but I have not read of how he did receive his command of the ANV.Lee being a devote religious man he could say that Fate of God played its part in this,as to the outcome of all of his battles as it did with Jackson.The only answer could be of rank in the Union army,but the question if one has the best tool why use it digging ditches.Being a engineer prehabs he could have dug trenches along the Union and Southern lines as in WWI.Are engineers more defensive minded than infantry?Were not the battles he was most successful on defensive strategy? Imagine Lee placing his army in a defensive position with Mead on the high ground.any bets on who would either leave or be forced to attack first?What would Johnston have done?
You raise some good thought provoking points but have you considered what kind of influence the Lee family name may have had on his military career. Lee’s father ‘ Light Horse Harry’ was a well respected leader of men with the ability to command troops, it’s just a thought but maybe it was hoped that Robert E Lee had the same abilities.
 
You raise some good thought provoking points but have you considered what kind of influence the Lee family name may have had on his military career. Lee’s father ‘ Light Horse Harry’ was a well respected leader of men with the ability to command troops, it’s just a thought but maybe it was hoped that Robert E Lee had the same abilities.
Lee's performance in the Mexican war may have contributed to his status as an engineer ,but I have found no information other than his service with Scott in Mexico.Could this relation have contributed to Scott requesting Lee to remain?Would Scott have placed the new army under his command?Imagine Lee in charge of the Army of the Potomac!If you read of Harry ,you will find that he may have been a respected general but I could not compare him to Robert as to character,he left the family in debt after many a failed ventures.Then he left the family
 
remember this, lee had just won a huge battle at chancellorsville, where he was out number two to one (60,000 csa vs 120,000 union)
He felt that if he followed it up with another such win, the union would accept an armistice such as the union goes their way and the goes their way . It is my opinion that if stonewall was there and there was much better communication between all the csa commanders lee would have won gettysburg.
 
remember this, lee had just won a huge battle at chancellorsville, where he was out number two to one (60,000 csa vs 120,000 union)
He felt that if he followed it up with another such win, the union would accept an armistice such as the union goes their way and the goes their way . It is my opinion that if stonewall was there and there was much better communication between all the csa commanders lee would have won gettysburg.
Just wondering, when you say ‘better communication between all CSA commanders’, are you thinking about Lee’s orders to his commanders or the way in which the various commanders passed on information?
I only ask because I’ve always felt that Lee wasn’t direct enough. In some respects, it’s probably a good quality that Lee trusted his commanders but I’ve always believed that some of his orders lacked clarity which left many officers indecisive. Longstreet certainly argued on more than one occasion that Lee’s orders lacked clarity, I’d read somewhere that Longstreet actually altered an order from Lee to Stuart because the order was to ambiguous.
 
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