Performance of Col. William S. Tilton of the Fifth Corps on July 2

Tom Elmore

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Col. Tilton commanded the First Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps, comprised of four regiments:

18th Massachusetts – 139 officers and enlisted men; losses 1 killed, 23 wounded, 4 captured (19.4%)
22nd Massachusetts – 137 officers and enlisted men; losses 3 killed, 27 wounded, 1 captured (22.6%)
1st Michigan – 145 officers and enlisted men; losses 5 killed, 33 wounded, 4 captured (29.0%)
118th Pennsylvania – 233 officers and enlisted men; losses 3 killed, 19 wounded, 3 captured (10.7%)

Total estimated strength in the battle was 654, but even this number may be a bit high. Hard marches heavily depleted the strength of the Fifth Corps on the way to the field. On July 2, the brigade initially faced off against G. T. Anderson’s Georgia brigade, followed by Kershaw’s South Carolina brigade, afterwards the 21st Mississippi of Barksdale’s brigade, and finally Wofford’s Georgia brigade. Let’s examine each of these confrontations individually.

Tilton and Sweitzer formed their initial line of battle on the “Stony Hill,” which we also know as “The Loop,” with Tilton on the right as they faced south. The brigades had just taken position when their skirmishers opened fire and retreated from Anderson’s advancing Georgians, who soon appeared at the edge of the woods in their immediate front. After an intense firefight the Confederates fell back. The 118th Pennsylvania, on the right, did not suffer much, and the brigade as a whole lost perhaps 15 percent of their strength in this one encounter. The loss was substantial, but Tilton made it appear much worse when he wrote: “The onslaught was terrible and my losses heavy – so much so that was somewhat doubtful if our line could withstand it.”

Kershaw’s brigade was now moving up toward Tilton’s unprotected right flank, but rather than make a stand, Tilton ordered a quick retreat to the woods north of the Wheatfield, which compelled Sweitzer to fall back as well. Men in each brigade later accused the other of moving back first; perhaps it was nearly simultaneous. In any event, they let others (Caldwell’s division) deal with Kershaw. Privately Tilton also blamed Sweitzer for breaking first, while Sweitzer claimed that Tilton’s men were first to commence running.

Tilton led his brigade to the western edge of the woods north of the Wheatfield, where it remained idle until Bigelow’s 9th Massachusetts battery began to retire northward by prolonge, toward the Trostle buildings. Tilton’s men did perform a useful service in preventing skirmishers from Kershaw’s brigade from following too close upon Bigelow’s artillerymen.

Tilton did not have to wait long until the 21st Mississippi appeared, bearing down on four of Bigelow’s remaining guns on the Trostle grounds. Some men of the 118th Pennsylvania, evidently still on the right of the brigade and just to the left rear of Bigelow, went forward to help oppose the 21st Mississippi. But it was apparently not a strong effort, as attested by the light losses of the 118th, nor was it supported by the rest of Tilton’s brigade. In fact, Tilton soon ordered a retreat, perhaps upon seeing the approach of Wofford’s strong brigade to his front and left. Tilton later wrote, “I think, however, I saved my brigade from great disaster, after it could no longer be of any good at the front.” Tilton may have saved his own brigade, but he left the door wide open for Wofford to clear the area around the Wheatfield of six other Union brigades (Zook, Kelly, Brooke, Sweitzer, Burbank and Day).

Finally, Tilton’s wrote in his official report that he had 474 men remaining on July 2, and thus claimed that “the percentage of loss is very great.” But he seems to obscure the facts by suggesting that he lost about 180, when his actual losses amounted to 126 or so, or 19.3%. While by no means insignificant, his losses pale in comparison to many other hard fighting units in the battle. My take is that Tilton lost his nerve after the initial encounter with Anderson, and thereafter declined to put up much of a fight. What do you think?
 
I have always believed that Tilton became unnerved during this confederate assault and prematurely retired as he thought he was about to be flanked. The retirement of Tilton and Sweitzer left the Union in a vulnerable position in The Wheatfield.

I just reread Tipton's Battle report and found this comment to be interesting.

In this last movement I was greatly embarrassed by squads of men and parts of regiments, who, hurrying from the front, broke into and through my line. I think, however, that I saved my brigade from great disaster after it could no longer do any good in front, and succeeded in forming a new line, which was retained through the night.

Link to his report.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/tiltongettysburgor.html
 
It's rather ironic that Tilton complains of other soldiers breaking through his line, since he earlier "broke into and through" Caldwell's men during his hasty retreat from the Stony Hill, as Caldwell's brigades were moving into position in the woods north of the Wheatfield.
 
It's also ironic that in contrast to the lackluster performance of Tilton's and Sweitzer's brigades, the third brigade in that division, Vincent's, performed so heroically.
 
Tilton led his brigade to the western edge of the woods north of the Wheatfield, where it remained idle until Bigelow’s 9th Massachusetts battery began to retire northward by prolonge, toward the Trostle buildings. Tilton’s men did perform a useful service in preventing skirmishers from Kershaw’s brigade from following too close upon Bigelow’s artillerymen.

I've never understood why the NPS didn't build a footpath to the actual site of Bigelow's "last stand" and place a couple of cannons with descriptive exhibits. My first picture is from where I believe Bigelow's guns were centered ( facing Trostle farm.) The second picture is from the same location, but facing the woods where Tilton's brigade would have provided support.

Capture.JPG
Capture2.JPG
 
Personally, I believe it was a combination of factors. Tilton was overly sensitive about his lack of strength, he was in a position that he perceived as exposed, and his division commander was uninspiring to say the least. Not to mention that Barnes had given some kind of order to withdraw (Sweitzer believed it was discretionary and Tilton said it was peremptory). Tilton did lose his nerve but Barnes gave him an out and didnt really do anything else that day.

Ryan
 
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