Percentage of European arms at battles

They ins some ways had two different weapons.
To some extent, perhaps, but the difference was not all that great. Handmade Enfields were still quite easy to work with for armourers, because they were at least all similar to one another and the QC was quite good. They weren't completely one-off weapons you have to replace if one bit breaks, it just means you need to "file to fit" a little bit.

In terms of ease of serviceability as a factor, I'd say "entirely armed with hand made Enfields" would be worse for serviceability than "entirely armed with machine made Springfields/Enfields" but better than just about any other combination, including "armed with a mix of Enfields and Springfields of any type".
 
I don't know for sure what the exact caliber of the minie balls was that I was using but, for whatever reason, I don't know, but when I would shoot at the range the Springfield would foul faster than the Enfield using the same charge and bullets. Come to think of it, I don't think the Enfield ever got so fouled that it even became difficult to ram home the charges. I usually shot until the barrel became too hot to handle and still no fouling on the Enfield, an 1862 Tower with the numeral "24" on the barrel. As for accuracy, at a hundred yards I saw no difference but when I switched over to the 200 yard range the Enfield seemed more accurate.
 
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Certainly the Enfield was a lot more accurate in British hands than the Springfield was as generally used in the Civil War. Some of the accounts from the Crimea are pretty amazing, especially as they're often from ordinary line battalions instead of elite troops - at Inkerman the 88th (Connaught Rangers) followed up two bouts of bayonet combat by dispersing into skirmish order, going prone, and disabling a Russian artillery battery with aimed fire at 800 yards.

It's rather a pity McClellan didn't put the Army of the Potomac through a kind of "Valley Forge" analogue focused on rifle training. Even poorly executed compared to the Hythe standard, it'd transform the relative capabilities of his army as compared to his opponents and would probably result in victory even without the reinforcements he wanted.

Of course, almost nobody else in America realized it was possible either, and there probably weren't enough good rifles around for McClellan to pull it off during his time in charge of the AotP.
 
Little if any infantry combat took place at ranges much over 1-200 yards. Thus making the more advanced site on the Enfield a moot point. When it comes to combat Infantry the KISS principle is accurate.

It can be said the Enfield never really won a war whereas the Springfield did. The Crimea was won by siege at Svestapol. The ACW was won by hard campaign and maneuver ending with the surrender of broken CS armies.

imported arms were a big part of that.
 
I just prefer the Springfield. I carried both, just didn't like the Enfield and never will. I prefer the 1855 or 61. Both were great rifles. being American I prefer a the Springfield. It is a matter of taste. That's all.
 
This is the U.S. M-1858 Long Range sight referred to earlier:
 

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Little if any infantry combat took place at ranges much over 1-200 yards.
In the Civil War specifically, this is true, but every other war between 1850 and 1871 (involving formed troops, at any rate) saw longer ranged fire. The failing is that of the American troops, it's nothing to do with a fundamental truth of infantry combat.

Crimean War: long ranged fire at Inkerman and the Alma are both critical.
Indian Mutiny: the ability of the British rifles to break up cavalry charges at half a mile with precise rifle fire, and their ability to create a thousand-yard exclusion zone around themselves, are very important.
Franco-Austrian: Solferino sees plenty of Austrian long ranged fire, indeed the French win the day principally by bayonet-charging under the Austrian fire as the Austrians can't reset their sights quickly enough.
Second Schleiswig: Danish long range fire is important during the actions both before and after abandoning the Dannevirke, though they lose out to long range Prussian artillery.
Austro-Prussian: When the Austrians can use their longer ranged rifles, they win, and the Prussians consider effective range to be at least a few hundred yards.
Franco-Prussian: Chassepot rifle fire (delivered accurately at well over a thousand paces) rips through the Prussian troops so well that even the Guards refuse to close to the effective range of their own weapons. It takes modern Prussian rifled artillery to redress the balance.

The Civil War is an anomaly, and the evidence suggests it is because of the lack of training of the troops.

Really, the period during which long range rifle fire is possible by infantry is quite a long one - it goes from the adoption of the Minie ball (thus allowing regular infantry to fire at ranges previously the domain of specialists) to the widespread use of the machine gun and/or quick firing artillery (which prevent infantry from being in the open long enough to make good use of their weapons). This "rifle age" is almost completely forgotten now, and I think that's because of the distortion the ACW has had on the popular history.

Thus making the more advanced site on the Enfield a moot point. When it comes to combat Infantry the KISS principle is accurate.
Again, though, the British, French, Austrians, Prussians and Danes managed it.

It can be said the Enfield never really won a war whereas the Springfield did. The Crimea was won by siege at Svestapol.
Technically the Crimea was won by the naval threat to the Russian capital, but focusing on the siege of Sevastopol specifically we can see the use of the Enfield to keep it going. At Inkerman the Russian relieving force is fended off by heavy and very accurate Enfield fire at extremely long range (up to 800 yards - certainly the few thousand British troops initially attacked couldn't have held out against the much larger attacking force without a major force multiplier,and the Enfield was it), while the maintenance of the siege included both heavy use of the Enfield for small skirmishes and the use of the rifle to attack embrasures.

Of course, you missed the Indian Mutiny, which certainly was won by campaigning.
And it's not really valid to say the Springfield "won" a war when frankly (as we've seen) just about any small arm would have done, as the Springfield was used roughly as well as an interchangeable musket for the most part.

imported arms were a big part of that.
Then the Springfield didn't win the war. :tongue:
 
First Lieutenant Cadimus Wilcox, USA, [Major General, CSA] had spent a year in Europe studying European infantry arms and marksmanship training prior to the Civil War. When his Rifles and Rifle Practice, which was largely based upon French marksmanship theory and sources, was published in 1861, the U.S. Army purchased 1,000 copies of the book, which was more than enough to issue to every commissioned officer in the pre-war Army. Although not formally issued as a Confederate training manual, Wilcox’s book was used in training the Army of Northern Virginia’s sharpshooter units in early 1864. Wilcox was one of the rifle partisans – American and Europen -- who believed that rifled arms would utterly revolutionize warfare. They believed that with the increased range and accuracy of rifled arms in the hands of properly trained troops, the enemy would simply be unable to close with you. Wilcox wrote:

“Without entering into a detailed enumeration of the changes that the improved rifle will produce in tactics, a brief statement will be made as to its probable effect.
“Fields of battle will be more extended than formerly; there will be more difficulty in estimating the variety and number of the adversary; more difficulty in properly placing troops on the field, and directing their movements. Keeping them together, holding them well in hand so as to mutually protect and sustain each other, will, in future, require the greatest care. As fields of battle will cover more ground than formerly, new tactical means to obviate the disadvantages resulting from this will be required; that continuity of lines required by tactics will no longer be necessary.
“…Formerly the position of the enemy could be approached to within 300 yards without experiencing much loss from the fire of his infantry. Now this fire is destructive at 1000 or 1200 yards, and well directed at 600 yards, becomes irresistible. The range of the rifle permitting battles to commence at considerable distance, without great care on the part of the general, his whole lines may become exposed at once to a destructive fire; the position assigned to troops not immediately engaged will require as much attention as those that are so engaged. The distances between lines in battle are fixed by tactics, and much importance seems to be attached to this feature: this will probably give way to a different order…
With the improved rifle, the infantry fire is fourfold more destructive than formerly; hence the necessity, in order to secure the full effect of the arm, to have a thorough system of instruction in target practice; every infantry soldier should be so instructed before he enters his battalion.
“…every company should be thoroughly instructed at target practice and the skirmish drill; but as some men will excel others in the use of the rifle, and have greater aptitude for the duties of light troops, the fourth battalion of each regiment should be formed of such soldiers…

“The improved rifle against cavalry. – Formerly cavalry could take up its position in columns of squadrons in full view of the infantry to be charged, at a distance of 400 yards, and could approach within 300 yaards without experiencing much loss…Under the existing condition of the infantry armament, cavalry will be within its sphere of action at 1200 or more yards, and as it approaches nearer the fire will become more and more destructive.
“The chances of success with cavalry are much lessened in the presence of the new arms…
“Improved rifle against artillery. – Formerly artillery began battles; it could take its position at pleasure in front of infantry and deliver its fire without incurring danger or loss from the fire in return of the infantry. Now that the range of the rifle is equal, if not superior, to that of field-pieces, the influence of light artillery in battles will be lessened…It is clear that field artillery, with its present range, cannot with any chances of success remain in action in front of infantry; its comparative efficacy is lessened, and even by extending the range by increase of calibre, or by a successful application of the principle of rifling, cannot restore it to its former comparative condition. The infantry rifle has now a range equal, or greater, than the limit of distinct vision, and greater even than the extent offered by field of battle in general, and should a range of several miles be given to artillery it would still fail to restore it to its former comparative state.
“The new rifle clearly gives to infantry, in all secondary operation of war, and in the defence of position, an element of force that it did not possess formerly.” [emphasis added] (Wilcox, Rifles and Rifle Practice, Chapter VI)

With consumate skill and ability, both armies ignored Wilcox once the war started, just as they ignored Henry Heath's marksmanship manual which had been adopted by the U.S. Army after the adoption of the Model 1855 Springfield rifle and rifle musket.

Lieutenant Wilcox also observed that no other military arms in the world gave the accuracy of Swiss and Austrian weapons. The best he could say for the Model 1855 Springfield rifle musket was that “Nevertheless, in material, manufacture, and appearance, the United States arms are inferior to none.” He said nothing about the accuracy of the Springfield in contrast to the European weapons he had observed. The American soldier wanted the Springfield because it was manufactured HERE, and consequently believed that it had to be the best rifle in the world and that everything that wasn't manufactured here was trash. Both the Enfield and the Muster 1854 Type II System Lorenz rifle -- when used with the ammunition they were designed for as opposed to the ammunition that the Federal and Confederate Ordnance Offices issued -- are superior in accuracy to the Springfield.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
North America is not Europe. The terrain is quite different. Simple way to look at it is from a war game view of terrain. For most European games a green felt patch tossed down represents wooded terrain. ACW that felt patch would identify a clearing. True from Shiloh to the Wilderness and point between. Ranges were typically less than 200 yards. KISS wins and it won the ACW.

Crimea plenty of open ground for arty and long range rifle fire. General view of Europeans was that American soldiers couldn't fight their way out of a wet bag. But the Brits & Germans still haven't beat us

The Brits had no idea or even concept of interchangeability needing the US to help setting up Enfield. The Brits took so long to get going on that they still weren't cranking out interchangeable arms until WWI.
 
North America is not Europe. The terrain is quite different. Simple way to look at it is from a war game view of terrain. For most European games a green felt patch tossed down represents wooded terrain. ACW that felt patch would identify a clearing.
The simple question, then, is why artillery was able to function at all.

Of course, we can look at specific battles and see long fire lanes - take the rolling fields at Gettysburg (Pickett's Charge stepped off within moderate rifle range), or the clear areas around Antietam, or the patches between forests at Stones River for that matter. Heck, take most of the Peninsular Campaign.
There's two kinds of terrain in America, which are areas of wilderness (such as there are at Shiloh and the Wilderness) and cleared terrain where people generally live (such as can be found on a large number of the Eastern battlefields).

But that's not the only thing rifle-precision training gets you - troops with marksmanship training are also more effective at shorter ranges because they're better able to aim.

Crimea plenty of open ground for arty and long range rifle fire.
Well, Inkerman was fought in fog. But, of course, if artillery is generally used in America then the sight lanes for long range rifle fire exist.

General view of Europeans was that American soldiers couldn't fight their way out of a wet bag.
The general view of Europeans was that the American armies of the Civil War had the best basic human material of any army in history up to that time, but they'd wasted it with poor training. There's plenty of examples, such as when one Royal Engineer touring the defences of Washington demonstrated (much to the shock of those present) that it was quite possible to ride a horse right up and over the embankment - which would obviously have taken the fort if there were any good cavalry in the Southern armies capable of a sudden mounted charge. Similarly, at the battle of the Alma the British troops took the forts at the top of the hills with the point of the bayonet - this compares to Fredericksburg, where the hill was lower and the force ratio more in favour of the Union but the Union failed to take the hill.

Lee agreed - he once said that if he'd had Prussian soldiers and Prussian discipline present (at a particular battle going on at the time, IIRC?) that he'd have not only won but done so decisively.

Frankly, this should not be surprising because the US system of training pre-war was set up to take very roughly a thousand recruits a year. It got totally swamped and overloaded, and the resultant troops simply were not up to par because they had not been properly trained. (It happens, growing an army without a decline in quality takes time and lots of it - and time was something neither side in the Civil War had.)

But the Brits & Germans still haven't beat us
...neither was engaged with the armies of the American Civil War.

Of course, if you're referring to 1812-15 and 1917-18, it should be highlighted that you would be looking fifty years either side!

The Brits had no idea or even concept of interchangeability needing the US to help setting up Enfield.
This is a very simplified view (as while there was a much-publicized import of expertise from America for Enfield, there was a much less talked about import of rolling mills from Britain for Springfied as before that the US had to use hammered barrels)...


The Brits took so long to get going on that they still weren't cranking out interchangeable arms until WWI.
...and this is just plain wrong.

As I've already noted, interchangeable Enfields were being produced both at RSAF Enfield and at the London Armoury Company by the time of the Civil War - the US just didn't get any of them. (ED: not many, because there was one small order)
While the British didn't build solely interchangeable rifles for their own armies, neither did the US - having contracted out just as the British did to local gunmakers. The reason why more US rifles were interchangeable than British ones is simply that the contract-built Enfields were produced in such greater profusion (over 170,000 in the first two years, as compared to about 8,000 Springfields in the first fifteen months)
 
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The simple question, then, is why artillery was able to function at all. The simple answer is that competent and skilled CS commanders were able to use terrain to limit superior US Arty.

But that's not the only thing rifle-precision training gets you - troops with marksmanship training are also more effective at shorter ranges because they're better able to aim.

And simple sites are as effective at 200 yards or less than complex sites.

This is a very simplified view (as while there was a much-publicized import of expertise from America for Enfield, there was a much less talked about import of rolling mills from Britain for Springfied as before that the US had to use hammered barrels)... Enfield machinery imported from & set up by US interests because no one in England could do it. Look up Disston who took advantage of the leveling of the playing field when it came to metal foundries and less than a generation after the ACW had eliminated England as the source of all of the best tools. Mass production of the American style allowed anyone to purchase tools at an affordable price. From levels, squares, saws and large scale industrial tooling the US took the lead. It can be argued that the entire American system and the idea of interchangeability started with Mr Hall and his breech loading rifle. He was installed at Harpers Ferry in an effort to influence the workmanship and work practices there. Whitney really made it work with his M1841 and the rest of the world, particularly the Brits took note. But they lacked the expertise to make it really work and opted to pull in American machinery and expertise.

...and this is just plain wrong. No, LA & Co P53's were not fully interchangeable with those of Enfield though oddly enough Windsor made P53s were...

As I've already noted, interchangeable Enfields were being produced both at RSAF Enfield and at the London Armoury Company by the time of the Civil War - the US just didn't get any of them. (ED: not many, because there was one small order)
While the British didn't build solely interchangeable rifles for their own armies, neither did the US - having contracted out just as the British did to local gunmakers. The reason why more US rifles were interchangeable than British ones is simply that the contract-built Enfields were produced in such greater profusion (over 170,000 in the first two years, as compared to about 8,000 Springfields in the first fifteen months)
I have handled an original Enfield P58 Sgt's Fusil made in 1863 which was not even remotely interchangeable with a P53 1863 manufactured Enfield. That same 1863 Enfield would not fully interchange with a 1862 stamped LA & Co. I have also handled a variety of the P53 "Tower" stamped 1862, it would take a little more than some quick work with a file to make them interchangeable. As late as WW2 the SMLE was not a fully interchangeable arm. Whereas were you to disassemble an M1861 made by Springfield, Savage and say Bridesburg or Trenton and mix them all up you could assemble them with little worry about the need to pick up a file. You cannot say that of the P53 unless you are talking Enfield and Windsor and with the LA & Co they were not fully interchangeable with the Enfield.

We are going to just have to agree to disagree on what weapon was the superior arm and who had the better firearms designers etc. I once though the P53 was the cat's meow of the 19th century; it was the arm upon which all other percussion muzzle loading arms need to be measured. IMO the M1861 series of arms from the M1855-M1864 were all superior arms to the standard P53. The drop in the stock, band springs, simpler site, sling arrangement and more robust construction as well as superior consistent fit and finish (except Enfield manufactured) put the M1864 in particular as the finest muzzle loading arm made for mass use by the soldiery. Am I a bit biased? I don't think so because until I started handling originals I believed the P53 the superior arm. Necessity is the mother of invention and the M1861 series arms went through multiple advancements from the M1861 to the M1864 and it's replacement with the metallic cartridge of the Trapdoor Springfield took it as far as it could with the parameters given Springfield. The P53 was in service a few years longer than the M1855-1864 and lacked the concentrated test of campaign given the M1861 series but it to went through a variety of small advancements. The P53 was beside P51, Brunswick and even smoothbores in the Crimea and the Sepoy Revolt; it was not the only weapon in the pot so to speak.

I think the M1854 Lorenz series arms got shafted because of incorrect ammo use by both the US & CS and it not being an interchangeable arm.

I came late to an appreciation of interchangeability and the American system of manufacturing. I didn't really understand how spoiled I was by the ability to pluck parts from one US made arm and drop them into another of the same manufacture until I started working with a variety of antique military arms. I have experienced the frustration of trying to help someone fit replacement parts into a Martini-Henry, SMLE and other European military arms of the same pattern made at different arsenals.

I fully appreciate the advances in marksmanship made possible by the French with Col Minnie and later with the invention of "white powder" which we know as smokeless today. The Brits and others have put forth impressive advancements as well. The French certainly believe themselves the fathers of modern military bullets. The Brits, Germans, Belgians, Americans etc. all believe themselves the masters of the rifled arm and its production and all could certainly make a case for it. Though I readily admit I'm an American who pretty much believes in the world of firearms that if John Browning didn't invent or perfect it there was no need for it the stage for his brilliance was set by men like Hall, Colt, Sharps, Smith & Wesson, Ballard and a variety of others.
 
The simple answer is that competent and skilled CS commanders were able to use terrain to limit superior US Arty.
But clearly the CS was able to use artillery on the US, as well as vice versa. Limiting the damage from artillery by using terrain is the kind of thing that happened at Waterloo.

And simple sites are as effective at 200 yards or less than complex sites.
Actually, smoothbore muskets are more effective at 200 yards or less than minie rifles for untrained troops (troops without rifle training). But if firing at 200 yards or more was something no American army would ever have to do, then it begs the question of why they had all those rifled artillery pieces.
The answer, of course, is that long range fire was something they didn't really understand the potential of. If one of the armies of the Civil War had British-level accuracy and training and the othe did not, it would win any artillery duel by way of infantry sharpshooters and would subsequently dominate the field of battle - take Fredericksburg, where the guns that swept the Federal approaches were well within rifle range of the stepping-off point.

No, LA & Co P53's were not fully interchangeable with those of Enfield though oddly enough Windsor made P53s were...

Okay, I see, so your definition of "interchangeable" is that they should be interchangeable when from entirely different manufactories. That's not the one I was using...

The P53 was in service a few years longer than the M1855-1864 and lacked the concentrated test of campaign given the M1861 series but it to went through a variety of small advancements. The P53 was beside P51, Brunswick and even smoothbores in the Crimea and the Sepoy Revolt; it was not the only weapon in the pot so to speak.
I'm not sure how that makes it different to the Springfield, which had to share the field with smoothbores at least as late as Gettysburg.

I once though the P53 was the cat's meow of the 19th century; it was the arm upon which all other percussion muzzle loading arms need to be measured. IMO the M1861 series of arms from the M1855-M1864 were all superior arms to the standard P53. The drop in the stock, band springs, simpler site, sling arrangement and more robust construction as well as superior consistent fit and finish (except Enfield manufactured) put the M1864 in particular as the finest muzzle loading arm made for mass use by the soldiery.
I'm sure the Springfield had some potential ergonomic/logistic advantages in later models, but to my mind they don't really make up for the loss of accuracy on the Springfields. AIUI the Confederacy assigned the Enfield to their sharpshooters after comparative tests with the Springfield, and found the Enfield accurate out to a much longer range.
 
B
Actually, smoothbore muskets are more effective at 200 yards or less than minie rifles for untrained troops (troops without rifle training).
Just as a complement to the 200 yards musket. My HEIC musket of 1843 is sighted up to 140 yards. When Finland bought Italian short Carcanos in 1940 they modified the fixed sights from 200 down to 150 yards and the short Carano is a very neat rifle. It all backs up the non professional soldier being unable to usefully fire at over 200 yards except in volley fire to create a beaten zone. Which then requires trained officers to direct the fire properly It reinforces my opinion that most CW infantry would have been better served with percussion muskets than rifles, with rifles left to specialists acting, in effect, as light artillery.

BTW I have some experience putting Sniders (ex P153 Enfields) together from non interchangeable parts. Believe me nothing swaps without hand fitting and careful selection. The worst were hastily slapped together reject parts from under the benches of small English workshops to be made up fast to be sold to the French in 1870. Mine has an oversize barrel that only works because I use a 0.600" bullet but it still saw service in the defence of the Cotentin Peninsula which drew on English imports.
 
Just as a complement to the 200 yards musket. My HEIC musket of 1843 is sighted up to 140 yards. When Finland bought Italian short Carcanos in 1940 they modified the fixed sights from 200 down to 150 yards and the short Carano is a very neat rifle. It all backs up the non professional soldier being unable to usefully fire at over 200 yards except in volley fire to create a beaten zone.
Yes - the CEP of a good percussion musket at short range is not much greater than a rifle (the percussion cap reduces ignition delay and avoids "overs" due to the delay).

Which then requires trained officers to direct the fire properly
This is pretty much what the Austrians did in 1859, but the control system broke down under pressure and the French bayonet charge literally ran "under" the arc of fire.
The British system is far superior, but also a lot more expensive in terms of time and mental energy - essentially it requires training the entire force to be the equivalent of the old Rifle Brigade.

It reinforces my opinion that most CW infantry would have been better served with percussion muskets than rifles, with rifles left to specialists acting, in effect, as light artillery.
I've sometimes felt that what the American Civil War needed was essentially Napoleonic tactics and operational art, and what you describe would be in line with the Napoelonic era (with a bit of an upgrade for percussion). It'd probably be best to have "flank companies" armed with rifles and the rest with muskets, especially in 1861 when the supply of percussion muskets was much greater than the supply of rifles - give them the specialist training and it means even a single infantry regiment has organic long range support.

BTW I have some experience putting Sniders (ex P153 Enfields) together from non interchangeable parts. Believe me nothing swaps without hand fitting and careful selection. The worst were hastily slapped together reject parts from under the benches of small English workshops to be made up fast to be sold to the French in 1870. Mine has an oversize barrel that only works because I use a 0.600" bullet but it still saw service in the defence of the Cotentin Peninsula which drew on English imports.
Unsurprising, really - I think the British approach was simply to produce so many of the things (they had over 200,000 in storage in the 1860s on top of equipping pretty much everyone both at home and in the Canadian militia) that they could swap out unserviceable rifles with fresh ones and repair the problematic ones by way of specialists.

But yes, the 1870 ones would basically be the equivalent of P. S. Justice's rifles or the rifles carried by the Corn Exchange Regiment - if it looks shootable then that's good enough to get the money!
 
But clearly the CS was able to use artillery on the US, as well as vice versa. Limiting the damage from artillery by using terrain is the kind of thing that happened at Waterloo. Hence the Wilderness, a alrge portion of the Atlanta campaign. Competent CS commanders minimized the effectiveness of US Arty by utilizing terrain. This was common not uncommon. Hence where you see CS defeats when they failed to utilize terrain to minimize US Arty superiority and which also tended to negate the rifled musket potential.


Okay, I see, so your definition of "interchangeable" is that they should be interchangeable when from entirely different manufactories. That's not the one I was using... Springfield pattern M1861 = manufactured at Springfield, Savage, Trenton etc. All interchangeable. British not interchangeable of the same pattern of arm up through WW1 at least if not later.


I'm not sure how that makes it different to the Springfield, which had to share the field with smoothbores at least as late as Gettysburg. It can be argued by the fall of 1863 US troops were largely using Springfield arms of one make or model ie M1855-M1863 and the CS wasn't winning battles anymore. How much of that can be attributed to better more robust arms getting into the hands of the troops? Well there is still not a single case of US troops being given the chance to turn in their Enfields for Springfields and refusing. There are notable examples of US troops opting to hold onto older US made rifled arms instead of converting to newer Enfield. There are also cases of CS troops scouring the fields and eagerly trading in their own Enfields for captured Springfields you can come up for your own reasons on that. The CS manufactured Richmond Rifle Musket was viewed every bit as good as the Springfield by the US and CS with good reasoning, many parts were interchangeable with captured Springfield pattern arms easing maintenance somewhat. Though once the CS stopped holding battlefields that became less of an advantage.


I'm sure the Springfield had some potential ergonomic/logistic advantages in later models, but to my mind they don't really make up for the loss of accuracy on the Springfields. AIUI the Confederacy assigned the Enfield to their sharpshooters after comparative tests with the Springfield, and found the Enfield accurate out to a much longer range.

Professionals study logistics, amateurs study battles. If you don't need that longer range; it's like a vernier rear sight on a Sharps that you only ever use out to 200 yards...

US Sharpshooters utilized the M1861 series arms, Spencer Rifle, M1841, Sharps and Enfield. There can be no doubt the US soldier consistently out skirmished his CS opponent in the Atlanta campaign with no dedicated Sharpshooter Battalions of the sort utilized by the ANV. It isn't the weapon that makes a Sharpshooter, it is the soldier. During the ACW a sharpshooter was more akin to a professional skirmisher than a sniper, perhaps the best way to understand US & CS sharpshooters of the day is too look how the Soviets utilized snipers during WW2.

IMO much of the P53 love is because it was & is viewed as a CS weapon by many. It doesn't help that the repro Enfields made today are superior to the repro Springfields... blame the Italians for that and American ignorance for most re-enactors not knowing the repros are not the same as the originals by a long shot.
 
Hence the Wilderness, a alrge portion of the Atlanta campaign. Competent CS commanders minimized the effectiveness of US Arty by utilizing terrain. This was common not uncommon. Hence where you see CS defeats when they failed to utilize terrain to minimize US Arty superiority and which also tended to negate the rifled musket potential.
Or the terrain mostly did not exist in the East. Let's look at the important battles in the eastern theatre and see how many times there was good terrain for long range fire:

Bull Run (both)
Generally good visibility.
Peninsular Campaign
Depends on the particular battle. Defenders at Yorktown could have benefitted from long range rifle fire as they could cover the river more easily by fire.
Valley Campaign
Well farmed land, so good visibility.
Seven Days
Large clear areas at most battles.
Antietam
Again, large clear areas.
Fredricksburg
Large clear area around the town and south around Prospect Hill, plus the town was within long musket range of Marye's Heights.
Chancellosrville
Depends where the fighting's taking place, though there's certainly areas with open unwooded terrain on the eastern end of the battlefield.
Gettysburg
Seminary Ridge, Cemetery Hill, Pickett's Charge.
Overland
Hard to tell, though long range anti-battery fire would presumably be helpful and the trenches were within rifle range of one another at several points. Wilderness is certainly not good rifle terrain.

As we can see, the early battles fought in open terrain could have produced considerable dividends. This shouldn't be surprising as many of them were fought in farmed areas.


Springfield pattern M1861 = manufactured at Springfield, Savage, Trenton etc. All interchangeable. British not interchangeable of the same pattern of arm up through WW1 at least if not later.
Though the vast majority were Springfield manufactured, which meant they were mostly the same place anyway.



It can be argued by the fall of 1863 US troops were largely using Springfield arms of one make or model ie M1855-M1863 and the CS wasn't winning battles anymore. How much of that can be attributed to better more robust arms getting into the hands of the troops? Well there is still not a single case of US troops being given the chance to turn in their Enfields for Springfields and refusing. There are notable examples of US troops opting to hold onto older US made rifled arms instead of converting to newer Enfield. There are also cases of CS troops scouring the fields and eagerly trading in their own Enfields for captured Springfields you can come up for your own reasons on that. The CS manufactured Richmond Rifle Musket was viewed every bit as good as the Springfield by the US and CS with good reasoning, many parts were interchangeable with captured Springfield pattern arms easing maintenance somewhat. Though once the CS stopped holding battlefields that became less of an advantage.
All that means is that Americans liked American weapons, it doesn't tell us which was actually better.
As for the US starting to win battles by late 1863, surely this is because of the increasingly massive manpower preponderance - there's little or no statistical difference between units armed with the different types of weapons, unless they're completely unworkable like the Corn Exchange Regiment at Shepherdstown.

And I wouldn't be surprised if the Richmond was basically the same as the Springfield, because that's fundamentally what it was (being made with British-expertise rolled Virginia iron from Patrick County on the machines looted from Harpers Ferry).

Professionals study logistics, amateurs study battles. If you don't need that longer range; it's like a vernier rear sight on a Sharps that you only ever use out to 200 yards...

Yes, I'm sure they do. But to some extent this is a circular argument - they didn't use the long range because they couldn't, so therefore it wouldn't have helped and they didn't need it.
I'd say the ability of a rifle battalion to shake out into skirmish order and snipe out a gun battery at a range of half a mile for trifling casualties is valuable, to say nothing of the ability to hide at the far end of the cleared zone in front of enemy defences and shoot out anyone who poked their head up or tried to serve a gun. It completely unhinges the major advantage the defensive had at this time.

As I keep coming back to, Pickett's Charge is just one example of where that longer range would have been invaluable for either side.


It isn't the weapon that makes a Sharpshooter, it is the soldier.
Which is why I've been arguing that the soldiers - in the entire army, including the line troops - should have been trained to shoot straight. That's what the British did, and combined with the Enfield it meant their line troops could outfight enemy specialist sharpshooters (British line troops had been trained to skirmish for years).

IMO much of the P53 love is because it was & is viewed as a CS weapon by many.
Don't think so, I'm mainly focusing on what the British could do with it - from defeating enemy charges at half a mile of range, to sniping out gun batteries - and what other formations with rifle-muskets or long range rifles could do on other days and battlefields.


US Sharpshooters utilized the M1861 series arms, Spencer Rifle, M1841, Sharps and Enfield. There can be no doubt the US soldier consistently out skirmished his CS opponent in the Atlanta campaign with no dedicated Sharpshooter Battalions of the sort utilized by the ANV.
But examine Liberty Gap.


On June 24, at Liberty Gap, Tennessee, one of Cleburne's brigades held off three Union brigades with withering long-range small-arms fire... Although Cleburne's sharpshooters, armed with deadly long-range British Whitworth rifles, played their part, much of the 'terrible' effect was wreaked by Cleburne's ordinary infantrymen, properly trained in the use of the rifle-musket.
(Civil War Firearms)


As a testament to the fighting ability of Liddell's Brigade, one of the Union generals fighting for Liberty Gap thought they were fighting "the whole of Cleburne's Division," and a Union colonel thought that the Federals were "stubbornly opposed by a much larger force than ours." Another Union colonel said, "When we were within one-half or three-fourths of a mile of the enemy, the effect of their sharpshooters was terrible." The commander of the Union division, Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson, reported, "The affair at Liberty Gap will always be considered a skirmish, but few skirmishes ever equalled it in severity." The Federal casualties at the gap were 267.

Michael R. King, dissertation
Liddell's casualties at the Gap were 120 (25 dead, 77 wounded, and 18 missing) and he had a 3:1 numerical disadvantage, withdrawing only when he ran out of ammunition.

 
If anyone's interested, I've got a couple of analyses of the arms situation in the early Civil War available (specifically pertaining to imports) that I can link. Something I think is especially fascinating is that most Springfields were actually made with European-sourced iron from the Birmingham firm Marshall and Mills, but that the Confederacy managed to use a Birmingham-trained ironworker to locate a similar source of suitable ore in Virginia and thus they didn't need to import iron skelps to continue producing rifles with domestic rolling mills.

I'm definitely interested, Saphroneth. I've been working on an exhaustive longarms compilation, and am making progress, but will certainly take any and all information, Union and Confederacy. Thanks!
 
I'm definitely interested, Saphroneth. I've been working on an exhaustive longarms compilation, and am making progress, but will certainly take any and all information, Union and Confederacy. Thanks!
The analysis was by Robcraufurd from alternatehistory.com, but it's also been distributed elsewhere - here's the writeups, from 67th Tigers' blog (which published it as a guest post).


http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/guest-post-rifles-trade-and-blockade_21.html
http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/09/guest-post-further-note-on-barrels-by.html
http://67thtigers.blogspot.co.uk/2016/09/guest-post-executive-document-99-by-rob.html

‘Our great want to speedily crush this rebellion is guns. We have an abundance of men.’

Colouring the latter analysis further (Document 99) is that, at least on British guns, it's optimistic - several thousand more guns passed through Liverpool in H1 1862 than suggested by Document 99, meaning presumably several thousand fewer in 1861.
 
I don't know for sure what the exact caliber of the minie balls was that I was using but, for whatever reason, I don't know, but when I would shoot at the range the Springfield would foul faster than the Enfield using the same charge and bullets. Come to think of it, I don't think the Enfield ever got so fouled that it even became difficult to ram home the charges. I usually shot until the barrel became too hot to handle and still no fouling on the Enfield, an 1862 Tower with the numeral "24" on the barrel. As for accuracy, at a hundred yards I saw no difference but when I switched over to the 200 yard range the Enfield seemed more accurate.
There is nothing quite like first-hand knowledge. With as much book-learned or internet sources info on here, it's nice to get the story from a guy who has actually bruised his shoulder with the weapons he is talking about
 
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