I don't remember reading such a timeline, but that doesn't mean it was never done. Since the above is new information to me though I suspect it may have not been done.Did we ever establish a timeline for McClellan's movements that day, or was it something I had the intention of doing but was too busy?
I believe in his final hour he threatened to have a Union battery shoot a regiment that wasn't even part of his division (21st Mass, which was a 9th Corps regiment) when they didn't do whatever it was he wanted at that point. He ignored their unready state (wet cartridges) and the fact that there was an enemy in the position (not believing them even when they presented prisoners from the 49th Georgia) and forced them to advance blind and effectively unarmed; when the 21st Mass ran into the 49th GA Kearny got shot.That's what got Kearny killed at Chantilly, riding around moving regiments from the front
You asked me about McClellan. I feel he never realized the immense power he had created in AoP. It showed itself when he was greeted by the retreating army after 2nd Bull Run and when he was relieved from command. The demonstration by the men showed they would have stormed hell itself if he asked them. Instead he never asked them. It was the same with his battlefield command. He didn't show up on the field at Antietam or ride the lines at Malvern Hill, showing himself to the men. If he was a poker player, it would be like he would play well until the final ante, then he would pull back. He played not to lose instead of to win.
Well, the Jefferson Pass wasn't seized until near nightfall by cavalry and elements of the 6th and 9th Corps; the fact that 6th Corps elements were involved with taking the pass indicates in and of itself that 6th Corps was not wholly stationary. Given that McClellan sent the order to Franklin after sunset (6:20 PM) and they were on the eastern side of a mountain range it was probably already quite dark; given travel times Franklin would have recieved the order probably after 7PM, at which point you're dealing with trying to orient and march troops when it's too dark to point them in the right direction.McClellan seemed to be a half empty glass of water person. He saw obstacles. When finding the Lost Orders, he ordered Franklin to move "at daybreak in the morning." His orders were clear and precise but nowhere in them is there any hint of urgency. To march "at daylght" was good but to march upon reciept of these orders would have been better. Franklin's VI Corps was well-rested having not seen fighting since the Peninsula. The roads were good, the weather clear, and a night march was perfectly feasible. This way Franklin could have struck the gap at South Mt at first light.
I mean, McClellan's movements in Maryland are fairly rapid, and he's the one arguing to advance against the enemy afterwards. During the Loudoun Valley campaign some of his corps march upwards of fifteen miles, while back at the start of Yorktown he orders full on attacks by both wings as soon as they arrive.McClellan could drive his men just a hard as he was driven, but no harder. He never asked them to achieve more.
I actually don't think so. See, this was McClellan's plan:If Magruder had been properly reinforced the first line of defense works could have kept McClellan boxed in just outside fort Monroe.
The sand pits aren't good terrain though, not least because there's three landing options to put 1st Corps.The bluffs overlooking Elthams landing provided good defensive terrain. If the objective is to defend the capital then keeping enemy forces as far from the capital as possible is a must.