McClellan Opinions on Generalship of George B. McClellan?

26th Alabama. They were escapees from Ft Donelson, but lost their weapons in the process. They were posted in the fort.
So, no change to the estimates then. Would need to be factored in if calculating total strength of the line, but I don't think anyone's seriously suggesting McClellan could take a walled artillery fort at a rush without prep work - he wouldn't even have ladders.


Well, not quite.

This 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment was organized around the 3rd Alabama Infantry Battalion. Two companies of the 3rd had been sent up to Ft. Donelson, where they were captured (they did not escape). These two companies did not go to Virginia.

The 26th Alabama was newly organized (started in December 1861) and built up around the 3rd Battalion. They had never seen service before being sent to Virginia and assigned to Magruder. They were sent without arms, and Magruder is asked to arm them when they arrive. Their first commander was Colonel William Russell Smith -- he resigned March 27, 1862 when they were ordered to Magruder. Lt. Col. Edward O'Neal became Colonel. They were assigned to Rains Brigade when they arrived in Yorktown.

They fought long and hard in the war that followed, but on about April 1st, 1862 they are raw, green troops who have just received whatever sweepings Magruder had as weapons. They are also ***not*** the 26th Alabama you may find mentioned at Shiloh in Gladden's Brigade.

Their listed strength on the return of April 30 is 283.
 
Please note: the Engineer Brigade does not arrive until April 13th. They do not appear to start to do any particular work until April 14th. To the best of my knowledge, the Engineer Brigade does no preparation for the assault on the 16th.
Here you misapprehend the engineers completely. Most engineer officers did not command troops, but in the field acted like special recce officers. The engineers with McClellan under Barnard were tasked with finding a weakpoint to attack.

The engineer troops arrived later. They were originally attached to 1st Corps, because they manned the landing craft. The journal of the siege details the recces, and the fact that Duane with the 3 regular engr coys came ashore at Ship Point 10th April and started bringing bridging equipment ashore. The volunteer engrs came ashore 13th. The bridge is for Wormley Creek to shorten the supply route.

Please note: this is you replying to things not said.

I was talking about Woodbury's Engineer Brigade, which -- as I said -- arrives on the 13th. They took no part in what you are describing here.

I have read the journal you are referring to before. In fact, if you bother to refresh your own memory, you will see that it says exactly what I mentioned about Woodbury's arrival and the first tasks his men worked on.
 
One of the regiments around Yorktown arrived without arms a few days earlier and was armed with whatever sweepings Magruder had, clearly raw.
Perhaps so, but which one? Are they the one in Yorktown or not?
As noted elsewhere, this is the 26th Alabama -- a new regiment arriving without arms, raw and green.

As to where they are, here is what I know for sure:
HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PENINSULA,
Lee's Farm, April 7, 1862.

Brigadier-General WILCOX,
Commanding Third Division, Wynn's Mill:

SIR: I am instructed by the commanding general to inform you that should we be forced to retire it is necessary that Yorktown should be re-enforced under any circumstances with at least two regiments, and he designates the Twenty-sixth Alabama, Colonel O'Neal, and Forty-sixth Virginia, Colonel Richardson, as those which, if practicable, should be thrown into the garrison of Yorktown in the event of such retirements.

He therefore wishes that you should, circumstances permitting, so place these regiments that they may be certainly thrown into Yorktown when needed. This must be done if possible in the above contingency, and two regiments under any circumstances must be added to the garrison if we fall back, whether the above-named regiments can be thrown into it or not.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
HENRY BRYAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

P. S.— Owing to the pressure on this side Brigadier General Rodes' brigade will be held in reserve in the apple orchard near Dam No. 2, under General McLaws' command, for the present. He will come to your help if needed when informed by you.
HENRY BRYAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.​

So, on April 7th at least, they are no longer with Rains and are outside Yorktown. At some point they have been assigned to Wilcox. Here they are basically being positioned to be thrown into Yorktown (along with the 46th VA) and sacrificed as part of the garrison of a surrounded post, to hold out as long as they can and gain time for the army to retire.
 
He fears that Ward's position (the Red and White Redoubts) will be stormed by overpowering numbers. In fact in Porter's entire column there were about 18,000 troops (perhaps 9:1 or 10:1 in pure infantry count) but there's also about a hundred guns able to fire upon the attacking force so I doubt such an all-out attack would have succeeded - this is probably a fear derived from Magruder thinking there's 50,000 enemy per column.
I would doubt there are anywhere near 100 guns able to fire on Porter here. In such situations, if the attacker ever gets inside the defenses, it is all over for the defender.
Why would the previous sentence be relevant? The guns are artillery guns, not muskets, and there were dozens of heavy guns in Yorktown itself.

Not sure which sentence you are talking about, but:
  1. I really doubt there were "about a hundred guns able to fire upon the attacking force" at Yorktown on April 5th/6th.
  2. Even if there were, they become largely irrelevant if the Union can close and get into the position.
 
On the strength of the Yorktown lines, here is what D. H. Hill had to say about the place on April 13th, 1862:
APRIL 13, 1862
Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, C. S. A.:

DEAR SIR: As I am once more in charge of Yorktown, and General Magruder is at the other end of the line, I have taken the liberty of writing to you directly by Captain Tayloe.

I find this place totally unprepared for a siege. There are only 65 rounds per gun for each of the heavy guns, and there ought to be at least ten more heavy guns on the land side. General Johnston thinks that half of the water guns ought to be transferred to the land side.

The enemy is making formidable preparations. He has established a depot at the mouth of Wormley's Creek, as well as at Ship Point. There can be no doubt that he is bringing up heavy siege guns, and when he does open fire it will be terrific. The light guns in Redoubts Nos. 4 and 5 (outside of Yorktown) will be knocked over in half an hour. I fear that those redoubts cannot be held, certainly not with light guns. The woods which I was so anxious to have cut down are still standing, so that the enemy can establish his batteries under cover at 800 yards. In fact, we have had men killed by rifle-shots even inside of the works. We ought to have force enough to make formidable sorties to destroy batteries in process of construction. But with our present inadequate supply of troops we have no men to spare for outside operations.

The occupation of Wormley's Creek puts a new face upon the operations of the enemy. His light steamers can carry heavy guns up to White's Mill, within a mile of Yorktown. He has full possession of all the woods in that direction.

Our wants are, briefly, more infantry— at least 10,000; more heavy guns, and more ammunition. The calibers on the land side are four 32-pounders, navy carriages; one 52-pounder, light carriage; four 24-pounders; one 8-inch mortar; three 12-pounders; one rifled 24-pounder (a poor affair). These guns ought to be abundantly supplied with ammunition. In addition, General Magruder has ordered the removal of five 8-inch columbiads to the land side. These also ought to have a large supply of ammunition. Hand grenades ought to be supplied in large numbers, and at least 50,000 sand bags. Richmond and the Southern Confederacy are dependent upon the contest here.

Please excuse my calling your personal attention to these matters. General Johnston's presence and General Johnston's army may save us; otherwise the contest will be hopeless. It is not conceivable that the troops of General Johnston would fight as well under any other officer. The marvelous energy of General Magruder has accomplished wonders, but the Army of the Potomac will fight better under its own chief.

With great respect,
D. H. HILL.
Added Later:
Here is D. H. Hill again on April 15th:
YORKTOWN, VA.,
April 15, 1862.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of War, C. S. A.:

DEAR SIR: As nothing can be procured here without personal attention, I have sent my quartermaster up to get 2,000 tents. The army is diminishing most fearfully by sickness from fatigue, exposure, and stampedes.

The enemy has sent up two gunboats, which have been bombarding this place for two days. We have but two guns which can reach them, and these have but 16 rounds of disk shells. The other shells are worthless. The delay of McClellan can only be accounted for in one of two ways: He is either waiting for a formidable mortar and siege train or he is waiting until more iron-clad vessels are made. In the latter case he expects to reduce Yorktown from the water side, the Monitor keeping the Merrimac in check at Old Point. Yesterday the gunboats shelled the woods near Gloucester, feeling for batteries. The reduction of Gloucester would be a serious calamity, but iron-clad boats in the river would be much more so.

The enemy with his water facilities can multiply his artillery indefinitely, and as his is so superior to ours, the result of such a fight cannot be doubtful.

Would it not be better to let our railroads in North Carolina be cut, our cities in South Carolina and Georgia captured, and have the whole Southern army thrown here and crush McClellan? By attempting to hold so many points we have been beaten in detail, and are losing all that we have been trying to hold. We are no match for the Yankees at an artillery play with our wretched ordnance, poor in quality and feeble in quantity. We must fight on the field and trust to the bayonet. If we had 100,000 men here we could march out of the trenches and capture McClellan, unless he has a swift-footed horse. He has been anxious to dine in Richmond and we would be glad to send him up with an escort.

I have been much troubled about the river. If the enemy get a position in rear of us our men cannot stand to their guns on the land side while an assaulting column is coming up to attack the works. The enemy is accumulating men and guns much faster than we are. Every day is a gain to him.

I have a wretched tallow candle stuck in a box and cannot see the lines.
With great respect,
D. H. HILL.
 
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So this rather amused me. I found in the ORs a September 16 telegram from Halleck to McClellan, to the effect that he was dangerously uncovering Washington and that the Confederates were certainly planning to cross to Virginia, recross the Potomac further east, and cut McClellan off from Washington before attacking it.

McClellan quoted this telegram and others as part of his October 15 report on the events surrounding the Battle of Antietam, and frankly it's an excellent point he makes - which is that he was actually being told (but not ordered) to be more cautious in the campaign leading up to the battle, owing to concerns about the safety of Washington. It all adds to the synthesis of Halleck as being terribly concerned about the aggression of McClellan and others.
 
I was talking about Woodbury's Engineer Brigade, which -- as I said -- arrives on the 13th. They took no part in what you are describing here.
Ah, so there's confusion between "the engineers" (who were active doing recce work and preparing for the assault) and the "engineer brigade" (whose focus was the heavy arty), one assumes.


  • I really doubt there were "about a hundred guns able to fire upon the attacking force" at Yorktown on April 5th/6th.
  • Even if there were, they become largely irrelevant if the Union can close and get into the position.
Yorktown is described as having "nineteen heavy batteries" (~120 guns at 6 per battery, with Pendleton's reserve artillery and the Heavy Artillery Brigade totalling ~1340 artillery effectives who aren't part of the organic artillery of individual brigades), and there's also the guns firing from the Red/White redoubts (which themselves contain several batteries). All the guns on the SE and SW faces of Yorktown can fire into the flanks of an attacking force going towards the redoubts, and the guns at the redoubts can fire straight into the advancing enemy.
Hence, one assumes, the estimate of about 100 (which includes two faces of the fort, plus the guns on the Red/White redoubts).

Of course, if McClellan gets a force into the redoubts, that force is safe from fire from Yorktown (mostly). But any reinforcements also need to run the gauntlet.

The enemy is accumulating men and guns much faster than we are. Every day is a gain to him.
In fact this is largely incorrect, as by the 15th 23,000 extra effectives have arrived for Magruder and another 10,000 will arrive the next day. By contrast McClellan obtained 24,000 extra effectives (Casey, Hooker, Richardson) and his final 9,000 would not finish arriving until the 24th.

Excluding Gloucester Point, Williamsburg and the cavalry:

On the 5th McClellan had 51,000 effectives and Magruder 17,000 (3:1 odds),
6th 51,000:25,000 (2:1)
10th 51,000:36,000 (3:2)
11th 75,000:36,000 (2:1)
13th 75,000:40,000 (2:1)
16th 75,000:50,000 (3:2)
17th 78,000:50,000 (3:2)
18th 78,000:55,000 (4:3)
21st 78,000:57,000 (4:3)
24th 84,000:57,000 (3:2)

From the 13th to the 18th the strength of the Union increases far slower than that of the Confederates in ratio terms.
 
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Please note: this is you replying to things not said.

I was talking about Woodbury's Engineer Brigade, which -- as I said -- arrives on the 13th. They took no part in what you are describing here.

I have read the journal you are referring to before. In fact, if you bother to refresh your own memory, you will see that it says exactly what I mentioned about Woodbury's arrival and the first tasks his men worked on.

Then you should be clear about what you are talking about.

Barnard and his engineer officers ("The Engineers") spent the 5th-16th reconoitering the enemy line and actioning McClellan force multiplication efforts to enable an assault. From 17th onwards the focused changed and they were charged with laying out the heavy batteries and works.

Duane and the regular engineer troops (Companies A, B & C) those work was mainly enabling maneuver via bridging, laying out roads and operating boats) land on the 10th and get to work constructing a depot to allow the supply of the army. Now the supply of the army at Yorktown was precarious. Ship Point was 10-15 miles in the rear of the army, and with the state of the roads it was taking 2-3 days for a wagon to move over the roads. McClellan had left most of his transport wagons at Washington when Lincoln removed them from his army, and he had to fight to get them back. Cordroying the roads, bridging Wormley Creek and setting up a new depot there was imperative to simply surviving as an army.

Woodbury and the volunteer engineers joined in the bridging and roadmaking when they arrived on the 13th.
 
Barnard reports they captured 56 guns inside Yorktown proper and outworks, and there were emplacements for another 31 field guns and 7 naval guns. Of these 28 faced towards the Federals, and 30 were "across" the red and white redoubts and to the rear. The Water Battery had 9 pieces left (including a 10" Dahlgren) and 19 other heavy guns (32 pdrs and 8" columbiads, plus 1x 42 pdr carronade sweeping the beach) were captured. There were 6 empty gun emplacements, including 4 on the beach.

The Red and White Redoubts and their works had 31 gun positions. The rebels left 4 heavy guns, a 42 pdr (facing across the curtain to weep it), a 9" Dahlgren, 8" howitzer and a burst 4.5" rifle in the White Redoubt. The other positions there were field pieces.

I count 18 emplacements at Wynn's Mill, excluding the redoubt (prob 4).

At Dam No. 1 is the one gun work, plus further 3 dug in battery positions for 4, 6 and 4 guns respectively.

I've no map for Lee's Mill, but we know there were 15 guns in the batteries the morning of the 5th April.

So, 100 guns is extreme, but yes, an attack on the Red and White Redoubts could be under the fire of about a hundred guns.

On the 5th through I doubt any such attack would face more than 60 firing on them, as many of the batteries were dug for guns that came down from Johnston's army. It does include coming in canister range of several 8" and 9" guns though...
 
Then you should be clear about what you are talking about.

Barnard and his engineer officers ("The Engineers") spent the 5th-16th reconoitering the enemy line and actioning McClellan force multiplication efforts to enable an assault. From 17th onwards the focused changed and they were charged with laying out the heavy batteries and works.

Duane and the regular engineer troops (Companies A, B & C) those work was mainly enabling maneuver via bridging, laying out roads and operating boats) land on the 10th and get to work constructing a depot to allow the supply of the army. Now the supply of the army at Yorktown was precarious. Ship Point was 10-15 miles in the rear of the army, and with the state of the roads it was taking 2-3 days for a wagon to move over the roads. McClellan had left most of his transport wagons at Washington when Lincoln removed them from his army, and he had to fight to get them back. Cordroying the roads, bridging Wormley Creek and setting up a new depot there was imperative to simply surviving as an army.

Woodbury and the volunteer engineers joined in the bridging and roadmaking when they arrived on the 13th.

I was clear. I was talking about McClellan's use of Woodbury's Engineer Brigade. You have decided to talk about other matters.
 
Ah, so there's confusion between "the engineers" (who were active doing recce work and preparing for the assault) and the "engineer brigade" (whose focus was the heavy arty), one assumes.

No confusion at my end. I was quite clear. You and 67thTigers are talking about something else.

However, the same source he is looking at will also tell you that before Woodbury arrived on the 13th, Barnard and Barry were working on where to bring in the heavy artillery and what needed to be done to move the guns and equipment up after they arrived. The landing site and the road work have been specified, some battery positions selected, etc., before Woodbury arrives. Part of the mapping and recon work is along the coast in order to select the best landing site for the guns.
 
I have been much troubled about the river. If the enemy get a position in rear of us our men cannot stand to their guns on the land side while an assaulting column is coming up to attack the works. The enemy is accumulating men and guns much faster than we are. Every day is a gain to him.

This is General D. H. Hill is, in effect, offering his opinion on what is going on, how he sees things, in a letter to his friend or acquaintance George Randolph, the new Confederate Secretary of War( March 18, 1862). Both had served under Magruder at the Battle of Big Bethel on June 10, 1861: then-Colonel D. H. Hill commanded the 1st North Carolina Infantry while then-Major Randolph commanded the Richmond Howitzer Battalion. Both were commended by Magruder for their actions that day.

This is no different than thousands of such comments you can find in the OR. It might be factually true or false depending on what Hill is actually talking about, or what particular time-period he means. It might be an attempt to influence the brand-new Secretary of War. Daniel Harvey Hill often went outside the chain of command to get things he wanted (one of the reasons he was unpopular).

But what he is really saying in these two letters is that he is worried about what is coming down the pike. He sees an enemy building up positions and batteries that he believes will eventually blow his lines away when they open fire. He sees that his guns are going to be inadequate and their ammo is insufficient/sub-par. He wants to go out on sorties to disrupt and destroy the Union approaches, to delay the onslaught; he doesn't have enough strength to try, so he wants more men to attack with. He wants a lot of sandbags, and he thinks those two exterior redoubts are doomed the minute the Union guns open for real.

In short, he is a defending commander worried about an attack building up in front of him. He wants help and support. His opinions on the guns, their ammo and the effects of the Union siege weapons should carry a bit of weight: he was an artilleryman down in Mexico under Braxton Bragg. Bragg's three Lieutenants in the battery were George Thomas, John Reynolds, and D. H. Hill; not a bad group.
 
Even if there were, they become largely irrelevant if the Union can close and get into the position.

That's a huge if. Sort of like saying WW1 trenches are easy to assault if you get through all the defensive artillery and machine-gun fire, and through the belts of barbed wire. It is of course true, but not the crux of the issue. The issue is that huge concentrations of firepower can be brought to bear on the attacking formations as they advance across a mile wide prepared killing area.

The attacking commander faces the tactical issue of how to get his formations intact across this killing area so they can employ their personal weapons. This is not trivial.
 
That's a huge if. Sort of like saying WW1 trenches are easy to assault if you get through all the defensive artillery and machine-gun fire, and through the belts of barbed wire. It is of course true, but not the crux of the issue. The issue is that huge concentrations of firepower can be brought to bear on the attacking formations as they advance across a mile wide prepared killing area.

The attacking commander faces the tactical issue of how to get his formations intact across this killing area so they can employ their personal weapons. This is not trivial.

Yes, it is a big if and No, it is not trivial. It is, however, the essential point involved in attacking or defending any fortified position such as Yorktown.

Are you saying, BTW, that there were 100 guns that could be brought to bear on a land-side assault on Yorktown on April 5th or 6th? Because that is what I was responding to.
 
Yes, it is a big if and No, it is not trivial. It is, however, the essential point involved in attacking or defending any fortified position such as Yorktown.

Are you saying, BTW, that there were 100 guns that could be brought to bear on a land-side assault on Yorktown on April 5th or 6th? Because that is what I was responding to.

and you quoted the number of heavy guns facing east.

There were 4 field batteries and parts of two more in the Red and White Redoubt position on the 5th:

Red and White Redoubts

Smith's battery
Armistead's battery
Richardson's battery
Page's battery
rest of Nelson's battery
rest of Southall's battery

The White Redoubt when captured contained 4 heavy guns (a 42 pdr, a 9" Dahlgren, an 8" howitzer and a 4.5" rifle)

In Yorktown proper and outworks, there were emplacements for 94 guns, including 9 in the water battery. Of these 38 were empty and a number of field guns were removed from them. Of these seven of the emplacements were heavy guns moved from the water front to the land front.

20 heavy guns faced the "front" and 8 field guns facing front had been removed. There was a curtain wall to the ravine, and over looking the ravine was a redoubt with 5x 8" columbiads, there were 4 batteries linking Yorktown to the "ravine redoubt" with 11x 32 pdrs and 4x 8" columbiads. On the beach in front of Yorktown was a single 42 pdr to sweep the approach.

Very roughly, an attack towards, say, the ravine would be under the fire of

ca. 28 field pieces
ca. 44 heavy pieces (most 32 pdrs and 8" guns)

A "hundred" is likely a minor exaggeration, and probably includes guns which could fire on the Federals after they reached the works, and I count 23 such guns making a mere 95 rather than the full hundred.

Suffice to say that advancing over a mile of ground with ca. 72 artillery pieces playing on your formations will not be pretty.
 
Suffice to say that advancing over a mile of ground with ca. 72 artillery pieces playing on your formations will not be pretty.
This is definitely the operative point, of course. A mile is far too far to sprint, especially for men who are about to go into a close combat, and a good approximation is probably Pickett's Charge (where the men advanced at a walk and planned to break into a run a couple of hundred yards shot). As a first pass we can assume that the men would move at walking speed and as such would be under fire for about 20 minutes (or more for the guns on the flanks, which they'd have to go past).

Depending on the guns that's up to sixty RPG, and while the heavy guns will probably manage more like forty rounds per gun they're going to be individually much more devastating - the cannister load of a 32 pounder is about fourteen 2" balls and the shell is a 22 lber, while the 8" gun fires thirty-five one pound balls for cannister or a 50 lb shell.

It looks like it's a lot more weight of metal, for longer, than hit Pickett's Charge (which was only half a mile and was opposed by just field guns, not to mention Pickett's Charge being over undulating ground which the Federal gunners hadn't seen more than a day or two ago).

Not only is it going to be incredibly bloody, but it's not as if McClellan is swimming in men at this time - in fact, he's struggling to get his men onto the Peninsula fast enough for a build-up, had to leave at least one division behind, and he'll find out on the 6th that he's missing out another three large divisions. The units he has able to fight are just five divisions, and the next one won't come up for at least another few days - and even if he does get his men into the Redoubts this way, they'll be badly disorganized and depleted from having been under a withering artillery fire on their way up.
Exploting this penetration will involve sending more troops through the same gauntlet (though reduced as there'll only be the flanking guns in Yorktown) or waiting however long it takes Yorktown to be starved out and surrender, while reinforcements come marching down.

There's not much chance of success, and success isn't decisive in the least.
 
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It looks like the general sense we've got so far is that most of McClellan's supposed failings really aren't.
His "slowness" in front of Yorktown is adequately explained by the unexpected encounter with a strong and heavily defended line of forts; his conduct on the Peninsula quite explicable; his battles before Richmond coloured by his true status as outnumbered and his mandated poor strategic position; the Seven Days actually a skilful manoeuvre; his time at Harrisons Landing due to a total lack of needed reinforcement; his Maryland manoeuvres quick and decisive; his operations at Antietam evidence of a willingness to commit heavily; his "slows" after Antietam explained by a lack of supplies, and his relief essentially inexplicable.

In that light, I think we can certainly call him a quite competent general, and say it was a pity that - first, his Peninsular Campaign was interefered with from start to finish in materially deleterious ways; second, he got far fewer reinforcements post-Malvern than he needed; third, that he was withdrawn from the James; fourth, that he was relieved.
 
Lincoln, was the Boss, a singular fact , IMO, that little mac just could(or would) not accept; from which most, if not all, of McClellan's historical failures flowed.
 
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