Need the help of members well-versed in military tactics

Saint Jude

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Re. the battle of Chancellorsville, on pages 365 and 367 of Volume I of his autobiography, General Howard discussed the measures he took after 10:00 am on May 2 to prepare for a possible attack from the west. One of those measures was to allow Schurz to hold three regiments of his division free from the Eleventh Corps's south-facing line and place them facing west to protect the right flank. “[Schurz] preferred to hold them en masse, so as to charge in column, ” Howard wrote.

My question is: What was Schurz thinking? I thought “charging in column” was an offensive tactic. Am I mistaken? Shouldn’t it have been clear to Schurz that he needed to be thinking about defensive measures?
 
I've not read the book, but it sounds like Schurz was holding the three regiments back to either act as reinforcements should the main XI Corps line not hold or, less likely, to act as a reserve to exploit any perceived weakness after the repulse of the Confederate assault. I don't know the distance between the east and west facing lines to know if that was practical, so I'm not sure how likely either scenario is. However, reinforcement and exploitation are typically the two main reasons for holding back part of a force.
 
Re. the battle of Chancellorsville, on pages 365 and 367 of Volume I of his autobiography, General Howard discussed the measures he took after 10:00 am on May 2 to prepare for a possible attack from the west. One of those measures was to allow Schurz to hold three regiments of his division free from the Eleventh Corps's south-facing line and place them facing west to protect the right flank. “[Schurz] preferred to hold them en masse, so as to charge in column, ” Howard wrote.

My question is: What was Schurz thinking? I thought “charging in column” was an offensive tactic. Am I mistaken? Shouldn’t it have been clear to Schurz that he needed to be thinking about defensive measures?
Schhurz may have thought that, as the army was on the offense, he should be ready to attack if needed. Just the same, as the afternoon of the 2nd wore on, Schurz's troops went into defensive line. But, there were no trenches or felled trees or rocks to offer protection. Schurz may not have understood the difference between "defending a flank" and "refusing a flank" Schurz's education might have had too much Napoleon and not enough Caesar. A Roman army in camp was fortified on all sides, something that was not common in Napoleon's time...
 
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Thanks, James and Robin, for your responses! It seems that, since Schurz later claimed that he was sure the Eleventh would be attacked from the west, he should have at least dug trenches and felled trees for abbatis to make a strong defensive line in case the First Division, father to the west, was overrun. As it was, in the two hours before Jackson struck, Schurz was in charge of the Eleventh. By that time Hooker had sent the Eleventh's reserve to Sickles, so if Schurz was as certain as he later claimed to be that Lee would attack from the west,why didn't he turn the entire corps so it faced west? In the two hours that Howard was absent, Schurz did absolutely nothing!
 
Re. the battle of Chancellorsville, on pages 365 and 367 of Volume I of his autobiography, General Howard discussed the measures he took after 10:00 am on May 2 to prepare for a possible attack from the west. One of those measures was to allow Schurz to hold three regiments of his division free from the Eleventh Corps's south-facing line and place them facing west to protect the right flank. “[Schurz] preferred to hold them en masse, so as to charge in column, ” Howard wrote.

My question is: What was Schurz thinking? I thought “charging in column” was an offensive tactic. Am I mistaken? Shouldn’t it have been clear to Schurz that he needed to be thinking about defensive measures?

There isn't enough detail in this to be sure, but it sounds like a routine difference of opinion between commanders looking at the same situation.

Howard is talking about "refusing a flank" (this is "hold three regiments of his division free from the Eleventh Corps's south-facing line and place them facing west to protect the right flank"). That's a normal defensive approach when you are unable to connect your flank to another unit or anchor it on a barrier such as a river. When you can't do that, your flank is vulnerable to a turning movement/flank attack (referred to as having your flank "in the air" -- maybe "flapping in the breeze" would be more picturesque). Howard's "refused flank" approach is one method of dealing with that, because it makes the line L-shaped -- presenting a short-but-solid line to the enemy if they come around the flank instead of letting them hit the narrow-and-fragile end of your line.

Schurz is talking about having a central reserve, a solid-and-compact force ready to move quickly in response to an emergency. This can be sent against that enemy flanking attack -- or it can be used to counter-attack an enemy breakthrough on the main front. Schurz wants to be able to react along the whole front, while Howard's approach reduces the ability to counter enemy threats on the main line.

Both of these approaches are standards. As things developed, Howard's approach would have been better because Jackson was making a strong flank attack. If instead of this Jackson had been making a strong frontal assault (say like Longstreet at Chickamauga), then Schurz's approach would have been better. However, those three regiments were probably nowhere near enough to stop Jackson's flank attack -- they might have slowed it down and made it less successful.

It is also possible that Schurz was considering using those concentrated troops for quick counter-attacks at critical moments in a defensive struggle. At a crucial moment in a defensive battle, when it seems the decision hangs in the balance, a counter-attack by the defense is often used to throw the assault back -- even a small force can be very successful if the counter-attack is launched at the right moment (see Pat Cleburne's brilliant defensive tactics at Chattanooga against Sherman and Hooker).
 
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Thanks, James and Robin, for your responses! It seems that, since Schurz later claimed that he was sure the Eleventh would be attacked from the west, he should have at least dug trenches and felled trees for abbatis to make a strong defensive line in case the First Division, father to the west, was overrun. As it was, in the two hours before Jackson struck, Schurz was in charge of the Eleventh. By that time Hooker had sent the Eleventh's reserve to Sickles, so if Schurz was as certain as he later claimed to be that Lee would attack from the west,why didn't he turn the entire corps so it faced west? In the two hours that Howard was absent, Schurz did absolutely nothing!

This is essentially similar to a traverse inside a fortified line. A traverse is usually set at a right angle to the front line inside a fort or behind an entrenched line. The purpose of a traverse is to shield the men facing the front of the entrenchment or the wall of the fort from the flank (normally because of a bend in the line). This is normally artillery fire coming in at an angle to the front of the troops, hitting them in flank.

What you are describing here ("dug trenches and felled trees for abbatis") would not be done on such a scale and behind the lines -- certainly not without pre-planning. The reason is that if the right flank ("the First Division, farther to the west") were attacked in flank and driven, they'd be trapped against that line of trenches and abbatis, caught between the fire of their attackers and any troops trying to hold this line. If the defenders hold their fire to try to let the routed troops get through and over the trenches/abbatis, then they may be over-run if the attackers follow them closely with the bayonet (what Hood ordered at Franklin, where it almost worked). If the defenders fire while the ground before them is filled with fleeing/retreating Yankees ... well, a friendly-fire bloodbath ensues.

If you are going to set up an entrenched line/abbatis behind your own front, you need to pre-plan it to provide well-conceived ways to let troops through the line (fleeing troops or reinforcements to the front) while still letting the men on the line fire. If you just send a bunch of troops to dig it, you won't get that
 
Thanks again! This is very helpful. Would there have been a better way to form the troops than to "hold them en masse, so as to charge in column" ?

That is not a specific enough description (in military jargon) to know exactly how they were being held. :smile:

Generally, infantry in that day would be deployed in one of the first three formations below:
  1. Line (wide-front, thin-depth -- two-men-deep in the ACW; Napoleonic Wars were generally three-deep with the British using two-deep; early periods had more). Intended to maximize firepower to the front but very vulnerable to attack from the flank (a line of 500 rifles can fire all of them forward, but only a few to the left or right). Slower to move than a column, harder to maneuver in a different direction.
  2. Column (narrower-front, thick-deep -- maybe 4-to-30 wide depending on circumstances and use). Good for rapid movement and command control, limited in firepower but can be intimidating/overwhelming in an assault -- very vulnerable if exposed to firepower for long.
  3. Skirmish (loose formation where men operate individually or in small groups, usually out in front of the main line or in difficult terrain)
  4. Squares were becoming obsolete after the Napoleonic Wars and were rarely seen in the ACW (Sherman at the Bull Run retreat, Confederates maybe twice at Gettysburg, probably a handful more in the war) and were intended to defend against cavalry attack. Slow moving and dense, they made big targets and firepower doomed them as technology improved (percussion caps, rifles, artillery advancements)
In the description of what Schurz wanted ("hold them en masse, so as to charge in column"), en masse probably just means he wants them held at a single location in rear of his main line of resistance. He wants them there so they will immediately available when he needs them, located so they can quickly move to any part of his line (or to his flank) as needed. They would probably not be held in column -- they would be allowed to fall out of ranks as long as they could fall back in as soon as an order was given. If the enemy was not present (not attacking the line seriously, bombarding it, etc.), they might be making coffee and simply waiting.

Once the fighting began in earnest and an order was received, they might be called into column. Their colonels would not have wanted them standing in column until they expected a movement order; they also would not have wanted them straying about since they might be needed at any time.

The part about Schurz wanting "to charge in column" from Howard is subject to interpretation and debate. Schurz had experience fighting in the Revolution of 1848, particularly with the revolutionary army in the Palatinate and Baden fighting against the Prussian Army during 1849. He was part of a group that fled to America in the aftermath and became a force in the Republican Party (Sigel, Schimmelfennig, Blenker, Fritz Anneke and family, etc.). He might have had a very traditional European military meaning for that phrase.

If Schurz really wanted "to charge in column", that would imply he was looking to fight a defensive-offensive struggle, where he would use those 3 regiments to attack enemy penetrations and recover the line or to "sweep the front" (attack at a crucial moment by sallying from the line, pivoting at a 90 degree angle to hit a portion of the enemy from the flank, throwing them into a panic or disarray, driving them back to relieve the pressure, and then returning to the safety of your own lines).

If the word "charge" in the description is really Howard's and not Schurz's, maybe Schurz simply meant that he wanted them to move in column to whatever point was necessary. Troops move much faster in column than in line, they can change direction easier and faster. They can, if necessary, deploy fairly quickly from column into line when they get to the critical point. Once they get there, they can attack or defend, and they don't have to "charge" if that is a bad idea.

So the "charge in column" part could mean different things. If we knew Schurz actually did intend, say, to use the bayonet that would be a big indicator of what was going on. OTOH, if the "charge" part is simply Howard not getting/not understanding what Schurz intended (or trying to paint a particular slant in the aftermath), Schurz might be simply planning to hold a reserve where he could make efficient use of it -- however it was needed.

Also -- Schurz does not have to use all three regiments in the same moment. By having them in a central spot, he can order them to different points individually if he wants.
 
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That is not a specific enough description (in military jargon) to know exactly how they were being held. :smile:

I know. Howard just mentions it, almost like an aside, and moves on.


In the description of what Schurz wanted... en masse probably just means he wants them held at a single location in rear of his main line of resistance. He wants them there so they will immediately available when he needs them, located so they can quickly move to any part of his line (or to his flank) as needed. They would probably not be held in column -- they would be allowed to fall out of ranks as long as they could fall back in as soon as an order was given. If the enemy was not present (not attacking the line seriously, bombarding it, etc.), they might be making coffee and simply waiting.

This is pretty much what actually occurred before Jackson's attack.

The part about Schurz wanting "to charge in column" ... is subject to interpretation and debate... He might have had a very traditional European military meaning for that phrase.

From his background, I think that he did.

If Schurz really wanted "to charge in column", that would imply he was looking to fight a defensive-offensive struggle...

This sounds right to me.

If the word "charge" in the description is really Howard's and not Schurz's...

I'm certain these were Schurz's words and that Howard knew exactly what Schurz had in mind. Perhaps that's why he didn't include more details in his autobiography (which might have helped people like me understand what difference such a change would make). Schurz later claimed that he posted those regiments facing west on his own authority, but that wasn't true, as Howard permitted him to make the change. All this said, in the end the change made no difference in the outcome. When Jackson struck, he did so in such strength that Schurz's second line of defense held out less than 20 minutes. He tried to rally some of his troops and lead a charge three times, but to no avail.
 
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