Naval battle changed strategies of future combat

CMWinkler

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  • Naval battle changed strategies of future combat

  • A naval battle happened on March 9, 1862, in the first year of the Civil War, that changed naval combat forever in future wars.

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    John Reichley
  • Posted Mar. 11, 2015 at 10:38 AM

    Today is not an “exact date” in U.S. military history, but since it misses the event by only two days, and it was 153 years ago, that’s close enough.A naval battle happened on March 9, 1862, in the first year of the Civil War, that changed naval combat forever in future wars.
- See more at: http://www.leavenworthtimes.com/article/20150311/OPINION/150319813/-1/news#sthash.7EjhOTEm.dpuf
 
Maybe I'm just jaded, but I think the "revolutionary" nature of this event is overstated; I see it as more "evolutionary." (Dramatic, I'll grant.)

I see a number of other problems in the article which say to me that the author, though making a good-faith effort, is less than completely familiar with the topic. (Such as calling the Confederate Navy "iron-less" after the loss of Virginia, which is a strong indicator that he is unaware of other Confederate ironclads...)
 
I agree with Carronade as well. I think the battle signaled some significant transitions technologically.
  • Transition from wind power to steam power
  • Armor for naval vessels
  • Led to advances in naval weaponry
However the "strategy" of naval warfare did not change because of this battle. In fact, I don't think much of anything changed in the form of strategy until naval aviation and the widespread use of submarines was introduced. Until then we were still seeing naval battles fought in the old "slug fest" manner.

That being said, I don't believe that's what the author of this article was trying to say, I just think he picked the wrong title.
 
I see a number of other problems in the article which say to me that the author, though making a good-faith effort, is less than completely familiar with the topic. (Such as calling the Confederate Navy "iron-less" after the loss of Virginia, which is a strong indicator that he is unaware of other Confederate ironclads...)

100% agree, I just didn't want to say anything in case the author is a forum member. But then again, when you're getting your information from a calendar produced by the History Channel, the same group that gave you Assassin's Creed: Sons of Liberty what else would you expect?
 
100% agree, I just didn't want to say anything in case the author is a forum member. But then again, when you're getting your information from a calendar produced by the History Channel, the same group that gave you Assassin's Creed: Sons of Liberty what else would you expect?

Yeah... I've gotten a little leery of being too critical of things published, especially as I try to break into those ranks myself. On Goodreads, for instance, I don't post negative reviews. If I don't like something, I'll give it a low star rating and move on; I'll only write an actual review if I'd consider it a four-star or above.

(That said, there are some books I've encountered that people should be warned away from... but I generally keep that to myself and instead steer people towards other books, rather than away from those ones I'm wary of...)
 
  • Naval battle changed strategies of future combat
  • A naval battle happened on March 9, 1862, in the first year of the Civil War, that changed naval combat forever in future wars.

  • AR-150319813.jpg

    Zoom
    John Reichley
  • Posted Mar. 11, 2015 at 10:38 AM

    Today is not an “exact date” in U.S. military history, but since it misses the event by only two days, and it was 153 years ago, that’s close enough.A naval battle happened on March 9, 1862, in the first year of the Civil War, that changed naval combat forever in future wars.
- See more at: http://www.leavenworthtimes.com/article/20150311/OPINION/150319813/-1/news#sthash.7EjhOTEm.dpuf

I would say that the battle gave proof to the technological changes that were already underway. Steam power, ironclads, rifled cannon were not invented for or even first used by either the Monitor or Virginia. To my knowledge, the only really first use was the Monitor's revolving turret, and the battle didn't really give proof to it since turrets weren't accepted on ocean-going battleships until the 1880s.
 
Steam was a enormous change.
Armor plating was an evolutionary change.
Steam largely, though not completely, negated the advantage of fixed fortifications.
A steam driven fleet could by pass a fixed fort, if necessary, in a short enough time, to escape destruction.
Armor plating changed the emphasis from the number of guns, to the weight of the heaviest guns.
 
Largely agree with Mark. The Battle of Hampton Roads was the culmination of multiple technological trends in guns, armor, and propulsion,all of which had been in use (or even in combat) previously. They just happened to come together very dramatically on that particular day. It helped, also, that that fight on March 9 was largely a tactical draw — because it underscored how much those new technologies have changed the nature of naval warfare, compared to the calamity the Federals had the day before.
 
In fact, I don't think much of anything changed in the form of strategy until naval aviation and the widespread use of submarines was introduced.

Sirs, I would submit that the advent of the true naval torpedo, (not the ACW 'mine' variety ), changed naval tactics, operational employment and greatly influenced naval procurement...thereby strategy had to follow as the time-tested line-of-battle strategy was, well, tested.

But this is post-ACW via Robert Whitehead.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Well, actually, it changed the strategy pretty much. The previous strategy was almost entirely based on the idea that bigger ship is always more powerfull than smaller. Ship-of-the-line could outgun frigate, frigate could outgun corvette, corvette could outgun sloop... So, there were pretty stable system that existed for centuries. Even the advent of shell guns could not crash those system immediately.

But the ironclad era brought something new in strategy. The technology & engineering. It suddenly became obvious, that you couldn't just build bigger ships to mantain naval superiority - you need better technology. And, even more important - you need to predict correctly the best engineering solutions. The small innovative "Monitor" defeated bigger but less innovative "Virginia". Suddenly around the world admirals started to look at their - pretty conservative - ironclad frigates, and wonder: "what if? What if we guessed wrong, and our ironclads would be technologically inferior?"

And this basically shattered the strategy. Because strategical assumptions must be based on the ability to predict the results of tactical engagements. If we could not predict the outcome of tactical situations - would our 2-to-1 numerical superiority in ironclads be enough to ensure victory, or our superior numbers would be devastated by superior enemy technology? - we could not plan the strategy.
 
Maybe I'm just jaded, but I think the "revolutionary" nature of this event is overstated; I see it as more "evolutionary."

Indeed sir - from the time cannon were first put on ships up until the 1800s, very little changed with naval vessels and tactics. Most were enhancements to already existing equipment and procedures.

Then, in less than 100 years, wood to steel, sail to steam, muzzle-loading solid balls to breech-loading shell guns, and finally, the advent of electricity.

In the course of one career, you could have been part of all of that...wow

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
If I recall correctly, there was a proposal to fit the Monitor with a giant hammer that would smash the Virginia to pieces. Now THAT would have changed naval strategy forever!

BattleBots writ large 140 years early!

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Maybe I'm just jaded, but I think the "revolutionary" nature of this event is overstated; I see it as more "evolutionary." (Dramatic, I'll grant.)

I see a number of other problems in the article which say to me that the author, though making a good-faith effort, is less than completely familiar with the topic. (Such as calling the Confederate Navy "iron-less" after the loss of Virginia, which is a strong indicator that he is unaware of other Confederate ironclads...)
I agree with you Mark. The advent of large scale "hardening" of vessels was an interim change leading to a 75 year contest between the armor designers and the gun designers trying to penetrate the armor. It also lead to a swing to larger vessels with displacements to carry that much protection. I would argue that the great change came from improvements in targeting which came later. The disagreement between designers on the merits of large caliber batteries versus smaller "quick firing" gun was later settled on the side of fewer, large caliber guns. But this became possible only with the advent of improved fire control. The Civil War was among the first in which the participants attempted to keep accurate records on types and numbers of rounds expended versus results. With very few exceptions, the overall picture is high utilization with low percentage results. It would be interesting to see if someone did a study on the real effectiveness of rifled guns during the war. They certainly had an impact on effective range, but without improvements in fire direction were they actually hitting the targets more often at those increased ranges? Most of the well known clashes were actually fought a very short ranges, primarily to allow the rounds to have a maximum effect upon impact with armor. Another factor is that for much of the war just about any type of ironing allowed you to close to shorter ranges for accurate targeting. You can argue that the true Union advantage in ironing was the durability of their plate armor versus early Confederate use of rr iron which was frequently effective during the engagement but required significant repairs later. Confederate vessels with plate iron also proved more durable and required fewer repairs after action.
 
With very few exceptions, the overall picture is high utilization with low percentage results. It would be interesting to see if someone did a study on the real effectiveness of rifled guns during the war. They certainly had an impact on effective range, but without improvements in fire direction were they actually hitting the targets more often at those increased ranges?

I've long been of the opinion that the theoretical range and accuracy advantages of naval rifled guns were largely negated by the relatively short ranges that battles were actually fought at; the now-obvious superiority of rifles over smoothbores was by no means so obvious at the time, whereas reliability was generally on the side of the smoothbore.

Something that has always struck me is that the significant advances in armament, armor, and propulsion were not matched by similar strides in what we would call the command-and-control areas. Lt. Worden, commanding arguably the most advanced warship of his time on March 9, 1862, had to depend on his paymaster to run messages back and forth from the pilothouse to the turret-- and what that replaced, a speaking-tube, was not a particularly advanced piece of equipment either. Gun ranging and sighting was entirely by the proverbial Mark One eyeball except in some very specific and limited circumstances. And the principal reason Farragut tended to climb up the rigging was so he could see what was going on. Electricity and associated technologies like radio (and eventually, radar) would change all of this within a couple of generations, but for the moment, power had outraced the ability to really control it.
 
I've long been of the opinion that the theoretical range and accuracy advantages of naval rifled guns were largely negated by the relatively short ranges that battles were actually fought at; the now-obvious superiority of rifles over smoothbores was by no means so obvious at the time, whereas reliability was generally on the side of the smoothbore.

Something that has always struck me is that the significant advances in armament, armor, and propulsion were not matched by similar strides in what we would call the command-and-control areas. Lt. Worden, commanding arguably the most advanced warship of his time on March 9, 1862, had to depend on his paymaster to run messages back and forth from the pilothouse to the turret-- and what that replaced, a speaking-tube, was not a particularly advanced piece of equipment either. Gun ranging and sighting was entirely by the proverbial Mark One eyeball except in some very specific and limited circumstances. And the principal reason Farragut tended to climb up the rigging was so he could see what was going on. Electricity and associated technologies like radio (and eventually, radar) would change all of this within a couple of generations, but for the moment, power had outraced the ability to really control it.
At Tsu Shima the Japanese Navy use buglers to transmit orders, this system according an RN observer reached it's greatest efficiency when no one could hear what they were blowing !
Accepted battle range for the RN in 1860 -61 was 800 yards, increasing to 1,000 yards by 1865. Rifled guns really didn't make a lot of difference until the respective muzzle velocities between them and smooth bores became markedly different.
Even then, as you rightly point out rifled guns could be ranged for thousands of yards ,but actually were no more able to hit then smooth bores at battle range because of the lack of developed sighting and control.
 
I think the key word here is "strategy"; technology changed the construction of ships, but battle fleets, cruisers, and the rest operated much as they had for the past couple of centuries (or would have, had there been major naval wars in the late 1800s). The "Bible" of the steel navies was still Mahan's history of warfare under sail.
 
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