There you go and no one asked you, blaming General Meade. It was all his fault, I guess? Because Girlfriend Grant may never be assigned a mistake, let alone a disaster.
Sit on your own keyboard and continue the de-fense. You're doing great.
So I suppose Meade is trying to protect Grant?
“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 8 A.M. JUNE 4, 1864 I have only time to write you that we had a big battle yesterday, on the field of the old Gaines's Mill battle-ground, with the positions of the contending forces reversed. The battle ended without any decided results, we repulsing all attacks of the enemy and they doing the same; losses estimated about equal on both sides; ours roughly estimated at seven thousand five hundred in all. I had immediate and entire command on the field all day, the Lieutenant General honoring the field with his presence only about one hour in the middle of the day. The papers will, however, undoubtedly inform you of all his doings, and I will therefore confine myself to mine.”
https://books.google.com/books?oe=UTF-8&id=Kr7jU0hGkgEC&q="Great+howl"#v=onepage&q="immediate and entire"&f=false
After all, Meade was there.
Some people do research, others pound on their keyboards and make snide comments with no facts at all, preferring to believe myths.
"Grant had ordered the offensive. Meade, however, was responsible for deploying his corps, coordinating their movements, and posting reserves to exploit any gains. 'I had immediate and entire command of the field
all day,' Meade wrote his wife. The Pennsylvanian still smarted from the humiliation of his subordinated position and thoroughly disapproved of Grant's hard-hitting, army-wide assaults. Facing a disagreeable assignment, he dealt with it by doing little. The record reveals no steps to reconnoiter the ground, coordinate the army's elements, or tend to the things that diligent generals ordinarily do before sending soldiers against fortified enemy lines." [Gordon C. Rhea,
Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864, pp. 318-319]
"By midmorning Meade had lost control of the attack. In the face of Hancock's pessimistic reports, the army commander had allowed his subordinates to decide whether to renew the assault. Wright and Smith each argued that whether they would press forward would be up to the actions of the other corps commanders. Finally, Meade ordered Smith and Wright to attack without reference to each other; he instructed Hancock to try one more time. Hancock demurred; Wright and Smith remained in place. Finally Grant took charge." [Brooks D. Simpson,
Triumph Over Adversity: Ulysses S. Grant, 1822-1865, p. 325]
That's when Grant sent a message to Meade telling him to call off the attacks.