Myths of Cold Harbor

Whose facts? We know what happened at Cold Harbor from the accounts of people who were there. We don't know the numbers and we never will, regardless of modern smart-acres hiking around there in Gore Tex boots.

The only "fact" is slaughter.
I can't quite figure out what part the gore-text boots play in this little drama.
 
Whose facts? We know what happened at Cold Harbor from the accounts of people who were there. We don't know the numbers and we never will, regardless of modern smart-acres hiking around there in Gore Tex boots.

The only "fact" is slaughter.
Then I assume that you actually never read any history, just participant accounts. Now, Dan Sickles tells us what happened at Gettysburg. So does George G. Meade. Those two men disagree over what happened on July 2, 1863. But according to your criteria, we know what happened from those who were there.

So tell me what happened at Cold Harbor from those who were there, including Meade, who proclaimed he was in charge of the assault. Yet do you blame Grant? Meade was there, and you were not. According to your criteria, we can dismiss what you say because you weren't there.

If we don't "know" the numbers, then how do we know there was a "slaughter?"

I tend to trust the folks who did the research over the folks who sit at their keyboard and throw off unsupported opinions that largely reflect their prejudices. You're entitled to your opinion, but you are not entitled to select whatever "facts" support it simply because they do. If you have some actual facts to contest the material in the video, bring them forth.
 
So tell me what happened at Cold Harbor from those who were there, including Meade, who proclaimed he was in charge of the assault. Yet do you blame Grant? Meade was there, and you were not. According to your criteria, we can dismiss what you say because you weren't there.

If we don't "know" the numbers, then how do we know there was a "slaughter?"

I tend to trust the folks who did the research over the folks who sit at their keyboard and throw off unsupported opinions that largely reflect their prejudices. You're entitled to your opinion, but you are not entitled to select whatever "facts" support it simply because they do. If you have some actual facts to contest the material in the video, bring them forth.

There you go and no one asked you, blaming General Meade. It was all his fault, I guess? Because Girlfriend Grant may never be assigned a mistake, let alone a disaster.

Sit on your own keyboard and continue the de-fense. You're doing great.
 
There you go and no one asked you, blaming General Meade. It was all his fault, I guess? Because Girlfriend Grant may never be assigned a mistake, let alone a disaster.

Sit on your own keyboard and continue the de-fense. You're doing great.

So I suppose Meade is trying to protect Grant?

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC 8 A.M. JUNE 4, 1864 I have only time to write you that we had a big battle yesterday, on the field of the old Gaines's Mill battle-ground, with the positions of the contending forces reversed. The battle ended without any decided results, we repulsing all attacks of the enemy and they doing the same; losses estimated about equal on both sides; ours roughly estimated at seven thousand five hundred in all. I had immediate and entire command on the field all day, the Lieutenant General honoring the field with his presence only about one hour in the middle of the day. The papers will, however, undoubtedly inform you of all his doings, and I will therefore confine myself to mine.”

https://books.google.com/books?oe=UTF-8&id=Kr7jU0hGkgEC&q="Great+howl"#v=onepage&q="immediate and entire"&f=false

After all, Meade was there.

Some people do research, others pound on their keyboards and make snide comments with no facts at all, preferring to believe myths.

"Grant had ordered the offensive. Meade, however, was responsible for deploying his corps, coordinating their movements, and posting reserves to exploit any gains. 'I had immediate and entire command of the field all day,' Meade wrote his wife. The Pennsylvanian still smarted from the humiliation of his subordinated position and thoroughly disapproved of Grant's hard-hitting, army-wide assaults. Facing a disagreeable assignment, he dealt with it by doing little. The record reveals no steps to reconnoiter the ground, coordinate the army's elements, or tend to the things that diligent generals ordinarily do before sending soldiers against fortified enemy lines." [Gordon C. Rhea, Cold Harbor: Grant and Lee, May 26-June 3, 1864, pp. 318-319]

"By midmorning Meade had lost control of the attack. In the face of Hancock's pessimistic reports, the army commander had allowed his subordinates to decide whether to renew the assault. Wright and Smith each argued that whether they would press forward would be up to the actions of the other corps commanders. Finally, Meade ordered Smith and Wright to attack without reference to each other; he instructed Hancock to try one more time. Hancock demurred; Wright and Smith remained in place. Finally Grant took charge." [Brooks D. Simpson, Triumph Over Adversity: Ulysses S. Grant, 1822-1865, p. 325]

That's when Grant sent a message to Meade telling him to call off the attacks.
 
"The newspaper correspondents speak of Grant doing this and that, hardly ever mentioning Meade's name. Here we see nothing of General Grant; I hardly heard his name mentioned." [Charles S. Wainwright, A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles S. Wainwright, 1861-1865, Entry for 4 Jun 1864, p. 406]

It might be useful to review some of the correspondence.

During the assault, Meade asked Grant for his advice should the attack fail:

HEADQUARTERS,
June 3, 1864-7 a.m.
Lieutenant-General GRANT:
Reports from Wright announce some progress. His advance occupies a line of the enemy's pits--I presume their skirmish line. He reports the Eighteenth Corps having occupied the same line, but retiring. His (Wright's) line is pushing on. No report from Smith. I sent you one from Hancock, reporting he was about attempting another assault, written before my order to him to do so had reached him. I should be glad to have your views as to the continuance of these attacks, if
unsuccessful.
GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General.

Grant's reply:

NEAR COLD HARBOR,
June 3, 1864--7 a. m
Major-General MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive, but when one does succeed push it vigorously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

[OR Series I, Vol XXXVI, Part 3, pp. 525-526]

That was two-and-a-half hours into the attack.

Finally, at 1230, Grant ordered a halt to the attacks.

COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864--12.30 p.m.
Major-General MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac:
The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. Hold our most advanced positions, and strengthen them. Whilst on the defensive, our line may be contracted from the right, if practicable. Reconnaissances should be made in front of every corps, and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond than to have them go back there. Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through General Smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault.
U.S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
[Ibid., p. 526]

Meade issued no overall order for the attack, and left his corps commanders to plan their own advances. As can be expected, this resulted in completely uncoordinated attacks, and the corps commanders were inadequate in their reconnaissance of the rebel positions.

When William F. Smith asked Horatio Wright to help him develop a coordinated attack, Wright replied that he just planned to "pitch in." [William F. Smith, Autobiography of Major General William F. Smith, p. 93]
 
Mike Gorman isn't just a "guide." He's a respected historian.

The reactions to the video show how much of a hold the mythology about Cold Harbor has on casual readers.
Ok, if Grant's recollection is flawed what are the statistics (if they exist) that the US Government put out for the losses that day? Surely Grant had seen any number of battles where the Union dead carpeted the battlefield. What was it that made this one so different that he commented only on this one (and Vicksburg a close second) as a bad mistake on his part?
 
Ok, if Grant's recollection is flawed what are the statistics (if they exist) that the US Government put out for the losses that day? Surely Grant had seen any number of battles where the Union dead carpeted the battlefield. What was it that made this one so different that he commented only on this one (and Vicksburg a close second) as a bad mistake on his part?

Who said Grant's recollection is flawed? Grant didn't talk about the numbers. Look at the full quotation. He said there was no advantage gained as a result. That's why he regretted the assault.
 
Ok, if Grant's recollection is flawed what are the statistics (if they exist) that the US Government put out for the losses that day? Surely Grant had seen any number of battles where the Union dead carpeted the battlefield. What was it that made this one so different that he commented only on this one (and Vicksburg a close second) as a bad mistake on his part?

By the way, he never said it was a mistake on his part. In his memoirs he said, "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained." Horace Porter claimed Grant said, "I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered. I regarded it as a stern necessity, and believed that it would bring compensating results; but, as it has proved, no advantages have been gained sufficient to justify the heavy losses suffered. The early assault at Vicksburg, while it was not successful, yet brought compensating advantages; for it taught the men that they cold not seize the much-coveted prize of that stronghold without a siege, and it was the means of making them work cheerfully and patiently afterward in the trenches, and of securing the capture of the place with but little more loss of life; whereas if the assault had not been made the men could not have been convinced that they could not have captured the city by making a dash upon it which might have saved them many months of arduous labor, sickness, and fatigue."

He never characterized it as a mistake. That's an interpretation placed on it that isn't supported by his actual words.
 
I think that shows another good side to Grant. Not many generals from the war ever admitted to their mistakes. Lee did after Pickett's charge and Sherman admitted fault for I think Kennesaw mountain.
 
Horace Porter is hardly a reliable chronicler in the first place. He fabricated the "reason" why the Overland campaign started with a move downstream from Lee's position. He said in great detail that it was to allow the wounded to be transported by water back north. But that only happened days into the battle, after Grant pulled up the bridges and sent the wounded toward Fredericksburg. The initial route for the wounded was to be by railroad to Washington, and personnel and supplies were set up to accomplish that.

So, when he quoted Grant, on the evening of 6/3, "I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered," he's not necessarily believable (he probably was just embroidering what Grant said in his unreliable Memoirs). This is shown to be the case, in this instance, by contemporaneous evidence. Comstock in his Diary of Cyrus B. Comstock had an entry for June 5th: "General Grant spoke yesterday of ordering another assault today." That hardly sounds like "regret."

Another myth is the one about 3600 U.S. casualties for Cold Harbor. Grant ordered an attack all along the lines, including Warren and Burnside, so there's absolutely no reason not to count their casualties as part of the whole. Gordon Rhea indicates that 6000 U.S. soldiers were killed, wounded or missing that day.
 
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Horace Porter is hardly a reliable chronicler in the first place. He fabricated the "reason" why the Overland campaign started with a move downstream from Lee's position. He said in great detail that it was to allow the wounded to be transported by water back north. But that only happened days into the battle, after Grant pulled up the bridges and sent the wounded toward Fredericksburg. The initial route for the wounded was to be by railroad to Washington, and personnel and supplies were set up to accomplish that.

So, when he quoted Grant, on the evening of 6/3, "I regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered," he's not necessarily believable (he probably was just embroidering what Grant said in his unreliable Memoirs). This is shown to be the case, in this instance, by contemporaneous evidence. Comstock in his Diary of Cyrus B. Comstock had an entry for June 5th: "General Grant spoke yesterday of ordering another assault today." That hardly sounds like "regret."

Another myth is the one about 3600 U.S. casualties for Cold Harbor. Grant ordered an attack all along the lines, including Warren and Burnside, so there's absolutely no reason not to count their casualties as part of the whole. Gordon Rhea indicates that 6000 U.S. soldiers were killed, wounded or missing that day.
Wow! So this actually solidifies the first hour at Franklin as the bloodiest of the war! I always believed the myth of the 6000 in an hour, but I don't study much of the east. I always thought the first hour at Franklin was the worst hour of the war.
 
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Another myth is the one about 3600 U.S. casualties for Cold Harbor. Grant ordered an attack all along the lines, including Warren and Burnside, so there's absolutely no reason not to count their casualties as part of the whole. Gordon Rhea indicates that 6000 U.S. soldiers were killed, wounded or missing that day.

As you cite Rhea as a source, you must also admit that he also argues that the tale of 7,000 down in a matter of minutes to an hour is false. That's what people are discussing.
 
There you go and no one asked you ...
Sit on your own keyboard and continue the de-fense. You're doing great.

I venture to say that this is how a discussion board works. People who wish to comment on a discussion thread log in and use their keyboard (or other input device) to respond to what others have said. I'm unaware that there are special invitations issued as a requirement of participation.

After all, who asked you?

Testy?
 
Sooner or later, I'll log onto this site and find a video showing an over-fed park ranger telling me the wily Union Army was vastly outnumbered by its Confederate foe.

Sure it was, and Cold Harbor never happened. Or, it was just a skinned knee for Grant. Nothing to see here, move along. Whatever.
So, is your take home message that overweight people lack credibility? Now that you mention it, Santa Claus never did come through with the HO train set he promised. You might be on to something.
 
Mike Gorman is very passionate about his work, I enjoyed the video.

The Civil War battlefield changed so rapidly due to technological advances that by the time of Cold Harbor the shovel had become as important to the Southerners as the rifle. Being above ground was too dangerous, so what we have here is the beginnings of trench warfare. Grant was attacking "in line" instead of "line abreast" hoping to punch through Confederate trench works. Those poor fellows in front didn't stand a chance.

When I was a young man, I asked my uncle to tell me about the Battle of Iwo Jima. He said "I can't tell you much son, I had my head buried in the sand most of the time."
 
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As you cite Rhea as a source, you must also admit that he also argues that the tale of 7,000 down in a matter of minutes to an hour is false. That's what people are discussing.

The original post consisted of a video, in which a person who should seemingly know better cites Gordon Rhea as determining that there were 3500 casualties "all day" on June 3, stressing that he means "24 hours." As I stated, Rhea indicated that 6000 U.S. soldiers were killed, wounded or missing that day.

And the real Horace Porter apparently concocted another myth about Grant's "regret."
 
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Both of these statements ... that the entire day cost 6,000 USA losses and that the stories about the cost of the initial assault are wildly exaggerated ... may be true. After all 7,000 is more than 6,000.
 
I have found this discussion fascinating from first to last post. I probably did not give that much thought to Cold Harbor, the numbers who fell, who ordered the attack, what its results actually were other than to conclude from all the sources that I had read that it was a bad day for Union soldiers. This discussion has been a reminder of how very difficult it is to reconstruct the past and arrive at consensus. Once again, though, is there consensus of the total casualties for that battle? When I see repeated reports of some seven thousand, whether inflicted in ten minutes or over the course of a single day, is this "a lie agreed upon" or is it based on after combat reports? Where does this seven thousand come from? Meade's next day estimate, or some after battle compilation by graves registration personnel much later? Where does the battlefield guide get his approximately 50% of that 7, 000 come from? Is it based on his gut feeling or something else. (I once had a national park service ranger give the public a tour wherein he told us that Burnside did a very credible job of planning Fredericksburg and came closer to winning than most people imagine. Maybe, but was that his gut feeing or something else?). By the way, are there any Confederate primary sources about Cold Harbor that support or refute the accepted truisms of the battle?
 
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