So true. Historians, quite aware that the CSA lost the war, continually focus on the anti-Bragg cabal within the officer corps, while rarely writing about the pro-Bragg group. To be honest, I totally understand Jeff Davis' attraction to Bragg. This was the officer who assumed near corps-level command on his own during the chaos of the fighting at Shiloh. He kept up the pressure on the wing where A.S. Johnston wanted to apply the most pressure, and it was Bragg who was trying to make one last push to take Pittsburg Landing at the end of the day. The generals ranking him were noticeable in their comparative lack of initiative or vigor. Then he came up with the Kentucky incursion, which reversed much of the reverses of the spring campaign and took the strategic initiative back for several months. Then the surprise attack at Murfreesboro, then the trap to destroy Rosecrans that his subordinates bungled. It seems Polk's insubordination on the first day at Chickamauga, starting the assault hours behind schedule, seemed to finally make Bragg snap. His ignoring Longstreet that night was totally out of character. The poor defensive lines on Missionary Ridge were inexplicable. That nobody saw the problem is astounding. I have come to regard much of the confederate general staff as grossly unprofessional, the result, I think, of so many of the generals coming from the planter aristocracy, wealthy men accustomed to getting their way, quick to take insult at perceived slights or disrespect, ready to do pretty much anything to get back at those who failed to appreciate them as they felt they deserved. Really toxic, a perfect stew for what resulted -- back biting, quarreling clicks, insubordination and destructive politicking. Bragg definitely had his faults, most stemming from his own personality. Today, the historians focus on the downside to the point they cannot see his value at all. In a way, Bragg was the "orange man bad" of the civil war. The caricature became the narrative.