Movements of Generals – Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock on July 3

Tom Elmore

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The below chronological sequence of events describe interactions of participants with Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock on July 3. They highlight his energy and decisiveness up until the time of his wounding in the mid-afternoon. For a similar description on Hancock’s battlefield activities for a portion of the previous day (which together with this post encompasses roughly a 24-hour period), see:

https://civilwartalk.com/threads/mo...s-hancock-july-2-4-9-p-m.126233/#post-1369423

July 2/3, around midnight. Hancock, with Gibbon and Newton, crawled into Gibbon’s personal ambulance close to the Peter Frey house on the Taneytown Road (about 400 yards south of Meade’s headquarters at the Leister cottage). (John Gibbon, Personal Recollections of the Civil War)

July 3, daybreak, about 4:45 a.m. Hancock was on the southern end of his corps line, personally rectifying the alignment of Kelly’s brigade. He positioned the 116th Pennsylvania to support the guns of Sterling’s 2nd Connecticut battery. (St. Clair A. Mulholland, The Story of the 116th Regiment, Pennsylvania Infantry, War of Secession 1862-1865)

July 3, early morning. Hancock appeared and ordered the building of works (which can still be seen today), intimating that rails from fences in front could be used for this purpose. (Major R. H. Forster, Dedication of Monument to 148th Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania at Gettysburg)

July 3, noon. Hancock joined Gibbon for a light lunch behind the 20th Massachusetts. Meade, Newton and Pleasonton arrived in succession. Cigars were lighted afterward. Meade then rode away and the party broke up. (George A. Bruce, The Twentieth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1861-1865)

July 3, 1 p.m. Hancock resumed command of the Second Corps and Gibbon returned to command his division. (Gibbon’s Official Report)

July 3, after 1:10 p.m. Hancock spent part of the cannonade at Meade’s headquarters. (Thomas Livermore, Days and Events 1860-1866)

July 3, around 1:45 to 2 p.m. Hancock rode to Maj. McGilvery’s artillery line and ordered the batteries to commence firing, then returned (multiple sources, including the Official Report of Capt. Patrick Hart)

July 3, about 2:45 p.m. Fifty men of the Second Corps came running past headed to the rear. Hancock turned to his staff, who were following him, and in a tremendous rage cried, “Go after them! Go after them!” (Thomas Livermore, Days and Events 1860-1866)

July 3, about 2:55 p.m. Lieutenant Wheeler’s battery rode south along the Taneytown Road and when near Meade’s headquarters reported to Hancock, who showed him the position he was to take on the ridge (behind and to the left of Battery B, 1st New York). (July 26 letter of Lt. William Wheeler)

July 3, about 3:03 p.m. Hancock was riding past the left rear of the 19th Massachusetts when he checked his horse and pointed toward the clump of trees to the right and front. It was construed (over the din of battle) as an order for the 19th Massachusetts and 42nd New York to run for the trees to prevent the enemy from breaking through. (Lt. Col. Edmund Rice, 19th Massachusetts, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, III: 388) /// “Hancock came riding furiously up. I halted him, pointing out the enemy’s colors crossing the stone wall and asked permission to put my men in there. His prompt direction was to ‘Get in *** **** quick.’” (Col. Arthur F. Devereaux to J. B. Bachelder, The Bachelder Papers, III:1609) /// Hancock shouted, “Now, men, forward! Now’s your chance. Get up and go at them.” (History of the Nineteenth Regiment Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, comp. by Ernest Linden Watt)

July 3, about 3:06 p.m. Hancock conferred with Brig. Gen. Stannard (of the First Corps), intending to order a flank attack on Pickett’s men, however, Stannard had just issued those orders and the 13th Vermont was already on the move when Hancock rode up. (George G. Benedict, The Element of Romance in Military History, Vermont Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States, War Paper, 14 March 1893; reprint Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1994)

July 3, about 3:10 p.m. Hancock was wounded in front of the Union lines near a position indicated by a monument. A large conical (minie) ball had entered his thigh near the femoral artery and lodged in his pelvis, carrying with it a large wrought iron nail from the saddle tree. He was assisted from his horse by two officers on Stannard's staff, but remained upon the ground giving orders until the enemy had been driven from the field. (Brooklyn Eagle, September 30, 1880, which quoted Hancock's AAG, William G. Mitchell)

July 3, about 3:45 p.m. An ambulance was taking Hancock to the hospital. Near the Taneytown Road Hancock insisted the ambulance stop, probably to write a dispatch. At the time “a rebel piece of artillery (it must have been a Whitworth on Oak Hill) was throwing shot and shell down the road every three or four minutes. I suggested we had better move on as the rebels were enfilading our line, to which he replied, ‘We’ve enfiladed them – **** them!’ ” adding that if other troops were only now sent in, they could be routed. (Thomas Livermore, Days and Events 1860-1866)

July 3, about 4 p.m. “Along the (Taneytown?) road in rear of our regiment, our men recognized Hancock’s horse being led in rear of the ambulance in which he was conveyed, and at once rushed to see what casualty had befallen their former commander, whom they literally adored. As Hancock, white and faint, raised his head, they greeted him with wild hurrahs. The old fire came into his eyes, and he said affectionately, ‘Why, this is my old Sixth Maine.’ ” (Charles A. Clark, War Sketches and Incidents, as related by the companions of the Iowa Commandery of the Loyal Legion of the United States, 1898; reprint Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1994)

July 3, after 4 p.m. At the hospital Assistant Surgeon Alfred Thornley Hamilton, 148th Pennsylvania, made a second examination of Hancock’s wound and found a (saddle) nail. (Adjt. J. W. Muffly, ed., The Story of our Regiment, A History of the 148th Pennsylvania Volunteers) (Hamilton was initially assigned to the aid station at the Jacob Hummelbaugh farm but may have attended Hancock at the main Second Corps hospital.)
 
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Thanks for reminding us of this busy day for Hancock- and others. It is surprising to me that we have such a detailed record.
 
Thanks for reminding us of this busy day for Hancock- and others. It is surprising to me that we have such a detailed record.

It also strikes me quite how hands on Hancock was. Specifically shifting regiments... an action that shouldn't really be the job of a Corps Commander, rather that of the Brigade or at a push the Division Commander... and an action which hadn't gone well for John Reynolds but two days before (ok the situation isn't quite the same and yet...).
 
Hancock had two horses shot from under him on day three. The one he was on was when wounded was from an aide.
July 3, about 3:10 p.m. Hancock was wounded in front of the Union lines near a position indicated by a monument. A large conical (minie) ball had entered his thigh near the femoral artery and lodged in his pelvis, carrying with it a large wrought iron nail from the saddle tree.
His original saddle had no nails. Thinking this it was surmised that he had been hit by a nail fired by a reb.
 
Being interested in Hancock, myself (there is a clue to that somewhere:wink:), I have always been a bit confused as to what his command responsibilities were during the Gettysburg campaign. I would be interested in a timeline for that if you have one. For example, in your July 2 post, you say that at 6:35 PM, he took command of the Third Corps. Now was that in addition to the Second Corps? I'm guessing yes, since he continued giving orders to Second Corps units. However, in your July 3 post, you say that at 1 PM, Hancock resumed command of the Second Corps, since Gibbon apparently had it up until then. So what was Hancock's responsibility before 1 PM?
 
Actually it was Meade who put Hancock in temporary charge of the Third Corps (in addition to his own Second Corps) on the early evening of July 2, and Gibbon who spoke of Hancock resuming command of just his own corps on July 3, but it is a good question. At the Council of War on the night of July 2, both Hancock and Gibbon represented the Second Corps, while both Slocum and A. S. Williams represented the Twelfth Corps. Newton represented the First Corps although Doubleday was his senior. I will leave it to others with greater knowledge of this issue to say why this was so. Without having researched the topic, I surmise it was because Meade wanted it that way - it was his prerogative. Hancock after all had been elevated by Meade on both July 1 and July 2 to exercise a more strategic command beyond his own corps, I suppose because he felt Hancock was equal to the emergency. By mid-day July 3 perhaps Meade determined he could discard this temporary expedient and restore the normal corps chain of command.

Of course Hancock was so comfortable running the battlefield that I did chuckle when he didn't think twice about ordering Stannard of the First Corps to attack, or directing Artillery Reserve units. The latter erupted into a major dispute with Hunt that endured into the post-war period.
 
Good for Hunt! The fight I guess is the army's struggle how to coordinate long rang and up close support and who controlled them.
Hooker had attached them to the infantry by and large striping hunt of a command, much to Joe's detriment. Hancock I doubt care's little about any of as he controls darn near everything. Why Lincoln didn't just give Hancock the army to begin with...
 
Actually it was Meade who put Hancock in temporary charge of the Third Corps (in addition to his own Second Corps) on the early evening of July 2, and Gibbon who spoke of Hancock resuming command of just his own corps on July 3, but it is a good question. At the Council of War on the night of July 2, both Hancock and Gibbon represented the Second Corps, while both Slocum and A. S. Williams represented the Twelfth Corps. Newton represented the First Corps although Doubleday was his senior. I will leave it to others with greater knowledge of this issue to say why this was so. Without having researched the topic, I surmise it was because Meade wanted it that way - it was his prerogative. Hancock after all had been elevated by Meade on both July 1 and July 2 to exercise a more strategic command beyond his own corps, I suppose because he felt Hancock was equal to the emergency. By mid-day July 3 perhaps Meade determined he could discard this temporary expedient and restore the normal corps chain of command.

Of course Hancock was so comfortable running the battlefield that I did chuckle when he didn't think twice about ordering Stannard of the First Corps to attack, or directing Artillery Reserve units. The latter erupted into a major dispute with Hunt that endured into the post-war period.

I think that the best way to describe Hancock's role late on July 2 and 3 was as a wing commander. That said, he was a very active wing commander and freely gave orders to whomever was nearby regardless of command authority. That also explains why Gibbon was nominally representing the Second Corps at the council (of course, he also intermittently commanded the corps while Hancock was otherwise disposed even though he was junior to John Caldwell, another Meade command authorization).

Ryan
 
Good for Hunt! The fight I guess is the army's struggle how to coordinate long rang and up close support and who controlled them.
Hooker had attached them to the infantry by and large striping hunt of a command, much to Joe's detriment. Hancock I doubt care's little about any of as he controls darn near everything. Why Lincoln didn't just give Hancock the army to begin with...

To be fair, Hunt did not have a command prior to Hooker taking command. Until the reorganization prior to Gettysburg, the chief of artillery position was an administrative role and Hunt lobbied hard to take a more active role, something which he was given during the Gettysburg Campaign, although he never got the artillery corps organization that he wanted.

Ryan
 
Meade is so confusing. Hancock is not a wing Commander acting as one. Slocum is one and doing nothing. No. Wait. Meade's the man. :wink: if I was Lincoln I would buy the guy a box of snapping turtles.
 
Meade is so confusing. Hancock is not a wing Commander acting as one. Slocum is one and doing nothing. No. Wait. Meade's the man. :wink: if I was Lincoln I would buy the guy a box of snapping turtles.

I think you are being a bit harsh on Meade. He has only just inherited command and the command structure he has to deal with is Hooker's not Meade's... albeit with influence from Burnside and even McClellan in that it was they who were so keen on Wing Commanders. Hooker seems to have been uncertain on the idea but in the run up to Gettysburg he seems to have returned to the idea at least somewhat in that Reynolds commands the left of the advance in a Wing Commander role.

As to Slocum at least some of this seems to have been Slocum's opinion for I have never seen any documentation actually appointing him Wing Commander [Would love to know if there is any]. Admittedly Meade seems to roll with it. Perhaps he preferred the idea of Williams in command of 12th Corps rather than Slocum who by seniority (and seniority alone) is deputy army commander.
 
I think you are being a bit harsh on Meade. He has only just inherited command and the command structure he has to deal with is Hooker's not Meade's... albeit with influence from Burnside and even McClellan in that it was they who were so keen on Wing Commanders. Hooker seems to have been uncertain on the idea but in the run up to Gettysburg he seems to have returned to the idea at least somewhat in that Reynolds commands the left of the advance in a Wing Commander role.

As to Slocum at least some of this seems to have been Slocum's opinion for I have never seen any documentation actually appointing him Wing Commander [Would love to know if there is any]. Admittedly Meade seems to roll with it. Perhaps he preferred the idea of Williams in command of 12th Corps rather than Slocum who by seniority (and seniority alone) is deputy army commander.
My intent has been mistaken. Lincoln sent the last man who fought some liquor. Thus turtles for Meade. Good job was my point.
 
Good for Hunt! The fight I guess is the army's struggle how to coordinate long rang and up close support and who controlled them.
Hooker had attached them to the infantry by and large striping hunt of a command, much to Joe's detriment. Hancock I doubt care's little about any of as he controls darn near everything. Why Lincoln didn't just give Hancock the army to begin with...
He was simply too junior to too many other generals. He began the previous year as a brigadier commanding a brigade on the Peninsula at Williamsburg and only rose to divisional command at Antietam, remaining so through Chancellorsville - Gettysburg was his first time actually leading a corps! All the other corps commanders were his senior at that level, having led them at least as far back as Chancellorsville.
 
I think you are being a bit harsh on Meade. He has only just inherited command and the command structure he has to deal with is Hooker's not Meade's... albeit with influence from Burnside and even McClellan in that it was they who were so keen on Wing Commanders. Hooker seems to have been uncertain on the idea but in the run up to Gettysburg he seems to have returned to the idea at least somewhat in that Reynolds commands the left of the advance in a Wing Commander role.

As to Slocum at least some of this seems to have been Slocum's opinion for I have never seen any documentation actually appointing him Wing Commander [Would love to know if there is any]. Admittedly Meade seems to roll with it. Perhaps he preferred the idea of Williams in command of 12th Corps rather than Slocum who by seniority (and seniority alone) is deputy army commander.

There was a general order that delineated the wing commands but I don't have my ORs available at the moment. It gave Reynolds the Left Wing (First, Third, and Eleventh Corps), Slocum the Right Wing (Fifth and Twelfth Corps), and Sedgwick the Center (Second and Sixth Corps).

P.S.: The wing commands were only supposed to be in effect while on the march but Slocum opted not to give up his role, leaving Alpheus Williams in command of the Twelfth Corps, not unlike Burnside at Antietam.

Ryan
 
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A missed entry:

July 3, 1:07 p.m. At the moment the Confederates opened their artillery cannonade Hancock and Gibbon were together with their staffs at Gibbon’s ambulance in a hollow near the Taneytown road (presumably near the Peter Frey house), where Hancock was dictating an order to Col. Morgan on the distribution of beef to the soldiers. Shells began to fall close to them, and the frightened ambulance horses circled wildly, overturning the ambulance. All of the officers rushed to secure their horses and hastily departed. (Col. Charles H. Morgan, Hancock's Inspector General and Chief of Staff, Bachelder Papers, 3:1360)
 
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