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So far then as General Meade was concerned, the battle of Gettysburg was a pure accident.
Let us see how it was on the other side. In his official report of July 31st, already referred to, General Lee states "that preparations were made to advance upon Harrisburg, but on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout, that the Federal Army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached South Mountain," &c.
In General Longstreet's official report he makes a similar statement: "That on the night of the 28th, one of the scouts came in with the information, that the enemy had passed the Potomac, and was probably in pursuit of us," and in his book, "From Manassas to Appomattox," the scout is described as one who had been employed by him, and that he brought the additional intelligence of Meade's assignment to the command of the Federal army. Colonel Mosby has pointed out the extreme improbability, or as he thinks impossibility, that the scout referred to could have brought the news of Meade's assignment.
The messenger conveying the order of assignment did not reach Frederick until the morning of the 28th, and the order would not be promulgated and become known generally among the troops, so that it could be picked up by a spy until probably late in the day, when it would be next to impossible for a scout in the Federal camps at Frederick to reach Longstreet at Chambersburg the same night. It would appear too, notwithstanding the language of both these official reports, that General Lee must have had some knowledge of Hooker's movements prior to the news brought in by the scout on the night of the 28th. For in his letter to General Ewell, dated June 28, 1863, 7:30 A.M., from Chambersburg, he says, "I wrote you last night stating that General Hooker was reported to have crossed the Potomac, and is advancing by way of Middletown," &c. He adds, "That in that letter he had directed him to return to Chambersburg, or if there were any reason against it, to proceed in the direction of Gettysburg." The information, then, which reached General Lee on the 28th must have been that the column had reached South Mountain and not that it had crossed the Potomac. That it had reached South Mountain, and that up to this time, he had not heard a word from Stuart, doubtless surprised and disturbed him. Two cavalry brigades of Jones and Robertson, which had been left behind on the Potomac, and who were to receive their orders from Stuart, appear to have been still lagging on the banks of that stream, and Robertson only reported on the 2d of July.
General Lee was in a hostile country, and the only information he could pick up was the loose and uncertain news gathered from rumor, and brought to him by scouts. It was of the utmost consequence to him to have accurate and reliable information of the movements of the enemy: As the cavalry are said to be the eyes of an army, General Lee was like a blind man groping in the dark.
As an illustration of the conditions which prevailed at the time with the Confederate forces, the following incident may be mentioned. A number of the artillery horses in the third corps had given out since the march began from Fredericksburg, and there was urgent need for fresh ones to supply their places. Before Fayetteville was reached, Lieut. J. Hampden Chamberlayne of the corps, a brave and resolute officer, was directed by the Chief of Artillery to proceed with a small detachment of men drawn from the several battalions into the country adjacent to the line of march and gather up some draft animals. The lieutenant and most of his men were quickly gobbled up by the hostile cavalry hovering upon the Confederate flanks, and the mishap was only learned through those who escaped.
Up to this time the chief occupation of the army had been gathering in supplies; it now became necessary to concentrate. As soon as positive information was received of General Meade's movements, General Lee issued orders to bring his different corps within supporting distance.
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Early says that orders recalling him were received at York on the 29th. As these came through Ewell, who was thirty miles distant at Carlisle, and Carlisle is about the same distance from Chambersburg, it is probable that Ewell sent orders to Early immediately on receipt of the first letter from General Lee, written the night previous to the 28th. On receipt of General Lee's letters? Ewell, who was about to set out for Harrisburg, having sent forward his engineer to reconnoitre the defenses of that place, recalled his scattered divisions and turned his immense trains to the rear. The latter moved in a continuous stream towards Chambersburg, passing through that place the greater part of the night of the 29th. Johnson's division accompanied these and moved to Green Village, about seven miles from Chambersburg, whence it turned east on the 30th and marched via Scotland towards Gettysburg. The other two divisions of Ewell's countermarched, and Rodes moved, on the 30th, almost due south, about twenty miles to Heidlersburg, nine miles northeast of Gettysburg; and Early moved almost due west to a point three miles distant from Rodes on the road leading to Berlin.
In view of the order to Ewell to return to Chambersburg, and the subsequent order "to proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg as circumstances might dictate," it is a little surprising to find in A. P. Hill's official report, after stating that his corps on the 29th was encamped on the road from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, that he proceeds to say, "I was directed to move on this road, in the direction of York, and to cross the Susquehanna, menacing the communications of Harrisburg with Philadelphia, and to co-operate with General Ewell, acting as circumstances might require," without any mention of change of plan, or the reception of orders other than those originally given. His report proceeds, "accordingly on the 29th I moved General Heth's division to Cashtown, some eight miles from Gettysburg, following on the morning of the 30th with the division of General Pender, and directing General Anderson to move in the same direction on the morning of July 1st. On arriving at Cashtown, General Heth, who had sent forward Pettigrew's brigade to Gettysburg, reported that Pettigrew had encountered the enemy at Gettysburg, (principally cavalry) but in what force he could not determine. A courier was then dispatched with this information to the General commanding, and with orders to start Anderson; also to General Ewell informing him, and that I intended to advance the next morning and discover what was in y front." Heth's division of Hill's corps moved on the 29th from Fayetteville to Cashtown, at the east base of South Mountain, where it remained until the morning of the 1st. Pender's division on the afternoon of the 30th, moved up to the north or west side of the mountain, from which point it moved on the morning of the 1st.
Anderson's division reached Fayetteville on the 27th, where it remained until the morning of the 1st. Longstreet's corps, except Pickett's division, which was left at Chambersburg to guard the rear, was moved on the 30th to Greenwood.
The respective distances of these two corps from Gettysburg on the morning of the 1st was as follows: Heth's division nine miles; Pender's in rear of Heth's a short distance further; Anderson's at Fayetteville, seventeen miles; two divisions of Longstreet's corps, Hood and McLaws at Greenwood, fourteen miles; and Pickett's at Chambersburg, twenty-four miles. General Lee, writing from Greenwood on July 1st to Imboden, who with a force of cavalry had marched from West Virginia and was about joining the army, directs him to relieve Pickett, who was to move forward to Greenwood, and giving further directions says, "You will at the same time have an opportunity of organizing your troops, refreshing them for a day or two and getting everything prepared for active operations in the field, for which you will be speedily wanted. Send word to General Pickett at this place to-morrow, which is eight miles from Chambersburg, the hour you will arrive there, in order that he may be prepared to move on your arrival. My headquarters for the present will be at Cashtown, east of the mountains." This letter does not indicate that Lee regarded an action as then imminent, but the opposing columns must have been almost, if not quite, in contact before the letter was dispatched.
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Captain Cecil Battine, of the 15th Hussars in the English army, who has written a most graphic and intelligent account of the campaign, thinks Hill did not display his usual vim during the first day, and that his actions were characterized by a timidity unusual to one of his intrepid nature, and that he committed a mistake in putting his troops into action by brigades and fighting the battle piecemeal. On the other hand, Colonel Mosby fiercely assails Hill in having departed from General Lee's plan in moving beyond Cashtown. He contends that this place and not Gettysburg was selected by Lee as the point for the concentration of the army, and that Hill and Heth in making the so-called reconnaissance, were acting entirely upon their own initiative, and with a selfish desire to acquire a little glory on their own account. Neither of these criticisms, the one suggesting timidity, the other, charging unauthorized temerity, are deserved. Hill and Heth were both brave and gallant soldiers, and Hill met an honorable death in the face of the enemy in front of Petersburg on April 2d, 1865.
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While Howard was sending urgent messages to his own corps, and to those of Slocum and Sickles, to push on as rapidly as possible, Hill, with another division at hand, permitted Heth to cope single-handed with his antagonists. He was waiting to hear from Ewell. When the latter learned from Hill on the morning of the 1st that he was advancing on Gettysburg, Rodes' division, moving in the direction of Cashtown, was turned to the left at Middletown, and its course directed towards Gettysburg. It was after 2 o'clock when the bright steel barrels of Rodes' men were seen glistening in the sun as his brigades emerged from the woods and deployed on the slopes of Oak Hill. They were none too soon, for Heth's men were well nigh exhausted, and they welcomed the hour of relief. The three leading brigades of Rodes' moved across the slope in splendid style, with ranks evenly dressed, at right angles to Heth's front, with the purpose of taking the enemy in flank and rear. The distance to be traversed was greater than expected, and unexpected obstacles made several changes of direction necessary. Before the enemy was reached, Robinson's division had been moved forward to connect with Wadsworth's right, forming at the junction, the apex of an angle, while Schurz's division was pushed forward on Robinson's right, leaving, however, a gap between.
Iverson's and O'Neil's brigades, sent forward by Rodes, missed their direction, and became involved in much confusion, during which they suffered a flank attack themselves, and met with stunning losses. The remaining brigades fared better and after a severe struggle, succeeded in forcing back their opponents.
The appearance of Rodes was the signal for Pender's advance.
Heth's men opening ranks, Pender's swept through them with extended front and the combatants were again locked in deadly embrace.
The struggle continued as before with varying success. While at its heighth Early with his division came up on Rodes' left. Gordon's brigade made an impetuous charge on Barlow's division, which in general prolongation of Schurz' line, faced north a short distance beyond the town.
Gordon took advantage of a gap between Schurz and Barlow, and after a short struggle, Barlow's division was routed, and the General left for dead upon the field. This was the beginning of the end. The eleventh corps soon gave way and beat a hasty retreat into and through the town, Ramseur, Daniel and Gordon in pursuit.
Pender was meanwhile, hotly engaged, and confronted with the same obstinate resistance and valor, which earlier in the day had withstood for so many hours the Confederate assaults. Wadworth's division in the centre of the first corps, had continued the fight from the time it relieved the cavalry, and now with the assistance of Rowley's and Robinson's divisions was still holding its antagonists at bay. Nothing, however, could finally resist the rushes of Pender's fresh troops, and after many fierce struggles the first corps with its batteries was driven back to Seminary Ridge. Here a last and determined stand was made, and the artillery of the Federals massed in great force. Colonel Perrin, commanding McGowan's brigade, reports that the charge up the hill, which drove the enemy to his last position at Seminary Hill, was made without firing a shot. Here, he says, he received the most destructive musketry fire to which he had ever been exposed, and which for a moment staggered his men, and it looked as if one regiment had been entirely destroyed; that finally piercing the enemy's lines and turning in either direction, he succeeded in taking them in flank and effecting, a complete rout. Two of his regiments reduced to one-half the number they carried into battle, pursued the enemy into the town of Gettysburg, capturing two field pieces and many prisoners. While this was the work of two regiments, a third attacked the forces posted behind a stone fence to the right of the college, which was entirely successful, and made it easy for the remainder of the brigade now coming up to drive the enemy down the opposite slope and across the open field west of Gettysburg. "This (he adds) was the last fight of the day. The enemy completely routed and driven from every point, Gettysburg was now completely in our hands."
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