Morris Island, South Carolina – July 10th, 1863

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1SGDan

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Introduction
The nasty battle for Morris Island, South Carolina in the summer of 1863 was highlighted by the failed attempt of the 54th Massachusetts and other regiments on 18 July. The bold attempt, depicted in the film Glory, is most of whatpeople know about the lengthy fight for control of this island at the head of Charleston Harbor. Sandwiched around the famous attack was a well planned and a well executed amphibious operation, a desperate defense and a successful, if not miserable siege operation. Lost on a stage that was dominated by the great battles occurring at the same time this campaign has been under represented.

Charleston was prominent, and remained prominent throughout the war, in the minds of Union leaders and soldiers as the symbolic seat of the rebellion. To capture the city would have been a coup for the Federals. They, however, never quite dedicated the necessary forces to accomplish that goal. Nevertheless, an effort was made with what was available. The hardships and sacrifices made by the soldiers on both sides during this campaign were incredible in the blistering hot, windswept sands and marshland of the South Carolina coast. Seen as the key to controlling the entrance to the harbor and its defenses Morris Island became the focus of operations there. This short series of posts will deal with the Federal effort to gain a foothold on the island.
 

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Background
Many places on the southern Atlantic seaboard either remained in Union control at secession or fell under Union control shortly thereafter. This was true on the South Carolina coast. In November 1861 a combined operation seized Port Royal and Beaufort. Expansion of this success northward to Folly Island by MG David A. Hunter was made possible by the Confederate abandonment of the Cole Island defenses at the mouth of the Stono River. To control the water traffic at the river and to defend his position on the island a series of works were built at the southern end of Folly Island. These works were manned by soldiers from a brigade of infantry, commanded by BG Israel Vogdes.

The threat to Charleston Harbor should Union troops move northward to James and Morris islands was obvious. It prompted the Confederate command to increase measures to defend these areas. On the northern end of Morris Island at Cumming’s Point Battery Gregg was constructed to guard the ship channel into the harbor and to add protection for Fort Sumter. Additionally Battery Wagner was added at the narrowest part of the island to protect the southern approaches to Battery Gregg. The southern end of the island was fortified by order of MG Beauregard starting March 10th.

A failed attempt to run the guns into Charleston Harbor in April led to a period of stagnation for the Department of the South and the Navy. In the Union high command there was a growing impatience toward the lack of progress being made in the effort to capture Charleston. The local Union commanders had both gone a long way to promote their exit from the theater. The army commander, Hunter, had embarrassed the administration with a local emancipation proclamation designed to increase recruiting in the black regiments he was forming from escaped slaves. Coupled with a failed program of interdiction based on raids on the transportation infrastructure to the city the administration saw fit to relieve him in May of 1863. The naval commander, Samuel Du Pont, also condemned himself. No advocate of operations against Morris Island, he stated;

“I pity the poor soldiers if they ever land there.”

An open blast at administration and navy policies regarding the use of armored monitors completed his departure. He was also excused on June 3, 1863.

To replace the departed Hunter the army turned to the man who had been so successful in the reduction of Fort Pulaski, BG Quincy Gillmore. Gillmore openly campaigned for the position and was rewarded for his enthusiasm by being named commander of the Department of the South. The Navy choice, Admiral Andrew Foote, was a bit less committal towards the mission but nevertheless was named by Secretary of the Navy Welles. Foote’s health almost immediately became an issue. When it was obvious that Foote would be incapable of taking part in an active campaign naval command fell to his hand selected second, John A. Dahlgren. Five days later on June 26, Foote died from complications arising from the infection of a leg wound suffered at Fort Donelson. Dahlgren would arrive to replace DuPont in early July. With the commands in place all that remained was the formation of a plan.
 

1SGDan

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The Plan
MG Gillmore’s success at Fort Pulaski translated into a similar concept in South Carolina. He viewed Fort Sumter as the cornerstone of the Charleston defenses. Gillmore believed that no operations against Charleston could be successful while the fort controlled the entrance to the harbor. He meant to remove the fort by use of massed firepower. Morris Island was an obvious target for his efforts. He wanted batteries placed on Cumming’s Point. This position contained, a Confederate work, Battery Gregg, which supported Fort Sumter at the mouth of the harbor. If the island could be seized this battery could not only be negated as a defensive asset but reversed for bombardment of the fort. Once the fort was removed then the naval assets of Admiral Dahlgren could be turned loose in the harbor. Of course, this would require land based positions within effective range of the fort for the plan to succeed. This would be the first phase of the operation for possession of Morris Island.

Gillmore resolved to turn Folly Island’s northern end into an artillery platform for the support of an invasion of Morris Island. He ordered the construction of batteries to cover the intended target. To maintain a level of secrecy regarding his intentions Gillmore insisted that the new batteries remain masked until they opened. Construction under these circumstances posed a number of difficult problems. The selected location on the very tip of the island became separated from the rest of the island at high tide. Troop rotations and material transportation had to be coordinated with the tidal flows. LT Patrick Maguire of the 1st New York Engineers supervised the development of the works which was done exclusively at night. All work had to be done noiselessly to avoid being detected. The batteries were within easy range of the Confederate batteries on Morris Island and to be detected meant not only the end of secrecy concerning the impending invasion but extreme danger to the work parties. Remarkably ten batteries were built without revealing the Union presence. When the time came they would add the weight of 32 guns and 15 mortars to the operation.

In the second phase Gillmore had to assemble the necessary forces to conduct the attack. The Department of the South had approximately 22,000 men to cover their entire area of responsibility. More than half of these would be called together to execute the operations against Charleston Harbor. These men were formed in two divisions under the leadership of BG Alfred Terry and BG Truman Seymour. Although heavily weighted in favor of the infantry branch the task force also contained 750 engineers and artillery soldiers. Nearly all were veterans.

The intervening water obstacle mandated the cooperation of the Navy. The Union forces gathered boats and barges while Gillmore pleaded with a reluctant DuPont for assistance. For his part DuPont was fearful of pitting his monitors against the Confederate land based batteries. Fortunately his replacement, Dahlgren, arrived to replace the reluctant sailor. With just days to prepare Dahlgren ordered the tugs Dandelion and O. M. Petit to tow the assembled fleet of launches, cutters, and barges north from Port Royal.

Finally a design for the assault had to be generated. Using information about Confederate defenses gathered by chief scout CPT Lewis Payne (100th New York) on several boat trips to Morris Island as a basis Gillmore assembled his plan. Confidential instructions bearing the date 8 July 1863, were as follows:
An attack upon Morris Island will be made at the rising of the moon tonight, by Brig. Gen. Strong's brigade, of Brig. Gen. Seymour's division.

1.This force will be embarked in small boats immediately after sunset, and will pass through Folly Island Creek to and across Light-House Inlet. A small detachment from this force will enter the creek to the west of Morris Island, and will land just north of the old lighthouse, seize the batteries there, and if possible turn them upon the enemy's encampment north of them. The main column will land from Light-House Inlet, carry the batteries on the south end of Morris Island, and advance to the support of the detachment above mentioned. Two regiments and some field artillery will be held in readiness on the extreme north end of Folly Island, to be pushed over as reinforcements. To this end, Gen. Strong will send his boats back as soon as he has disembarked his command.

2. At the same time. Gen. Terry, with all his division except the One Hundredth New York Volunteers, will ascend the Stono under convoy of the navy, and make a strong demonstration on James Island, but will not unnecessarily hazard any portion of his command. Perhaps one or two regiments only need be disembarked. These should be pushed forward as skirmishers, under cover of the navy.

3. A naval force is expected to enter the main channel abreast of Morris Island, by or before sunrise tomorrow morning, to co-operate with the land forces.

4. Should the night attack fail from any cause, the assaulting column will withdraw to Folly Island, sending their boats to Folly Island Creek. In that event the batteries at the north end of Folly Island will open at daybreak or as soon thereafter as practicable. Brig. Gen. Seymour will arrange all the details.
 
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1SGDan

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A Change in Plans
Vigorous preparations were made during the short window of time available. Troops from BG George C. Strong’s Brigade were designated as the spearhead. Three days of rations were prepared and final inspections conducted. Because the assault was planned as a night attack, a band of white flannel was sewn or tied onto the left sleeve of the uniforms as a precaution against friendly fire. Medical teams, headed by Surgeon John J. Craven, established a field hospital on Folly Island. Their efforts were bolstered by the arrival of Clara Barton and the additional supplies she could provide. As darkness fell the troops were marched to the embarkation point on Folly Island Creek only to find no boats.

With everything else in place the one unmanageable variable had intervened. Heavy weather prevented the launches from arriving at the rendezvous point at the appointed time. Even had they done so it was also discovered that the engineers had not yet completed clearing obstacles from the mouth of Folly River.

The job of removing the obstructions was an incredibly difficult task and was probably not allotted enough time to be completed. Again to prevent early detection of activity that might signal the coming attack the work was not begun until the morning of July 8th. COL Edward Serrell, commander of the 1st New York Engineers, described the task;

July 8th – Arrived in Folly River at 10 a.m. Orders were received to remove as many of the piles in the Folly River, as would admit the passage of the largest launches and the large scows. This was done the same night, by sawing them off underwater at a depth of 8 feet below low tide.
A special saw bent in an arc was developed that allowed the work to progress rapidly. The process worked as described by Serrell;

The saw is worked by boring a hole in the pile to be sawed off. At the proper height above water and in this hole, an iron pin is inserted, upon which the saw-frame vibrates. Ropes from the rings at either end of the saw are taken to boats properly anchored, or held, as they were in this case, by sharp pointed poles thrust into the sand at the bottom of the river. At a given signal the ropes are pulled alternately and the saw vibrates. In this way, a pile 10 or 12 inches in diameter was cut off in an average time of from six to seven minutes; including the change from one pile to another, about ten minutes were occupied.

Despite their proficiency not enough piles could be removed in the available time. Gillmore was forced to issue new orders. True to his instructions of the 8th the night time attack was scrapped in new instructions issued to his leaders.

The attack on Morris Island, ordered for this morning, but postponed in consequence of the inclemency of the weather and other unfavorable circumstances, will take place tomorrow morning at break of day, by opening our batteries at the north end of Folly Island.

Gen. Strong's brigade, or so much of it as the small boats can accommodate, will embark tonight and hold itself in Folly Island Creek, ready to move forward and at the proper time occupy the south end of Morris Island.

Lieut. Commander Francis W. Bunce, U. S. Navy, with four navy howitzer launches, will approach Light-House Inlet at daybreak by way of Folly Island Creek, and engage the enemy's rifle-pits and batteries on Morris Island in flank and reverse, choosing his own position. He will cover Gen. Strong's landing.

Two regiments of infantry, a battery of light artillery and five Requa rifled batteries will be held in readiness to reinforce Gen. Strong promptly. Brig. Gen. Seymour will arrange and order all details.

Despite the difficulty with the primary assault the diversionary attack by BG Terry’s forces moved up the Stono River to Sol Legare Island. Elements of the 104th and 52nd Pennsylvania stormed the island and seized the connecting causeways to James Island.
 

1SGDan

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Making their Move
At 2100 on the 9th preparations for the revised assault began. BG Strong marched his brigade back to the embarkation point on the north side of the island. The loading commenced with four companies (A, B, I, and K) of the 7th Connecticut manning the lead boats. The 6th Connecticut trailed followed, in turn, by the remainder of the brigade. By one count 80 boats were loaded but by some miscalculation or shortage the final regiment, 48th New York, could load only four companies (A, C, D, and F). With orders for strict silence the armada of boats pushed off, escorted by Bunce’s armed launches. The boats weaved their way through a maze of back channels until they neared the mouth of the stream at Lighthouse Inlet. There they found the engineers still removing piles to widen the access way. They started the long wait for the signal to begin “under the cover of the tall marsh grasses along the shore.” The boats were so well hidden that one member of the 3rd New Hampshire noted that a peek over the grass revealed “the batteries on Morris Island and the rebel sentinels walking their beats as though no enemy was near.”

Many of the men had severe doubts about crossing open water in fragile craft with the distinct possibility of being engaged by the Confederate artillery and pickets. One member of the7th Connecticut revealed that “when I learned what we were to do my knees shook so that I thought I should drop.” The battalion of the 48th New York feared the passage of the river more than the fight on the other side. Writing in the unit history they remarked;

“We all feared a deal more that we might be drowned in the inlet, than any danger we should meet from the batteries when once our feet were on shore.”

The silent wait magnified the tension. To be discovered at this point would ruin the entire operation. Absolute quiet was the order.

At sea Dahlgren was preparing his vessels for their role in supporting the assault. He would be leading four monitors; Catskill, Nahant, Montauk, and Weehawken into action. The Catskill, serving as flagship, had under gone an overhaul to upgrade the armor plating on the deck and turret. The other vessels were in various stages of upgrade but to be safe Dahlgren ordered the other boats to lay off at a distance. Only the completely improved Catskill would be permitted to engage the Confederate batteries in close. Like the infantry laden boats across Lighthouse Inlet they waited for Gillmore’s signal gun

On Folly Island Gillmore waited until the last possible moment to order the unmasking of the Federal batteries. Calculating the time needed to clear the fronts of the batteries with the anticipated sunrise the order to begin the work was issued at 0415. In a flurry of action with axes and shovels the work progressed rapidly. As the sun started over the horizon the batteries were clear. At 0508 Gillmore ordered his guns to open fire. The sudden barrage caught the Confederate defenders from the 1st and 21st South Carolina Infantry completely by surprise. Some were so unprepared that they rushed to their positions shirtless. After an hour long bombardment, that seem much longer to the men waiting in the boats, BG Strong roared out;

“Forward! Pull, you oarsmen, pull for your lives!”
 
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1SGDan

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“The Very Boldness of the Project”
The preliminary bombardment had fully alerted the Confederate defenders. The boats were caught in open water with the element of surprise gone. Although severely outgunned the Confederate batteries and infantry did their best to respond to the situation. “We then received special notice and their whizzing shot and bursting shell were hurled into our midst.” With grim determination the men at the oars redoubled their effort. For most of the boats the crossing took only about twenty minutes, but a harrowing time it was. One boat (6th Connecticut) was overturned by a shell spewing the human cargo as a “struggling mass” into the water that was “reddened with the blood of the dead and wounded.” Under the onslaught the courage of a few became infectious. In the 3rd New Hampshire boats one officer who had been declared “a martinet” stood firm on the bow of his boat. Others followed his lead and the men rallied to stand “rifles firmly grasped” to form “one solid, courageous unit.”

It is doubtful that the new found fortitude made the rapidly approaching landing site any less gratifying. Some of the men could not wait and jumped from the boats early and into waist deep water. A close blast of artillery caused BG Strong to be one the early departures. He disappeared momentarily causing some concerned as only his floating hat marked the area. He reemerged and waded to shore. One of his boots had been sucked from his foot by the mud of the river bottom. He removed the other and in his stocking feet moved inland waving his sword and shouting “come on brigade.” The7th Connecticut sprang from their boats eager to engage the enemy batteries that were proving a serious annoyance. The first line of rifle pits was seized almost immediately. Companies B and I were advanced while A and K held the works and provided a base of fire. The forward companies entered into a short but vicious fight for the next set of works. Confederate infantry there, led by CPT Charles Haskell of the 1st South Carolina Infantry, fought the invaders hand to hand until Haskell went down mortally wounded. Suddenly the defenses collapsed and began a mad rush rearward toward Battery Wagner.

The suddenness of the Confederate departure was a result of not only the loss of their leader but the appearance of Union soldiers at their flank and rear. Colonel John Chatfield, of the 6th Connecticut, apparently operating on his own initiative did not land his boats at the designated site. Instead, realizing that the enemy guns could not be depressed enough to engage them he had his men pull for the open ocean. At the mouth of Lighthouse Inlet they beached on the southeast corner of the island. The combination of loss of the leadership, fire from the monitors and the unexpected appearance of enemy troops in their rear proved too much; the defenders fled. The Confederate flag bearer was ordered to halt but did not. Unfortunately he could not out run the bullet of PVT Roper Houslow, of Co. D., who dropped him with a bullet to the head and captured the flag which was inscribed “Pocotaligo, Oct. 22, 1862.” The rout was complete.
 
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1SGDan

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Consolidation
Although the flanking move by the 6th Connecticut was in large part responsible for the collapse of the Confederate defense south of Battery Wagner they paid an unexpected price for their success. They had surprised the enemy and their own troops as well. As the 3rd New Hampshire moved around the extreme right of the Confederate works they spotted unidentified troops across the field. The new line of troops “was supposed to be the enemy and a fire was opened on them.” The mistake was soon realized and “cease fire” was ordered. In the chaos of battle the order went unheard. One officer, understanding the danger of the situation, ran down the parapet waving his sword and “kicking their rifles right and left.” The firing stopped and no mention of casualties resulting from the incident was made. Credit for the rout was claimed by every regiment but the 7th Connecticut promoted its case in the official report of CPT Sylvester H. Gray who wrote:

“the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers were first to land, the first in their batteries, and sent their card after Mr. Secesh in the shape of a few 8-inch shells, from a gun which they had just left in good working order.”

Whoever was responsible the result could not be questioned. Taken were 11 pieces of mixed ordnance and 127 prisoners. The troubles for the fleeing defenders were not over. As they neared the relative safety of Battery Wagner the retreating men ran head long into reinforcements that had been sent to their aid. Men from the 7th South Carolina Battalion and 20th South Carolina were dispatched to Morris Island at the first sign of the attack. Landed at Cumming’s Point these men had run nearly the full length of the island. Exhausted they were caught up in the stampede towards Battery Wagner. The entire force became a retreating mob seeking the shelter of Wagner’s walls. Inside the fort at least one Confederate viewed the disorganized men and felt that “only a little dash on the part of the union army would have given them the whole island; all they had to do was press on.”

But press on they could not. The unexpected ease of their initial victory had worked against that aim. The assaulting troops were exhausted by two consecutive nights with little or no sleep and the mad dash after the routed enemy and also disorganized by the rapid turn of events. Their close proximity to Battery Wagner and thus the enemy put them in harm’s way from further shelling so the naval bombardment was stopped. The Confederate guns at Fort Sumter now had them in range and began taking them under fire. Night was falling and the lengthy trip by the boats to get fresh troops over from Folly Island precluded any further action. Any assault would wait for reinforcements.
 

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July 11th Assault on Battery Wagner
While Gillmore struggled to get his reinforcements involved in the fight the Confederate command was succeeding. The Federal diversions had failed to influence the flow of enemy troops into the area. Terry’s James Island incursion had not tied up a significant number of Confederate forces and the second Union diversion, a raid by the 1st South Carolina (US), failed to destroy the railroad bridge connecting Savannah to Charleston. Reinforcements from Savannah came in the shape of a mixed command of Georgians, under Col. Charles Olmstead. Around midnight this command was being ferried to Morris Island. More than 450 men of the 1st Georgia, 18th Georgia Battalion, and the 12th Georgia Artillery Battalion were added to Battery Wagner’s defense. Outside the walls 150 men of the 7th South Carolina Battalion and 20th South Carolina manned the rifle pits as pickets awaiting the anticipated Federal attack. They would not have long to wait.

At 0230 BG Strong ordered a sunrise attack on Battery Wagner. Four companies of the 7th Connecticut, under LTC Daniel Rodman, were selected to lead the assault. As the Union skirmishers moved forward the Confederate pickets, rather than contest the advance, retired down the beach behind a couple of scattered volleys. The well planned move cleared the fields of fire for the batteries in Wagner. The lead companies of the 7th Connecticut were allowed to enter the moat before the guns released a massed barrage. Two fresh follow on regiments, the 76th Pennsylvania and the 9th Maine, were stopped short. The 76th was driven to the ground while the 9th struggled to regain organization after the stunning blasts. The 7th was left unsupported to be devastated by the flood of rifle fire coming from the fort. Col Rodman searched in vain for the expected relief. Caught in the moat they could not move forward and retreat posed no great hope of relief. Grenades and small arms fire continued to pour in on his command. Finally, wounded and seeing no chance for assistance Rodman gave the every man for himself order. Of the 185 men he led into the moat only 88 answered a roll call conducted after the assault. Total Union casualties exceeded 335 men.

A tearful Strong met the retreating survivors with the cry of “Ah, my brave fellows, you deserved a better fate.” The assault had been a miserable failure and the 76th Pennsylvania became the scapegoats. Major J. W. Hicks, in temporary command of the regiment, was accused of directing his attack at the wrong location and losing control of the men under the intense fire. Driven to the ground the unit was slow to recover and never advanced. BG Strong did not hesitate to place blame in his official report of the attack. Writing of the 76th Pennsylvania;

“The causes of their failure, and hence the failure of the assault, were, first the sudden, tremendous and simultaneous fire which all encountered, and second, the absence of their colonel, who was taken ill before the column was put in motion.”

The Confederates were in firm control of the narrow corridor to the northern part of the island. Another 56 days would elapse before Gillmore would have his prize.
 
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Mark F. Jenkins

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I like this series of posts, particularly as I recently finished reading Stephen R. Wise's Gate of Hell myself. One of the most interesting elements of the campaign for Morris Island was the correlation of inter-service cooperation with the success of the campaign; when it was good, there was significant progress, and when it was poor, there were setbacks and catastrophes. The peculiar thing about this is that General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren were among the more scientific and forward-thinking officers of their professions; one would expect that they'd have paid more attention to this, but evidently not.
 

1SGDan

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The Navy provided great fire support but when it came to more aggressive action they proved a bit more reluctant. Dahlgren was eager to assist but putting the precious monitors at risk was asking too much.
 

ExNavyPilot

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Do you recommend "Gate of Hell" for info on this campaign? I'm reading up on the operations in which my ancestor likely saw action. My GG Grandfather, PVT Jacob Minnick, arrived at Folly Island Aug 1st with the 142nd NY Infantry for the follow-on seige efforts. Per Dyers' Compendium, the 142nd NY "[m]oved to Folly Island, S. C., August 1-8. Siege operations against Forts Wagner and Gregg, Morris Island, S. C., and against Fort Sumter and Charleston, S. C., August 9-September 7. Operations against Charleston and duty at Folly Island, Johns Island and Hilton Head, S. C., till April, 1864."
 
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Mark F. Jenkins

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I recommend it without reservations. Wise is a good writer and historian, and he has a remarkable ability to impart a lot of information without overwhelming the reader. :thumbsup:

(He's also a great speaker; heard him address a Marine Corps League "Landing Party Breakfast" a few years back, about the history of Parris Island, where he's the resident historian.)
 

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Conclusion
The amphibious assault on the 10th was a complete success. The Confederate defenses were caught by surprise and routed from the southern end of Morris Island. Only the inability to quickly support the attack prevented the Union troops from seizing the entire island. Given the chance to reinforce the Confederate command made the most of a tactically superior position at Battery Wagner. After the unsuccessful attack on Fort Wagner on the 11th an order to put breaching batteries and mortar batteries in place on the Island was issued. A set of works in front of the Confederate position defending the northern end of the island, Battery Wagner, was improved. On the night of the 12th the first parallel was started. This original position was used as the starting point for the failed assault led by the 54th Massachusetts.

Following the massacre of the 18th Gillmore decided that the advantageous position of Battery Wagner made a successful assault impossible. Already strapped for troops, and denied further reinforcement by Stanton, the losses of the 11th and 18th convinced Gillmore to enter into a siege. To comply with his order 482 engineers of the 1st New York began a line of works against the fort, assisted by 200 members of the 3rd New Hampshire Infantry. Before the end of the campaign thousands would see duty in the trenches of Morris Island. The work here proved slow and more dangerous than expected. It also created an opportunity for the enemy to conduct operations of their own.

The Confederates also suffered a lack of troops and a July 12th leader conference determined that they lacked the necessary resources to drive the Union forces from Morris Island. This however did not preclude operations in other areas. While Federal units and equipment were massed for the effort against Morris Island MG Terry’s forces on Sol Legare became increasingly isolated and vulnerable. On July 16th a Confederate counter-strike drove them from the island and eventually from James Island as well. Nevertheless the siege work and placement of batteries on the southern half of Morris Island continued. On September 7th, realizing the futility of further resistance the island was abandoned by Confederate troops. The fall of Morris Island did not, as anticipated by Gillmore, lead to the collapse of the Charleston defenses.
 

1SGDan

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Bibliography
The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies; Volume 28, Parts I and II
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies; Volume 14
Gate of Hell – Campaign for Charleston Harbor, 1863; Stephen R. Wise
The Third New Hampshire and all about it; Daniel B. Eldredge
Reminiscences of the War of the Rebellion; Elbridge J. Copp
The Old Sixth Regiment: its War Record 1861-5; Charles K. Caldwell
The History of the 48th Regiment of New York State Volunteers in the war for the Union 1861-1865; Abraham J. Palmer
History of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, Hawley’s Brigade , Terry’s Division, Tenth Army Corps , 1861-1865; Stephen W. Walkley Jr.
The Defense of Charles Harbor 1863-1865; John Johnson
Articles
The Federal Attacks on Fort Wagner and Gilmore at Charleston; taken from Field, Fort and Fleet; M. Quad &Henry Whittemore
Military Studies
Confederate Defense of Charleston, South Carolina; LCDR Howard L. Stone III
So rudely sepulchered: the 48th New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment during the Campaign for Charleston, July 1863; LCDR Luis M. Evans
 
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1SGDan

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I would also recommend Wise. The Johnson book also gives an excellent view of the campaign from a Confederate perspective. And the best part is it can be accessed free on google books
 

rhp6033

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"To comply with his order 482 engineers of the 1st New York began a line of works against the fort, assisted by 200 members of the 3rd New Hampshire Infantry. "

Just out of curiosity, how many men would have been in an engineer's regiment? Usually I see only a handful of engineers in an entire army, who directed the projects and the army commander would assign work details to provide the labor. The 1st New York Engineers seem to be much more on the more modern model, a self-sustaining unit individuals trained in the handling of specific tools and accouterments necessary to perform any task required.
 
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