Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)

JAGwinn

Retired User
Joined
Jun 13, 2016
Messages
734
Location
Bloomington, IL Corvette Gold
#1
the report is here, on the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...nce/kent-csi/vol10no3/html/v10i3a09p_0001.htm



Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95​
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A review of information on enemy forces available to the commanders in the first campaigns of the Civil War, its sources and how it was used.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63
Edwin C. Fishel
Part I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg
The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.
 

(Membership has it privileges! To remove this ad: Register NOW!)
Joined
May 27, 2011
Messages
16,613
Location
los angeles ca
#2
the report is here, on the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...nce/kent-csi/vol10no3/html/v10i3a09p_0001.htm



Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95​
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A review of information on enemy forces available to the commanders in the first campaigns of the Civil War, its sources and how it was used.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63
Edwin C. Fishel
Part I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg
The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.
Per T.J. Stiles " Jesse James last Rebel of the Civil War" General Rosecrans was well aware of General Price's upcoming invasion of Missouri and made excellent preparations to defeat Price.
Leftyhunter
 
Joined
May 27, 2011
Messages
16,613
Location
los angeles ca
#3
the report is here, on the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...nce/kent-csi/vol10no3/html/v10i3a09p_0001.htm



Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95​
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A review of information on enemy forces available to the commanders in the first campaigns of the Civil War, its sources and how it was used.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63
Edwin C. Fishel
Part I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg
The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.
Also to be fair to ACW commanders there has been no shortage of intelligence failure's in the US and other militaries up to and including the present era. The CIA not an exception to intelligence failure's.
Leftyhunter
 
Joined
May 27, 2011
Messages
16,613
Location
los angeles ca
#4
Maybe @Pat Young or @ForeverFree would have information on the spying activities of Harriet Tubman.
Per Margret Storey's book on Unionists in Alabama both General Thomas and Dodge gave aid to and received information from Unionist guerrillas in Alabama.
Leftyhunter
 

Tom Elmore

Sergeant Major
Member of the Year
Joined
Jan 16, 2015
Messages
2,335
#5
I would tend to agree in terms of a systematic approach to intelligence gathering and integration. Cavalry was properly tasked with gathering tactical intelligence on enemy movements, strength, etc. The bigger problem in my mind was the absence of analysts who could sift through what information was available to evaluate the data, and sift the wheat from a lot of chaff. However, the constant throughout history is that human nature accepts that which accords with previously held beliefs, and ignores/dismisses what does not.
 
Joined
Nov 27, 2018
Messages
972
Location
Chattanooga, Tennessee
#6
Before the war began, Robert B. Morse created a signal cipher with the use of flags, and the men in the signal corps were sworn to uphold its secrecy. When the war broke out one particular officer defected to the south and at the battle of Bull Run used those signals to allow Evans to know he was being flanked at Sudley Springs. Can anyone name the officer?
Lubliner.
 

USS ALASKA

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Mar 16, 2016
Messages
4,037
#7
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Bureau of Military Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign.
Author; DeLew, Christopher
Branch/Country; United States Army

Abstract; This military historical study investigates the effectiveness of the Bureau of Military Information during the Chancellorsville Campaign. The thesis examines the all-source information provided to the Federal army commander during the planning and operational phases of the battle, while scrutinizing the accuracy, timeliness, and relevance of the intelligence collected by this organization. The effectiveness of Colonel Sharpe's bureau is also analyzed by the modern intelligence doctrine standards of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. This paper highlights the history of early Civil War intelligence efforts in the east and west, and the organization of General Hooker's secret service after he took command of the Army of the Potomac. The Battle of Chancellorsville served as the bureau's first test in supporting the Union war effort, and this project studies the information collected by the staff section from mid-February to early May 1863. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from this period indicates the Bureau of Military Information proved its worth to the Union army. The lessons learned from this staff section were not reinstated until the United States Army established a professional Military Intelligence Corps decades after the Civil War. The bureau established a framework for future intelligence organizations, beginning with the Chancellorsville Campaign.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Focus Program; Military History
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2017-06-09
Date; Digital 2017-06-09
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2017-07-25
155

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

Joined
Nov 27, 2018
Messages
972
Location
Chattanooga, Tennessee
#8
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Bureau of Military Intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign.
Author; DeLew, Christopher
Branch/Country; United States Army

Abstract; This military historical study investigates the effectiveness of the Bureau of Military Information during the Chancellorsville Campaign. The thesis examines the all-source information provided to the Federal army commander during the planning and operational phases of the battle, while scrutinizing the accuracy, timeliness, and relevance of the intelligence collected by this organization. The effectiveness of Colonel Sharpe's bureau is also analyzed by the modern intelligence doctrine standards of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. This paper highlights the history of early Civil War intelligence efforts in the east and west, and the organization of General Hooker's secret service after he took command of the Army of the Potomac. The Battle of Chancellorsville served as the bureau's first test in supporting the Union war effort, and this project studies the information collected by the staff section from mid-February to early May 1863. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from this period indicates the Bureau of Military Information proved its worth to the Union army. The lessons learned from this staff section were not reinstated until the United States Army established a professional Military Intelligence Corps decades after the Civil War. The bureau established a framework for future intelligence organizations, beginning with the Chancellorsville Campaign.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Focus Program; Military History
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2017-06-09
Date; Digital 2017-06-09
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2017-07-25
155

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Wow thanks @USS ALASKA, this is incredibly helpful for reviewing. I have it downloaded for some free time. I can test it against the Buell Commission to measure validity, lucidity, and harmony.
Lubliner.
 

USS ALASKA

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Mar 16, 2016
Messages
4,037
#9
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Topographical intelligence and the American Civil War.
Author; Nettesheim, Daniel D.

Abstract; This study analyzes the organizational approaches to meet topographical intelligence needs which evolved in the major Federal armies during the Civil War. Research reveals that a topographical problem existed in 1861 which had significant impact on Federal operations early in the war. The primary cause of inadequate military maps was the focus of the Corps of Topographical Engineers from 1816 to 1860. National leaders, as well as many Army generals and the military engineers themselves, supported strong emphasis on civil works and internal improvement. The nature of the war placed a premium on the North's need for maps. The geographic size of the theater and strategies of opposing commanders were key factors in determining the necessary degree of map detail. Three distinct approaches to the map problem emerged. In the East where large-scale maps were most important, little was accomplished by the Army of the Potomac as engineers were horded on the army-level staff and employed without functional distinction. This approach was consistent with precedence and pre-war doctrine. In the West, Grant decentralized his meager engineer assets in the Army of the Tennessee. His directives fostered centralized control and engineer focus on map work during critical phases of his campaigns with favorable results. Only the Army of the Cumberland developed a formal topographical organization extending from army to brigade level. Its system, with specialization as the cornerstone, was clearly superior to those of the other armies. Ironically, the formal merger of the two engineer corps in 1863 masked the system and reasons for its origin and success, many of which transcend the American Civil War.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1978-06-09
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 057970
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date; created 2008-08-27
187

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

USS ALASKA

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Mar 16, 2016
Messages
4,037
#10
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Tactical intelligence in the Army of the Potomac during the Overland Campaign.
Author; Morgan, Todd T.

Abstract; This study examines how Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant and the Army of the Potomac used tactical intelligence during the Overland Campaign. Although Grant did not achieve his operational objective to defeat General Robert E. Lee in the field, tactical intelligence allowed him to continue the operational maneuver of the Army of the Potomac, which later contributed to the eventual defeat of Lee in April of 1865. The examination of tactical intelligence in the Army of the Potomac covers the period of 4 May to 12 June 1864. It encompasses campaign planning and preparation, as well as the battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania Court House, North Anna River, and Cold Harbor. The study combines a general contextual overview of the campaign and battles with a focused discussion and analysis of tactical intelligence collection and use. The study also includes background discussion of influences that contributed to the lack of intelligence functions in the War Department and the Union Army, the intelligence organizations that emerged in the Army of the Potomac, and description of the primary forms and methods of tactical intelligence collection used during the campaign.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : U.S. Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2004-06-17
Date; Digital 2004-06-17
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2005-04-01
223

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

USS ALASKA

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Mar 16, 2016
Messages
4,037
#12
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Blame game: federal intelligence operations during the Chickamauga Campaign.
Author; Shelton, Paul A.

Abstract; This thesis examines intelligence operations conducted by Major General Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland during the initial phases of the Chickamauga Campaign (11 August to 16 September 1863). The thesis methodology is a detailed analysis of all intelligence reports received by the headquarters and a detailed examination of all outgoing correspondence from the headquarters intended to identify the analytical process used and the impact of intelligence on Rosecrans’ decision making during the campaign. The record shows that contrary to popular historical opinion there was significant intelligence available indicating the probable Confederate course of action. General Rosecrans and his staff actively discounted information that did not conform to their pre-conceived expectation or template of the enemy with tragic results for the Army of the Cumberland. This thesis highlights several timeless lessons of relevance to the modern military officer: the importance of focused intelligence collection operations, the requirement for clear thinking and disciplined analysis of intelligence reporting, the dangers of over-confidence and preconceptions, the hazard of focusing on one’s plan instead of the enemy, and the importance of avoiding “group-thinking” among a staff.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2000-06-02
Date; Digital 2000-06-02
Call number; ADA 384048
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2006-02-27
259

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

trice

Lt. Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
Messages
11,462
#13
the report is here, on the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...nce/kent-csi/vol10no3/html/v10i3a09p_0001.htm



Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95​
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A review of information on enemy forces available to the commanders in the first campaigns of the Civil War, its sources and how it was used.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63
Edwin C. Fishel
Part I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg
The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.
The basis for Fishel's The Secret War for the Union: The Untold Story of Military Intelligence in the Civil War, published in 1996, based on files the author found in the National Archives in 1959. Fishel died in 1999, age 84.
 

USS ALASKA

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Mar 16, 2016
Messages
4,037
#14
Collection; School of Advanced Military Studies Monographs
Title; Grant's final campaign : intelligence and communications support.
Author; Elley, Ben L.

Abstract; This monograph reviews Ulysses S. Grant's approach to conducting the final campaign to end the Civil War. Grant's assumption of command of all Union Armies in March 1864 marked the beginning of this campaign. This date sets the stage for documenting what type of intelligence structure existed and how communication supported the transmittal of intelligence to make this campaign a success. The monograph first examines Grant's early military background to determine how his past may have shaped his views and impacted on his use of intelligence. Next, the type of intelligence organization that existed in the Civil War is established along with a discussion of the role of the “signal corps” in the collection and transmission of intelligence.Finally, the methodology used to collect, analyze, and transmit intelligence by Grant is reviewed through a brief look at the final campaign beginning with the Battle of the Wilderness through the surrender of the Confederate Army. A conclusion centering on lessons learned of significance to today's military is offered. The Union Army lacked a national level intelligence organization to direct the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. This shortfall was overcome through the efforts of Grant, his staff and commanders, and the use of the "signal corps." The signal corps provided the telegraph as a tool for transmitting intelligence and also became the focal point for much of the analysis and direction for the intelligence collection effort. Lastly, Grant's understanding of the need for intelligence in operational planning set the stage for insuring the connectivity between battle commanders and intelligence analysts in directing the collection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. This connectivity is essential for the planning and waging of successful campaigns.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC), School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) Monograph
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date Original; 1992-04-29
Date Digital; 2007
Call number; ADA 252037
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2007-10-23
340

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments




(Membership has it privileges! To remove this ad: Register NOW!)
Top