JAGwinn
Retired User
- Joined
- Jun 13, 2016
- Location
- Bloomington, IL Corvette Gold
the report is here, on the CIA website: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...nce/kent-csi/vol10no3/html/v10i3a09p_0001.htm
Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)
OFFICIAL USE ONLYA review of information on enemy forces available to the commanders in the first campaigns of the Civil War, its sources and how it was used.
Part I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg
The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.
Military Intelligence 1861-63 (Part I)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
18 SEPT 95
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 1861-63
Edwin C. FishelPart I. From Manassas to Fredericksburg
The intelligence officer who has a due regard for his own morale will do well to pass over the history of the American Civil War. In that vast literature are many accounts of critical decisions in which intelligence is given only an incidental role or none at all. If a piece of intelligence is prominently cited, there is often an implausibility about it: it does not seem strong enough, or relevant enough, to account for the decision taken. When clearly decisive intelligence does appear, it is likely to seem more an act of God than the result of organized effort. The tall-tale memoirs of Union and Confederate spies only add new disappointments: they avoid the relationship between espionage and military events so determinedly as to reinforce the suspicion that maybe intelligence was a business of little substance and effect.