Mexico's Role in Subverting the Union Blockade

It was, but the port capacity and remoteness significantly reduced its utility; it was never anywhere near the volume that Wilmington, North Carolina, did, for instance.

Now, Wilmington, there's a site of real strategic importance. The Union failure to move against the city earlier in the war quite possibly prolonged it.
 
I guarantee you that far more went into and out of Wilmington in that same time period, and was much more likely to impact the military operations in the East.
 
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Title of thread immediately made me think of these; excuse me I gotta RUN
 
I guarantee you that far more went into and out of Wilmington in that same time period, and was much more likely to impact the military operations in the East.
My original point was that the Brownsville, Montomoros, Bagdad nexus played a critical role in subverting the Union blockade. The nitpicking is that no weaponry from Bagdad ended up in the East. I did provide a source that the weaponry reached all parts of the Confederacy. Even if most of the weapons only stayed in the West that is still a successful subverting of the blockade.
So my point still stands and I documented it.
Leftyhunter
 
Sorry if i might derail this thread a bit, but at least the Imperial Mexican Navy would not be a problem for the Union Navy if there was any Imperial Mexican Navy from the four years the Second Mexican Empire existed.
 
Sorry if i might derail this thread a bit, but at least the Imperial Mexican Navy would not be a problem for the Union Navy if there was any Imperial Mexican Navy from the four years the Second Mexican Empire existed.

As I recall, the "Texican" navy inflicted a defeat on their Mexican counterparts in the War of Independence in 1836.
 
Well Lefty, how much material got out of Texas once the United States forced the Confederacy to take up the railroad east of Shreveport?
Once Farragut returned to the Mississippi and Porter had gunboats and barges below Vicksburg, it took weeks just to get a letter from Richmond to Texas, if my memory serves me correctly.
There were three steps to isolate Texas. Take New Orleans, control the Mississippi, close Mobile Bay to blockade runners.
With those three things accomplished Confederate resistance in the west disintegrated.
 
The problems related to Wilmington related to taking Charleston first, which never happened, the nature of Fort Fisher, one of Lee's successes, and the Albermerle.
Until Cushing's heroics, the US Navy was not confident of operating in North Carolina.
Grant did the next best thing and cut the Weldon railroad.
 
Well Lefty, how much material got out of Texas once the United States forced the Confederacy to take up the railroad east of Shreveport?
Once Farragut returned to the Mississippi and Porter had gunboats and barges below Vicksburg, it took weeks just to get a letter from Richmond to Texas, if my memory serves me correctly.
There were three steps to isolate Texas. Take New Orleans, control the Mississippi, close Mobile Bay to blockade runners.
With those three things accomplished Confederate resistance in the west disintegrated.
My point was that for a while in fact at least two and a half years Mexico did indeed play a strategic critical role in subverting the Union blockade.
I have documented that any where from 70 to 300 large ( not little blockade runner's) ships lay off the shore of Bagdad awaiting shipments. I documented that the Lincoln Administration was very concerned about Mexico's role in subverting the Union blockade.
What happened to Brownsville happened to all major Confederate ports, it was captured. By the time the Union withdrew as you mentioned the Confederacy lacked the ability to receive supplies from Texas and was in dire straits.
Leftyhunter
 
That is acceptable. Makes sense.
It took Lincoln awhile to realize that only the ports with railroad connections made a difference.
And it took awhile to realize "one war at a time" applied to the French also. :wink:
 
That is acceptable. Makes sense.
It took Lincoln awhile to realize that only the ports with railroad connections made a difference.
And it took awhile to realize "one war at a time" applied to the French also. :wink:
70 to 300 large ships off the coast of Bagdad plus bales of cotton as far,as the eyes can see. No Bagdad was a very important and busy port. Railroads were not everything.
Leftyhunter
 
Here is the Secretary of the Navy's General Instructions to the blockading squadrons in regards to the "right of search" and I believe the first time the U.S. authorized seizures under the "continuous voyage" doctrine:

General instructions from the Secretary of the Navy to Flag-officers commanding blockading squadrons, regarding the right of search.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, August 18, 1862.
SIR: Some recent occurrences in the capture of vessels and matters pertaining to the blockade render it necessary that there should be a recapitulation of the instructions heretofore from time to time given, and also of the restrictions and precautions to be preserved by our squadrons and cruisers.

It is essential in the remarkable contest now waging that we should exercise great forbearance with great firmness and manifest to the world that it is the intention of our Government, while asserting and maintaining our own rights, to respect and scrupulously regard the rights of others. It is in this view that the following instructions are explicitly given:
First. That you will exercise constant vigilance to prevent supplies of arms, munitions, and contraband of war from being conveyed to the insurgents, but that under no circumstances will you seize any vessel within the waters of a friendly nation.

Secondly. That, while diligently exercising the rights of visitation on all suspected vessels, you are in no case authorized to chase and fire at a foreign vessel without showing your colors and giving her the customary preliminary notice of a desire to speak and visit her.

Thirdly. That, when that visit is made, the vessel is not then to be seized without a search carefully made so far as to render it reasonable to believe that she is engaged in carrying contraband of war for or to the insurgents and to their ports directly, or indirectly by transshipment, or otherwise violating the blockade, and that if, after visitation and search, it shall appear to your satisfaction that she is in good faith and without contraband, actually bound and passing from one friendly, or so-called neutral, port to another, and not bound or proceeding to or from a port in the possession of the insurgents, then she can not be lawfully seized.

Fourthly. That, to avoid difiiculty and error in relation to papers which strictly belong to the captured vessel, and mails that are carried, or parcels under official seals, you will, in the words of the law, preserve all the papers and writings found on board and transmit the whole of the originals unmutilated to the judge of the district to which such prize is "ordered to proceed,” but official seals, or looks, or fastenings of foreign authorities are, in no case or on any pretext, to be broken, or parcels covered by them read by any naval authorities, but all bags or other things covering such parcels and dnly sealed and fastened by foreign authorities will be, in the discretion of the United States officer to whom they may come, delivered to the consul, commanding naval officer, or legation of the foreign government, to be opened upon the understanding that whatever is contraband or important as evidence concerning the character of a captured vessel will be remitted to the prize court, or to the Secretary of State at Washington, or such sealed bag or parcels may be at once forwarded to this Department, to the end that the proper authorities of the foreign government may receive the same without delay.

You are specially informed that the fact that a suspicious vessel has been indicated to you as cruising in any limit which has been prescribed by this Department does not in any way authorize you to depart from the practice of the rules of visitation, search, and capture prescribed by the law of nations.
Very respectfully,
GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

O.R. of the Union and Confederate Navies,Series 1, volume 7, pp. 656-657 United States.
 
Regardless of the documentation submitted, the Brownsville/Matamoros route was never a strategically vital one to the Confederacy. A hole in the blockade, it certainly was, for a number of reasons; but the war was not going to be won by the Union's closing the Rio Grande. The Mississippi and Wilmington were many times over more strategically-important targets.
 
More information about the importance of Mexico's role in subverting the Union blockade can be read online for free from JSTOR.
www.jstor.org
The following information is from the Southwest Review"The Neutral Matamoros trade, 1861-1865
Michael Smith
Vol 37 No4 autum 1952 p.319-324.
Published by Southetn Methodist University
P.320
The leaders of the Confederacy certainly believed even after the fall of New Orleans that wagon trains originating from Mexico could reach the Confederacy. Davis,spoke of stocking the Trans-Mississippi with supplies,and fighting from there should Eastern areas be lost.
A lot of information on the confused political situation in Mexico and Confederate difficulties in establishing diplomatic relation in a very turbulent nation.
P.323
The federal government had agents in London to spy in the British firm of Bennet and Wake and alerted the U.S. Navy to intercept their shipments to Mexico.
The author contends on p.324 that overall the Confederacy failed to fully exploit the Mexican connection due to their "poor planning,chaotic financing, conflict of authorities,and compltion of agencies so often found in the annals of Confederate activities".
So we have differet sources that say different things about Mexico's role in subverting the Union blockade.
Leftyhunter
 
At the risk of being tarred and feathered I'll toss this into the mix.
1. The materials brought in via Matamoros proved more valuable to the civilian population and industries versus ordnance.
2. Matamoros was a darned inconvenient spot to ship cotton overland. It wasn't just the issue of wagons and stock to haul the goods in a period of severe drought, there was also the issue of cotton presses. There were two I've found along the Rio Grande. Unpressed cotton ran about 250 lbs, pressed cotton about 465 lbs per bale. We're talking about a commodity sold by weight and how much you could pack into the ship. There was also the issue of getting the goods off the beach at Bagdad and out to the shipping anchored off-shore. There were oared "ferries", usually flagged in Mexico, but the mouth of the Rio Grande could be very dangerous and a number of boats and lives were lost trying a direct delivery from Brownsville and later White's Ranch. There were a limited number of river steamers, but a many of the originals had been appropriated by the Union Army in 1863.
3. Although clever attempts at hiding munitions were attempted (half barrels of flour with the powder in the lower half), you still had to bribe your way across the river into Texas and then ship it overland.
4. Runs into the Brazos, Galveston and Sabine were potentially more productive in terms of reduced times for trans-shipment.
5. One factor that is generally overlooked is that Galveston didn't receive much traffic from steamers until Mobile fell. The hauling capacity of the new steamers diverted to Texas actually exceeded the capacity of the Texas RRs and steam presses to supply the pressed bales needed for export. Sail driven runners had hauled very small cargoes from the beginning of the war.
6. You can argue the importance of Texas imports and exports to supply the Trans-Mississippi, but after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson the possibility of moving bulk amounts of goods was limited and the time factor critical due to Union patrols. It made a lot more sense to run goods into Wilmington, and the failure to reinforce that point in the Winter of 1864/65 was nothing short of criminal. There were also plans to open us a route from Havana to the Suwanee River in Florida. Just how they would move goods on to other parts of the Confederacy is a question.
 
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