Meade vs Thomas, Who Was Better?

Meade vs Thomas, Who Was Better?

  • Meade

    Votes: 13 39.4%
  • Thomas

    Votes: 20 60.6%

  • Total voters
    33
Again, this really doesn't bear on Meade versus Thomas.


I think, to the extent that Meade, in contrast to Thomas, was exposed to the concept of failure much more often , that, I think would have worn on the confidence of one compared to the other...don't you?
 
I guess the counter is that the West was the easier theater. Lee and the AoNV was just a different animal from what was encountered in the West.


The war was easier, in the event, only because there were generals willing to seek out and destroy the enemy armies, i.e., once engaged in fighting, it turned out the confederate soldiers and armies were Not in any war superior to the Union's. But, to find it out, you had to fight them. Something, Thomas, I am sure, took to hear, from direct observation.
 
I think, to the extent that Meade, in contrast to Thomas, was exposed to the concept of failure much more often , that, I think would have worn on the confidence of one compared to the other...don't you?
Maybe. Maybe not. Thomas seems to have been frustrated for much of his career that he did not get independent command, until he was placed in charge at Nashville with orders to assemble one.
 
I seem to recall that during the post Gettysburg campaign, one of Meade's engagements led to the loss of Lee's Winter Camp. No small inconvenience.



Perhaps, but, was taking strategic points, while avoiding the enemy main body, winning the war in the East? Lincoln was looking for fighting Generals, not, necessarily, skillful ones.
 
Maybe. Maybe not. Thomas seems to have been frustrated for much of his career that he did not get independent command, until he was placed in charge at Nashville with orders to assemble one.


Part of Meade's problem, was that from his experience, he had no confidence that his Army could defeat Lee on the offensive. Thomas,, from his experience had no doubt that his Army could defeat the enemy, on the offensive and defensive, as required by circumstances. That is not necessarily Meade's fault, but, it does, I think, largely explain how that fact, would lead to Thomas being a more confident leader, when ordered to seek and destroy the enemy.
 
That could be. My bias is that the AoP was the best Union army and fought the best Confederate army.

Illinois man that I am I often think that at the very end of the war the armies of the James and the Potomac were the best of the war, but only at the very end, with all new corps commanders since May of 64 and with Ord in command of the James army and Sheridan being a general, what, task force commander? Go to guy?
 
Westerner that I am I often think that at the very end of the war the armies of the James and the Potomac were the best of the war, but only at the very end, with all new corps commanders since May of 64 and with Ord in command of the James army and Sheridan being a general, what, task force commander? Go to guy?

That's a fair point I don't think the AoP corps commanders of 62 were particularly skilled. Overall though I still lean towards the AoP being the best fighting force of the war. It might be worth another thread to discuss it, I'd be curious to see what people say.

You describe your bias correctly. The Army of the Tennessee was a better army than the Army of the Potomac.

I'm confused what you mean? Are your opinions unbias?
 
You describe your bias correctly. The Army of the Tennessee was a better army than the Army of the Potomac.



I agree. But, I attribute a lot of that(not all) to the AoP's lackluster(uninspired and uninspiring) corps of senior commander's especially from 1863 thru 1865.

To me, it is a sign of just how good, Grant and Meade were, that they were able to as much as they did from that group.
 
First, of all, did Thomas travel to Nashville over the same route as Schofield? If he did not how was he to know the bridge at Franklin was missing?

Second, as stated by Schofield, he had no intention of fighting for Franklin at all. He had just escaped disaster at Spring Hill and was high-tailing it to Thomas as soon as he possibly could. Thomas had no need to reinforce Schofield to defend Franklin, because he no intention of defending it(despite Thomas' request to do so if he could)

Third, Hood attacked prematurely because even as his Army was arriving at Franklin, he could see that the bridge had been repaired and the Union forces were already crossing the river, even as he watched. If Schofield's retreat was to be stopped, he had to attack immediately. If Hood wanted Franklin, he could had it for nothing in a few hours...if that was what he wanted.

As already noted, it is a false assumption that Thomas inherited a field army ready for active campaigning at Nashville. Schofield's force was to be the solid vertran core of the Army that Thomas was in the process of forming,
Schofield had telegraphed Thomas 2 days before Franklin to have the Harpeth bridged. Thomas did not do this, and told Schofield to do it himself using pontoons from Columbia which Schofield did not possess.

I agree that Schofield was not planning to fight at Franklin, and if Thomas had the bridges ready, there would have been no battle.

Schofield was also critical of Thomas for not concentrating the forces he did have on hand. Sherman had told Thomas to concentrate immediately and not to get his forces get attacked in detail. Thomas waited too long to get Steedman and Granger into the fray.

Schofield should not have been left hanging out to dry like that. Thomas had been ordered by Sherman to personally command in battle against Hood, and yet there at Franklin, in the most significant fighting against Hood, Thomas remained an hours train ride away in Nashville.
 
My opinion that the Army of the Potomac was the better force rests on the fact that they held off the strongest Confederate army of the war and the best senior officers Lee, Jackson, Longstreet. They went through great trials by fire in the Seven Days and Gettysburg but emerged intact. Despite some setbacks they ended up winning the war in the East and taking out the leading Confederate army.

McMurray's book below makes a good case that the AoNV was the best of the war when compared to Western CSA. I think Longstreet's preformance at Chickamauga shows just how effective the AoNV units were:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0807845698/?tag=civilwartalkc-20
 
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Thomas's scheme in Tennessee worked. He organized his reinforcements at Nashville while Schofield went out with the veteran 4th and 23rd Corps, a very formidable force, to keep in eye on Hood and possibly hold him at bay. Thomas could reasonably expect Schofield to be up to the job. Having been given commmand how Thomas went about working and delegating was his business.

So anyway, Schofield retreats back to Nashville, inflicting heavy losses on Hood. Thomas organizes his new army, which has elements of all three main western armies, and goes out and whips Hood. Success. Pretty good job.
 
Schofield had telegraphed Thomas 2 days before Franklin to have the Harpeth bridged. Thomas did not do this, and told Schofield to do it himself using pontoons from Columbia which Schofield did not possess.
I agree that Schofield was not planning to fight at Franklin, and if Thomas had the bridges ready, there would have been no battle.
Schofield was also critical of Thomas for not concentrating the forces he did have on hand. Sherman had told Thomas to concentrate immediately and not to get his forces get attacked in detail. Thomas waited too long to get Steedman and Granger into the fray.
Schofield should not have been left hanging out to dry like that. Thomas had been ordered by Sherman to personally command in battle against Hood, and yet there at Franklin, in the most significant fighting against Hood, Thomas remained an hours train ride away in Nashville.



While it might be natural for Schofield to assume the war revolved around him and his force. Thomas as Commander of the whole Army he was forming, might be forgiven if he had decided a professional like Schofield and his vetran force, might be able to take care of themselves, without holding their hands, over every difficulty they ight face.. In the end, i think Thomas showed himself the master of the situation, assigned him, even his estimation of the abilities of Schofield and his force.
 
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Here is how the Grant-Thomas relationship is described in Education in Violence:

"The reasons for Thomas's aloofness have never been revealed. Personal relations between the two had been strained during the Corinth campaign and seem to have worsened sense. Thomas's feeling was so marked that it was adopted by his staff as a model for their official relations with Grant's headquarters. As a result, transactions between the two chiefs of staff deteriorated in several instances to personal rudeness. Friendly cooperation between the staffs was never established.

A mutual friend who tried unsuccessfully to bring about more cordial relations between the two men found the Grant at first was more considerate and conciliatory toward Thomas then was Thomas toward Grant. Both were strong men with different points of view and idiosyncrasies and with prejudices and preferences that pulled them in different directions. This temperamental friction, however, was not permitted to interfere with their work.
(P. 274)

As far as I can tell he does not discuss why or how relations we're strained during the Corinth Campaign.
I am currently reading Ronald White's American Ulysses in preparation for tackling Chernow (and then perhaps I'll take up the suggestion of Bee & others to read Simpson). Anyway, White discusses an episode at Chattanooga that may have more bearing on Grant's opinion of Thomas than the headquarters meeting. Here is the excerpt (p. 302):

On November 7, Grant wrote Thomas, "I deem the best movement to attract the enemy to be an attack on the Northern end of Missionary Ridge, with all the force you can bring to bear against it." Emphasizing urgency, he ordered the attack "should not be made one moment later than tomorrow morning." ...

Thomas, concerned his beaten-up army was still not prepared for a full-scale attack, sent for "Baldy" Smith. "If I attempt to carry out the order I have received," he told him, "my army will be terribly beaten." Then, recognizing that Grant was particularly receptive to Smith's ideas, Thomas urged, "You must go and get the order revoked."

Obliging, Smith told Grant he was of the opinion that no movement should be made until the coming of Sherman's army.

That evening, even though he believed speed was paramount in relieving Burnside, Grant revoked his order. "Thomas will not be able to make the attack of which I telegraphed you, until Sherman gets up," he informed Burnside, then wrote Halleck, "It has been impossible for Thomas to make the movement directed by me for Burnside's relief."

Was Grant disgruntled with Thomas? Certainly, Thomas's response had undermined Grant's confidence in him. At the same time, he trusted Smith's analysis as an engineer.
 
While it might be natural for Schofield to assume the war revolved around him and his force. Thomas as Commander of the whole Army he was forming, might be forgiven if he had decided a professional like Schofield and his vetran force, might be able to take care of themselves, without holding their hands, over every difficulty they ight face.. In the end, i think Thomas showed himself the master of the situation, assigned him, even his estimation of the abilities of Schofield and his force.
At the time that Schofield was working his way towards Nashville, the whole campaign DID revolve around him. Thomas did little to assist. Any competent staff officer could have stayed in Nashville, and received and forwarded the western reinforcements. Thomas should have been in the field.
 
At the time that Schofield was working his way towards Nashville, the whole campaign DID revolve around him. Thomas did little to assist. Any competent staff officer could have stayed in Nashville, and received and forwarded the western reinforcements. Thomas should have been in the field.




It can be amatter of perspective, I suppose. But, although an important part of of Thomas' new army, he was forming, Schofield and his men, were only a small part of it.

In any case, being as Schofield escape destruction at Spring Hill, he was probably too sensitive to the threat of Hood's Army presented in a frontal attack. In the end Schofield's nervousness proved unfounded. Fortunately it was counterbalanced by Thomas' calmness and clear thinking under pressure.
 
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