Meade gets mauled

[Elennsar]

This is more a what if in the sense "what would you make of it if it happened" then "What do you make of the odds of" - we can discuss all day how unlikely they were on the threads discussing the historical situation.

Some members here beleive Meade was too cautious or at least more cautious than they would believe appropriate to the point of at least mild critici

So let's say Meade pressed harder, marcher longer, took more risks, whatever it is.

And he gets his army bloodied - let's say 20,000 casualties because Lee pulls something out of his hat like some kind of magician.

Lee continues on his way back (he's still running out of ammo and the like). Meade is left on his a-- with an army reduced to 40,000 odd and with its best and brightest dead on the field.

Now, I don't think this is a likely what if, but it is a what if Meade has to consider - particularly if Lee did have the 95,000 odd he thought he did.

Would you say Meade should have been more prudent? Would you consider having that outcome worth risking if there was a better chance (any better chance) of crippling Lee?

What do you make of it?

Remember, we can dismiss the possibility of this actually occuring with the benefit of hindsight and information as good if not better than what Lee had on his army. Meade could not.

So let's not do that - what would you make of Meade if it somehow did?

 

[Vareb]

Horse feathers!!

 

[trice]

This is more a what if in the sense "what would you make of it if it happened" then "What do you make of the odds of" - we can discuss all day how unlikely they were on the threads discussing the historical situation.

Some members here beleive Meade was too cautious or at least more cautious than they would believe appropriate to the point of at least mild critici

So let's say Meade pressed harder, marcher longer, took more risks, whatever it is.

And he gets his army bloodied - let's say 20,000 casualties because Lee pulls something out of his hat like some kind of magician.

Lee continues on his way back (he's still running out of ammo and the like). Meade is left on his a-- with an army reduced to 40,000 odd and with its best and brightest dead on the field.

Now, I don't think this is a likely what if, but it is a what if Meade has to consider - particularly if Lee did have the 95,000 odd he thought he did.

Would you say Meade should have been more prudent? Would you consider having that outcome worth risking if there was a better chance (any better chance) of crippling Lee?

What do you make of it?

Remember, we can dismiss the possibility of this actually occuring with the benefit of hindsight and information as good if not better than what Lee had on his army. Meade could not.

So let's not do that - what would you make of Meade if it somehow did?

20,000 casualties for the AoP would probably mean 10-15,000 for the ANV, even in victory. That's a battle the size of the Wilderness or Spotyslvania Court House, so probably much too big for the aftermath of Gettysburg. If it had happened, Lee would have had great difficult moving his wounded back to the Virginia shore and his ANV (with 40,000 or so casualties in the first week of July) would be a wreck incapable of serious action for at least the rest of the year. Meade's AoP, with 40,000 casualties of its' own, would also be a wreck and probably couldn't do much more than watch the Potomac as Lee slowly moved back.

Neither Army would be in shape to detach troops. Longstreet would not be going to Chickamauga, nor Hooker with two Corps to counter him. That probably means Rosecrans survives Chickamauga with a Stones River type victory in September (maybe even better), which would throw a big monkey-wrench into the Grant-Sherman command team of 1864.

I don't think that's too likely. A battle that big, even with someone far more aggressive than Meade parachuted in, just seems too unlikely to happen. I think it more likely that you'd find some portion of Meade's force (say Sedgwick with some attached force and the cavalry) might get mousetrapped by Lee in the pursuit. Say something in the 5-8,000 range for Union casualties, and maybe 3-5,000 for the Confederates. That would knock all the pressure off Lee for a few days, and allow him to get across the river relatively intact. The sides would be a bit weaker and still not inclined to detach troops. Maybe -- maybe -- Lee might send a reduced Longstreet to assist Bragg in September, and that makes that battle of Chickamauga more likely to be a draw.

Which also means Rosecrans is still in command after another bloody victory, with his reputation intact. Which makes it pretty hard for Grant to dump him, and a little less likely Grant gets the overall command he did get.

So all that probably means that XI and XII Corps are still in Virginia come late 1863, and that Sherman's troops are still over along the Mississippi. Maybe Grant gets to try his Mobile operation after all, with Sherman leading the effort there, and Rosecrans-Thomas pressuring Atlanta from the North, and who knows what happening in Virginia.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

As is frequently the case, I am forced to agree with your analysis.

It cannot be considered wholy impossible from the information Meade has available, so I posted this as a "Look, this is not literally impossible." - anyone who thinks the Army of Northern Virginia has no chance of handling an aggressive pursuit is greatly over optimistic.

Strange flukes occur in war, which is the only way I can imagine a 20,000 Union casuality mauling (that or attacking into well prepared defensive lines and even there it would take a lot to keep it going to that point) - so its worth pondering.

Vareb: Um, what do horse feathers have to do with this?

 

[trice]

As is frequently the case, I am forced to agree with your analysis.

It cannot be considered wholy impossible from the information Meade has available, so I posted this as a "Look, this is not literally impossible." - anyone who thinks the Army of Northern Virginia has no chance of handling an aggressive pursuit is greatly over optimistic.

Strange flukes occur in war, which is the only way I can imagine a 20,000 Union casuality mauling (that or attacking into well prepared defensive lines and even there it would take a lot to keep it going to that point) - so its worth pondering.

Yes, strange things can happen; but Burnside couldn't manage to lose 20,000 men at Fredericksburg (thank God!) Meade was better than Burnside, so it's just too much for me to think a battle of that size is in the cards here (particularly since both the ANv and the AoP are smaller after Gettysburg than they were at Fredericksburg.) I think it is plenty possible for the AoP to get a bloody nose, just not one on that scale.

Tim

 

[Elennsar]

Yeah, I'm worried about one of those sudden counter attacks in which the hunted becomes the hunter and wreaks merry hell in regards to the only way I can imagine it - smashing through Sedgewick (somehow) and swalloing up Buford and Kilpatrick.

I don't know how that would be possible with what Lee has to work with, but that would be a massive whallop.

And yes, thank God even Burnside only managed 12-13 thousand.

Set against, oddly enough, five thousand. Not too horrible when looked at that way, ironically.

But relevantly to this, Meade would only suffer even this sort of disaster with something gone wrong - Stuart managing to surround Buford's division instead of merely chasing it off, or Sedgewick having a moment of stupidity and ordering a charge into the maw of death - Lee has no easy opportunities to exploit.

Perhaps Meade was a touch too cautious in the sense of being concerned about that rather than exploiting Lee's to the fullest, but from the information he has, he d--- well should have been - if I had two divisions of fresh infantry waiting up north (as Lee), I'd be going to considerable trouble to use them to do this - and Meade is calculating on Lee having that amount of infantry due to his intelligence (as in information).

 

[trice]

Yeah, I'm worried about one of those sudden counter attacks in which the hunted becomes the hunter and wreaks merry hell in regards to the only way I can imagine it - smashing through Sedgewick (somehow) and swalloing up Buford and Kilpatrick.

I don't know how that would be possible with what Lee has to work with, but that would be a massive whallop.

And yes, thank God even Burnside only managed 12-13 thousand.

Set against, oddly enough, five thousand. Not too horrible when looked at that way, ironically.

But relevantly to this, Meade would only suffer even this sort of disaster with something gone wrong - Stuart managing to surround Buford's division instead of merely chasing it off, or Sedgewick having a moment of stupidity and ordering a charge into the maw of death - Lee has no easy opportunities to exploit.

Perhaps Meade was a touch too cautious in the sense of being concerned about that rather than exploiting Lee's to the fullest, but from the information he has, he d--- well should have been - if I had two divisions of fresh infantry waiting up north (as Lee), I'd be going to considerable trouble to use them to do this - and Meade is calculating on Lee having that amount of infantry due to his intelligence (as in information).

The real great opportunity in any pursuit usually lies in exploiting and causing chaos. You have to throw everything you can in the general direction of the enemy and trust it will all work out. It is hard to picture Meade or most commanders doing that, and Meade didn't have what is essential to it: aggressive, talented commanders he could trust.

Now if we say Reynolds is alive and well, and Hancock hasn't been shot, and maybe Gibbon, and that someone like Buford or Sheridan commands the cavalry -- OK, then I could see Meade risking more. Those are people you can put some trust in for a risky operation. But Pleasonton? Sedgwick? Slocum? Howard? Sykes? Are these the guys you want to risk your army on?

Meade's plan is a decent one. If Buford and Kilpatrick do slightly better (Kilpatrick, IMHO, is a dangerously flawed commander prone to disaster) and the Confederates do worse on July 6th, Lee might have suffered a very painful disaster. Sedgwick's direct pursuit is pretty mediocre, but a truly aggressive one was going to be attacking uphill into 30,000 Rebel infantry. I'd describe Meade's actions as prudently aggressive in this situation. I might like a little less prudence because the reward for a triumph is so high -- but I'd probably also be one of those coming down hard on him if he'd lost 5,000 troops for little gain here in a disaster.

BTW, I was at the site of the Wagoneers Fight in Williamsport a couple of weeks ago. There's a plaque for it in the parking lot of the Williamsport Red Mens organization, Tribe #84 (click here for their website, but I don't think they mention it.)
Tim

 

[Elennsar]

I'd describe Meade's actions as prudently aggressive in this situation. I might like a little less prudence because the reward for a triumph is so high -- but I'd probably also be one of those coming down hard on him if he'd lost 5,000 troops for little gain here in a disaster.

That I think is why I ultimately side with "Meade did fine." Sure, more might have been doable (and with Hancock, Reynolds, etc. to rely on, one should be able to hope for such) - but I don't think another bloody fight would be worth risking Lee pulling something out of his hat for.

But Kilpatrick really fumbled here. He had the aggressiveness but not the good judgement you want in the vanguard.

Interesting link.

As to Meade and all: If Lee did have the numbers Meade thought he did (I know this is flat out "Yeah. Right.", I'm just looking at this as a study in plans) - would Meade's move look "better" for that?

 

[cw1865]

Losses

The Union can accept the losses.

 

[Elennsar]

Theoretically, the Union could accept (or at least absorb) losses exceeding the entire armies of both sides (in the entire war) put together.

But would it be good strategy? Just because the song says "we'll fill the vacant ranks with a million freemen more" doesn't mean that they'll actually step forward and the ranks will actually be filled.


Practically, losing a division sized force for nothing is like getting your teeth knocked out in a bar fight with someone bigger, stronger and faster than you to impress a girl who doesn't really care for you.

In a what-if world where Meade had Reynolds and Hancock to put in charge of the spearhead of the pursuit, I would enthusiasticallly support pressing on with all possible speed and taking chances (if not necessarily in frontal assaults) to smash Lee so hard that the only news of what exactly happened would come from parolees.

To paraphrase a historical message of his:

If Hancock can get ahead of Lee, and Reynolds launch his attack promptly, I can catch Lee between a hammer and an anvil, trusting that Washington will be secure regardless of what happens to us.

Maybe its a bit over optimistic, but I could write that knowing that they'd storm the gates of Hell if anyone can.

But that's not the situation. Meade doesn't have a Hancock to pull off that gamble or a Reynolds to command the advancing main force.

And in that context, risking heavy losses just because we can say (to quote McMurry) that "...New York State's military population alone was three-fourths that of the entire Confederacy." (bold is mine) or even that the people would not consider it a devastating blow to morale is not reasonable.

There are better ways to use their lives than to order Sedgewick to attack at daybreak on pain of dishonorable discharge.