Strategic Hex Game McClellan's Last Command (custom GCACW module) - community playthrough

I do like the way GCACW sets this up in general - not just "point and shoot." Organization is a factor.
Indeed, it's an operational level game and that means that the gameplay decisions are operational in nature. During the Gettysburg campaign it was a key aspect how both sides divided their forces east versus west of the Catoctins, and it's one of the relatively few games where you really understand why control of a crossroads matters (and hence why thousands of men would become casualties in a fight over one).
 
No fighting took place on turn 10 of the game, but I thought I'd share an interesting example of what-if. This is an example of how a lack of scouting can cause one to miss opportunities.


This is (a very cut version of) the situation in the Wilderness at the start of turn 10.

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Now, the Union rolled higher and so got to act first, and with the right orders they could have done this:

1630676760610.png


Which spreads out to englobe the CS force at Locust Grove and makes evasion difficult (not impossible, but difficult).

But the Union had no scouting, so didn't know it was a possibility. Instead a traffic jam resulted for the Union around Locust Grove as 5th Corps contacted the enemy and recoiled, lines of march that had been intended to be clear instead crossed one another, and in the confusion the CS forces were able to pull back out of immediate danger.


Shades of certain historical campaigns, perhaps?
 
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Turn 12, Nov 19


Skirmish at Amissville

Farnsworth's cavalry brigade fell back from Amissville when pressed by Taliaferro, pulling back on Jefferson.
Jackson had Taliaferro advance into Amissville and called Early up to support, but both divisions made contact with Union forces coming up the roads from the Sheads Mountain area late in the day.
(no casualties)


Battle of Wilderness Church

After a slogging approach march through the Wilderness in the rain, 5th Corps attacked Confederate units at Wilderness Church in the early evening. The whole of 5th Corps made the actual assault, supported by several thousand Union cavalrymen who had conducted exhausting marches to work around the Confederate flanks and the approach of Birney's division from the direction of the Wilderness Tavern.

Personally present, Lee conducted the defence himself, and inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking Union forces (around 1,500, as opposed to around 500 for the defenders). With his flanks imperilled however he had to fall back, and with Union cavalry present on his eastern flank the most viable direction was to the north - which turned out to be only a relative succor, as Buford led Averell and di Cesnola's cavalry in a charge which captured the rearguard cavalry and 1,500 further Confederate infantry.
(1,500 Union, 500 Confederate battle casualties; 2,000 Confederate retreat attrition)
 
Turn 13, Nov 20


Battle of Chancellorsville

Lee attempted a flank march via the roads north of Chancellorsville with the tired troops who had previously retreated to Tom's Ford, but while his initial move caught Union troops by surprise the rain slowed his efforts and the enemy cavalry quickly responded; by midday McLaws' division in the lead of the movement was suffering from marching in the presence of the enemy, and lost several hundred men in small skirmishes as it gained the Mine Road.
Around three PM, Stoneman launched a large assault on McLaws' division. This attack was badly mishandled and served to exhaust both sides, with Union casualties also incurred, but fighting off the attack also consumed precious time. McLaws ultimately fell back along the river road, and Birney occupied his former position.
(500 CS casualties from moving through ZOC without a road; 500 US casualties from battle. Note that if the ZOC move had not taken place then the CS forces would have been enveloped when the battle went in and they would have suffered more severely).

Meanwhile, a mile to the west, Sickles launched an attack on the rear of the Confederate column. This attack was made with greater coordination and the assistance of flanking cavalry, and resulted in the loss of the remains of Anderson's division while Ransom (in a feat displaying significant coup d'oeuil) was able to recognize that retreating north away from Union pressure would result in the loss of the rest of his command. Instead he retreated south, through Chancellorsville, suffering extra casualties in the short term but breaking through the Union lines.
(500 Confederate battle casualties to Anderson, 500 Confederate retreat attrition to Ransom. In this case, retreating north would have resulted in the loss of the whole force owing to insufficient possible retreat distance.)
 
Turn 14


Battle of Amissville (Third or fourth?)

In the middle of a foggy afternoon, after considerable difficulty coordinating the attack, Franklin launched two divisions of 2nd Corps against Taliaferro's division in Amissville. The attack was well supported by flanking units, and inflicted 1,000 casualties before Taliaferro's units broke and routed in disarray through Hinson's Mill.

Franklin attempted to follow up with a further attack on Confederate positions south of Poe's Mountain, but failed to organize an effective assault through the fog on four (!) occasions before giving up with the onset of night.



Battle of Tabernacle Church

Further south, Ransom's unit found its path to Fredericksburg repeatedly interrupted by enemy cavalry. Moving south to avoid cavalry around Salem Church it found the same cavalry blocking it near Gayle (Bayard's unit), then moved north to attempt the route Bayard may have left clear; the poor wisdom of this decision was revealed when Ransom ran into the column of the Union 5th Corps in the fog.
Butterfield and Porter reacted quickly, diverting the 5th Corps to attack Ransom, and the disrupted brigade of ~1,500 infantry found itself attempting to fend off ~12,000 Union troops who executed the rarely-employed right turn without a right wheel to form into line.
Ransom's unit was so overwhelmed in fact that the commander elected to surrender in order to preserve his men in a hopeless situation. The process of policing up his unit did consume time,though, and the head of the Union column was significantly inconvenienced.
(1,500 Confederate casualties; since the whole unit would be eliminated by this with no Union consequences I have described it as a surrender.)
 
Turn 15



Battle of Wishbone Creek
After planning overnight, Franklin launched an assault on Early's encampment in the half-light of a foggy dawn. He caught the Confederates preparing to move northwest, and forced their precipitate departure - though the confusion of the poor light prevented a greater victory, and several hundred Union casualties were incurred, chiefly in Steinwehr's division.
(1000 Confederate casualties, 500 Union casualties)
 
Turn 16


Battle of Fredericksburg

Most of the Union Right Wing enveloped Fredericksburg in the morning, followed by an assault in the afternoon by two divisisons of 3rd Corps and one division of 5th Corps. The combined assault was by 18,000 men and 15 batteries of artillery, supported by additional flanking units in both infantry and cavalry, and the well-fortified Fredericksburg militia gave way under the assault before a general rout set in. The complete destruction of the defenders was averted, but the force that broke through encircling Union lines to retreat south along the Telegraph Road was heavily reduced in strength to only around 2,500 men.
(1,000 CS battle casualties, 3,000 CS retreat casualties).


Battle of Massaponax Creek

Buford led Bayard's cavalry south along the Telegraph Road after the Battle of Fredericksburg, moving to Massaponax Church and then sweeping east to cut the fleeing troops off. He coordinated this movement with Griffin's division of the 5th Corps (not involved in the fighting itself) and a column under Porter, and was able to compel the surrender of the escaped column - though it was later found that neither GW Smith nor RE Lee were among the prisoners, though both were known to have been at Fredericksburg.
(2,500 CS battle/rout casualties out of 2,500, considered to be a surrender).


Battle of Orleans

Elements of the Union 11th and 2nd Corps, with support from Farnsworth's cavalry,attempted to concentrate on and attack Taliaferro's division north of Orleans.
Both individual attacks, one by French's division with Couch in personal command and the second by Howard's division, were failures that saw several hundred Union casualties incurred. The fighting, however, prevented Taliaferro's formation from doing any kind of foraging or recovery.
(Total 1,000 US battle casualties)
 
Hehehe… yup, my top two gaming exercises laid out simply: (1) partial insight on military history and (2) dice-cursing :D
It does sort of reflect the inherent uncertainty of actual military campaigning, so there's an insight there as well. The best you can do is stack the roll/situation in your favour, but sometimes it goes sour even then.

It's worth considering how much of our judgement of commanders as good vs. bad comes down to getting good dice rolls. To take a WW2 example, the German attack on France outstripped even their own most optimistic expectations of how well they could do...
 
It does sort of reflect the inherent uncertainty of actual military campaigning, so there's an insight there as well. The best you can do is stack the roll/situation in your favour, but sometimes it goes sour even then.

It's worth considering how much of our judgement of commanders as good vs. bad comes down to getting good dice rolls. To take a WW2 example, the German attack on France outstripped even their own most optimistic expectations of how well they could do...
I must add that being present with the dice is a whole lot more focused than being absent from the visual determinations when they are cast. The times become a bit disconnected, day to day, with me anyway, just because the focus is diverted to other topics. And if I can think up any more 'good excuses' I will add again. But it all conforms to being blindfolded, so if any here can provide an additional excuse for me, it will be thoroughly welcomed. :D
Lubliner.
 
I will say again: another reason I love this set up is the fog of war is no joke! Saph put it well: "...inherent uncertainty of actual military campaigning..." is an element that is very difficult for us hindsight-armed observers to relate to. I challenge all our fellow armchair generals to sit where you're sitting now at least once!

But @Lubliner , whether present or absent, rolled manually or electronically, dice are always to blame in the end!! :roflmao:
 
As an example of how you can look at the operational environment and how control of crossroads can be useful, here is a Union defence scheme for the Northern Virginia campaign I laid out pretty much by eye:

1632146855521.png



The adjacency rules mean that this covers the defensive line fairly well, though it is not perfect. There is a point three miles north of Catlett's Station where Confederate forces could march cross-country (northeast) over clear terrain and get on roads in the rear of Sigel or Reno, though such a move would be risky.
Similarly Sigel could be flanked on both wings at Clover Hill and to his NW.
But otherwise the reason why this is a fairly good setup is that it covers all the vital crossroads.


This alternative:

1632147113269.png

Standing on the defensive behind the Broad Run, is actually weaker because it leaves the left flank uncovered. Confederate troops could march through Brentsville to outflank the defensive line, or use Cedar Run as a curtain of manoeuvre to get into the Union strategic rear, and in both cases they wouldn't have to go far out of their way (i.e. it wouldn't take a long time and the Union might not have the chance to respond).
 
I will say again: another reason I love this set up is the fog of war is no joke! Saph put it well: "...inherent uncertainty of actual military campaigning..." is an element that is very difficult for us hindsight-armed observers to relate to. I challenge all our fellow armchair generals to sit where you're sitting now at least once!

But @Lubliner , whether present or absent, rolled manually or electronically, dice are always to blame in the end!! :roflmao:
I totally agree. The lessons I've learned doing this that will impact how I think about campaigns and battles in the future --

1. Fog of war is real -- which means the more information you have (less fog), the better.

2. Cavalry are the eyes and ears of the army -- I spent all the last campaign misusing cavalry and had no idea where the Confederates were until I lost.

3. Controlling crossroads is very important

4. Interior lines makes things a lot easier

5. Stupid things like actual fog and rain can really screw things up

6. Logisircs, especially food, plays a big, big part.

7. It still all comes down to the dice roll, lol
 
I will say again: another reason I love this set up is the fog of war is no joke! Saph put it well: "...inherent uncertainty of actual military campaigning..." is an element that is very difficult for us hindsight-armed observers to relate to. I challenge all our fellow armchair generals to sit where you're sitting now at least once!

But @Lubliner , whether present or absent, rolled manually or electronically, dice are always to blame in the end!! :roflmao:
I haven't been whooped this bad, since that time my Mama caught me doing.... ah, nothing! Real work enforcer she was!
Lubliner.
 
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