Strategic Hex Game McClellan's Last Command (custom GCACW module) - community playthrough

Andy Cardinal

2nd Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Feb 27, 2017
Location
Ohio
As a participant, I would say the biggest lesson was on supply. We may have been moving late on the Monocacy, but we were moving and the supply problem got in the way. Lesson learned!
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Absolutely, yeah. Another thing to keep in mind is to define at what level attacks should just be outright declined.
Looking at the offensive on the 22nd onwards, the attack launched by McLaws (which was at -1) was responsible for 1,000 Confederate casualties, and if you remove that then the fighting around Frederick on the 22nd and 23rd (Turns 15 and 16) would have seen 3,500 Union casualties for 1,000 Confederate.
As of the end of Turn 16, and showing the most powerful Confederate unit in each stack, the positions in the west were like this:

1613685591005.png


Now, this is a reasonable defensive configuration - Hooker, Mansfield, Meade and Porter are in positions which between them mean there isn't an obvious line of operations against the flanks, at least on an immediate level. But it's also one which is creaking under the strain, because of the stacks which aren't on the front lines every single Union division in shot is routed (i.e. every unit not committed to a defensive position at that moment was unfit for front line combat, and if they'd been forced into deployment anyway it would have hindered their recovery).
If McLaws hadn't launched that attack and thus been able to move up (say, through the road to Steam Mill), the Union position could have given way; indeed, it pulled back to New Market to avoid being overwhelmed before the Union main body arrived.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
This is the big document of "lessons learned" which I wrote over the course of the game.




Lessons learned and lessons to learn:

Unless the exact end point is important to you, it is usually better to specify a destination which you want the unit to reach tomorrow and tell them to make an easy march (or whatever kind of march you want). This avoids wasting daylight, which can happen when you gave a unit an eight-mile march and they roll high enough that they could have marched another three miles without tiring.

An alternative approach would be to give orders something like:

Couch's division to make an easy march along the route Seneca-Dawsonville-Beallsville
(As this will give them an intended line of advance.)
This can be used synergistically with the information you gain from cavalry scouting - if you end up in a situation where you want a unit to hold position or only move so far, do it, but giving "a goal they can't march to in one day" means that you won't waste time.




It's better to order easy marches on a rain day, rather than try and give them easy objectives and order normal marches. The rain can absolutely bog down a unit and they can strain themselves before having to recover the next day, and it's no good tiring your unit out to move an extra two miles and then rest them in dry weather while in dry weather you could have had them move an extra five instead.
To give some idea of the scale of this, the difference between "a normal march in wet weather and then an easy march in dry weather" and "an easy march in wet weather and then an easy march in dry weather" for a typical unit (Union infantry under corps orders) is:
The first one has a greater than 60% chance your movement will be less than 12 hexes
The second one has a greater than 50% chance your movment will be *more* than 12 hexes.




Cavalry is valuable, and you shouldn't throw it away, but you can't always gain cavalry superiority without being willing to work for it. Cavalry units are small and so you don't need large units to gain surround bonuses, and cavalry can't automatically retreat from other cavalry - though a cavalry brigade (which usually comes with attached artillery) is a fearsome prospect to attack on flat ground. Try and have your cavalry take up defensible positions which still accord with their other duties, and when they go after enemy cavalry try to surround them - a 500 man Union regiment attacking a 1,500 man Confederate brigade which has another 500 man Union regiment on the other side of it can actually be fighting at an overall advantage (though do gang up on the enemy if you have to).
Conversely, don't overwork your cavalry if you can possibly avoid it. Losing a few hundred men to overworking the unit is merely an inconvenience for infantry if you have tens of thousands of infantrymen, but if you've only got 4,000 cavalry you'll begrudge them much more.

The top cavalry commanders leading a big cavalry unit can absolutely smash a single regiment if they go for it. F. Lee's brigade was 2,000 strong, led by Stuart, and this actually means a +6 bonus all told in a head-on battle against a single cavalry regiment (of 500) - leading to about a 5/7 chance of simply destroying a targeted cavalry regiment. No other situation is quite so advantageous, but both sides should bear this in mind - concentrated cavalry has a big advantage against individual regiments of dispersed cavalry.


In this light - the Union cavalry screen was well managed, either accidentally or deliberately, and managed to avoid giving much hint of the Union's infantry movements for several days. However, the Union scouting northwest of Baltimore was badly mismanaged - sending the only available scouting regiment after Stuart was a bad move, not least because they could do nothing if they caught him and there was no other way to keep an eye on the approaches of Baltimore. It would have been better to assign a different cavalry regiment to this task and leave the 12th PA to their role.




Don't be afraid to split or merge units for greater tactical flexibility or a bigger hammer. It's possible for the Union to be in a situation where they need one strong division rather than two weak ones (Union divisions can go up to 9,000 men in strength) but it's also possible for the Confederates to be in a situation where they need multiple weaker units to form a continuous line.


I am probably going to have to ask commanders to set the level of initiative which their local units should employ - for example, if we define "victory" as forcing the enemy to retreat, here's the table of what bonus reflects what chance of retreat for a successful attack:
Attacker bonus Percent chance
-4 0%
-3 3%
-2 8%
-1 17%
0 28%
+1 42%
+2 58%
+3 72%
+4 83%
+5 92%
+6 97%
+7 100%



Remember the independent will of the enemy. It can sometimes be better to attack sooner, rather than waiting for your plan to execute perfectly, and conversely you may need to delay if your opponent is in a position that a hasty attack would go badly.

For example, during Longstreet's move on Baltimore he was detected on the 11th (a rain turn). At that date and on the morning of the 12th there were less than 10,000 troops in Baltimore itself and they were substantially not fortified; by the morning of the 15th there were over 23,000 troops in Baltimore, with one division arriving from Washington roughly every day.

It would have been quite feasible, with good scouting from a detached cavalry regiment, for Longstreet to easy march towards Baltimore on the 12th before forced-marching on the 13th - or for F. Lee to cut the rail lines south of Baltimore so no such reinforcement could take place, under the guise of a nuisance raid.



A lot of the striking power of an army comes from the ability to concentrate damage. A fairly even fight will usually end up with both sides taking significant damage, but being able to pounce on a previously weakened division with a fresh one can be what really rips the guts out of it; in this campaign both armies spread out so much that there was not as much opportunity for that as there could have been.



Conditional orders can be your friend. Anything too elaborate can lead to misunderstanding, but writing out a codicil like "if the enemy pulls back, follow them but maintain a distance of more than one mile" can help you avoid wasting a day.



On the 18th Hampton near Cearsville was depleted owing to forage issues and in addition was in a position where the two hexes to the south and southeast were blocked off by river, while the hexes to the north and northeast were fords covered by the 1st MA.
McReynolds' cavalry near Walkersville could have been issued orders for a conditional raid over the Monocacy where they'd cross, move south so that they were to the west of Hampton, and sent in an attack. If the 1st MA had been sent with them to make it an assault (replaced by the 1st NY) then the scope for doing damage would be considerable (a +5 from ratio)



In the first phase of the campaign (up to the 11th) the key decisions were:
- Munford attacking Farnsworth, which was a key event in the reduction of Confederate cavalry strength (it cost the Confederates 2 out of their 11 starting cav strength, or about 30% of the cavalry brigades that would left around Frederick).
- The decision for the flank march to Baltimore.
- The march goals for the Union army, which contributed to a sluggish movement to contact.
- Management of the Union cavalry, which concealed their lack of position.

In the second phase of the campaign (12th-15th) the key decisions were:
- The Confederate pull back to (and fortification along) the Monocacy, which presaged an overall defensive mentality
- The Confederate movements around to Baltimore's eastern flank and F. Lee not going after any rail stations on the Washington-Baltimore route. This permitted a significant reinforcement of Baltimore by Union troops by rail before they actually arrived and attacked.


In the third phase of the campaign (16th to 20th) the key decisions were:
- The Union flank march to Baltimore, masked by cavalry.
- The decision for all Union troops to head east, rather than some elements moving north to block Longstreet's possible return
- The subsequent decision for all Union troops to hook around to the north, rather than splitting their attention north-middle-south.

In the fourth phase of the campaign (21st onwards) the key decisions were:
- The belated Confederate offensive
- The Union caginess about pressing their advantage
- The Confederate decision to fall back across the Catoctins instead of heading directly south to Point of Rocks, which could have cost them but ended up advantaging them



When the Union troops arrived at Baltimore they planned to all come in from the north; this was an error because a corps could have been sent to avoid a breakout to the west (where Union lines were comparatively thin). With most of the Baltimore defenders to the north of Longstreet the northern position did not need to be as strong.



One of the best ways to destroy a formation is to force them to retreat *through* enemy troops. If you can pull it off, every hex an enemy formation has to retreat through costs 1500 men *per unit* per hex, which can completely gut even a strong division; this is one of the big advantages of completely surrounding an enemy.


During the attacks on Longstreet on the 20th, the Union players failed to notice a gap in their coverage (the hex directly south of Camden Station was not covered) and in addition they failed to realize that almost the whole of the weight of the Union forces was to the north of the Confederates. This resulted in a situation where Longstreet routed south, away from the Union army; better management could have produced a situation where Longstreet was more likely to rout towards the main body of the Union army.


The Union orders for the 21st did not allow for any attacks on Longstreet's divisions while they were damaged. Doing so would have offered a good opportunity to keep Longstreet's troops from resting up and recovering and only a small chance of damage - for example Grover's division of Heintzelman's corps alone would have been able to attack at (-1 tac +1 type -1 rain +2 encirclement) once Sigel's 11th Corps had closed up, meaning a 5/6 chance of keeping Longstreet off balance. Conversely, Longstreet's divisions actually could have recovered if they'd remained static as a consequence, though the above means it was probably a good idea to retreat anyway (you cannot plan for your opponent being foolish, though if your only chance of victory is if your opponent is foolish you may as well lean into it).



A key feature of a good defensive position is that it does not have good lines of operations against the flanks - i.e. there should not be an easy way to march on roads around the position.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Anyway, here's the analysis of events of the 22nd.


Here's what the Confederates could see:

as_seen_Confederate_evening_22nd.jpg


Longstreet doesn't know a lot about what's going on around him, partly because of a serendipitous placement of Union forces marching south along the Washington Pike which is blocking Stuart from getting good recce. He knows it's not good, though.

Meanwhile around the Monocacy the Confederates are acting aggressively, which is quite correct given the situation. They're pushing over to the north because that's where they have better intel, and they've already absolutely spanked a Union division (Ricketts) routing him hard enough to make him ineffective until the 25th (i.e. recovering on the 23rd and 24th).


To my mind though the most interesting thing here is actually that little note about Stuart seeing Union forces marching west. This is the Union main body that Stuart saw as he went through,and the exact wording was:

During his ride south, Stuart observed large Union forces marching west and crossing the Patapsco, and additional large forces moving south.

Now, you can actually predict roughly when those Union forces would reach the fighting to the west. Let's for now assume that the Union forces have arrived in the area when they reach New Market. From the Patapsco around Woodstock (which is one of the crossing points and the more pessimistic one) to New Market moving as close as possible to due west is 22 hexes.

The average movement of a Union division under control of a commander is 9 hexes per turn (2 moves, d6+1 per movement, average 2d6+2, so 7+2, so 9), so we'd expect the Union troops to arrive around New Market more than 2 turns later - meaning that in addition to the 22nd they march on the 23rd and 24th and should not be expected to arrive until at least the 25th.

As it happens on the morning of the 25th the head of the main Union column was three miles east of New Market - just about exactly as predicted.


Here's what the Union could see, meanwhile:

as_seen_Union_evening_22nd.jpg


The Union still has a good idea about what's going on. (n.b. that cav unit with Rodman is actually the 12th PA, I only just noticed the error.) As you can see the Union is a little further west than the estimate, but not enough to skew the calculations and have them substantially able to participate in fighting on the 24th (as 2nd Corps did a normal march and has to slow down the next day to avoid straggling).

Also of note is that the Union is pulling back 12th Corps to provide a general reserve.

Something else which occurs to me to point out is that, if there is an enemy cavalry force across a ford, it can sometimes be a pretty good idea to have your infantry force at least consider making an attack. Right now (as in, in the image shown here) Lawton's division faces across a ford from the 6th PA, and if Lawton launched an attack on the 6th PA they'd spontaneously combust (the attack would be at +14) - so they'd be forced to conduct a cavalry retreat, leaving a 1 in 6 chance of the destruction of the cavalry in question.
Even if not destroyed, it'd offer an opportunity to clarify the situation - and Lawton doesn't need to cross the river, after all.


And here's the true situation:


movements_of_22nd.jpg

Yes, the situation south of Baltimore is very confusing. 9th, 11th, 3rd and two divisions of 5th are chasing down Longstreet, making for 55,000 men plus the Baltimore defenders themselves.







In addition, I'm going to check again for the Long Roads To Gettysburg game. At the moment I have:

@dgfred (Confederate)
@Andy Cardinal (either)
@Pat Answer (either?)

I've had a no from Rebel Brit, but is anyone new interested in joining in? Is @Lubliner interested in coming back for a second one?
Looking back through the thread I see @rpkennedy said they might be interested this year, but I won't hold them to that... ideally at least two a side would be good, but it can work with a minimum of two people total and we've got more than that.
 

Lubliner

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Nov 27, 2018
Location
Chattanooga, Tennessee
I really did enjoy the game, @Saphroneth. It gave me an opportunity to view movements and options, while in general studies, I am too easily sated by those decisions already made. So I learned something new. But, at the moment I have just now caught up to daily postings and need to spend more time searching for topics of interest. Let me sit the next one out, but keep me as a future participant, please. Thanks,
Lubliner.
 

Andy Cardinal

2nd Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Feb 27, 2017
Location
Ohio
I would just say as an advertisement if you will that this has been a tremendous experience for me at least. The fog of war element is real and it gave me, for one, a better appreciation of tve decision making commanders need to make. Its easy to see where things went wrong (for my side) in retrospect.

Also, as I mentioned in a previous post -- the importance of supy and logisitcs. There were several moves Rebel Brit, Lubliner & I talked about and/or wanted to make, but had to postpone die to tiredness and/or veing out of supply. The rout of Ricketts division Saph mentioned above is one. If I recall correctly 2 of the 3 divisions that made that attack needed to resupply and that was one factor in the fizzle of the offensive we had intended. By the time we were ready to go, Union reinforcements had arrived from Baltimore.

And again, as Saphroneth says above, its really hard to know what to do when you dont really know where the enemy is. The cavalry as eyes and ears of the army was really reinforced to me playing this.

I'm looming forward to the next game and hope to apply some of the lessons learned.
 

Lubliner

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Nov 27, 2018
Location
Chattanooga, Tennessee
I would just say as an advertisement if you will that this has been a tremendous experience for me at least. The fog of war element is real and it gave me, for one, a better appreciation of tve decision making commanders need to make. Its easy to see where things went wrong (for my side) in retrospect.

Also, as I mentioned in a previous post -- the importance of supy and logisitcs. There were several moves Rebel Brit, Lubliner & I talked about and/or wanted to make, but had to postpone die to tiredness and/or veing out of supply. The rout of Ricketts division Saph mentioned above is one. If I recall correctly 2 of the 3 divisions that made that attack needed to resupply and that was one factor in the fizzle of the offensive we had intended. By the time we were ready to go, Union reinforcements had arrived from Baltimore.

And again, as Saphroneth says above, its really hard to know what to do when you dont really know where the enemy is. The cavalry as eyes and ears of the army was really reinforced to me playing this.

I'm looming forward to the next game and hope to apply some of the lessons learned.
This makes me wonder if it would not have been better if we had remained together at the beginning, and then advanced in force with the cavalry as our front.
Lubliner.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
In the interests of making sure that there's time for any questions to be raised and answered about the nature of the Gettysburg game, I'm going to make the decision on teams and send out the initial scouting reports now. There are currently three people signed up, which means uneven teams, but anyone else who signs up will be assigned to even out the teams etc.


And having rolled dice, it seems like... everyone carried over from last time has now swapped teams. This means that

@Andy Cardinal is the Union commander and
@Pat Answer and @dgfred are the Confederate commanders.



They'll be getting their start up info momentarily, but here's the rules on supplies just so everyone's clear.


Every unit in the game has six days' rations at the start.
They DO NOT CONSUME rations if they are within supply range:

Supply range is being at zero fatigue (i.e. well rested, which requires not having moved) and :
1) Being within six passable miles of a friendly depot.
2) Being in the same county as a friendly depot.
3) Being in a county which is connected by an intact rail line to a friendly depot. (note: Orange, Caroline and Spotsylvania Counties are connected by rail line to Richmond and so the Confederates are always in supply there)
4) Being off the map.

Otherwise, a unit consumes one days' rations per day.

They CAN REGAIN rations if they are PASSIVE (which is a decision that they must inform me of). The whole army is passive or active at once.
While passive, units can regain rations by:
1) Being within supply range. This automatically returns the unit to full rations.
2) Foraging (which is an all-encompassing term which includes getting wagoned supply). This costs Fatigue and I must be informed how much fatigue is to be spent (from 0 to 4). This returns some rations.
3) Distributing food from a captured enemy depot.
4) For the Confederates ONLY, levying towns for supplies. This can be done once per town, and produces a "pool" of rations which can be distributed to nearby units.
 

rebel brit

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Feb 7, 2013
Location
United Kingdom
Before you all get into the new game I just want to thank @Saphroneth for taking on the role of Games master and for his patience in explaining the rules etc to a complete novice. This has been a learning curve for me which I've thoroughly enjoyed. Many thanks also to my fellow team members @Lubliner and @Andy Cardinal, I've enjoyed playing along side you both. Congratulations to @Pat Answer and @dgfred on a well played victory ( all down to the luck of the dice) :wink::laugh:
Unfortunately, I have to sit this next one out but I'm looking forward to reenlisting in the future.
Thanks again.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
So here's the events of the 23rd, which is the day Longstreet was forced to surrender:

Here's what the Confederates could see at the end of the day.

as_seen_Confederate_evening_23rd.jpg


This is also the date of a major Confederate offensive over the Monocacy, which managed to rout two more divisions, leaving just four Union divisions in the west unrouted. A misstep however was the peremptory order to McLaws to cross the river at a specific ford (which was defended).

as_seen_Union_evening_23rd.jpg

The Union view shows where 5th, 6th and 2nd Corps have reached now, along with the chaotic mess that resulted as an attempt to corall Longstreet.

movements_of_23rd.jpg


And here's the movements. Yes, it's very confusing.
Interestingly Couch defended his ford, but then moved east (probably correctly as otherwise he'd be liable to encirclement) and got successfully attacked.
 

Lubliner

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Nov 27, 2018
Location
Chattanooga, Tennessee
So here's the events of the 23rd, which is the day Longstreet was forced to surrender:

Here's what the Confederates could see at the end of the day.

View attachment 391746

This is also the date of a major Confederate offensive over the Monocacy, which managed to rout two more divisions, leaving just four Union divisions in the west unrouted. A misstep however was the peremptory order to McLaws to cross the river at a specific ford (which was defended).

View attachment 391747
The Union view shows where 5th, 6th and 2nd Corps have reached now, along with the chaotic mess that resulted as an attempt to corall Longstreet.

View attachment 391748

And here's the movements. Yes, it's very confusing.
Interestingly Couch defended his ford, but then moved east (probably correctly as otherwise he'd be liable to encirclement) and got successfully attacked.
So my advance didn't putter out. In fact I am surprised I still exist! What I wonder, though Longstreet has surrendered, and Stuart is caught, what would have been my chances of crossing back into Virginia over the Potomac?
Lubliner.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
So my advance didn't putter out. In fact I am surprised I still exist! What I wonder, though Longstreet has surrendered, and Stuart is caught, what would have been my chances of crossing back into Virginia over the Potomac?
As of this date (the 23rd), fairly good chance of getting most of the rest of the army out.


If there's another game, I would definitely be interested.

Ryan
There is indeed. At this point there's one Union player and two Confederate, so I'll most likely attach you to the Union...
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
The culmination point

This is another real concept in military analysis, and it basically reflects the point at which the momentum of an offensive - the ability for it to keep driving forwards towards its goals - is passed, and it is no longer worth continuing even if it is still making progress because the sustained engagement is now damaging the attacker more than the defender. Sometimes the culmination point is followed by mutual exhaustion, sometimes by a counterattack.

This is one of the things which is the hardest to figure out while it's actually going on, because the fights just after the culmination point are not very dissimilar (at the time) from the fights that take place when a defender is about to give way. It's also sometimes a matter of information, because if reinforcements are arriving over time while the attacker is being worn down then that can provoke the passing of the culmination point.

I would say that one of the clearest examples of a culmination point being passed in the Civil War is Hood's campaign. With hindsight it is easy to see that the point was passed before Nashville, probably at Franklin if not before.

It shows up in the GCACW system, as well, as an organic thing rather than a rules matter (as such). Certainly in the On To Richmond campaign an over-aggressive Union commander can find himself hitting the culmination point; in the Grant campaign it is a matter for the rules, because the game can end early if the Union has suffered too many casualties relative to the Confederates.


ED: incidentally, the reason why the Prussian/German military often outperformed expectations is the same reason they also often screwed up assessing the culmination point and got hammered for it.
 
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Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
So here's a bit of operational analysis which turned up as I was looking at the options during the Maryland Campaign.

In the case of a Confederate retreat to Point of Rocks, there's a great deal of benefit for a Union division moving onto the heights over the town, thus:

1614027036651.png

One more division isn't necessarily going to help much in the pursuit itself, because a bit of a traffic jam develops, but one division moving aroud as shown means that both Point of Rocks itself and the hex immediately northeast of it are in the zone-of-control of a Union unit. The hill provides a strong defensive position (one which can't be easily flanked - the Confederates would have to commit a unit to going west of the Catoctins to outflank the position) and it basically adds a delay of up to a day's worth of standard marching to the Confederates crossing the ford south.

This can be enough delay for a Union division to take up position south of Point of Rocks, thus cutting off the retreat.


There are three possible Confederate counter-moves. The first is simply to try and be over the ford before the Union can spare a division and the marching time to reach the blocking position.
The second is to have a column aiming for the Licksville ford as well, which means that they can in turn defend that crossing and prevent the Union from blocking the retreat; this means that the Confederates are simply delayed by the blocking position, which is annoying but no worse.
The third is to occupy the heights themselves and first.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
The events of the 24th in the Maryland campaign game.

Here's what the Confederates could see:


as_seen_Confederate_evening_24th.jpg


There's not a huge amount of information here, but there is what should be an ominous warning.
Notably Anderson has disengaged from the National Road and moved south, while the Union has pulled back to a shorter defensive line with more depth (i.e. a single unit routing isn't as much of a problem).


Here's what the Union could see:

as_seen_Union_evening_24th.jpg


Stuart has just interrupted Willcox's movement... though I actually said Dorsey's Switch instead of Dorsey's Run, eaning that Willcox misreported his position.
Apart from that, the Union now has 1st, 2nd, 4th, 6th and 12th Corps concentrated or nearly concentrated, plus two divisions of 5th Corps.

Here's the movements:

movements_of_24th.jpg


Notably, the movement of the Union cavalry at first blocked and then unblocked the Confederate view of the approaching column, so the Confederate cavalry only saw the back of the column...

On this date the total Union force around New Market was at almost exactly a 2:1 advantage over the Confederates (counting the Union 2nd Corps at the rear of the column).
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
Maps for the 25th September in the Maryland game.

Here's what the Confederates could see:


as_seen_Confederate_evening_25th.jpg


The Confederate picture on Union strength is incomplete, which is about to cause them gradually worsening problems.

Here's what the Union could see:

as_seen_Union_evening_25th.jpg


And here's the true situation:

movements_of_25th.jpg


I'm probably going to stop showing what's happening to the east around Baltimore, as it's mostly just units closing up at rail junctions.


The Union here is deploying into line with their newly arrived divisions, screened (albeit imperfectly) by cavalry on each flank.
 

Lubliner

1st Lieutenant
Forum Host
Joined
Nov 27, 2018
Location
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Well, it appears Stuart has been headed off from his mission and pushed back to the confederate left. He might try swinging around to the right via the rear to scope out all those Yankees back east. He sure got stopped in the north!
Lubliner.
 

Saphroneth

Major
Joined
Feb 18, 2017
For the 26th, here's what the Confederates could see:

as_seen_Confederate_evening_26th.jpg

Stuart has rejoined the rest of the Confederate force, which on the one hand protects him but on the other hand reduces the effectiveness of his scouting (as it reduces his avenues to see Union troops). However, the situation there is pretty bad anyway - most of what the Confederates can see is actually the result of being in contact with the Union lines, such as around Ijamsville (where JR Jones is).



Here's what the Union could see:


as_seen_Union_evening_26th.jpg


The Union picture is functionally complete. You can also see here that there are six divisions around New Market on or north of the National Road... and eight of them south of the National Road.
This is a very bad situation for the Confederates, but it actually could have been worse - many of those Union divisions moved into position with plenty of daylight left, and if ordered to attack if possible they could have shattered the whole Confederate southern flank.


Here's the true situation:

movements_of_26th.jpg
 

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