Is it fair to say that Fitz John Porter was McClellan's most capable corps commander?

MikeyB

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Sep 13, 2018
Good morning everyone.
After reading some more about the events of 1862, is it fair to say that Fitz John Porter was the most capable corps commander in the East during the McClellan era? Who else would even be an honorable mention? Maybe Hooker? And if so, did Pope and army politics deprive the AoP of a competent commander for the duration of the war?

mike
 
Is your criticism of Reynolds validated by any of this? Do you think that somehow Doubleday is not being "committed" to support Meade in the above? At what point do you want to start blaming Reynolds for "leading from the front"?

You'll note that I was relying on that blog post as my source for my understanding of what Reynolds was in fact doing; if that blog post is in error, then the specifics of my case do not apply.
However, the general form of my case (regarding to the risks that can happen when someone is up front and out of comms) are not actually disproven; they merely don't apply and so the battle can't be used as a disproof.

Reynolds notified Gibbon to begin and went to speak personally to Meade. With everyone in agreement, the troops moved forward, 8,000 strong. The artillery opened up again.

Here we are, shortly after Noon. Reynolds is "up front" in personal contact with Wainright and Meade, probably less than a five minute ride from Gibbon, about the same or a bit more to Doubleday. They know where he is and can reach him easily.

Is this where you think Reynolds is "leading from the front" and somehow losing "coordination" of his Corps? If so, please show specifically what you are referring to: what has he done wrong, what units are out of control, and where is it that you say he should be? Back at Mannsfield house with Franklin? Back by the bridges? Over with the "reserve", Doubleday's division (which is now in the front line)?
What you are describing here is Reynolds being up front and in comms - able to get updates on all parts of his corps and coordinate them in good time. This, as I've said more than once, is not a problem; if this was the true situation, then what Reynolds was doing was fine.

The place for a commander to be is in comms. If he can go up front while still able to maintain comms with his whole unit, then we don't have a problem; if he goes up front and loses contact with his comms, we do have a problem.

It simply happens that the easiest way for a commander to lose comms accidentally (and not notice) is to go up front, because he's busy doing something else and because he's moved from the position he was in previously (where his comms net knew he was). A commander going to the front can (and should) shift his comms net so that they know where to send updates.
 
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Remember when Meade went back to ask Sickles' division (attached) to go in? Reynolds was nowhere to be found. Effectively Meade on his own authority ended up taking command of the whole corps because no-one knew where Reynolds was.
Hmm. I would guess you are talking about David Birney's division of Stoneman's Corps, not Daniel Sickles division. Sickles was not sent up to Reynolds. Neither of those divisions was involved in anything I have described in the two posts (#116 and #119)) I just made.

After the events described in the post (#119) you are responding to, or perhaps at the very end of them -- as Meade was about to kick off, Doubleday got in touch with Reynolds, said that he was over-extended and concerned with going forward as planned -- suggesting that Reynolds find someone else to support Meade. Reynolds had a choice: delay the attack or look for troops elsewhere. Since the attack was now five hours or so late, he decided to let the attack go. He sent to Franklin, pleading for reinforcements.

Franklin, back at Mannsfield, ordered Birney's division to leave the bridges and report to Reynolds. Birney moved quickly, but somehow his 3rd brigade didn't get the word. Only two brigades moved forward to Reynolds. Robinson's brigade remained at the bridges. (ADDED LATER: this is actually Revere's Brigade)

I haven't mentioned them yet because I am trying to proceed in an orderly fashion and establish what Saphroneth is talking about in a clear timeline. Birney's troops are still back guarding the bridges at the end of my post #119, Franklin has not yet ordered them forward, and Reynolds has either not yet sent or has just sent his request for troops to Franklin. I would like him to lay out what his complaint about Reynolds is in a recognizable way. (ADDED LATER: none of this matches the timeline in Birney's report, which doesn't match with the reports of his subordinates. :smile: )
 
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Is your criticism of Reynolds validated by any of this? Do you think that somehow Doubleday is not being "committed" to support Meade in the above? At what point do you want to start blaming Reynolds for "leading from the front"?
You'll note that I was relying on that blog post as my source for my understanding of what Reynolds was in fact doing; if that blog post is in error, then the specifics of my case do not apply.
However, the general form of my case (regarding to the risks that can happen when someone is up front and out of comms) are not actually disproven; they merely don't apply and so the battle can't be used as a disproof.

The information I am trying so hard to find is what you say about Reynolds. I only looked at the blog post because you offered it as support for your position.

Your point seems to be now that you have no real knowledge of what Reynolds did yourself. Asked why you were criticizing Reynolds, you looked around, saw a a blog post online that seemed to fit your theory, and thus posted that as support. You say that if you are wrong, it was the blog poster that mislead you. But even that has a qualifier -- your theory is still good, you say, because nothing has been presented to disprove it.

This is not the way these things are done. It is generally considered the responsibility of the person presenting the theory to provide data to prove the case first. If you have no support for the application of your theory to the man you are criticizing, you should simply not use him as an example. Find a case that actually does support your theory and use that instead. Or research this case of Reynolds at Fredericksburg first and then show how it specifically fits your theory.

So, do you actually have any research you have done on Reynolds and his actions here at Fredericksburg to support your criticism of the man? Or is this only about theoretical models with no need to verify their applicability to specific cases?
 
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What you are describing here is Reynolds being up front and in comms - able to get updates on all parts of his corps and coordinate them in good time. This, as I've said more than once, is not a problem; if this was the true situation, then what Reynolds was doing was fine.

What I am doing (or at least trying to do) is to accurately describe what was actually happening on the battlefield at the time. I am making absolutely no attempt to describe Reynolds as being "in comms" or "not in comms".

The place for a commander to be is in comms. If he can go up front while still able to maintain comms with his whole unit, then we don't have a problem; if he goes up front and loses contact with his comms, we do have a problem.

No offense: what does this have to do with what Reynolds did at Fredericksburg?

You have criticized Reynolds for his actions, but seem to only talk in generalities about a theoretical model, not to discuss why you are criticizing ***him***. What is it you say he did wrong? When did he do it? Where was he when he did it? What makes you think he actually did it and why -- specifically -- is what he did wrong?

It simply happens that the easiest way for a commander to lose comms accidentally (and not notice) is to go up front, because he's busy doing something else and because he's moved from the position he was in previously (where his comms net knew he was). A commander going to the front can (and should) shift his comms net so that they know where to send updates.

Yep -- and a quarterback who holds the ball too long in the pocket usually gets sacked. I understand you have a general model that may or may not be a good one. Please show how and why it is a good model to use to evaluate what Major General Reynolds was doing on December 13, 1862 at Fredericksburg.
 
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When I get a chance ( I have to unroll them at home and connect to the book). Correct on the options - Hennessey doesn't discuss those in either the Map Study or Return to BR - he just assesses Porter's overall performance in the battle. It's a matter of using the maps in conjunction with the other authors. The additional source which does the most balanced assessment of the entire controversy is Henry Gabler's 1979 dissertation - which unfortunately isn't online. It's important to note that some of the pro-Porter testimony in front of the Board is also subject to criticism (e.g., the ANV witnesses such as Marshall and Robertson). In addiition, the Schofield Board strongly condemned Porter's statements to others and suggested that while he was innocent of the charges brought by Pope he had made his own bed to some extent.

The strange thing is, Hennessey praises Porter for his conduct and damns Pope for literally living in a fantasy world. As Henessey begins the section of Porter's attack:

"John Pope was in fact doing his utmost to oblige Lee’s hope for another Federal attack. But the breakdown of the “pursuit” had complicated things greatly for the Union army commander, and had revealed again his inability to quickly adapt to changing conditions on the battlefield. Pope had initially conceived Porter’s assault as a swipe at what he, Pope, believed would be Jackson’s fleeing rearguard. Since then, Pope’s perception of the tactical situation had changed dramatically, but his tactical plan had changed only in that Reynolds’s division had been withdrawn from Porter’s column. Now, rather than attacking an unstable rearguard with fifteen thousand men, as Pope had presumed when he issued his written pursuit orders, Porter would use ten thousand men to assail Jackson’s stationary, strong position along the unfinished railroad.

An even more grievous error was that Pope repeated his major mistake of the previous day: he failed to place Porter’s attack within any overall tactical framework. There would be no diversions along other portions of the line. Nor did Pope make arrangements to exploit any breakthrough Porter’s column might manage. Like Grover’s, Nagle’s and Kearny’s attacks on August 29, Porter’s would be an operation unto itself. Porter would live with the irony the rest of his life: he who had so boldly predicted Pope’s incapacity only weeks before was now the man most affected by it.

The problems afflicting Porter that afternoon ranged from tactical to administrative. On the tactical side, Confederate skirmishers pelted the right of Porter’s column, bringing it to a cold stop in Groveton Woods. General Butterfield, whose division was the object of the Confederate lead, rode to the front to consult with brigade commander Roberts, Colonel Berdan and Colonel Charles Johnson of the 25th New York. Butterfield had been advised by Porter that Hatch’s division was to move on the right of the column. But Hatch had not arrived. Without Hatch’s division, whenever the Union skirmish line tried to advance, the Confederates played havoc with its flank and forced it back. At 1:45 Butterfield scratched out a rough sketch of the situation, pointing out where Hatch should be, and sent it to Porter.22

With this dispatch, Porter realized that army bureaucracy had failed him that afternoon too; the swirl of changing orders during the last two hours left him with a major misimpression. His initial verbal orders to attack had called for Hatch to move on his right, but that changed with Pope’s written pursuit orders, issued at noon. Those orders called for Ricketts’s division, not Hatch’s, to move on Porter’s right. Since then, of course, the “pursuit” had been abandoned, but no one had told Porter that Ricketts’s advance had been halted—indeed never really began—90 minutes before. With the earlier verbal orders to attack now reinstated, Hatch’s division was again assigned to move on Porter’s right. Porter, not surprisingly, failed to understand all this. He had not given Hatch the required orders, and that division now stood idly on the Warrenton Turnpike at the base of Dogan Ridge.23

Once he recognized the error, however, Porter acted quickly to correct it. He immediately sent orders to Hatch to move up on Butterfield’s right and “make the attack simultaneously” with Porter’s Corps. At the same time he soothed Colonel Roberts, whose brigade suffered most from the error, by telling him, “I will at once send infantry upon your right. Wait until they arrive, then push vigorously forward.”24"

Hennessy, John J.. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas . University of Oklahoma Press. Kindle Edition.
 
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The strange thing is, Hennessey praises Porter for his conduct and ****s Pope for literally living in a fantasy world. As Henessey begins the section of Porter's attack:

"John Pope was in fact doing his utmost to oblige Lee’s hope for another Federal attack. But the breakdown of the “pursuit” had complicated things greatly for the Union army commander, and had revealed again his inability to quickly adapt to changing conditions on the battlefield. Pope had initially conceived Porter’s assault as a swipe at what he, Pope, believed would be Jackson’s fleeing rearguard. Since then, Pope’s perception of the tactical situation had changed dramatically, but his tactical plan had changed only in that Reynolds’s division had been withdrawn from Porter’s column. Now, rather than attacking an unstable rearguard with fifteen thousand men, as Pope had presumed when he issued his written pursuit orders, Porter would use ten thousand men to assail Jackson’s stationary, strong position along the unfinished railroad.

An even more grievous error was that Pope repeated his major mistake of the previous day: he failed to place Porter’s attack within any overall tactical framework. There would be no diversions along other portions of the line. Nor did Pope make arrangements to exploit any breakthrough Porter’s column might manage. Like Grover’s, Nagle’s and Kearny’s attacks on August 29, Porter’s would be an operation unto itself. Porter would live with the irony the rest of his life: he who had so boldly predicted Pope’s incapacity only weeks before was now the man most affected by it.

The problems afflicting Porter that afternoon ranged from tactical to administrative. On the tactical side, Confederate skirmishers pelted the right of Porter’s column, bringing it to a cold stop in Groveton Woods. General Butterfield, whose division was the object of the Confederate lead, rode to the front to consult with brigade commander Roberts, Colonel Berdan and Colonel Charles Johnson of the 25th New York. Butterfield had been advised by Porter that Hatch’s division was to move on the right of the column. But Hatch had not arrived. Without Hatch’s division, whenever the Union skirmish line tried to advance, the Confederates played havoc with its flank and forced it back. At 1:45 Butterfield scratched out a rough sketch of the situation, pointing out where Hatch should be, and sent it to Porter.22

With this dispatch, Porter realized that army bureaucracy had failed him that afternoon too; the swirl of changing orders during the last two hours left him with a major misimpression. His initial verbal orders to attack had called for Hatch to move on his right, but that changed with Pope’s written pursuit orders, issued at noon. Those orders called for Ricketts’s division, not Hatch’s, to move on Porter’s right. Since then, of course, the “pursuit” had been abandoned, but no one had told Porter that Ricketts’s advance had been halted—indeed never really began—90 minutes before. With the earlier verbal orders to attack now reinstated, Hatch’s division was again assigned to move on Porter’s right. Porter, not surprisingly, failed to understand all this. He had not given Hatch the required orders, and that division now stood idly on the Warrenton Turnpike at the base of Dogan Ridge.23

Once he recognized the error, however, Porter acted quickly to correct it. He immediately sent orders to Hatch to move up on Butterfield’s right and “make the attack simultaneously” with Porter’s Corps. At the same time he soothed Colonel Roberts, whose brigade suffered most from the error, by telling him, “I will at once send infantry upon your right. Wait until they arrive, then push vigorously forward.”24"

Hennessy, John J.. Return to Bull Run: The Campaign and Battle of Second Manassas . University of Oklahoma Press. Kindle Edition.
We must be doing one-year anniversary responses. It's really not that "strange". It's actually simple common sense and an objective analysis of the facts. The situation you point to is directly tied to its cause the day before and the matter that also led to the court martial - Pope's belated August 29 attack order. As I'm sure you know, by 4:30 PM on August 29 (when Pope's attack order was issued, received by Porter later), things had substantially changed on the Union left from what they had been hours earlier on that date. The problem is that a lot of people conflate two separate issues: (1) was Porter's failure to implement Pope's order by the time he received it the correct reaction and (2) was Porter's overall performance at Second Bull Run "pedestrian", as Hennessy - who you apparently and correctly concede is a justifiably recognized authority on the battle - states in the book you quote from. His latter conclusion is buttressed by close analysis done by others of what Porter did/did not do significantly earlier on August 29. And, by the way, nothing about Porter's performance on August 30 was remotely brilliant. It's simply that the orders he received from Pope were based on delusion. That hardly makes Porter one of the great captains of history.
 
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  1. Irwin McDowell
    • I am never sure how to evaluate him
I'm currently reading Cunningham's book on Shiloh and was reminded of the presence there of one of Sherman's brigades that just happened to be led by a colonel who was the younger brother of Irvin McDowell. Apparently he didn't fare any better than his brother and soon disappeared from the chain of command as well!
 
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I'm currently reading Cunningham's book on Shiloh and was reminded of the presence there of one of Sherman's brigades that just happened to be led by a colonel who was the younger brother of Irvin McDowell. Apparently he didn't fare any better than his brother and soon disappeared from the chain of command as well!
Irvin McDowell's brother was Colonel John A. McDowell of the 6th Iowa, who was got a recommendation by William T. Sherman to General. He resigned from the army in March 1862 due to his health and had a division command at the start of the Vickburg campaign as a Col.

 
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"Pedestrian" Porter's performance might have been, but compared to the other senior commanders it was superb.

Porter saved the army when he rallied his command on Henry Hill and held the rebels off long enough to allow the army to move down the pike. If it were not for Porter we'd be discussing 2nd Bull Run as a "modern Cannae".
 
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"Pedestrian" Porter's performance might have been, but compared to the other senior commanders it was superb.

This speaks to the point I made earlier in the thread - given the (lack of) selection process for corps commanders in the Union army in 1861 and 1862, getting a basically capable but unspectacular ("pedestrian") commander is, oddly enough, rather better than average. And since there's no seasoning process for them (i.e. a period as a brigade commander long enough to learn the ropes and be noticed as capable, then the same at division commander) generating a wide selection of division commanders who can get the nod, it kind of comes down to who has the talent required to pick it all up on the job.

Certainly I can think of other McClellan corps commanders who failed or objected when given even a simple task to fulfil, like "march to X location" or "conduct a retreat". It's like having a Charisma-11 character in a D&D party where all the rest of them have chosen Charisma as their dump stat, that character ends up being the party's best negotiator simply by default.
 
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"Pedestrian" Porter's performance might have been, but compared to the other senior commanders it was superb.

Porter saved the army when he rallied his command on Henry Hill and held the rebels off long enough to allow the army to move down the pike. If it were not for Porter we'd be discussing 2nd Bull Run as a "modern Cannae".
You have a low bar. By the way, Porter didn't "rally his command on Henry Hill" and "save the army". You should have read the rest of Hennessy's book.
 
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This speaks to the point I made earlier in the thread - given the (lack of) selection process for corps commanders in the Union army in 1861 and 1862, getting a basically capable but unspectacular ("pedestrian") commander is, oddly enough, rather better than average. And since there's no seasoning process for them (i.e. a period as a brigade commander long enough to learn the ropes and be noticed as capable, then the same at division commander) generating a wide selection of division commanders who can get the nod, it kind of comes down to who has the talent required to pick it all up on the job.

Certainly I can think of other McClellan corps commanders who failed or objected when given even a simple task to fulfil, like "march to X location" or "conduct a retreat". It's like having a Charisma-11 character in a D&D party where all the rest of them have chosen Charisma as their dump stat, that character ends up being the party's best negotiator simply by default.
Porter was mediocre. That he was better than Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman (as I pointed out a years ago) speaks more about them than it does Porter.
 
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Porter was mediocre. That he was better than Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman (as I pointed out a years ago) speaks more about them than it does Porter.
It largely speaks to the problems with the selection method - remember that Sumner, Franklin and Heintzelman were still better than Keyes! (McDowell is better than Keyes as well, IMO.)

As of Feb 1862 the Union DCs were:

Banks
Blenker
Casey
Franklin
Heintzelman
Hooker
Keyes
Lander
McCall
McDowell
Porter (FJ)
Smith
Stone
Sumner

So if McClellan is going to get his own picks for CC in he pretty much has these to pick from...
 
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It largely speaks to the problems with the selection method - remember that Sumner, Franklin and Heintzelman were still better than Keyes! (McDowell is better than Keyes as well, IMO.)

As of Feb 1862 the Union DCs were:

Banks
Blenker
Casey
Franklin
Heintzelman
Hooker
Keyes
Lander
McCall
McDowell
Porter (FJ)
Smith
Stone
Sumner

So if McClellan is going to get his own picks for CC in he pretty much has these to pick from...
Sure. The point remains - Porter only looks "good" when you compare him to the even worse options. It's similar to the fact that the lone offensive action he undertook - Hanover CH - was ineptly managed by him, but his opponent Branch did even worse. In the NHL or the NFL it would be called a "bad draft year". That doesn't mean that the best of a poor crop is Connor McDavid or Aaron Rodgers .
 
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Sure. The point remains - Porter only looks "good" when you compare him to the even worse options. It's similar to the fact that the lone offensive action he undertook - Hanover CH - was ineptly managed by him, but his opponent Branch did even worse. In the NHL or the NFL it would be called a "bad draft year". That doesn't mean that the best of a poor crop is Connor McDavid or Aaron Rodgers .
That's the thing, though, isn't it?

The Union as a whole, especially in the first years of the war, is going begging for good general officers. It's one reason why problems often arise wherever McClellan wasn't - he simply didn't have a supply of reliable executive generals who could carry out his instructions as given, let alone also act independently - and it's hardly as if other commanders get much better performance in that year from them, either.

If you can't have a supply of talented corps commanders, then the best you can do is exclude the complete duffers; what you have then is a situation which is at least workable, and you can work to improve the commanders over time based on experience. (Porter's efforts at Hanover Court House take place less than two weeks after his elevation to corps command, which may not have been a coincidence, though he also does err in his appreciation of the situation during Gaines Mill.)


But the reason why there's not a supply of good general officers is twofold. The first is that there's not been time to test them in combat and command and determine which of them is good and which is bad; the second is that they've not had time to actually pick up the ingredients of managing the lower formations etc. on the field. This means that an officer with potential is going to look worse in 1862 than he would in 1864, and also that you can't filter out the officers who don't have potential in the first place.


What might have helped was if McClellan could do a "discard and draw", i.e. dump a poor corps commander and replace him with someone else. That would let him get rid of Keyes and replace him with, say, Couch, and see if Couch does well; then if that works out fine move on to the next weakest commander. Eventually you get to the point where either it's now Porter who's the weakest commander or Porter has managed to grow into his responsibilities and the overall quality of the army's articulation is much better. Instead even if Porter isn't great he's still someone who McClellan keeps in command just to have someone comparatively reliable, because he can't replace Keyes, Heintzelman or Sumner.
(A better alternative is to have Porter's Wing and Sumner's Wing and Franklin's Wing and Heintzelman's Wing for a month or so of manoeuvres, then elevate whoever did best to a corps command at McClellan's appointment and swap the other wing commanders for someone else, as that way you can suspend something that's going disastrously at a moment's notice.)



Of course, if what Porter is is a solid executive general who isn't reliable in independent operations (even after he's had a while to develop) but is able to command successfully if unimaginatively as part of an army - well, that's still better than most, and it's entirely workable as part of an army even if he's the worst one in it (he just ends up being the one commanding part of the main body).



ED: I had a look for the best Union corps commanders or the ones most highly thought of, and, well...
Hooker is a division commander. Hancock is a brigadier. Meade and Reynolds are in the Pennsylvania Reserves and thus aren't even part of McClellan's army at all until June, and they're not the senior or even second-senior commanders of that division either. Most of the corps commanders at Gettysburg not mentioned prior were:
- Sickles wasn't even a proper officer in the army until May, and was a brigadier then.
- Sykes was in command of the regular infantry, and got a division in 5th Corps when that was formed.
- Sedgwick inherited Heintzelman's division, so was a BC until then.
- Slocum likewise inherited a division when the commander went up to CC rank, and was until then a BC.

So... yeah. Without a crystal ball, it's hard to pick commanders that come out as better than Porter - and hard to escape the idea that they had to come up like they did. Best I can see is Hooker/Franklin/Porter without picking a brigade commander directly for corps command.




Of course, the question does arise as to what Porter could have done better at Second Bull Run...
 
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That's the thing, though, isn't it?

The Union as a whole, especially in the first years of the war, is going begging for good general officers. It's one reason why problems often arise wherever McClellan wasn't - he simply didn't have a supply of reliable executive generals who could carry out his instructions as given, let alone also act independently - and it's hardly as if other commanders get much better performance in that year from them, either.

If you can't have a supply of talented corps commanders, then the best you can do is exclude the complete duffers; what you have then is a situation which is at least workable, and you can work to improve the commanders over time based on experience. (Porter's efforts at Hanover Court House take place less than two weeks after his elevation to corps command, which may not have been a coincidence, though he also does err in his appreciation of the situation during Gaines Mill.)


But the reason why there's not a supply of good general officers is twofold. The first is that there's not been time to test them in combat and command and determine which of them is good and which is bad; the second is that they've not had time to actually pick up the ingredients of managing the lower formations etc. on the field. This means that an officer with potential is going to look worse in 1862 than he would in 1864, and also that you can't filter out the officers who don't have potential in the first place.


What might have helped was if McClellan could do a "discard and draw", i.e. dump a poor corps commander and replace him with someone else. That would let him get rid of Keyes and replace him with, say, Couch, and see if Couch does well; then if that works out fine move on to the next weakest commander. Eventually you get to the point where either it's now Porter who's the weakest commander or Porter has managed to grow into his responsibilities and the overall quality of the army's articulation is much better. Instead even if Porter isn't great he's still someone who McClellan keeps in command just to have someone comparatively reliable, because he can't replace Keyes, Heintzelman or Sumner.
(A better alternative is to have Porter's Wing and Sumner's Wing and Franklin's Wing and Heintzelman's Wing for a month or so of manoeuvres, then elevate whoever did best to a corps command at McClellan's appointment and swap the other wing commanders for someone else, as that way you can suspend something that's going disastrously at a moment's notice.)



Of course, if what Porter is is a solid executive general who isn't reliable in independent operations (even after he's had a while to develop) but is able to command successfully if unimaginatively as part of an army - well, that's still better than most, and it's entirely workable as part of an army even if he's the worst one in it (he just ends up being the one commanding part of the main body).



ED: I had a look for the best Union corps commanders or the ones most highly thought of, and, well...
Hooker is a division commander. Hancock is a brigadier. Meade and Reynolds are in the Pennsylvania Reserves and thus aren't even part of McClellan's army at all until June, and they're not the senior or even second-senior commanders of that division either. Most of the corps commanders at Gettysburg not mentioned prior were:
- Sickles wasn't even a proper officer in the army until May, and was a brigadier then.
- Sykes was in command of the regular infantry, and got a division in 5th Corps when that was formed.
- Sedgwick inherited Heintzelman's division, so was a BC until then.
- Slocum likewise inherited a division when the commander went up to CC rank, and was until then a BC.

So... yeah. Without a crystal ball, it's hard to pick commanders that come out as better than Porter - and hard to escape the idea that they had to come up like they did. Best I can see is Hooker/Franklin/Porter without picking a brigade commander directly for corps command.




Of course, the question does arise as to what Porter could have done better at Second Bull Run...
You appear to have misunderstood my point, so I'll make it clear again. It's not that McClellan bleeped up picking Porter given his choices. It's that Porter was mediocre by any objective standard - albeit "less mediocre" than most of the others. As for "what Porter could have done better at Second Bull Run", you seem like a pretty sharp guy so I'll let you take a crack at it first before giving the answer. There is one but let's see what you come up with. You should start with August 28 late and work forward. And feel free to take the full 49 weeks if needed, which appears to be the default time frame for responding in this Porter sub-thread.
 
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It largely speaks to the problems with the selection method - remember that Sumner, Franklin and Heintzelman were still better than Keyes! (McDowell is better than Keyes as well, IMO.)

As of Feb 1862 the Union DCs were:

Banks
Blenker
Casey
Franklin
Heintzelman
Hooker
Keyes
Lander
McCall
McDowell
Porter (FJ)
Smith
Stone
Sumner

So if McClellan is going to get his own picks for CC in he pretty much has these to pick from...
This reminds me that I was favorably impressed by what I read about Lander in one of the several books about Jackson's Valley Campaign. (Unfortunately, at this point I no longer remember which!) Lander seems to have done well around the time of the Romney phase in very early 1862, and doesn't seem like the sort who would've been buffaloed or stymied by Stonewall. Of course, he died very shortly thereafter, so must remain another might-have-been.
 
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As for "what Porter could have done better at Second Bull Run", you seem like a pretty sharp guy so I'll let you take a crack at it first before giving the answer. There is one but let's see what you come up with. You should start with August 28 late and work forward. And feel free to take the full 49 weeks if needed, which appears to be the default time frame for responding in this Porter sub-thread.
I'll admit I was rather hoping your work wasn't getting in the way any more.
Let's see...

28th
Porter marches from Warrenton Junction at 3AM and arrives at Bristoe Station 10:30 AM, remains there for the rest of the day

I can't find a mention of Porter being ordered to the battlefield on the 28th in Hennessy; Hennesey lists orders to King, McDowell, Kearny, Heintzeman, Reno and Sigel, but none to Porter. If Pope forgot to send Porter orders then that's on him; if Pope thought McDowell would pass on orders then that's also a mistake.

I assume what you're thinking of is that he should have marched to the sound of the guns in the afternoon, but no such charge is in the accusations of which he was convicted in the court-martial. There is an accusation that he started marching to Bristoe at 3AM instead of 1AM, but that's nothing remarkable and he was acquitted in the Schofield report on the grounds that he still got moving at a reasonable time. He marched about 10 miles (from modern Calverton to Bristoe Station) which is a serviceable day's march.



29th
3AM August 29th Porter is ordered to move on Centreville at dawn.
Just after dawn Pope moves to Centreville himself, and upon arrival sends orders via McDowell to turn King's division over to Porter and have Porter and King march to Gainesville (delivered by Piatt, who apparently failed to make clear that Piatt's brigade was now attached to Porter).
The final set of orders on the morning of the 29th to Porter reach him at Manassas at 9:30 (delivered by Gibbon), and is to push 5th Corps plus King's division to Gainesville.

Piatt was under Porter's command, but apparently Porter was unaware of that fact until 16 years after the battle.

10AM to noon
The Joint Order is issued. It contains these elements:
- Move to Gainesville.
- "The whole command shall halt" as soon as communication is established between the main body and the combined 1st/5th Corps wing.
- order not to be strictly carried out if advantage can be gained by departing from it.
- troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run by tomorrow morning (as they may need to fall back behind the river tonight).

Porter is on the march up the road parallel to the Manassas Gap railroad, which is the correct road to take to get most directly to Gainesville, as is McDowell behind him. The combined force (under McDowell's command as senior general) runs into enemy troops and halts; McDowell decides to take the Sudley Springs road (to the right of the Gainesville road) and have Porter stay where he is.

The Porter retrial concluded that Porter had complied with the order as much as possible, as it had essentially run into Longstreet, and that to expect Porter to somehow punch through Longstreet was too much (while having Porter keep Longstreet in check and be ready to fall back behind Bull Run that night was doable and was what he did).

Noon to 2PM
Pope writes of this period that he expected Porter and McDowell were moving to Gainesville and were going to outflank and turn the enemy; in fact they'd run into elements of Longstreet's "corps" and thus were unable to do so.

Porter remains basically engaged to his front and tries movements to the right, but doesn't hit on a solution.


2-4 PM
Porter assumes a defensive posture, in accord with McDowell's opinion.
He does not fall back despite the opinion of Morell (for the rest of the day; it's in his orders in the ORs.)


4-6 PM
4:30 - Pope writes an order to Porter to attack the enemy flank and if possible rear. (Porter is actually aimed at Longstreet's entire corps.) This order will not arrive until around dusk.

Porter considers falling back but decides against it; he also considers an attack, but decides against it because the enemy is still in his front. Griffin's brigade withdraws but this does not seem to have resulted from Porter's orders.
Around 6PM Porter checks with McDowell what he should be doing.


6PM-midnight
Pope believes Jackson is retreating.
Pope is now aware that Longstreet has arrived, but believes Longstreet has not extended Jackson's line; he thus believes that Jackson's right is still vulnerable to an attack by Porter moving towards Gainesville. (This is an incorrect belief on Pope's part.)

When Porter's 6PM dispatch is mentioned, Pope is unaware that the 4:30 order to attack had not been recieved; he thought Porter's actions were disloyal, but McDowell said it was the result of incompetence.

Pope sends an order to Porter directing him to "march his command to the field of battle of today and report to me in person for orders". This order is peremptory.


Porter orders an advance around 6PM based on information that the enemy is retreating, and then recieves the 4:30 PM attack order. He orders an attack, but Morell protests that the enemy is not retreating, and since it's now basically dusk Morell's opinion that an attack would be a bad idea is followed.


So basically the 5th Corps skirmishes all day. It might be possible to argue that Porter should have pushed more aggressively to his front, but given that
(1) his orders of the morning included a directive to be able to retreat behind the Bull Run overnight
(2) he was in fact facing a grind through Longstreet's entire corps if he'd continued to advance
(3) McDowell, his senior, had modified the "move on Gainesville" orders by removing more than half of the strength of the column tasked to carry them out, leaving Porter with just two divisions instead of the five initially tasked
(4) McDowell had also said it'd be better if Porter held his position
I think you can argue that the decision was the correct one with hindsight; you can also argue that given what Porter could know at the time it was the correct decision.
The inital court-martial had as a basis that Longstreet was not present; the retrial noted that he was. Similarly the initial court-martial got Porter's position wrong.

To summarize the findings of the retrial on these respects, it would be that the initial court-martial had Porter close enough to fall on Jackson's right and also had Longstreet not present; both of these were entirely false.




I'm not really seeing it, I'm afraid, or rather I can see an alternative (which is to continue the advance to Gainesville with a set-piece attack past Dawkins' Branch) but this would in fact have just led to Porter running straight into Longstreet's whole corps with his own much weaker force.
 
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I'll admit I was rather hoping your work wasn't getting in the way any more.
Let's see...

28th
Porter marches from Warrenton Junction at 3AM and arrives at Bristoe Station 10:30 AM, remains there for the rest of the day

I can't find a mention of Porter being ordered to the battlefield on the 28th in Hennessy; Hennesey lists orders to King, McDowell, Kearny, Heintzeman, Reno and Sigel, but none to Porter. If Pope forgot to send Porter orders then that's on him; if Pope thought McDowell would pass on orders then that's also a mistake.

I assume what you're thinking of is that he should have marched to the sound of the guns in the afternoon, but no such charge is in the accusations of which he was convicted in the court-martial. There is an accusation that he started marching to Bristoe at 3AM instead of 1AM, but that's nothing remarkable and he was acquitted in the Schofield report on the grounds that he still got moving at a reasonable time. He marched about 10 miles (from modern Calverton to Bristoe Station) which is a serviceable day's march.



29th
3AM August 29th Porter is ordered to move on Centreville at dawn.
Just after dawn Pope moves to Centreville himself, and upon arrival sends orders via McDowell to turn King's division over to Porter and have Porter and King march to Gainesville (delivered by Piatt, who apparently failed to make clear that Piatt's brigade was now attached to Porter).
The final set of orders on the morning of the 29th to Porter reach him at Manassas at 9:30 (delivered by Gibbon), and is to push 5th Corps plus King's division to Gainesville.

Piatt was under Porter's command, but apparently Porter was unaware of that fact until 16 years after the battle.

10AM to noon
The Joint Order is issued. It contains these elements:
- Move to Gainesville.
- "The whole command shall halt" as soon as communication is established between the main body and the combined 1st/5th Corps wing.
- order not to be strictly carried out if advantage can be gained by departing from it.
- troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run by tomorrow morning (as they may need to fall back behind the river tonight).

Porter is on the march up the road parallel to the Manassas Gap railroad, which is the correct road to take to get most directly to Gainesville, as is McDowell behind him. The combined force (under McDowell's command as senior general) runs into enemy troops and halts; McDowell decides to take the Sudley Springs road (to the right of the Gainesville road) and have Porter stay where he is.

The Porter retrial concluded that Porter had complied with the order as much as possible, as it had essentially run into Longstreet, and that to expect Porter to somehow punch through Longstreet was too much (while having Porter keep Longstreet in check and be ready to fall back behind Bull Run that night was doable and was what he did).

Noon to 2PM
Pope writes of this period that he expected Porter and McDowell were moving to Gainesville and were going to outflank and turn the enemy; in fact they'd run into elements of Longstreet's "corps" and thus were unable to do so.

Porter remains basically engaged to his front and tries movements to the right, but doesn't hit on a solution.


2-4 PM
Porter assumes a defensive posture, in accord with McDowell's opinion.
He does not fall back despite the opinion of Morell (for the rest of the day; it's in his orders in the ORs.)


4-6 PM
4:30 - Pope writes an order to Porter to attack the enemy flank and if possible rear. (Porter is actually aimed at Longstreet's entire corps.) This order will not arrive until around dusk.

Porter considers falling back but decides against it; he also considers an attack, but decides against it because the enemy is still in his front. Griffin's brigade withdraws but this does not seem to have resulted from Porter's orders.
Around 6PM Porter checks with McDowell what he should be doing.


6PM-midnight
Pope believes Jackson is retreating.
Pope is now aware that Longstreet has arrived, but believes Longstreet has not extended Jackson's line; he thus believes that Jackson's right is still vulnerable to an attack by Porter moving towards Gainesville. (This is an incorrect belief on Pope's part.)

When Porter's 6PM dispatch is mentioned, Pope is unaware that the 4:30 order to attack had not been recieved; he thought Porter's actions were disloyal, but McDowell said it was the result of incompetence.

Pope sends an order to Porter directing him to "march his command to the field of battle of today and report to me in person for orders". This order is peremptory.


Porter orders an advance around 6PM based on information that the enemy is retreating, and then recieves the 4:30 PM attack order. He orders an attack, but Morell protests that the enemy is not retreating, and since it's now basically dusk Morell's opinion that an attack would be a bad idea is followed.


So basically the 5th Corps skirmishes all day. It might be possible to argue that Porter should have pushed more aggressively to his front, but given that
(1) his orders of the morning included a directive to be able to retreat behind the Bull Run overnight
(2) he was in fact facing a grind through Longstreet's entire corps if he'd continued to advance
(3) McDowell, his senior, had modified the "move on Gainesville" orders by removing more than half of the strength of the column tasked to carry them out, leaving Porter with just two divisions instead of the five initially tasked
(4) McDowell had also said it'd be better if Porter held his position
I think you can argue that the decision was the correct one with hindsight; you can also argue that given what Porter could know at the time it was the correct decision.
The inital court-martial had as a basis that Longstreet was not present; the retrial noted that he was. Similarly the initial court-martial got Porter's position wrong.

To summarize the findings of the retrial on these respects, it would be that the initial court-martial had Porter close enough to fall on Jackson's right and also had Longstreet not present; both of these were entirely false.




I'm not really seeing it, I'm afraid, or rather I can see an alternative (which is to continue the advance to Gainesville with a set-piece attack past Dawkins' Branch) but this would in fact have just led to Porter running straight into Longstreet's whole corps with his own much weaker force.i
I wouldn't rely on either of the courts martial for a definitive assessment of the three days (as opposed to whether Pope's specific charges were proven - and even there politics played a role in both proceedings). I would examine the status of things as of c. 10 AM on August 29 - from that several follow up questions arise, but let's work with one. What reconnaissance did Porter conduct? (and I mean specifics - I don't mean sitting stoned because of reports that "something" was in his front). Keep in mind here that the issue is whether Porter's performance has been accurately assessed by the justifiably recognized authority on this battle as "pedestrian" (and his excellent map study is helpful to this but not essential). The issue is not whether (1) Porter "lost" the battle or (2) Porter should have been convicted of the express charges brought by Pope.
 
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