McClellan was a great disciplinarian. So?

Estimating Numbers (Part II)

I think the notion that the over-exaggerated numbers mistakenly attributed to Pinkerton's 'incompetence' is already well-known in Civil War circles. What I was sort of curious about was the source (or cause) of these numbers. Fishel is reluctant to blame all of it on McClellan insofar as simply attributing it to McClellan…um….being McClellan (i.e., his well-known personality quirks). He acknowledges that McClellan's particular personality issues contribute to it (as it nearly always does), but Fishel also acknowledges that a variety of other factors (from erroneous arithmetic logic to just plain mistakes) also contributes as well. (I'd also add, as I said above, that no real expertise existed in this kind of intelligence gathering.)






FYI.....the company the Pinkerton started still exists (but a different name):

http://www.ci-pinkerton.com/







CC
 
McClellan was a gret disciplinarian, So?

In the first place, I understand that at first, Pinkerton's estimates were fairly accurate(his early estimate of total forces availabvle in all of Va. were very close to reality) at the beginning of his operations and became progressively worse over time. It seems, likely that it did not take the astute businessman, Pinkerton long to realize what it took to keep the Boss happy (sometimes the Boss is right and sometimes the Boss is Wrong; but the Boss is always the Boss)
In fact, McClellan was very consistent in his estimate of what kind of army he needed to defeat those of the confeceracy's. When he first took over in Washington, he estimated a Union Army of at least 140,000 men and never really deviated from that estimate (that is why he never considered he had enough men and used every hook and crook to get more men into his army)
McClellan was an idiot, not studpid, if he really believed his more outrageous estimates, he would never have positioned himself on the Peninsula.
The inflated estimates of confederate forces, were just ploys, to firighten civilian gov't officials into giving him a 140,000 man army. With such a force, even a general of McClellan's modest ability would have been assured of victory.
 
Given Mac's history of playing fast and loose with numbers, there is every reason to doubt any numbers he quotes, especially if it refers to how many men he may have in his army, at any one time.
The important fact that comes through to me is that there is a discrepancy of 28,000 men between McClellan's and his Surgeion-General's.

Those in General Hospital in Washington. They were still carried on the Adjutant General's strength as AoP (detached), but on the Surgeon-General's rolls as in General Hospital.

In fact McClellan had a very good idea of the strength of his forces, Lincoln and Stanton kept massively overestimating.

Following The Seven Days, Lee had little Mac's number. After a little rest, Lee calmly turned his back and left the AoP and the 'Young Napoleon' to their own devices
on the Peninsula and took his army to its namesake, Northern Virginia. So much for McClellan being a threat on the Peninsula.

Rubbish, read Rafuse or any of the similar. McClellan's position was impregnable, and all he needed was another 20,000 men to secure the southern bank of the James before rolling into Richmond under the cover of the Navy (as indeed was the plan). These men were Burnside's Corps, and never arrived. McClellan started his movement anyway, but the army was recalled to Washington.
 
Even if so (which is at best extremely dubious), that is not enough to envelop McClellan.

Yes it is, if Lee's operational art was up to it (it wasn't, but no-one knew that at the time).

The only army at risk of being destroyed is Lee's. McClellan's is pretty safe.

Lee is 6 miles from his supply base, on interior lines. McClellan's supply base is at the end of a long, exposed railroad. There is no danger of Lee being taken, but every danger McClellan will. Both Lee and McClellan recognised the situation and Lee tried to exploit it, McClellan tried to change it. McClellan's OODA loop was quicker and he won that race.

At Antietam? No. At Antietam, Harvey is a division commander, not a de facto "wing" commander.

As I say, Longstreet is a Division Commander, Jackson is a Division Commander; the officers commanding their Divisions on the day were the senior brigadiers who stepped up, as was the normal practice (although in Longstreet's case, like many CS divisions there was an intermediate level of command between Division and Brigade called a Demi-Division, it was the senior Demi-Division commander that stepped up).

In fact, there are initially 4 Wing Commanders on the field. Jackson with 2 divisions (Jackson's and Ewell's), Longstreet with 2 divisions (Longstreet's and Hood's), DH Hill with 2 divisions (DH Hill's and Walker's, both Dept of North Carolina) and McLaws with 2 divisions (McLaws' and Anderson's). There is some messing with structures certainly and they don't quite fight that way, but it appears to have been the way they were orbated under SO191. When the decision to collapse to 2 wings was undertaken, it was simply a case of putting DH Hill under Jackson, and McLaws under Longstreet (and certainly in Longstreet's Corps they continue to operate as 2 distinct "demi-corps", the move to 3 Corps again was a simple renumbering of Longstreet's Corps' Left Wing (McLaws and Anderson) as 3rd Corps, and transferring AP Hill's division in, making him senior Maj Gen and defacto Corps Commander until confirmed by Richmond as Lt Gen).

So move it.

Show me a good artillery position on the Federal right...

No, all of them except possibly Bragg would have, because McClellan is facing <45,000 rebels with 75,000+ federals.

Hardly long odds.

McClellan didn't have that many. He had about 57,000 on the field, which includes his trains. Lee had about 40,000, but had already removed his trains back across the Potomac. Both had made considerable detachments to guard their rears (because both are professional soldiers).

Of his 57,000, about 10,000 (10,746 PFD) are "new levies", most of whom have never even loaded their muskets.

McClellan does have a slim manpower advantage on the 17th, but not a decisive one. Not enough to overcome the problem of having to attack on exterior lines against a well placed (although not entrenched) defensive line.


Since that counts Richmond's defenses and Holmes, that leaves Lee with 5:4 odds against him.

So much for double McClellan's numbers by this essay.

Yes, but the numbers reported are not the same numbers. The Union returns include detachments to the trains, hospital etc., while the Confederates generally omit these.

The actual combat strength of both armies is less than their PFD. For the Union the infantry brigades typically report about 50% of their PFD strength is with the colors (i.e. on average about 1,000 muskets per brigade), with the Confederates it's about 75% (i.e. about 1,750 muskets per brigade).

The ratio of formations (McClellan: Lee) is:

Infantry Brigades: 32:39
Cavalry Brigades: 2:3 (Stuart's "Brigade" is already operating as 3 demi-brigades)
Field Artillery Batteries: 57:73

Or in simpler ratios of man/gunpower

Infantry: 1:2
Cavalry: 2:3
Field Guns: 1:1
 
Fishel is reluctant to blame all of it on McClellan insofar as simply attributing it to McClellan…um….being McClellan (i.e., his well-known personality quirks). He acknowledges that McClellan's particular personality issues contribute to it (as it nearly always does),

McClellan's "pathological personality" has no basis in fact, although it's a nice bit of character assassination.

See Harsh's "On the McClellan-go-round" for an overview of how the current consensus view of McClellan was constructed. We're in the middle of a backlash against this construct, but I suspect the same old tales will be trotted out for decades to come....
 
Let's just assume that McClellan did an adequate job during the Seven Days.
Again assume he did not ignore orders to consolidate armies before 2nd Manassas.
Please explain how any General worth his salt can possess the actual battle plans of his opponent and not aggressively take advantage?

Ah, now we have it; McClellan lacked the aggressive gene.

Character assasination...hardly.
Political affilation....horsefeathers.
Historical revisionism....misguided folderol.
 
Let's just assume that McClellan did an adequate job during the Seven Days.
Again assume he did not ignore orders to consolidate armies before 2nd Manassas.

You're referring to him insisting on equipping Franklin with wagons, forage, sustainence and ammunition before marching him out two days later?

Please explain how any General worth his salt can possess the actual battle plans of his opponent and not aggressively take advantage?

Because he didn't possess Lee's battle plans. He possessed an old Operations Order, and he indeed did move aggressively upon it's receipt. Had Halleck acceeded to McClellan's request for Miles to abandon an untenable position at Harper's Ferry before the noose closed things could have been very different. If Col. Alexander had been right that Harper's Ferry would hold out another day, Lee would have been utterly destroyed. As it was, Lee displayed what Napoleon thought was the first quality of a General: Luck.
 
Had McClellan marched within the hour with the kind of vigorous aggressiveness his opponent would have showed with the same, Lee would have been destroyed.

One thin division (Harvey Hill's) holding South Mountain all day does not speak well of McClellan's attack on it, since the defense was not one of his (Hill's) finer moments.

On the whole, McClellan failed at two things
.
1) Acting vigorously.

2) Giving a convincing, acceptable explaination for not doing so immediately (and explaining how things were being dealt with as he wrote this).

http://ehistory.osu.edu/osu/sources/recordview.cfm?content=/012/0051

McClellan said:
Several contrabands just in give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanower Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.

The text in bold is exagerated, the idea that Beauregard is there is...

Pessimistic is the kindest word I can think of.
 
He possessed an old Operations Order, and he indeed did move aggressively upon it's receipt.
Not quite, 67th. The order was not old -- it revealed that Lee had divided his army into three parts. And saying that McC moved aggressively is an overstatement -- kinda like he agressively changed from a snail to a tortoise.

I don't want to compare McC with a Grant or a Sheridan, so let's use Jackson. Jackson would have said something like, "Cook three days rations and move out in the hour." Then he would have ordered some Colonel or staff member to start getting the wagons ready to follow. McClellan would have, and did, make certain that all the "i's" were dotted and "t's" crossed.

I'm forgetting my details, but it seems to me that days elapsed before he started across South Mountain. This is not aggressive.

Ole
 
Had McClellan marched within the hour with the kind of vigorous aggressiveness his opponent would have showed with the same, Lee would have been destroyed.

Obviously he should have waited 30 minutes then. He gave verbal march orders 30 minutes after the receipt of SO191 in his HQ.

One thin division (Harvey Hill's) holding South Mountain all day does not speak well of McClellan's attack on it, since the defense was not one of his (Hill's) finer moments.

The whole of DH Hill's division, Longstreet's, and Hood's divisions and elements of McLaw's and Anderson's, plus most of Stuart's cavalry. Lee had almost half of the ANV at South Mountain. How the head's of the Federal marching columns were simply meant to roll over 18,000 entrenched men well supported by artillery in an extremely strong position is beyond me.

The gaps were roughly defended by:

Fox's: Ripley's demi-division of D.H. Hill's division, Toombs' demi-division of Longstreet's division (minus Toombs himself and his brigade, which remained in reserve at Bonosboro, Drayton commanded the rest of the demi-division) and Hood's division (total 6 bdes)

Turner's: Rodes' demi-division of D.H. Hill's division, Kemper's demi-division of Longstreet's division and Evan's "division" (total 6 bdes) under D.H. Hill (acting Corps Commander)

Crampton's: Mahone's (Parham's) brigade of Anderson's division, Cobb's demi-brigade of McLaws' division* and Robertson's cavalry brigade under Munford (3 inf bdes)

* Note that DH Hill held back considerable elements of McLaws and Anderson not specified under SO191. Longstreet, on learning of this, gave McLaw's Wilcox's division, which was incorporated into Anderson's division as the left demi-division.
 
Obviously he should have waited 30 minutes then. He gave verbal march orders 30 minutes after the receipt of SO191 in his HQ.

Ok so his plan was to march within thirty minutes and then wait 2 days while Lee got nice and settled. It amounts to the same thing. He should have attacked on the 15th. Instead he gives plenty of time for Jackson to get back... and for Hill to reach just in the nick of time. A day earlier and Jackson would not have even left Harpers Ferry yet... so why march all fast like with thirty minutes notice if you're just going to sit and watch anyways? To give the illusion that you acted with all speed without actually accomplishing anything. McLellan was all about the illusions.
 
Ok so his plan was to march within thirty minutes and then wait 2 days while Lee got nice and settled. It amounts to the same thing. He should have attacked on the 15th. Instead he gives plenty of time for Jackson to get back... and for Hill to reach just in the nick of time. A day earlier and Jackson would not have even left Harpers Ferry yet... so why march all fast like with thirty minutes notice if you're just going to sit and watch anyways? To give the illusion that you acted with all speed without actually accomplishing anything. McLellan was all about the illusions.

The 15th? 6,000 exhausted infantry without reserve ammunition or artillery attacking 18,000 Confederates?

McClellan indeed did order an attack on the 16th ("a day earlier"), but Hooker refused the order citing too much strength to his front. McClellan could have gone for half Lee's army on the 16th, with a third of his own....

I don't think people understand just how slowly armies move. Jackson's "foot cavalry" barely managed 6 miles a day in the valley. 20 hours after pushing the Confederates back from South Mountain McClellans lead elements are 12 miles forward and in contact with Lee's piquets on Antietam Creek. The speed of McClellan during Maryland puts Jackson's "foot cavalry" to shame. Indeed, it's actually one of the more rapid movements made in the Civil War, and so I don't see it getting much faster....
 
Obviously he should have waited 30 minutes then. He gave verbal march orders 30 minutes after the receipt of SO191 in his HQ.

Source? And what I meant was, have the men on the move within the hour.

The whole of DH Hill's division, Longstreet's, and Hood's divisions and elements of McLaw's and Anderson's, plus most of Stuart's cavalry. Lee had almost half of the ANV at South Mountain. How the head's of the Federal marching columns were simply meant to roll over 18,000 entrenched men well supported by artillery in an extremely strong position is beyond me.

If the situation was half as good for the Confederacy as you're portraying it, then it is a sign of inexcusably poor performance to not be able to just hold McClellan at the passes until Jackson is ready to join back up with the main army.

Also, entrenched is far too strong a word here. Braced for attack, possibly (maybe even probably). Dug in in the sense 1864 would make commonplace? Not even close.
 
The 15th? 6,000 exhausted infantry without reserve ammunition or artillery attacking 18,000 Confederates?

Thanks for correcting that date... the 16th is indeed what I meant. But the 6000 exhausted infantry? I don't think so.

Landscape Turned Red Chapter 5 "We will Make our Stand";

"Some eighteen hours had passed since his army had reached the field, but he had as yet no clear picture of the Confederate positions."



That hardly sounds like a vigorous pursuit... OR an exhausted army of only 6000.

Lee only 2 paragraphs later is stated as telling;
"One of his artillerists that there would be no battle that day (the 15th) Or the next day either. He expected to have time to reunite his army."

It also states a paragraph or two later that McClellan had 60,000 fighting men at his disposal on dawn of September 16th, at odds of four to one.

And the order of Hooker to cross didn't come until the afternoon... and the 12th corps would be sent as reinforcements per Hooker's request but it was too late in the day. So what About the rest of the day up until then?
 
Source? And what I meant was, have the men on the move within the hour.

Never had to organise a large body of people for a movement before?

The order of events is distorted by a transcription error in the OR's. McClellan's telegram to Lincoln in the OR's has a timestamp 12M (interpreted by most as midday); the original bears the timestamp 12-midnight. An entire myth of a slow reaction has been built on this. (Some writers report sending a telegram at both 12 midday and 12 midnight with the same content!)

SO191 is picked up about 10am, and works it's way through various command levels and reaches McClellan mid-afternoon. He immediately orders Pleasonton's cavalry to scout whether the movements are authentic, and Franklin and Burnside to move forward in preparation to strike South Mountain the next day,

If the situation was half as good for the Confederacy as you're portraying it, then it is a sign of inexcusably poor performance to not be able to just hold McClellan at the passes until Jackson is ready to join back up with the main army.

Also, entrenched is far too strong a word here. Braced for attack, possibly (maybe even probably). Dug in in the sense 1864 would make commonplace? Not even close.

Point, but they were as well protected as Cobb at Fredericksburg or Hancock at Gettysburg day 3.

The Confederate delaying movement was successful in that it forced the Federals to deploy.
 
Thanks for correcting that date... the 16th is indeed what I meant. But the 6000 exhausted infantry? I don't think so.

He [McClellan] had lead elements on Antietam Creek late on the 15th, who set up a skirmish screen. He had 2.5 Corps up the next day, and another 2 up by the beginning of the 17th, 1.5 Corps arrived during the 17th (during the bloodiest day), and another 2 divisions on the 18th. Such is the joy of deploying off march columns.
 
McClellan was a great disciplinarian, So?

On the Peninsula, McClellan's loss of nerve can only be condoned, not justified, if he were actually outnumered as badly as he claimed.
The fact that little Mac let a smaller army concentrate superior numbers at the point of attack with impunity, is Not a sign of good generalship.(Not to mention allowing a smaller army to outfight your own, as at Antietam)
The fact is McClellan was never confident nor prepared to fight, aggressively, unless and until he had a army of, at least, 140,000 men and because, historically, the AoP never approached that number, the young napoleon, never fought confidently nor aggressively.



P.S. After The Seven Days, the London Times noted that the reason McClellan did not capture Richmond was:
"First he had two HILL'S to PASS, Second a STONEWALL to Mount, And Third a LONGSTREET to March Through. And seeing the impossibility of such a captu8re, he wisely chose to Skedaddle." Skedaddle being the operative word.
 
Never had to organise a large body of people for a movement before?

No, but I can say with a fairly high level of confidence that if you gave Stonewall something like this - provided he trusted it was credible (and there's no reason whatsoever to condemn McClellan for wanting to test it first, though his "Here is something with which I can whip Bobby Lee..." indicates he was pretty confident.) would be prodding his men to get going immediately if not sooner. If you can't get at least the

Presumably, he was already pursuing/seeking Lee, so it isn't as if his army has to be woken up from being in their camps sitting on their hands.

That is why we should see a march within the hour - the army is already "active", so to speak, any "cook three days rations" has already been done and they just need to know where to go.

Point, but they were as well protected as Cobb at Fredericksburg or Hancock at Gettysburg day 3.

Much thinner lines though, even if the terrain is also rougher - Hill was in a tight spot, Cobb or Hancock, not so much.
 
I do hope you guys are satisfied. When Dear One get's home and her light fixture is not installed and she determines that I've done absolutely nothing but read this screen all day, I'm going to be in trouble. All I'm going to be able to say, as an excuse, is that it was "A busy day."

Thank you very much.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch, the Lone Ranger and Tonto .......

McC was criminally lax in not moving promptly upon discovering and verifying that the AoNV was situated in three pieces.

Which has nothing to do with his having whipped the AotP into shape. That is what he did, and that is why Lincoln let McC's ego run rampant. But it did fall a bit short of what was required.

Ole
 
No, but I can say with a fairly high level of confidence that if you gave Stonewall something like this - provided he trusted it was credible (and there's no reason whatsoever to condemn McClellan for wanting to test it first, though his "Here is something with which I can whip Bobby Lee..." indicates he was pretty confident.) would be prodding his men to get going immediately if not sooner. If you can't get at least the

Jackson? Ever examined his performance at Cedar Mountain?

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...l+war+command&ei=EKKaSffAK5K6M_7-0aYJ#PPP1,M1

I can't speak lowly enough of it.
 
Back
Top