McClellan on Hooker at Antietam

So, I am now expressing my belief that if McClernand had disobeyed the direst order of relief he would have been arrested. This comes into no conflict with any acts said, done, and/or written.
Lubliner.
 
Now please explain how Major-General Buell is authorized to appoint Corps commanders.

and I explained he wasn't. I then further immediately explained that within a month of this, official corps were were formed in the west with the Army of the Ohio/Cumberland being designated the 14th Army Corps, and the wings were designated as such.
Or we can just take it as McClernand did: he had been relieved of his command.

Indeed, and the mechanism was that the Inspector-General turned up at his tent in the middle of the night with a squad of troops and notionally "took his sword" by suspending his functions as a general. This is an arrest in form.
 
So, I am now expressing my belief that if McClernand had disobeyed the direst order of relief he would have been arrested. This comes into no conflict with any acts said, done, and/or written.
Lubliner.

He would have been confined. I think part of the problem is that whilst today being arrested and being placed in confinement are basically synonymous, for officers in the 1860's, they were not. The regulations and customs of the service were that officers were honourable and could be trusted not to flee, and confinement was only to be used in extreme circumstances. Further, in the field, per the Militia Act of 17th July 1862, an arrested officer whose case could not be rapidly processed was to be "bailed" (not the word used, the term was "released from arrest") and sent away until the court could be arranged. Under English law, which the US law was modeled on, the officers Commission was considered sufficient collateral for the bail.

Only when the court was arranged was the arrested officer to be formally charged and brought back under arrest. In the former case, charges must be preferred within 8 days, and in the latter case it was taken that the papers of the case be transmitted to the adjutant-general within 8 days (which they were in the McClernand case, exactly 8 days later).

In the McClernand case, as the prosecuting officer, Grant could not arrange a court. It had to go up to the President. McClernand even asked Lincoln for a court-of-inquiry after Grant declined to prefer charges, which Lincoln denied. By issuing a general order replacing McClernand with Ord backdated to 18th June, Lincoln had made it a regular "transfer".
 
and I explained he wasn't. I then further immediately explained that within a month of this, official corps were were formed in the west with the Army of the Ohio/Cumberland being designated the 14th Army Corps, and the wings were designated as such.
Again, here is that order:
SPECIAL ORDERS No. 158.
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Louisville, September 29, 1862.
I. The following organization of corps is announced and will be observed until further orders, viz:
First Corps.--Maj. Gen. A. McD. McCook commanding; Second Division (McCook's), Third Division (Rousseau's), Tenth Division (Jackson's).
Second Corps.--Maj. Gen. T. L. Crittenden commanding; Fifth Division (Crittenden's), Sixth Division(Wood's), Fourth Division (Smith's).
Third Corps.--Maj. Gen. C. C. Gilbert commanding; First Division (Schoepf's), Ninth Division (Mitchell's), Eleventh Division (Boyle's).
Division commanders will report in person to their corps commanders, and commanders of corps will report to the general commanding at the Galt House at 9 o'clock this evening.
* * * * * * * * * *
By order of Major-General Buell:
[J. M. WRIGHT,
Assistant Adjutant-General. ]

I asked you to please explain how Major-General Buell is authorized to appoint Corps commanders.

Your explanation is that "he wasn't".

Yet, it appears that those Corps actually were organized and those officers actually were in command of them. Gilbert was actually placed in command of Third Corps because, well, William "Bull" Nelson had actually been murdered by Jefferson Davis that morning, the 29th.

A few days later, all of these Corps actually moved out of Louisville, groping forward in the movement that led to the Battle of Perryville on October 8th. McCook, Crittenden and Gilbert actually did command their Corps in the battle.

So how do you explain all that? Are you saying it never happened? Or are you saying that Buell acted illegally? Would that mean he was "arrested"?
 
Indeed, and the mechanism was that the Inspector-General turned up at his tent in the middle of the night with a squad of troops and notionally "took his sword" by suspending his functions as a general. This is an arrest in form.

As I have mentioned time after time, McClernand was not arrested. His sword was not taken. There was no "arrest".

As to "notionally", here are definitions of that term from the Merriam-Webster dictionary:
  1. theoretical, speculative.
  2. existing in the mind only : imaginary.
  3. given to foolish or fanciful moods or ideas.
The Oxford dictionary seems to think it means "based on a guess, estimate or theory; not existing in reality."

Which one of those do you mean with your use of the word "notionally"?
 
He would have been confined. I think part of the problem is that whilst today being arrested and being placed in confinement are basically synonymous, for officers in the 1860's, they were not. The regulations and customs of the service were that officers were honourable and could be trusted not to flee, and confinement was only to be used in extreme circumstances. Further, in the field, per the Militia Act of 17th July 1862, an arrested officer whose case could not be rapidly processed was to be "bailed" (not the word used, the term was "released from arrest") and sent away until the court could be arranged. Under English law, which the US law was modeled on, the officers Commission was considered sufficient collateral for the bail.

Only when the court was arranged was the arrested officer to be formally charged and brought back under arrest. In the former case, charges must be preferred within 8 days, and in the latter case it was taken that the papers of the case be transmitted to the adjutant-general within 8 days (which they were in the McClernand case, exactly 8 days later).

In the McClernand case, as the prosecuting officer, Grant could not arrange a court. It had to go up to the President. McClernand even asked Lincoln for a court-of-inquiry after Grant declined to prefer charges, which Lincoln denied. By issuing a general order replacing McClernand with Ord backdated to 18th June, Lincoln had made it a regular "transfer".
So much for my offer of a mutual cease and desist. You're incapable of it.

What happened to"Article 57", by the way?
 
He would have been confined. I think part of the problem is that whilst today being arrested and being placed in confinement are basically synonymous, for officers in the 1860's, they were not. The regulations and customs of the service were that officers were honourable and could be trusted not to flee, and confinement was only to be used in extreme circumstances. Further, in the field, per the Militia Act of 17th July 1862, an arrested officer whose case could not be rapidly processed was to be "bailed" (not the word used, the term was "released from arrest") and sent away until the court could be arranged. Under English law, which the US law was modeled on, the officers Commission was considered sufficient collateral for the bail.

Only when the court was arranged was the arrested officer to be formally charged and brought back under arrest. In the former case, charges must be preferred within 8 days, and in the latter case it was taken that the papers of the case be transmitted to the adjutant-general within 8 days (which they were in the McClernand case, exactly 8 days later).

In the McClernand case, as the prosecuting officer, Grant could not arrange a court. It had to go up to the President. McClernand even asked Lincoln for a court-of-inquiry after Grant declined to prefer charges, which Lincoln denied. By issuing a general order replacing McClernand with Ord backdated to 18th June, Lincoln had made it a regular "transfer".
Read the Lincoln-McClernand correspondence for comprehension. Read Stanton to Dana in May. This is all concocted spin. In this dispute three skilled lawyers - Stanton, Halleck, and Lincoln - were involved - a profession in which the precise use of words is a requirement. An experienced journalist - Dana - was involved. Another profession in which the mastery of words is essential. And the CO at the heart of this had a well-earned reputation for issuing precise, careful orders and wrote memoirs that are considered a model for that category. NONE of them used ANY of the terminology you're using. There are two options: (1) they didn't know how to articulate any of this; (2) your theory is wrong. Here's a tip: one of the options makes no sense. In a courtroom your case wouldn't survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
 
As I have mentioned time after time, McClernand was not arrested. His sword was not taken. There was no "arrest".

As to "notionally", here are definitions of that term from the Merriam-Webster dictionary:
  1. theoretical, speculative.
  2. existing in the mind only : imaginary.
  3. given to foolish or fanciful moods or ideas.
The Oxford dictionary seems to think it means "based on a guess, estimate or theory; not existing in reality."

Which one of those do you mean with your use of the word "notionally"?
I think that "notionally" Lee surrendered to McClellan.
 
So how do you explain all that? Are you saying it never happened? Or are you saying that Buell acted illegally? Would that mean he was "arrested"?
Buell had no authority to form corps. Thus these groups he created were not, in the legal sense, corps.

Let me expand on that. An army corps was, at the time, proscribed in law to only be allowed to be organised by the President, and only the President could appoint corps commanders. If someone else put some divisions together and called it a corps, sure, it's a group of divisions and functions like a corps, but it was legally not an army corps, and the command was not legally a corps commander. Not being appointed by the President, they did not have said protection.

Shortly thereafter, by the direction of the President, army corps were created in the western armies. The Army of the Cumberland was designated as 14th Army Corps, and Rosecrans named corps commander.
 
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Read the Lincoln-McClernand correspondence for comprehension. Read Stanton to Dana in May. This is all concocted spin. In this dispute three skilled lawyers - Stanton, Halleck, and Lincoln - were involved - a profession in which the precise use of words is a requirement. An experienced journalist - Dana - was involved. Another profession in which the mastery of words is essential. And the CO at the heart of this had a well-earned reputation for issuing precise, careful orders and wrote memoirs that are considered a model for that category. NONE of them used ANY of the terminology you're using. There are two options: (1) they didn't know how to articulate any of this; (2) your theory is wrong. Here's a tip: one of the options makes no sense. In a courtroom your case wouldn't survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Again, you are making an entirely semantic argument, and now you combined it with a false dichotomy.

Here is a true dichotomy:

Given that the law gives the right to appoint or relieve corps commanders exclusively to the President (which is undisputed by all the principals), but this does not prevent a superior general from arresting a corps commander for a military offense; which of these is true?

1. McClernand was arrested for the military offense of publishing an order in the press without permission, or
2. Grant committed a military offense in disobeying a lawful order of the President, to wit; countermanding the order appointing McClernand to command 13th army corps.

If you're good with that, I am. I've posted where the others can look for themselves.
Apparently not, since you've posted a repeat of your previous argument, which is rooted entirely in semantics.
 
Again, you are making an entirely semantic argument, and now you combined it with a false dichotomy.

Here is a true dichotomy:

Given that the law gives the right to appoint or relieve corps commanders exclusively to the President (which is undisputed by all the principals), but this does not prevent a superior general from arresting a corps commander for a military offense; which of these is true?

1. McClernand was arrested for the military offense of publishing an order in the press without permission, or
2. Grant committed a military offense in disobeying a lawful order of the President, to wit; countermanding the order appointing McClernand to command 13th army corps.


Apparently not, since you've posted a repeat of your previous argument, which is rooted entirely in semantics.
Since you can't stop, there's an obvious third option which you fantasize out of existence - sort of like a multiple choice test which offers only 1. It's raining outside and 2. It's snowing outside without 3. It's doing neither of the above

3. Grant relieved McClernand for all the reasons relayed by Dana to Stanton (Grant acknowledging that in hindsight he should have done so before June 18), in accordance with Grant's broad power to do so as confirmed by Stanton to Dana in May (which added that should he fail to exercise that authority Grant would be held accountable)

And your accusing me of making a point "rooted entirely in semantics" is a genuine knee-slapper.

Whatever did happen to the role of good old Article 57?
 
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Buell had no authority to form corps. Thus these groups he created were not, in the legal sense, corps.

So, then, you say the Corps were never formed and Buell violated the law. Does that mean you think he was "arrested"?

Let me expand on that. An army corps was, at the time, proscribed in law to only be allowed to be organised by the President, and only the President could appoint corps commanders. If someone else put some divisions together and called it a corps, sure, it's a group of divisions and functions like a corps, but it was legally not an army corps, and the command was not legally a corps commander. Not being appointed by the President, they did not have said protection.

What law would that be?

The Militia Act of July 17, 1862 does not use the word "only" about anything concerned with Corps. It says that the President can organize them -- but the President had already organized several Corps months before the law was passed. Was Lincoln somehow violating the law when he did that?

The Militia Act of July 17, 1862 does not say anything at all about anyone appointing Corps commanders. It is reasonable to assume that organizing a Corps would include appointing a commander, but it is an assumption.

The Militia Act of July 17, 1862 does not say anything at all about anyone relieving Corps commanders either: not a single word. This is, again, an assumption you are making. Certainly the President can relieve an officer from a position -- he is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy according to the Constitution. Superior officers can relieve juniors, but that is always situational (IOW, if your superior denies you, you cannot.)

The Militia Act of July 17, 1862 does get specific about who can make certain assignments in a Corps:
  • The President "shall assign" officers to all four staff slots in the Corps (assistant adjutant general, quartermaster, commissary of subsistence, and assistant inspector general) with a rank of lieutenant colonel.
  • All three aides-de-camp (1 major, 2 captains)) will "be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, upon the recommendation of the commander of the army corps". This is the only mention of the "commander of the army corps" in the The Militia Act of July 17, 1862.
You keep insisting that the Act "gives the right to appoint or relieve corps commanders exclusively to the President", but there is no actual mention of it in the Militia Act of July 17, 1862.

So, since the Congress obviously knows how to be extremely specific about who gets to appoint and assign officers to specific slots in the army Corps, why did the Congress completely omit this exclusive power of the President from the Act?

Are you saying that the Congress somehow went down to strict and detailed limitations on the four staff slots and the three aide-de-camp spots, but somehow overlooked the issue of the "commander of the army corps"? Is this entire line simply another "notionally" developed thought of yours?

Shortly thereafter, by the direction of the President, army corps were created in the western armies. The Army of the Cumberland was designated as 14th Army Corps, and Rosecrans named corps commander.

Yes, the Union Army was being constantly reorganized in late 1862 and early 1863. This has nothing at all to do with the actions of General Buell on September 29, 1862.
 
3. Grant relieved McClernand for all the reasons relayed by Dana to Stanton (Grant acknowledging that in hindsight he should have done so before June 18), in accordance with Grant's broad power to do so as confirmed by Stanton to Dana in May (which added that should he fail to exercise that authority Grant would be held accountable)

Really? Please send me a copy of the order from the War Department authorising Grant to relieve McClernand.

I think what you are (mis)reading is this:

1634477427230.png


This is of course true. Grant has the power to arrest any subordinate officer, including a corps commander, who disobeys orders. No-one has ever disputed that. Stanton is telling Dana that Grant must enforce his authority to enforce obedience to his orders. The mechanism by which officers are expected to enforce their authority is ultimately to arrest subordinates who do not obey orders.

The above neither states directly, nor implies, that the President of the United States had deputed his powers to Grant. It states that Grant was expected to use the powers he did have.
 
You keep insisting that the Act "gives the right to appoint or relieve corps commanders exclusively to the President", but there is no actual mention of it in the Militia Act of July 17, 1862.

Ahem. Yes, it does. You just can't read it right. Section 9 says:


1633686507543-png.png



There you go. The President may establish and organize an army corps, not a department commander.

Hence Halleck told Burnside that the commanders of Army Corps may only be changed by the President


1633686829185-png.png



Indeed, Grant acknowledged in the papers of the McClernand case that only the President had the power to change a corps commander:



1633687485962-png.png



Indeed, Sherman noted in his summing up of the Warren inquiry that corps commanders were all Presidential appointees:



1633687940892-png.png



Corps commanders were always, and could only be, appointed or removed by the President. That was the law as it stood. Until you can acknowledge this basic principle of the law, no progress can be made.

Please, why do you think three General's-in-Chief, Halleck, Grant, Sherman, were wrong and your interpretation, which was not that of the time, is correct?
 
Really? Please send me a copy of the order from the War Department authorising Grant to relieve McClernand.

I think what you are (mis)reading is this:

View attachment 418626

This is of course true. Grant has the power to arrest any subordinate officer, including a corps commander, who disobeys orders. No-one has ever disputed that. Stanton is telling Dana that Grant must enforce his authority to enforce obedience to his orders. The mechanism by which officers are expected to enforce their authority is ultimately to arrest subordinates who do not obey orders.

The above neither states directly, nor implies, that the President of the United States had deputed his powers to Grant. It states that Grant was expected to use the powers he did have.
Stop re-phrasing the plain English that everybody can see for themselves in the document..

You say that Stanton tells Grant that he "must enforce his authority to enforce obedience to his orders". Everybody here can read it and see that you're - as usual - twisting it so that it supports your theory.

First, Stanton refers to "removal" only - not to appointment. See Grant's June 18 order. Next - and more important - Stanton confirms that Grant had the "absolute authority" to remove any subordinate officer who "by ignorance, inaction or any cause" "interferes with or delays his operations". Those are the powers that Stanton told Grant he had. It does NOT limit Grant's authority to an officer who disobeys his orders. I understand that you need it to read that way but it doesn't. Lawyer Stanton knew exactly what he was saying. Grant and Dana also knew exactly what he was saying. Hence Grant's explanation of his order to Halleck and Dana's explanation of the order to Stanton. Those explanations are fully consistent with Stanton's May communication to Dana.

You apparently don't comprehend the plain text used by lawyer Stanton. Try harder.
 
Really? Please send me a copy of the order from the War Department authorising Grant to relieve McClernand.

I think what you are (mis)reading is this:

View attachment 418626

This is of course true. Grant has the power to arrest any subordinate officer, including a corps commander, who disobeys orders. No-one has ever disputed that. Stanton is telling Dana that Grant must enforce his authority to enforce obedience to his orders. The mechanism by which officers are expected to enforce their authority is ultimately to arrest subordinates who do not obey orders.

The above neither states directly, nor implies, that the President of the United States had deputed his powers to Grant. It states that Grant was expected to use the powers he did have.
I can see removing a soldier for ignorance, but when was any soldier "arrested" for ignorance?
 
Stop re-phrasing the plain English that everybody can see for themselves in the document..

Yes, that Grant is being told to use his powers to enforce obedience to his orders. You are trying to derive completely new powers based on him being told to use those he has.
 
Yes, that Grant is being told to use his powers to enforce obedience to his orders. You are trying to derive completely new powers based on him being told to use those he has.
Repeat after me: "It doesn't say that". Try as you might, you can't alter the document so it reads that way. You refuse to accept the plain, unambiguous words that lawyer Stanton carefully chose because they show that your theory is wrong. Just like the one that McClernand was removed because he "violated Article 57".
 
I can see removing a soldier for ignorance, but when was any soldier "arrested" for ignorance?
That's the problem. The theory and Stanton's clear statement of Grant's authority are completely different. And "interference with or delay" of Grant's "operations" by "ignorance" or "inaction" is categorically not a violation of Article 9. That applies to an officer who "shall disobey any lawful command of his superior officer". Violation of Article 9 would be an "arrestable" offense - but not the broad scope of things covered by Stanton. The proof is in Grant's explanation to Halleck and Dana's explanation to Stanton of why he had relieved McClernand.
 
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