1SGDan
Major
- Joined
- Dec 13, 2009
- Location
- New Hampshire
Went through my archives and found this piece that I wrote about the recon of the Warwick Line
Contact with Magruder's line of defenders brought the Union advance to a complete stop. Operating under an inflated view of the Confederate strength and unwilling to walk into a poor tactical situation the Federals drew up a line and considered their options. On the 6th BG William F, Smith ordered BG Winfield Scott Hancock to conduct a reconnaissance of the enemy line in the direction of Yorktown to firmly establish the strength of the Confederate position. Hancock was assured that reinforcements would be sent to take advantage if any area of weakness that might be discovered.
Hancock selected the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine from his brigade (1st Bde, 2nd Division, IV Corps) to conduct the mission, He also fortified his reconnaissance capability by attaching LT W. E. Merrill of the Engineers and LT Nicolas Bowen of the Topographical Engineers to the patrol. The two regiments moved along the Warwick River occasionally skirmisking with enemy pickets. Charles Clark would report in an 1897 address to Iowa Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States that during one of these encounters that the 6th Maine "lost our first man, a private in Company E." The river was reported as "a succession of pools formed by damming the river at different points, rendering it, it is understood, unfordable."
The 6th Maine managed to collect four prisoners from the 14th Alabama and through interogation established the strength of that unit (1070 men) guarding a section of the river near a dam. Further investigation revealed that the dam, a dry crossing point of the Warwick River, was between "15 to 20 rods in length and about 12 feet broad" and was loosely guarded on the far side. Colonel Hiram Burnham, regimental commander, sent word back that the site could be forced. It was a claim that Magruder later readily admitted in his report to Richmond. Luck would intervene, however. The Major carrying the message with two escorts was delayed when they ran into a seven man Confederate patrol. The enemy patrol was scared off when the Major called out orders to non-existent support and then opened fire with the available weapons. Deeming themselves to be outnumbered and suffering one man killed in the volley the Cconfederate patrol retired. Nevertheless, Hancock did not get the message until later because he was "at the time with the other regiment."
The rest of the line was reported as strongly held. It was of no matter for Smith had been handed a message from McClellan that the town would be put under siege. All operations against the enemy were put on hold while the siege train was brought up. The first great opportunity for rapid development of the campaign went by the wayside. There would be no attack and the original plan for a rapid approach to Richmond via the peninsula was gone.
Even though McClellan was made aware of this opportunity no further investigations were made as the siege order had already been issued.
Contact with Magruder's line of defenders brought the Union advance to a complete stop. Operating under an inflated view of the Confederate strength and unwilling to walk into a poor tactical situation the Federals drew up a line and considered their options. On the 6th BG William F, Smith ordered BG Winfield Scott Hancock to conduct a reconnaissance of the enemy line in the direction of Yorktown to firmly establish the strength of the Confederate position. Hancock was assured that reinforcements would be sent to take advantage if any area of weakness that might be discovered.
Hancock selected the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine from his brigade (1st Bde, 2nd Division, IV Corps) to conduct the mission, He also fortified his reconnaissance capability by attaching LT W. E. Merrill of the Engineers and LT Nicolas Bowen of the Topographical Engineers to the patrol. The two regiments moved along the Warwick River occasionally skirmisking with enemy pickets. Charles Clark would report in an 1897 address to Iowa Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States that during one of these encounters that the 6th Maine "lost our first man, a private in Company E." The river was reported as "a succession of pools formed by damming the river at different points, rendering it, it is understood, unfordable."
The 6th Maine managed to collect four prisoners from the 14th Alabama and through interogation established the strength of that unit (1070 men) guarding a section of the river near a dam. Further investigation revealed that the dam, a dry crossing point of the Warwick River, was between "15 to 20 rods in length and about 12 feet broad" and was loosely guarded on the far side. Colonel Hiram Burnham, regimental commander, sent word back that the site could be forced. It was a claim that Magruder later readily admitted in his report to Richmond. Luck would intervene, however. The Major carrying the message with two escorts was delayed when they ran into a seven man Confederate patrol. The enemy patrol was scared off when the Major called out orders to non-existent support and then opened fire with the available weapons. Deeming themselves to be outnumbered and suffering one man killed in the volley the Cconfederate patrol retired. Nevertheless, Hancock did not get the message until later because he was "at the time with the other regiment."
The rest of the line was reported as strongly held. It was of no matter for Smith had been handed a message from McClellan that the town would be put under siege. All operations against the enemy were put on hold while the siege train was brought up. The first great opportunity for rapid development of the campaign went by the wayside. There would be no attack and the original plan for a rapid approach to Richmond via the peninsula was gone.
Even though McClellan was made aware of this opportunity no further investigations were made as the siege order had already been issued.