McClellan McClellan, Barnard, the Chickahominy, and engineers

Went through my archives and found this piece that I wrote about the recon of the Warwick Line


Contact with Magruder's line of defenders brought the Union advance to a complete stop. Operating under an inflated view of the Confederate strength and unwilling to walk into a poor tactical situation the Federals drew up a line and considered their options. On the 6th BG William F, Smith ordered BG Winfield Scott Hancock to conduct a reconnaissance of the enemy line in the direction of Yorktown to firmly establish the strength of the Confederate position. Hancock was assured that reinforcements would be sent to take advantage if any area of weakness that might be discovered.

Hancock selected the 5th Wisconsin and 6th Maine from his brigade (1st Bde, 2nd Division, IV Corps) to conduct the mission, He also fortified his reconnaissance capability by attaching LT W. E. Merrill of the Engineers and LT Nicolas Bowen of the Topographical Engineers to the patrol. The two regiments moved along the Warwick River occasionally skirmisking with enemy pickets. Charles Clark would report in an 1897 address to Iowa Commandery Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States that during one of these encounters that the 6th Maine "lost our first man, a private in Company E." The river was reported as "a succession of pools formed by damming the river at different points, rendering it, it is understood, unfordable."

The 6th Maine managed to collect four prisoners from the 14th Alabama and through interogation established the strength of that unit (1070 men) guarding a section of the river near a dam. Further investigation revealed that the dam, a dry crossing point of the Warwick River, was between "15 to 20 rods in length and about 12 feet broad" and was loosely guarded on the far side. Colonel Hiram Burnham, regimental commander, sent word back that the site could be forced. It was a claim that Magruder later readily admitted in his report to Richmond. Luck would intervene, however. The Major carrying the message with two escorts was delayed when they ran into a seven man Confederate patrol. The enemy patrol was scared off when the Major called out orders to non-existent support and then opened fire with the available weapons. Deeming themselves to be outnumbered and suffering one man killed in the volley the Cconfederate patrol retired. Nevertheless, Hancock did not get the message until later because he was "at the time with the other regiment."

The rest of the line was reported as strongly held. It was of no matter for Smith had been handed a message from McClellan that the town would be put under siege. All operations against the enemy were put on hold while the siege train was brought up. The first great opportunity for rapid development of the campaign went by the wayside. There would be no attack and the original plan for a rapid approach to Richmond via the peninsula was gone.

Even though McClellan was made aware of this opportunity no further investigations were made as the siege order had already been issued.
 
Went through my archives and found this piece that I wrote about the recon of the Warwick Line

I'll add some corrections

Contact with Magruder's line of defenders brought the Union advance to a complete stop. Operating under an inflated view of the Confederate strength and unwilling to walk into a poor tactical situation the Federals drew up a line and considered their options.

McClellan's estimate was prettymuch bang on. He'd estimated 18-20,000. Magruder later lowballed his strength by using his strength in "infantry effectives" in March, before reinforcements arrived. On 5th April, again using a stripped down "effectives" figure there were roughly 18,000 infantry, 3,500 artillery and 1,900 cavalry. Of these, ca. 4,600 infantry and about 800 artillery had only just arrived (indeed, 15 rebel batteries fired on Keyes' corps on the 5th). When McClellan made his estimate the correct number PFD is about 18,000 and so McClellan was bang on. In fact McClellan was underestimating the enemy strength because he didn't know Colston's brigade had come across from Norfolk, Wilcox's brigade had arrived from Johnston along with Pendleton's reserve artillery. Early's division of 2 brigades (ca. 5,400 effectives) arrived 6th, and McClellan is on record with an estimate of 30,000 on the 8th. Again this is bang on.

On the 6th BG William F, Smith ordered BG Winfield Scott Hancock to conduct a reconnaissance of the enemy line in the direction of Yorktown to firmly establish the strength of the Confederate position. Hancock was assured that reinforcements would be sent to take advantage if any area of weakness that might be discovered.

McClellan ordered this, and send two brigades, both Hancock's and Burns'. You are wrong about what happened though. McClellan moved the two brigades in opposite directions to provoke the enemy to fire. They then
estimated enemy dispositions.

Even though McClellan was made aware of this opportunity no further investigations were made as the siege order had already been issued.

That was Wynne's Mill, and defended on 5th April by Wilcox's 3rd division (brigades of Wilcox and Pryor, reinforced during the 5th with Colston).

FWIW, this is the orbat for the forces at Yorktown on 5th April. On the 6th the brigades of Rodes and Early, along with the battery of Wilcox's brigade also come up into line:


2nd Division (McLaws) occupying Lee's Mill and screening further right (the 10th Ga and Noland's Bn were thrown out to the south of Lee's Mill)

McLaws' Brigade with:
10th Georgia (picketting out beyond Lee's Mill towards Mulberry Island)
5th Louisiana
10th Louisiana
15th Virginia
Noland's Battalion

Cobb's Brigade with:
16th Georgia
24th Georgia
Cobb's Legion
2nd Louisiana
17th Mississippi
15th North Carolina

Divisional Artillery: Batteries of Young, Maj. Roemer, Cosnahan, Sands, Garrett, Read and Nelson

3rd Division (Wilcox) occupying Wynn's Mill and down to the redoubts near Yorktown

Wilcox's Brigade with:
9th Alabama
10th Alabama
11th Alabama
19th Mississippi
(the brigades battery didn't arrive until the next day)

Colston's Brigade with:
3rd Virginia
13th North Carolina
14th North Carolina

Pryor's Brigade with:
8th Alabama
14th Alabama
14th Louisiana

Divisional Artillery: Batteries of Macon, Maurin, part of Hudnel and part of Southall

1st Division (Rains) occupying Yorktown and the Red and White Redoubts

Rains' Brigade with:
13th Alabama
26th Alabama
6th Georgia
23rd Georgia

Ward's "brigade" with:
2nd Florida
2nd Mississippi Battalion

Divisional Artillery: 19 garrison batteries in the fortifications (various Virginia Heavy Arty Bns) and the field batteries of Smith, Armistead, Richardson, Page and the remainder of Hudnel and Southall.

Cavalry with the army:
3rd Virginia Cavalry
Cobb Legion Cavalry
Wise Legion Cavalry
Hampton Legion Cavalry
two other squadrons

Or 25 solid infantry regiments, 2 battalions, 34 batteries (15 field and 19 garrison) and 4 cavalry regiments and 2 squadrons. They had about 24,000 "effectives".
 
Magruder reported that the crossing in question was guarded by 3 companies of the 19th Mississippi and 3 of the 14th Alabama. Not exactly an imposing force.
Later in his report he admits "the enemy had time to turn our right by finding a crossing to Warwick River."
 
Magruder reported that the crossing in question was guarded by 3 companies of the 19th Mississippi and 3 of the 14th Alabama. Not exactly an imposing force.
Later in his report he admits "the enemy had time to turn our right by finding a crossing to Warwick River."

You've misread. That was the piquet force screening the dam near Wynn's Mill on the 5th, in the context of Wilcox marching 2 Alabama regiments down towards Yorktown.

The Wynn's Mill crossing is, by Magruder's report, guarded immediately by "3 regiments, a small battalion and 2 batteries under Col Winston" (i.e. Pryor's brigade), thus:

Expired Image Removed

Colston was placed at Wynn's Mill when they arrived on the 5th. Rodes and Early reinforced the Red and White Redoubts and on towards Wynn's Mill when they arrived on the 6th. Wilcox's brigade was behind Pryor's on the 5th as a reserve.

On the 6th the dispositions were:

2nd Division (Lee's Mill under McLaws)
McLaw's brigade at Lee's Mill
Cobb's brigade behind McLaw's as a reserve.
10th Georgia and Noland's Virginia battalion screening down to the south.

3rd Division (Wynn's Mill under Wilcox)
Pryor's brigade and Colston's brigade at Wynn's Mill (Colston marching down from Lee's Mill in the early morning)
Wilcox's brigade in reserve

4th Division (The Red and White Redoubts under Early)
Rodes' brigade and Ward's "brigade" in the redoubts
Early's brigade in reserve

1st Division (Yorktown fort proper under Rains)
Rains' brigade and the heavy artillery.

So rather than the 7 companies you suppose, around that dam were in fact 3 brigades of infantry with 10 regiments and around 20 guns sweeping the dam. Good luck with the assault.
 
When the enemy says you missed an opportunity then you have missed an opportunity

Really? Or it could mean the enemy thinks you are much stronger than you actually are.

Anyway, given the sudden change of topic I assume this means you concede that Magruder's force is much stronger than commonly supposed and that Yorktown can't easily be bypassed?
 
Really? Or it could mean the enemy thinks you are much stronger than you actually are.

Anyway, given the sudden change of topic I assume this means you concede that Magruder's force is much stronger than commonly supposed and that Yorktown can't easily be bypassed?

Never assume anything. Magruder knew he could be bypassed and said so. It was Mac that was held captive by visions of an overwhelming enemy.
 
Unfortunately General Magruder has been dead for some time so the precise location he spoke about would be impossible to specify. It should be enough that he chose to mention it and react to it to say that an opportunity was there. Your impassioned defense of McClellan should not discount what others saw. The enemy commander saw opportunity, members of his staff saw opportunities, and his field commanders saw opportunities not pursued. That the campaign failed is evident. A failed campaign cries out that it was not perfectly run. Mac dawdled when he should have moved both at the Warwick (which is out of scope for the OP) and at the Chickahominy. There is no defense that can be raised that will convince me otherwise.
 
Unfortunately General Magruder has been dead for some time so the precise location he spoke about would be impossible to specify. It should be enough that he chose to mention it and react to it to say that an opportunity was there. Your impassioned defense of McClellan should not discount what others saw. The enemy commander saw opportunity, members of his staff saw opportunities, and his field commanders saw opportunities not pursued. That the campaign failed is evident. A failed campaign cries out that it was not perfectly run. Mac dawdled when he should have moved both at the Warwick (which is out of scope for the OP) and at the Chickahominy. There is no defense that can be raised that will convince me otherwise.

Okay, here are the options, to "bypass" the defences, with a map:

Sneden%2BYorktown%2BMap%2Bapproaches.jpg


So, right to left:

1. Direct assault - have Porter's division charge across a mile wide killing area against Yorktown. There are more than 3,000 men in the fortification and about 60 odd guns engaging Porter.

2. "Red and White Redoubt" - have Porter's division advance into the killing area then wheel left and charge the two redoubts. There were only about 1,000 bayonets of infantry in the redoubts on the 5th (which is why Magruder was worried and sent 1,500 men under Wilcox down there to reinforce it). The attacking force after wheeling is under artillery fire from ahead, the right, and even behind with upto 100 guns playing on them (ca. 20 in the redoubts, the rest in Yorktown)

3. "Wynn's Mill" advance to the swamp, left wheel and move across the enemy position under a crossfire of about 20 guns. Right wheel and cross a narrow dam (that no-one knew was there) to assault two redoubts and ca. 5,000 infantry on the 5th (less 1,500 moved down to the Red and White Redoubts in the afternoon). The attackers would probably by Hamilton's division who occupied the line opposite on the 6th and sent a recce in on the 7th.

4. "Lee's Mill" - do what McClellan initially ordered, assault over the Warwick. However, there were (on the 5th*) around 7,000 infantry and 30 guns defending those crossings.

5. South of Lee's Mill the Warwick widens rapidly to 2 miles wide and with rebel gunboats from the James River supporting the fortifications and the mouth of the river. This can be discounted.

None of these options look like an easy bypass. Magruder of course represented himself as weak and in need of reinforcement, and of course massively overestimated the size of McClellan's force (at one point stating McClellan's 55,000** were 200,000). However, anyone with access to a map and the actual strengths and dispositions will immediately see that all of the approaches were essentially blocked. There is no way of bypassing Yorktown.

You might argue that it was possible to easily assault one of the above positions without fire support. I would not agree.

* On the 6th the brigades of Early and Rodes came up with maybe 5,500 bayonets, and on the night of the 6th a massive storm hits, making vehicular movement impossible. By the 10th, when the storm lifts, another 10,000 infantry are in position.

** In case you didn't know McClellan had 5 divisions with him on 5th April. Keyes with two divisions (Smith and Couch) were moving towards Lee's Mill, Heintzelman with two divisions (Porter and Hamilton) were moving on Yorktown and Sedgwick's division was at the rear, ready to march towards either column. Hooker, Richardson and the whole of 1st Corps are still around Washington and Casey's incomplete division relieved part of Wool's command at Newport News.
 
No assault is ever easy.
I have a fairly well read knowledge of this campaign.

Excellent, so now we're in agreement that what we are considering isn't bypassing the position, but assaulting it.

Of the four potential assaults above which should McClellan have undertaken?
 
Excellent, so now we're in agreement that what we are considering isn't bypassing the position, but assaulting it.

Of the four potential assaults above which should McClellan have undertaken?
I doubt we agree on much of anything concerning this campaign.
By pass without opposition would be preferable but unlikely in this compressed area. Assault at the weakest possible point seems to be a reasonable solution if you want to keep your campaign on track. Simply surrendering your initiative because things may become difficult is not the correct answer.
 
I doubt we agree on much of anything concerning this campaign.
By pass without opposition would be preferable but unlikely in this compressed area. Assault at the weakest possible point seems to be a reasonable solution if you want to keep your campaign on track. Simply surrendering your initiative because things may become difficult is not the correct answer.

So, a hasty or a deliberate attack? Which of the four options offers the best chance of success? How much fire support can be brought up?

You of course know that McClellan orders Smith's division to assault Lee's Mill immediately, and when he heard Smith had stopped with Keyes permission told Keyes "attack with all his force if only with the bayonet.". Later, when digesting Smith's report of events he turned to Smith and said “If you had gone and succeeded, you would have been a major general.”. He considered Keyes had failed utterly and on 6th April issued an order placing Keyes under Sumner (just arrived but without his corps yet).

That said, the lack of an assault on 5th April was Keyes, not McClellan....
 
So, a hasty or a deliberate attack? Which of the four options offers the best chance of success? How much fire support can be brought up?

Whatever is deemed the most appropriate course of action given the situation. Bring up what fire power is necessary and can be supplied in the time available. That is the leaders dilemma. Assuming nothing can be done gets nothing done.
 
Whatever is deemed the most appropriate course of action given the situation. Bring up what fire power is necessary and can be supplied in the time available. That is the leaders dilemma. Assuming nothing can be done gets nothing done.

That's very vague and in part contradictory.

Bringing up what firepower is both "necessary" and "can be supplied in the time available" is likely contradictory. Indeed knowing how much firepower is necessary is itself not a simple task as it requires the enemy position to be thoroughly reconnoitered. Indeed, McClellan sent out thorough reconnoiters and tasked the engineers with finding him a weakpoint to assault. They didn't report one to him until the 14th, when they recommended Dam no. 1 near Lee's Mill as the least bad option. McClellan ordered his three divisions in the rear (Casey and the newly arrived Hooker and Richardson) forward and ordered Smith to occupy an LD. Indeed, McClellan was with Smith when his Vermonters went forward, temporarily occupied the one-gun battery and had Ayres' 20 guns occupy the Garrow Ridge. This secured an LD for an assault ready for the assault forces to occupy it at night. However, when McClellan left back to HQ, to order the assault force to occupy the LD, Smith impetuously attempted to throw a small force over the river, and they found themselves fighting 3 enemy brigades (McLaws', Cobb's and Semmes').

Now, after Smith's little adventure McClellan cancelled his plans to assault at Dam no. 1 with 4 divisions and that night ordered ground to be broken for the siege batteries and the roads cordroyed to allow the guns to be brought from the landing place. McClellan acquiesced to Barnard's approach, having found no point that could be assaulted.

Now that's the 16th April, and by this point Johnston's force is pretty huge, about 55,000 "effectives" in the works or about 70,000 in the terms McClellan estimated. Arriving after this is GW Smith's corps and by the time McClellan tells Burnside the line is manned by 80,000 men it is in fact "manned" by 80,000 men, although Johnston has so many men that a lot of them are kept far back from the line. There probably was little hope of assaulting 70-80,000 men in their entrenchments.

Indeed, looking at the force ratios (below) it seems the only hope was the 5th April assault McClellan ordered, and that was nowhere near certain as the force ratios for Smith simply attacking off of march in a hasty were 1:1 at Lee's Mill (rising to 2:1 if they wait for Couch). There perhaps was a small opportunity on 5th April, but Keyes and Smith didn't attack and soon the rebel reinforcements make the whole thing academic. By 16th April there is found to be no chance of an assault without siege works, and indeed by the time the storm stops on the 10th April realistically an assault is not possible.

Yorktown%2BForce%2BRatios.png
 
That's very vague and in part contradictory.
150+ years after the fact it is impossible for me to design and implement movements. I do not possess the ability to transport myself to 1862 and get the most up to date intelligence and terrain analysis. I can only base my judgement on what the participants have offered us. What I will say is that accepting failure without an effort to alter circumstances is poor leadership.
Military success is defined by accomplishment of the pre-operational objectives. In this case Richmond was the objective that was never reached. All the excuse making in the world does not make this a successful campaign. When failure occurs there has to be accountability. Based on my reading of the campaign I chose to blame McClellan for mismanaging movements. You do not. Because we have different opinions regarding this campaign does not make either of us wrong.
 
150+ years after the fact it is impossible for me to design and implement movements. I do not possess the ability to transport myself to 1862 and get the most up to date information. I can only base my judgement on what the participants have offered us. What I will say is that accepting failure without an effort to alter circumstances is poor leadership.

Yet we have a wealth of sources to draw upon, and the arguments are well understood. Unfortunately the waters have been muddied by the likes of Sears who frames all his McClellan arguments in terms of psychodrama instead of as serious military problems that need overcoming.

Military success is defined by accomplishment of the pre-operational objectives. In this case Richmond was the objective that was never reached. All the excuse making in the world does not make this a successful campaign. When failure occurs there has to be accountability. Based on my reading of the campaign I chose to blame McClellan for mismanaging movements. You do not. Because we have different opinions regarding this campaign does not make either of us wrong.

However, until August 1862 it is not a failed campaign, anymore than in July 1864 Grant's campaign was a failed one. As Emory Upton says "[T]he worst that could be said of the Peninsula campaign was that thus far it had not been successful. To make it a failure was reserved for the agency of General Halleck."

This is absolutely true. By, for example, the standards of Grant's campaigns the Peninsula is going great until August '62. Yes there was a set-back, but much less serious than the loss of Holly Springs or Cold Harbor.

In fact Upton is pretty scathing of the Washington administration in this matter, pointing out that Lincoln could easily have found 100,000 men to send to McClellan and ended the war in 1862. Answering the criticism that McClellan "won't use them" Upton notes that if that were the case then the correct policy would have been to send another commander to the Peninsula, not mount a general retreat.

Blame should be apportioned relative to responsibility. The bulk of the blame for not quickly overcoming Yorktown is thus split between:

1. Smith and Keyes, who blew the chances of a successful assault despite McClellan's express orders
2. The Navy, who reneged on their promises to bypass Yorktown (and then denied ever having made them)
3. Wool, who supplied faulty maps to McClellan
4. McClellan, for choosing the right-hand rather than left-hand column to travel with on the 5th (and thus not being there to push Smith forward)
5. Lincoln, for removing the amphibious element of McClellan's force whilst the land element was in contact, and for generally seeking to blame McClellan for delays which in part Lincoln caused and whilst refusing to act to prevent the delay.

McClellan is not blameless, but the only mistake I can really locate is trusting Keyes, who Lincoln had made a corps commander against McClellan's plans. Perhaps McClellan should have personally supervised this incompetent subordinate, but this would have interfered with keeping control of the whole army.
 
This is absolutely true. By, for example, the standards of Grant's campaigns the Peninsula is going great until August '62. Yes there was a set-back, but much less serious than the loss of Holly Springs or Cold Harbor.

I will firmly disagree here. A campaign that was moving away from its objective as early as the first week in June did not wait to be a failure until August. Leaders must always bear responsibility for failure. It is incumbent in the job.
 
I will firmly disagree here. A campaign that was moving away from its objective as early as the first week in June did not wait to be a failure until August. Leaders must always bear responsibility for failure. It is incumbent in the job.

Like Grant was moving away from Richmond after Cold Harbor? Like Grant was moving away from Vicksburg after Holly Springs?

McClellan's response to the crisis was the best course of action available. Now, had Lincoln allowed 1st Corps to come down before this....

However, McClellan faced the problem of having to keep enough forces on the left bank to defend his supply line and enough on the right bank to attack Richmond. He didn't have enough to do both. No matter what balance McClellan struck those critical of him can find fault. However, it was probably the least worst option.
 
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