March 13, 1861: Did Lincoln tell Seward not to visit

Blessmag

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Conflicting sources say that President Lincoln told Sec. of State Seward not to meet with the Confederate commissioners:

President instructs Sec. Seward to refuse an audience to John Forsyth of Alabama and former Cong. Martin J. Crawford (Ga.). To receive them would be to admit that states they represent are out of Union. Henry J. Raymond, The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln . . . Together with his State Papers, including his Speeches, Addresses, Messages, Letters, and Proclamations and the Closing Scenes Connected with his Life and Death (New York: Derby & Miller, 1865), 170.

Interviews M. W. Delahay, whom he appoints surveyor general for Kansas. Abraham Lincoln to Mark W. Delahay, 13 March 1861, CW, 4:283.

Cabinet holds short session on appointments. N.Y. Times, 14 March 1861.

President consults with Lt. Gustavus V. Fox (USN, resigned), brother-in-law of Mrs. Montgomery Blair, and Postmaster Gen. Montgomery Blair on plan for provisioning Fort Sumter, S.C. Gideon Welles, "Fort Sumter, Facts in Relation to the Expedition Ordered by the Administration of President Lincoln for the Relief of the Garrison in Fort Sumter," Galaxy 10 (November 1870):618.

Receives request from Cong. Corwin (Ohio) to recall his nomination as minister to Mexico if it has not been acted upon. Corwin to Lincoln, 13 March 1861, Robert Todd Lincoln Collection of Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
http://www.thelincolnlog.org/view/show_date?day=13&month=03&year=1861

Whether or not Secretary of State Seward talked with Lincoln about the Confederate Commissioners in Washington is debatable. Some sources claim that a conversation took place and that Lincoln told him that he couldn’t meet with them. If a conversation took place at all, it probably happened on this date.3
Anyway, Seward had received the letter from the Commissioners requesting a formal meeting, but again delayed in his response.
http://civilwardailygazette.com/
 
wilber6150,

Blessmag is correct in that there is a source that Lincoln instructed Seward not to meet with the Confederate commissioners on the date indicated.

Check out the following website and see for yourself.

The Lincoln Log.

http://www.thelincolnlog.org/view

Just type in the date and see what was Lincoln up to that particular day from numerous historical sources.

Sincerely,
Unionblue
 
No,
I looked at that site but also on several on sites and the LOC and still haven't seen any memorandum or anything that actually states that or is some kind of paper trail that was actually produced by and for Lincoln..The link itself only gives one source and its not a primary document. For all we know it could be just Seward telling people that...I would love to look into this book to see what it states as evidence, as most other books relating to this say theres no clear evidence that this happened.

Henry J. Raymond, The Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln . . . Together with his State Papers, including his Speeches, Addresses, Messages, Letters, and Proclamations and the Closing Scenes Connected with his Life and Death (New York: Derby & Miller, 1865), 170

Something this controversial and which is used so frequently to **** the President really should be examined to make sure there is historical evidence to back it up..Theres already a good amount of evidence to show that Seward screwed around with the Pickens/Sumter operation, so I wouldn't put it past him to try something like this...
 
From the book...

On the 12th of March, Messrs. John Forsyth, of Ala-
bama, and Crawford, of Georgia, requested an unofficial
interview with the Secretary of State; which the latter
declined. On the 13th they sent to him a communication,
informing him that they were in Washington as commis-
sioners from a government composed of seven States
which had withdrawn from the American Union, and that
they desired to enter upon negotiations for the adjustment
of all questions growing out of this separation. Mr. Sew-
ard, by direction of the President, declined to receive
them, because it could not be admitted that the States
referred to had, in law or fact, withdrawn from the Fed-
eral Union, or that they could do so in any other manner
than with the consent and concert of the people of the
United States, to be given through a National Convention,
to be assembled in conformity with the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States."

http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=87045359

There is no real evidence here that directly ties in the President, just the usual statement that the President said so...
 
Now do I believe that the President probably knew there were representatives in DC, probably and would he have met them in official status? Probably not and for the same reasons that Buchanan didn't.. But, I find it curious Lincoln wouldn't take this chance to write a response much like Buchanan did if he knew they were there waiting to see him..He was trying to antagonize the seceded states as little as possible and Buchanan had already set a precedent of writing a response and meeting as a private citizen, so why wouldn't Lincoln do the same? It would be his chance to send a message directly to the CSA to defuse the situation. But he didn't, and maybe it was because Seward was hiding the fact that they were there and was trying to run his own version of diplomatic relations.
 
Conflicting sources say that President Lincoln told Sec. of State Seward not to meet with the Confederate commissioners:

My understanding has always been that Lincoln refused to meet with them, because they were not representatives of an internationally recognized foreign government , but were, in essence, representatives of a region of the US that was in rebellion against the US.

I can't really speak to what influence Seward may have had in that particular instance.

Seward did assure representatives from South Carolina, on his own authority, and without Lincoln's knowledge or consent, that Ft. Sumter would be evacuated, which was, of course, incorrect. In his efforts to become the "premier" of the administration, Seward ended up looking like a fool.
 
It is my understanding, that the csa delegates ended up presenting their credentials and purpose in writing to a State Dep't funtionary, which after consultation with Lincoln, Seward was told to return the ltr as rejected. But, there was a time gap between the time Seward was instructed to reject and return the ltr, during which time, Seward, seems to have let it be known to certrain acquaintances of the delegates that Ft. Sumter was to be evacuated.
When Seward, realized he was not the 'premier' of the administration, he completed his duty as Sec'y of State, as instructed and finally informed the confederate agents, the time gap and his back-stairs mechanitions, led the southerners to assume that Lincoln was responsible and not Seward's hubris.
 
Here is the account in Confederate Veteran, Volume 24 By Confederated Southern Memorial Association (U.S.), Sons of Confederate Veterans (Organization), United Confederate Veterans, United Daughters of the Confederacy. From the article
SUDDEN CHANGE IN NORTHERN SENTIMENT AS TO COERCION IN 1861.
BY JAMES H. M'NEILLY, D.D., NASHVILLE. TENN.
=====
Treatment Of Confederate Commissioners.

On the 12th of March, 1861, eight days after Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, the Confederate commissioners addressed a note to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, asking for an interview in order to have a conference for the purpose of adjusting all questions between the United States and the Confederate States government. To this request no answer was returned at the time. But to Supreme Justice Nelson, of New York, who had come to protest against coercion as unconstitutional, Mr. Seward intimated that to receive the commissioners officially would be taken as an acknowledgment of the independence of the Confederacy, which the Northern people would not stand. Then Supreme Justice Campbell, of Alabama, was asked by Justice Nelson to call with him on the Secretary, which they did, and the Secretary told them that the immediate recognition of the commissioners would not be sustained by sentiment at the North in connection with the withdrawal of troops from Fort Sumter, which had been determined on. When Judge Campbell proposed to write to President Davis the substance of the interview, Mr. Seward authorized him to say to Mr. Davis that before that letter should reach him the order for the evacuation of Fort Sumter would have been made. This was on March 15, 1861. Thenceforth the negotiations between the commissioners and Mr. Seward were through Judges Campbell and Nelson and turned on the evacuation of Fort Sumter as determining the question of coercion or peace, for all recognized that coercion meant war. Five days after the assurance of the Secretary that the fort should be evacuated there was evidence that it was being strengthened. Mr. Seward assured the commissioners, through Judge Campbell, that the delay in evacuation was accidental and did not involve the integrity of his assurance that the evacuation would take place.

On the 19th of March Mr. G. V. Fox, afterwards Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who had a plan for the relief of Fort Sumter,' wert, with Mr. Lincoln's consent, to Charleston, where, on his arrival on the 21st of March, he obtained permission from Governor Pickens to visit Fort Sumter "expressly on the pledge of pacific purposes." There he matured his plan for furnishing supplies and reinforcements to the garrison. He did not communicate his plan to Major Anderson, the commanding officer of the fort. He reported the result of his visit at Washington. His plan was approved by President Lincoln, and he was sent to New York to arrange for its execution. After a few days Colonel Lamon, another confidential agent, was sent by President Lincoln ostensibly to arrange for the removal of the garrison. On leaving he expressed hope to Governor Pickens of a speedy return for that purpose. He never returned.

On the 30th of March, after Colonel Lamon's departure, Governor Pickens wrote to the commissioners inquiring the meaning of the prolonged delay in fulfilling the promise of evacuation.. This dispatch was taken by Judge Campbell to Mr. Seward, who answered on April 1, saying that "the government will not attempt to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor Pickens." Being asked by Judge Campbell if there had been a change as to the former communications, Mr. Seward answered, "None." Let it be borne in mind that all this occurred white Mr. Fox was making active, though secret, preparations for his relief expedition.

On the 7th of April, the commissioners becoming impatient, having heard of the projected relief expedition, Judge Campbell asked Mr. Seward whether the assurances so often given were well or ill founded. To this the Secretary returned answer in writing: "Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait and see." At that time the relief expedition had already sailed from New York for Charleston; for on the 8th of April Mr. Chew, an official of the State Department in Washington, delivered to Governor Pickens and to General Beauregard an official notification, without date or signature, that the attempt would be made to supply Fort Sumter. Mr. Chew said that this notification was from the President of the United States and was delivered to him (Chew) on April 6. The relief expedition, or squadron, consisted of eight vessels carrying twentysix guns and fourteen hundred men, including troops sent to reenforce the garrison. It should have reached Charleston on the 9th, before General Beauregard could have prepared to receive it; but it was delayed by a tempest and was lying just outside of the harbor on the 12th of April when General Beauregard was bombarding Fort Sumter, which was surrendered after a gallant defense on the 13th of April, the garrison marching out with the honors of war.

The State of Virginia, while believing in the right of secession, did not wish to exercise it at that time. She believed that if the Federal government would abstain from all acts of aggression and evacuate the Southern forts she could hold the border States in the Union and ultimately bring the seceded States back into the Union. When the tension was greatest, shje sent three commissioners to Washington to learn definitely the President's policy. The commissioners only reached Washington on April 12 and had the interview on the 13th, the day of the surrender of Fort Sumter. They urged forbearance and the giving up of the Southern forts. In answer Mr. Lincoln read a paper which, while ambiguous and evasive, professed peaceful intentions. He objected to such a course in that all goods would be imported through Southern ports and so dry up the sources of his revenue; but he expressly disclaimed all purpose of war. Mr. Seward and Attorney-General Bates gave also to the commissioners the same assurances of peace. The following day the commissioners returned to Richmond, and the very train on which they traveled bore Mr. Lincoln's proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men to subdue the Confederate States, which were characterized as being in insurrection against the government of the United States.

Thus the War between the States was brought on by a deliberate system of deception, which in politics is called "diplomacy," in morals is called "duplicity," in business is called "plain lying," by two of the very ablest and craftiest politicians—they would say statesmen—in the party of centralization. With all the professions of peaceful intentions, it was the purpose of that party to wage a war of subjugation on the Southern States and to establish a strong centralized power at Washington to be administered in the interests of the commercial and manufacturing classes.
=====

You might say that is a heart-felt Confederate view of what happened.

Tim
 
From THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD
By
FREDERIC BANCROFT

Vol. II.
NEW YORK AND LONDON

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS

1900

=====
1. With profound complacency the Confederates regarded Seward as their cat's-paw. " I have felt it my duty under instructions from your department, as well as from my best judgment," Crawford wrote to Toombs, March 6th, " to adopt and support Mr. Seward's policy, upon condition, however, that the present status is to be rigidly maintained. His reasons and my own, it is proper to say, are as wide apart as the poles : he is fully
persuaded that peace will bring about a reconstruction of the Union, whilst I feel confident that it will build up and cement our confederacy and put us beyond the reach either of his arms or of his diplomacy." " It is well that he should indulge in dreams which we know are not to be realized," Forsyth and Crawford complacently said, two days later. Because the Confederates were living under their own laws and were levying tribute upon the North, the commissioners felt that a continuance of quiet would be most conducive to a solidification of their government and to preparation for any emergency ; while it would tend to' give them character, power, and influence abroad. The evacuation of Forts Sumter and Pickens would be pro tanto a recognition of
independence. Obtaining Fort Pickens might be a work of time. " Still, invest the latter as Sumter was and it soon becomes a necessity." Crawford pointed out that,
by procuring from Seward a pledge not to change the status, the Confederate States had won a great advantage, for they " were not bound in any way whatever to
observe the same course toward it " — the United States. " We think, then, that the policy of ' masterly inactivity,' on our part, was wise in every particular." As late as April 2d, the Confederate Secretary of State wrote to the commissioners : " It is a matter of no importance to us what motives may induce the adoption of Mr. Seward's policy by his government. We are satisfied that it will rebound to our advantage, and, therefore, care little for Mr. Seward's calculations as to its future effect upon the Confederate States." At the same time Toombs instructed the commissioners not to agree to maintain the present status except upon the condition that the United States troops should be withdrawn from both Sumter and Pickens. From the beginning these forts were linked together for war or peace.' This soon became apparent.
=====

It seems the Confederate commissioners were well aware Seward was acting in a fashion that would benefit them, and were perfectly willing to take advantage of it. Also, it seems, that they were aware they had made no promises and there was no agreement to anything on their part, so they felt it was OK for the Confederacy to strike whenever it was to their benefit -- just not OK for the Union to act as the Confederacy was willing to act.

Tim
 
So it seems from the above post that even if President Lincoln evacuated Sumter, at the same time reenforcing Ft. Pickens it would be only a matter of time before the CSA made a military fort against that bastion as well... Also, from post #9, there is still that ambiguity on whether Lincoln even knew that the represenatvies from the CSA were there to see him.. Seward seemed to want everything filterd thru him, I believe, so that he could steer the nation the way he thought it should go and not what Lincoln thought..
 
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