Lt. Gen. Richard Taylor's Accusation

Mr. King

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An Excerpt from:
DESTRUCTION
AND
RECONSTRUCTION:
PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF THE LATE WAR.
BY
RICHARD TAYLOR,
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Chapter IV


"After the battle of Chickamauga, in 1863, General Grant was promoted to the command of the armies of the United States, and called to Washington. In a conference between him, President Lincoln, and Secretary Stanton, the approaching campaign in Virginia was discussed. Grant said that the advance on Richmond should be made by the James river. It was replied that the Government required the interposition of an army between Lee and Washington, and could not consent at that late day to the adoption of a plan which would be taken by the public as a confession of previous error. Grant observed that he was indifferent as to routes; but if the Government preferred its own, so often tried, to the one he suggested, it must be prepared for the additional loss of a hundred thousand men. The men were promised, Grant accepted the governmental plan of campaign,[Pg 34] and was supported to the end. The above came to me well authenticated, and I have no doubt of its correctness.[2]"


note 2:
Some of the early pages of this work were published in the number of the "North American Review" for January, 1878, including the above account of a conference at Washington between President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and General Grant. In the "New York Herald" of May 27, 1878, appears an interview with General Grant, in which the latter says, "The whole story is a fabrication, and whoever vouched for it to General Taylor vouched for a fiction." General Halleck, who was at the time in question Chief of Staff at the war office, related the story of this conference to me in New Orleans, where he was on a visit from Louisville, Ky., then his headquarters. Several years later General Joseph E. Johnston gave me the same account, which he had from another officer of the United States Army, also at the time in the war office. A letter from General Johnston, confirming the accuracy of my relation, has been published. Since, I have received a letter, dated New York, June 6, 1878, wherein the writer states that in Washington, in 1868 or 1869, he had an account of this conference, as I give it, from General John A. Logan of Illinois. When calling for reënforcements, after his losses in the Wilderness, General Grant reminded Stanton of his opposition to the land route in their conference, but added that "he would now fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." The writer of this communication is quite unknown to me, but manifests his sincerity by suggesting that I should write to General Logan, who, he doubts not, will confirm his statement. I have not so written, because I have no acquaintance with General Logan, and no desire to press the matter further. From many sources comes evidence that a conference was held, which General Grant seems to deny. Moreover, I cannot forget that in one notable instance a question of fact was raised against General Grant, with much burden of evidence; and while declaiming any wish or intent of entering on another, one may hold in all charity that General Grant's memory may be as treacherous about facts as mine proved about a date
, when, in a letter to the "Herald," I stupidly gave two years after General Halleck's death as the time of his conversation with me. These considerations have determined me to let the account of the conference stand as originally written.
 
While there is no way to know for sure, the Lincoln administration does not appear to have been overly concerned when Grant stripped the Washington defenses bare as the Overland Campaign progressed. It was so bad that when Jubal Early crossed the Potomac in July Grant had to rush the Sixth Corps back from Petersburg.
 
Help me out here. I read that as an accusation against not only Grant,but Lincoln and Stanton too.
 
Foote talked about "the heavies" (heavy artillery units) being drawn out of the Washington defenses during the Overland Campaign. They were green regiments, 900 strong, having served 2 years or more without firing a shot. Must have been a stark contrast comparing them to emaciated veteran units like the 20th Maine.
 
Look how many men died during the Overland Campaign trying to get to Richmond. McClellan got just as close without that sizable loss. What was it, 66,000 Union casualties or something?
Just think, Grant could have landed at Yorktown with 66,000 more men, and be that much closer.

I can also see Stanton & Lincoln wanting to avoid anything like an admission that Little Mac was right, considering that they were a few months away from an election that just happened to be Lincoln vs McClellan.

If this implication were true, which seems entirely plausible to me, it is a very sad example of soldiers dying for political gains, which happens all too often.
 
Look how many men died during the Overland Campaign trying to get to Richmond. McClellan got just as close without that sizable loss. What was it, 66,000 Union casualties or something?
Just think, Grant could have landed at Yorktown with 66,000 more men, and be that much closer.

I can also see Stanton & Lincoln wanting to avoid anything like an admission that Little Mac was right, considering that they were a few months away from an election that just happened to be Lincoln vs McClellan.

If this implication were true, which seems entirely plausible to me, it is a very sad example of soldiers dying for political gains, which happens all too often.

I think it was too early for them to know they'd face Little Mac in the 1864 election, but your point about politics is well taken.

I've wondered myself if Banks was set up to fail in his 1864 Red River Campaign for the same reason, but that is a subject for another thread.
 
Personly I give little credibility to the quote. Please also remember that Grant's objective in the Overland campaign was the destruction of the ANV, not the capture of Richmond.

True, but we'll need a definitive date on when this objective was identified. Certainly not on Grant's first visit to Washington to meet with Lincoln and Stanton.
 
General Taylor was obviously not at the discussion. So that makes his account second hand, at best, or possibly third hand. Also since General Taylor was at arms against the USA, whoever related this to him did so some years after the event. It was also on its face an oral communication because if Taylor had contemporary documentation, one would think he would have said so. So we have a second or third hand oral account that was related years after the event. It is almost certainly inaccurate and distorted. I would think,that before the Overland Campaign, the James River approach would have been discussed, it was obvious. It is likely that the advantage of the Overland Campaign covering Washington was discussed. In facts, one would think it would have to have been mentioned. Even the downside of the possibility of more casualties might have come up. It is a pretty obvious. I doubt the mention of a specific number though but so what? If mentioned, it was not a certainty and everyone involved would have known it. I think Taylor errs in emphasizing the increased casualties. It seems to be an effort to blame the politicians for the casualties. But seeing as Taylor was a General, wasn't it natural for him to blame politicians if at all possible? His story in broad outline is plausible. But his conclusions are an unwarranted reach and Taylor had to know it. But heck, I bet it was a good chance to spice up his book so it would make a better read.
 
General Taylor was obviously not at the discussion. So that makes his account second hand, at best, or possibly third hand. Also since General Taylor was at arms against the USA, whoever related this to him did so some years after the event. It was also on its face an oral communication because if Taylor had contemporary documentation, one would think he would have said so. So we have a second or third hand oral account that was related years after the event. It is almost certainly inaccurate and distorted. I would think,that before the Overland Campaign, the James River approach would have been discussed, it was obvious. It is likely that the advantage of the Overland Campaign covering Washington was discussed. In facts, one would think it would have to have been mentioned. Even the downside of the possibility of more casualties might have come up. It is a pretty obvious. I doubt the mention of a specific number though but so what? If mentioned, it was not a certainty and everyone involved would have known it. I think Taylor errs in emphasizing the increased casualties. It seems to be an effort to blame the politicians for the casualties. But seeing as Taylor was a General, wasn't it natural for him to blame politicians if at all possible? His story in broad outline is plausible. But his conclusions are an unwarranted reach and Taylor had to know it. But heck, I bet it was a good chance to spice up his book so it would make a better read.
Imagine for one second that it was true.... Do you think Grant would ever admit it?
 
The thing about the passage from Taylor is that it really doesn't impugn Grant. His refutal is a legacy protection game, IMO.

If the passage is accurate, Grant dutifully informed the politicians of what their favored course of action would cost and they acceded to it. That's not on the General, it's on them.
 
The thing about the passage from Taylor is that it really doesn't impugn Grant. His refutal is a legacy protection game, IMO.

If the passage is accurate, Grant dutifully informed the politicians of what their favored course of action would cost and they acceded to it. That's not on the General, it's on them.
yeah, I agree. Look at Grant's options... I can tell you no, and go back to GA, and Meade can try to out maneuver Lee for the next 5 years, or I can say yes and try like he'll to defy my own dire prediction....
This is really implicated Stanton and Lincoln.
 
Foote talked about "the heavies" (heavy artillery units) being drawn out of the Washington defenses during the Overland Campaign. They were green regiments, 900 strong, having served 2 years or more without firing a shot. Must have been a stark contrast comparing them to emaciated veteran units like the 20th Maine.

When the 1st Maine H.A. made their disastrous charge at Petersburg that resulted in the heaviest regimental loss of the entire war, supposedly the defending Confederates thought it was a BRIGADE.
 
"After the battle of Chickamauga, in 1863, General Grant was promoted to the command of the armies of the United States, and called to Washington. In a conference between him, President Lincoln, and Secretary Stanton, the approaching campaign in Virginia was discussed. Grant said that the advance on Richmond should be made by the James river. It was replied that the Government required the interposition of an army between Lee and Washington, and could not consent at that late day to the adoption of a plan which would be taken by the public as a confession of previous error. Grant observed that he was indifferent as to routes; but if the Government preferred its own, so often tried, to the one he suggested, it must be prepared for the additional loss of a hundred thousand men. The men were promised, Grant accepted the governmental plan of campaign,[Pg 34] and was supported to the end. The above came to me well authenticated, and I have no doubt of its correctness.[2]"

Here is a link to a page by a book by Lincoln's aids that refute Taylor's story... Read the Footnote...

https://books.google.com/books?id=s...lic as a confession of previous error&f=false
 
I'm not sure about the James River being preferred by Grant over the route taken. I do know that neither was Grant wanted. He was thinking have Thomas hit North Carolina, Grant himself hit Mobile, Sherman at Atlanta and Meade Richmond. And variations of this.
Grant up the South side of the James, Thomas into NC. etc. Anything but what he got. I'm not saying Grant was a genius, but he knew to stay away.
 
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