Longstreet's possible ulterior motive to go west

Pat Answer

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Agreed. Lee and Longstreet had unique strengths and weaknesses that, despite the later criticism, helped the ANV achieve many of its greatest moments. To this day, there is probably no definitive conclusion as to what type of strategy would have best served the Confederacy in its quest for independence.

And that tough question is another whole topic... :D
 

uaskme

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Longstreet clearly believed he shouldn’t have to serve under Bragg. Serving under him didn’t change his mind. I think he wanted to serve under Johnson. Davis was in full throttle blaming Johnson for the loss of Vicksburg. Big reason Davis sustained Bragg after Chickamauga

Fate is a funny thing. Longstreet goes to Knoxville. Johnson takes over the AOT in early 64. There is no way Longstreet could get to Dalton to serve under him. Geographically impossible with the Federals controlling the Tennessee Valley.

After a few months in the West, Longstreet has many of the same command issues that Bragg had.

Davis should of made the decision to move Longstreet quicker. If he had of gotten to Bragg a few weeks before. The outcome could of been dramatically different. Lost the best opportunity to change the momentum of the War in North Georgia.
 

Pete Longstreet

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Longstreet clearly believed he shouldn’t have to serve under Bragg. Serving under him didn’t change his mind. I think he wanted to serve under Johnson. Davis was in full throttle blaming Johnson for the loss of Vicksburg. Big reason Davis sustained Bragg after Chickamauga

Fate is a funny thing. Longstreet goes to Knoxville. Johnson takes over the AOT in early 64. There is no way Longstreet could get to Dalton to serve under him. Geographically impossible with the Federals controlling the Tennessee Valley.

After a few months in the West, Longstreet has many of the same command issues that Bragg had.

Davis should of made the decision to move Longstreet quicker. If he had of gotten to Bragg a few weeks before. The outcome could of been dramatically different. Lost the best opportunity to change the momentum of the War in North Georgia.
Well said. So many factors were working against the AoT and Longstreet's corp... that as you begin to learn more about it... you begin to see that the campaign was destined to fail.
 

kabrown

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I don't think Longstreet was any more hungry for promotion and command than any other average general officer. He did have a great deal of respect for Joe Johnston. Would he have taken command if Bragg was removed? Sure, why not, but I think the idea that Longstreet was "scheming" for that command has been over-emphasized. Longstreet was always a proponent of a Western concentration (as opposed to Lee's Virginia-centric mindset).
 

kabrown

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Lee was definitely more inclined to take "long chances". Longstreet was much more cautious, sometimes to a fault. And was even called "slow Peter" during some campaigns.
Actually, the "Longstreet is slow" canard was part of the Lost Cause nonsense made up by Jubal Early and his cohorts years after the war. I have not come across anything written during the war that accuses Longstreet of being "slow".

In a 1998 article Gary Gallagher addressed many of the erroneous claims regarding Longstreet. He rejected the Lost Cause claims that Longstreet was a slow marcher, pointing out the 1875 statements of George Clay Eggleston that Lee himself said, "...that Jackson was by no means so rapid a marcher as Longstreet, and that he [Jackson] had an unfortunate habit of never being on time".

He also quotes William P. Snow's 1867 work that describes Longstreet as "bold, daring, dashing and a rapid marcher."[1] Gallagher goes on to examine the charge that Longstreet was slow in reaching the battlefield at Second Manassas, another Lost Cause claim, concluding that; "By any reasonable standard, it was an excellent march that compared favorably with what Jackson's troops accomplished in covering the same ground."[2]



[1] Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in War and Memory, 144.
[2] Ibid., 153.
 

Pete Longstreet

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I don't think Longstreet was any more hungry for promotion and command than any other average general officer. He did have a great deal of respect for Joe Johnston. Would he have taken command if Bragg was removed? Sure, why not, but I think the idea that Longstreet was "scheming" for that command has been over-emphasized. Longstreet was always a proponent of a Western concentration (as opposed to Lee's Virginia-centric mindset).
I can agree with that assessment. Based on the infighting, personal quarrels, and attempts to slander or discredit their superiors, north and south... Longstreet was right in line with other generals looking for advancement.
 

Pete Longstreet

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Actually, the "Longstreet is slow" canard was part of the Lost Cause nonsense made up by Jubal Early and his cohorts years after the war. I have not come across anything written during the war that accuses Longstreet of being "slow".

In a 1998 article Gary Gallagher addressed many of the erroneous claims regarding Longstreet. He rejected the Lost Cause claims that Longstreet was a slow marcher, pointing out the 1875 statements of George Clay Eggleston that Lee himself said, "...that Jackson was by no means so rapid a marcher as Longstreet, and that he [Jackson] had an unfortunate habit of never being on time".

He also quotes William P. Snow's 1867 work that describes Longstreet as "bold, daring, dashing and a rapid marcher."[1] Gallagher goes on to examine the charge that Longstreet was slow in reaching the battlefield at Second Manassas, another Lost Cause claim, concluding that; "By any reasonable standard, it was an excellent march that compared favorably with what Jackson's troops accomplished in covering the same ground."[2]



[1] Gallagher, Lee and His Generals in War and Memory, 144.
[2] Ibid., 153.
I recently came across this quote from his Chief of Staff Moxley Sorrell regarding Longstreet's actions on the night of July 1st:

"there was apparent apathy in his movements, they lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield."

Although I do agree with you, that Early, Pendleton and the other "anti-Longstreet faction" turned his actions at Gettysburg into the reason the south lost the war... which is considered part of the "lost cause".
 
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