OldBrainsHalleck
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What was Longstreet's original strategy for Day 3 during the Battle of Gettysburg, before he had to change it to the one that resulted in Pickett's Charge?
What was Longstreet's original strategy for Day 3 during the Battle of Gettysburg, before he had to change it to the one that resulted in Pickett's Charge?
Longstreet was guided by a strong desire that the ANV not engage federal forces unless they could be maneuvered into a position where the ANV was fighting a defensive battle.
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had great success in prior battles where they held a defensive position.A defensive battle, even if successful, rarely produces the sort of decisive victory the Confederacy needed at that point.
I would go a step further and say that- at least according to Longstreet- that was what he understood was Lee's plan as the campaign began: to avoid confrontation with the U. S. force unless it could be had at a place and under circumstances favorable to the rebels. Then take a strong defensive position and make the U. S. forces 'come to him'.Longstreet was guided by a strong desire that the ANV not engage federal forces unless they could be maneuvered into a position where the ANV was fighting a defensive battle.
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had great success in prior battles where they held a defensive position.
Thanks for your response.Yes, and both armies survived, to do it all over again a couple of months later. This is what Lee saw, and Longstreet seems to have missed: an ongoing stalemate in the ANV's theater of operations would not provide the needed relief to the Confederates everywhere else. They didn't need another Fredericksburg; they needed a crushing, decisive victory.
Yes, and both armies survived, to do it all over again a couple of months later. This is what Lee saw, and Longstreet seems to have missed: an ongoing stalemate in the ANV's theater of operations would not provide the needed relief to the Confederates everywhere else. They didn't need another Fredericksburg; they needed a crushing, decisive victory.
Unfortunately for Lee this just wasn't the way to achieve it!Lee was, by nature, aggressive.
This seems to explain much about the events at Gettysburg.
Before dawn on July 3rd, Longstreet had sent scouts out beyond his right in order to find a path around the Union flank.
A truly crushing victory can only be completed with offensive action, but it might start with a defensive phase, drawing the enemy into an assault that pins him down before hitting him with a decisive flank attack. Second Manassas would be an example, with Longstreet making the crucial attack. Chancellorsville, or more distantly Austerlitz or Waterloo, also somewhat fit the mold.
Thanks for your response.
Lee was, by nature, aggressive.
This seems to explain much about the events at Gettysburg.
Thanks for your response.I sometimes wonder if we underestimate the effect of Chancellorsville on Lee. After all, there the solution to a seemingly impossible tactical position was going on offense. And, it worked. And from Lee's perspective, going on the attack on July 2 had come within a hair's breadth of outright victory.
Not really. As a matter of fact the Union losses (in % of active) were larger at Fredericksburg (10.9%), where the Confederates fought a defensive battle, than at Chancellorsville (9.1%). And if you look at the Confederate losses in Fredericksburg, they were about 1/4 of those they had at Chancellorsville.
Fredericksburg was a much more decisive victory than Chancellorsville for the Confederates, and it was a defensive battle.
A defensive battle, even if successful, rarely produces the sort of decisive victory the Confederacy needed at that point.
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had great success in prior battles where they held a defensive position.
Given that the Union Right Flank on July 3rd was at the top of Big Round Top, that would have been pretty impossible. And this does not count being exposed to the 2nd Div. VI Corps reserves that were camped around what is now Wright/Howe Ave...
I sometimes wonder if we underestimate the effect of Chancellorsville on Lee. After all, there the solution to a seemingly impossible tactical position was going on offense. And, it worked. And from Lee's perspective, going on the attack on July 2 had come within a hair's breadth of outright victory.