Longstreet's Original Day 3 Strategy

What book is that in?

From Earl Hess' Pickett's Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg, pages 46-47 (Kindle version):

...The division approached the battlefield just as the assault of July 2 started. Bright reported the arrival of the division to Longstreet, who asked about the condition of the men. Bright told him they were game for an hour or two of heavy fighting, but not much longer than that; the march from Chambersburg had been rushed and the men were tired. Longstreet then told him to encamp the division near Marsh Creek, about five miles from the fighting, and said, "Tell Pickett I will have work for Him tomorrow." Lee agreed with this, and the Virginians bivouacked within sound of the guns...

Pickett's men were up at 3:00 A.M. on July 3 to eat breakfast and start their march forward. They soon halted for some time so that twenty additional cartridges could be distributed to each soldier. The column was headed by Kemper's brigade, then Garnett and Armistead followed. Leaving Chambersburg Pike, the division made its way by a circuitous route across the rolling countryside. First it moved southward along Knoxlyn Road, then east on Hereter's Mill Road. It crossed Herr's Ridge, the starting point of the first Confederate attacks on July 1, and angled off to the southeast to cross Hagerstown Road, which was the southern boundary of the fighting zone on July 1. Then the Virginians headed east on a small lane leading to Emanuel Pitzer's farm, shielded from Federal view by the low rise of Seminary Ridge, until they reached Spangler's Woods at about 9:00 A.M.

It took at least 4 hours to get from Pickett's bivouac to Seminary Ridge. If Lee wanted the First Corps ready to attack at dawn, he would have had to get them up and moving around midnight. Personally, I think Lee was looking to attack both flanks in the morning as early as possible but not at dawn. After all, he didn't even visit Longstreet to discuss an attack with him until 4:30 am and couldn't expect Pickett to be up and ready to go at that time. Regardless, the Union troops on Culp's and Power's Hills took the decision out of Lee's hands and he had to come up with a new plan, which he started to formulate shortly thereafter.

Ryan
 
At the risk of drawing down the wrath of the many Longstreet Lovers here on the forums, I'll opine that Longstreet is actually rather difficult to pigeonhole; part of this is due to his seemingly contradictory attitude where it involves his own personal role in events. As long as he was expected to play a subordinate role to someone else - be it Joe Johnston in 1861 and early 1862, Lee, or even Bragg at Chattanooga - he seems to have recommended caution and assumed a defensive attitude. However, if there was an opportunity for him to shine (as there initially was at Seven Pines) or act the independent commander as he did on a few occasions such as the Suffolk expedition or at Knoxville then he seemed much more in favor of more aggressive tactics, which unfortunately for him were inevitably unsuccessful. At Chickamauga one might say that greatness was thrust upon him by Bragg; and his aggressive assault in the Wilderness was more a defensive-oriented counterattack forced on him by necessity rather than any plan on his part - and of course it ultimately came to nothing too when he was wounded. Napoleon supposedly asked when considering promotion of his generals to higher levels, "Is he lucky?"; I think it's likely that Longstreet would've failed that particular qualification.

One of the most telling comments I ever read about Longstreet's generalship concerned his behavior at Chickamauga where, instead of pushing his men forward after the breakthrough and while Thomas was perfecting his defenses on Snodgrass Hill, Longstreet and his staff sat under a tree leisurely enjoying a picnic lunch! I believe Longstreet and his career have been overblown by the attention and acclaim accorded to him through Shaara's novel and Tom Beringer's performance in the movie. No doubt he was one of the Confederacy's better or even best generals, but a lot of his current reputation is based on hindsight that simply wasn't available at the time.
Overall, Longstreet was more effective as a suboordinate general and Jackson was more effective as an independent commander. They complemented eachother on the battlefield, which led to quite a few victories.

As a suboordinate during the Seven Days, Longstreet frequently maintained an aggressive role, even during defeat and when fellow generals were disorganized or faltered.

Longstreet was the 2nd highest ranking and arguably one of Lee’s more trusted suboordinate in the ANV. He was also popular among many of his men during the war. He was also stubborn and complex, and the loss of three of his children to Scarlett Fever affected him tremendously. Had he not lived through the war, or had he not been as controversial afterward, his reputation might have been more esteemed.
 
From Earl Hess' Pickett's Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg, pages 46-47 (Kindle version):



It took at least 4 hours to get from Pickett's bivouac to Seminary Ridge. If Lee wanted the First Corps ready to attack at dawn, he would have had to get them up and moving around midnight. Personally, I think Lee was looking to attack both flanks in the morning as early as possible but not at dawn. After all, he didn't even visit Longstreet to discuss an attack with him until 4:30 am and couldn't expect Pickett to be up and ready to go at that time. Regardless, the Union troops on Culp's and Power's Hills took the decision out of Lee's hands and he had to come up with a new plan, which he started to formulate shortly thereafter.

Ryan

Where was this bivouac area?
 
Where was this bivouac area?

Along Marsh Creek, northwest of Gettysburg along the Chambersburg Pike. In order to get in position along Seminary Ridge, the division had to take a roundabout way there and were also halted in order to receive more ammunition. Historically, it took about 6 hours to take their place in line and, without a stop for ammunition, it would take 4-5 hours instead of 6.

Ryan
 
Along Marsh Creek, northwest of Gettysburg along the Chambersburg Pike. In order to get in position along Seminary Ridge, the division had to take a roundabout way there and were also halted in order to receive more ammunition. Historically, it took about 6 hours to take their place in line and, without a stop for ammunition, it would take 4-5 hours instead of 6.

Ryan
How long were they at Marsh Creek?
 
How long were they at Marsh Creek?

They arrived around 5pm on July 2nd after a march of 25 miles. Lee and Longstreet agreed to let them rest at Marsh Creek so that they could be called upon the next day. They began to march to the field around 3am on July 3rd, were halted for a time so extra ammunition could be supplied to them and continued on, arriving behind Seminary Ridge around 9am.

Ryan
 
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had great success in prior battles where they held a defensive position.
Lee was looking for total destruction of the Union Army at this point, not just a win from a defensive position. Lee felt this was the South's last best chance to do so. The attrition rate after this battle led the ANV to Appomattox as Lee also most likely foresaw.
 
Longstreet's strategy with Lee was "get the Army of the Potomac out into the open", then flank the forces and roll through. This includes all three days at Gettyburg... the problem is that Buford's defensive stop on the first day gave the Army of the Potomac positions that naturally defended the flanks. Meade and his generals correctly predicted that Lee's day 3 strategy would be to try to wedge the middle, effectively dividing the Union forces and defeating them in detail... because Lee's forces had used that strategy in the past. The only Confederate winning move would have been to get between the Union Forces and Baltimore/Washington DC -- and positioned in such strength that the Union armies could have only pursued and engaged BY column... and run smack dab into a prepositioned rebel kill zone. Most of us armchair historians think that was what Longstreet wanted... whether or not it was proposed and rejected or not.
 
How do you know there would be any defeats if Stonewall Jackson had lived?
No one knows for certain. But as the rebels became weaker over time while the U. S. force became larger, when Lee was restricted in his battle plans and suffering defeats, it does not seem unreasonable.
 
Lee was looking for total destruction of the Union Army at this point, not just a win from a defensive position.
Thanks for your response.
That may well be so; it certainly seems to have been his reasoning.
 
Lee felt this was the South's last best chance to do so.
Thanks for your response.
I do not believe Lee felt Gettysburg his last chance. I believe he saw it as a setback, an opportunity lost, but not the end.
 
The attrition rate after this battle led the ANV to Appomattox as Lee also most likely foresaw.
Thanks for your response.
We discussed this in another thread some time ago. It is a most unflattering criticism some writers have of Lee, that he realized the cause was lost but stubbornly continued to sacrifice his men for over two more years.
 
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