Longstreet was a "defensive" General

rpkennedy

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Contrarily, Lee proved to be another losing example of why the maxim is true. He just couldn’t replace the casualties he took with his continual employment of aggressive tactics.
Agreed. But in all fairness, Lee realized that he couldn't sit back and react to his opponent since he had the smaller army and that the Confederacy probably could not win a drawn out war. Only by going on the offensive and making "those people" dance to his tune, he could mitigate his usual numerical inferiority and seek an active victory that might potentially force a resolution to the war.

Ryan
 

John S. Carter

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Mar 15, 2017
Longstreet's reputation as a defensive General is largely to make him a counter-point to Stonewall Jackson, who is regarded as an audacious offensive minded general. It's a simplification of the role both men plays as Lee's principle subordinates and partially reflective of their differening levels of success in more independent role - Jackson's Valley Campaign being a triumphant master-piece of aggressive warfare while Longstreet's Suffolk and Knoxville Campaigns being more passive pedestrian dissapointments.
Could it be said that Longstreet's strategy depended upon the field condition which he found himself. Offensive at Chattooga; Defensive at Fredericksburg. His actions at Fredericksburg gave him reason to move the army away from Gettysburg to a more advantageous field , but Lee did not desire to move for "the enemy is here and I intend to fight here" , not in just those words. Question; Did Longstreet have a spy who informed him of Mead's movements or position prior to the battle and then Longstreet informed Lee of this information or is this a legion by Longstreet's Legionnaires ?
 

Scott1967

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Very true. I also think that Longstreet gained a bit of a reputation as a "schemer" for constantly angling for independent command, asserting his tactical opinions with Lee, and identifying with the so-called "western concentration." But overall, Longstreet was as good at defense as he was at offense as you point out in your post. Important to remember that Lee depended on Longstreet's counsel until the very end at Appomattox. That alone counts for much in his favor.
Spot on , Longstreet was a party animal up to the point of losing his children then he became very withdrawn.

Ewell and Hill were a direct response to the influence both Jackson and Longstreet had on Lee , Lee wanted more direct control over the army with dire consequence's.

However I disagree about Lee wanting Longstreet's council he was away for long periods of time either wounded of fighting with Bragg or on his own and their has to be a reason for that because one does not send his best commander away unless its to get him out of your hair imho.
 

Wizard of Cozz

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Could it be said that Longstreet's strategy depended upon the field condition which he found himself. Offensive at Chattooga; Defensive at Fredericksburg. His actions at Fredericksburg gave him reason to move the army away from Gettysburg to a more advantageous field , but Lee did not desire to move for "the enemy is here and I intend to fight here" , not in just those words. Question; Did Longstreet have a spy who informed him of Mead's movements or position prior to the battle and then Longstreet informed Lee of this information or is this a legion by Longstreet's Legionnaires ?

I've seen this a number of times, but Lee had none of his good cavalry on the field on either Day 1 or Day 2, if he tries a flanking maneuver as many here suggest, Buford would have instantly moved to delay the movement, on top of that he would of opened himself up to being attacked from the direction Union reinforcements were coming from. I don't see how he could have "maneuvered to the right" as Longstreet requested. Wert's biography of Longstreet even mentions this both times, that Lee correctly shut down that suggestion. Now if we want to play hindsight 50/50, I think Lee should have moved Ewell from the Confederate left and sent them around to the right with Longstreet, to me that offered up more opportunities for possible success. Even with only the brigade of Greene on Culp's Hill, Meade was still able to barely hold the position the night of July 2. With moving Ewell, you take away the fishhook position and you make it to parallel lines, and Meade loses his advantage of interior lines.

As to your 2nd point, the spy Harrison, is the reason that Lee began his concentration to Gettysburg.
 

Wizard of Cozz

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Spot on , Longstreet was a party animal up to the point of losing his children then he became very withdrawn.

Ewell and Hill were a direct response to the influence both Jackson and Longstreet had on Lee , Lee wanted more direct control over the army with dire consequence's.

However I disagree about Lee wanting Longstreet's council he was away for long periods of time either wounded of fighting with Bragg or on his own and their has to be a reason for that because one does not send his best commander away unless its to get him out of your hair imho.
Just curious what are you basing your support on to the idea that Ewell and Hill were promoted so Lee could effect more direct control?? If that was the case Lee would have been more direct during the Gettysburg campaign, but that wasn't his style. He believed in marching the army and then directing his corps to battle, but leaving the battle up to them. The issues came when they both showed they weren't up to the task in the same way as Longstreet and Jackson. Afterwards Lee begins to take a more firm hand with those two. To be fair I don't disagree with the splitting of the army to 3 corps, Longstreet at times was commanding up to 5 divisions and any one time and becomes almost too wieldy to handle. I will say I have kept Longstreet's corps at 4 divisions and just kept the other two corps at 2 divisions, I know it wouldn't of happened, but I also think keeping JEB Stuart in command of one of the infantry corps may have been a solution, then you could promote Hampton to command the cavalry.
 

Belfoured

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Hood, for one, over a dispute with a superior officer over captured ambulances. He was placed under arrest after 2nd Manassas until just before South Mountain.
I'll see you A.P. Hill and raise you Richard Garnett. (I'll leave out some in lower ranks). FWIW, the Longstreet-Hood matter was precipitated by an interaction between Hood and Shanks Evans, who as his superior had issued an order to Hood.
 

Belfoured

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
Spot on , Longstreet was a party animal up to the point of losing his children then he became very withdrawn.

Ewell and Hill were a direct response to the influence both Jackson and Longstreet had on Lee , Lee wanted more direct control over the army with dire consequence's.

However I disagree about Lee wanting Longstreet's council he was away for long periods of time either wounded of fighting with Bragg or on his own and their has to be a reason for that because one does not send his best commander away unless its to get him out of your hair imho.
There is no evidence that Lee wanted Longstreet "out of his hair". The transfer to the A of T was initiated by Longstreet (apparently based in part on his assumption that Johnston would replace Bragg) and was agreed to by Davis and Lee. After Gettysburg and the performances there by Hill and Ewell, Lee would have been not terribly bright to want to manipulate Longstreet out of the ANV. In fact, Davis and Lee had strongly resisted the idea until the Federals had maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga and had taken Knoxville.
 
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To be fair I don't disagree with the splitting of the army to 3 corps, Longstreet at times was commanding up to 5 divisions and any one time and becomes almost too wieldy to handle. I will say I have kept Longstreet's corps at 4 divisions and just kept the other two corps at 2 divisions, I know it wouldn't of happened, but I also think keeping JEB Stuart in command of one of the infantry corps may have been a solution, then you could promote Hampton to command the cavalry.
Longstreet's Tidewater Operations deprived the ANV of two divisions and, when Lee urged back his top-subordinate, Longstreet didn't managed to reach the battlefied of Chancellorsville in time. The expedition at Suffolk slightly damaged the trust between Lee and Longstreet.

The splitting of the army could have been made in November 1862 but D.H. Hill would have been next in rank to Longstreet and Jackson. So the army kept his two-corps structure until mid-1863, when Lee realized that he barely could fight the Army of the Potomac without his whole force. The Third Corps allowed Lee to reduce Longstreet's initiative while transferring a veteran division under A.P. Hill, one of his favorite officers.

There is already an existing thread about "No A.P. Hill's Third Corps", and therefore I think you can take a look on it by using the search bar. Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's biographer, explained quite well the situation Lee faced when organizing his army before the invasion of Pennsylvania : Stuart was kept at the head of cavalry because Lee thought no one could perform a better job, Ewell was chosen because of Jackson's praises and A.P. Hill deserved his command after having led the largest division of the ANV and for having saved Lee's force at Sharpsburg.

The solution could have been to keep a two-corps structure with a huge reserve division commanded by either Ewell of A.P. Hill and directly under Lee's command :

Army of Northern Virginia
- - - Reserve (Ewell's/A.P. Hill's) Division (6 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Cavalry Division (4 Cavalry Bdes)
- First Corps (LTG Longstreet)
- - - McLaws' Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - R.H. Anderson's Div. (5 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Pickett's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Hood's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- Second Corps (LTG Ewell / A.P. Hill)
- - - Early's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Johnson's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Rodes' Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
[- - - Heth's Provisional Bde (2 Infantry Bdes), from North Carolina]

Nevertheless, if the battle of Gettysburg still be fought, Longstreet has enough mapower to try his flanking on the Union left wing, while Lee can assign the Second Corps to the center and the reserve division to the right (originally, A.P. Hill's Third Corps on the center and Ewell's Second Corps confronting the Union right wing).
 

Wizard of Cozz

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Longstreet's Tidewater Operations deprived the ANV of two divisions and, when Lee urged back his top-subordinate, Longstreet didn't managed to reach the battlefied of Chancellorsville in time. The expedition at Suffolk slightly damaged the trust between Lee and Longstreet.

The splitting of the army could have been made in November 1862 but D.H. Hill would have been next in rank to Longstreet and Jackson. So the army kept his two-corps structure until mid-1863, when Lee realized that he barely could fight the Army of the Potomac without his whole force. The Third Corps allowed Lee to reduce Longstreet's initiative while transferring a veteran division under A.P. Hill, one of his favorite officers.

There is already an existing thread about "No A.P. Hill's Third Corps", and therefore I think you can take a look on it by using the search bar. Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's biographer, explained quite well the situation Lee faced when organizing his army before the invasion of Pennsylvania : Stuart was kept at the head of cavalry because Lee thought no one could perform a better job, Ewell was chosen because of Jackson's praises and A.P. Hill deserved his command after having led the largest division of the ANV and for having saved Lee's force at Sharpsburg.

The solution could have been to keep a two-corps structure with a huge reserve division commanded by either Ewell of A.P. Hill and directly under Lee's command :

Army of Northern Virginia
- - - Reserve (Ewell's/A.P. Hill's) Division (6 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Cavalry Division (4 Cavalry Bdes)
- First Corps (LTG Longstreet)
- - - McLaws' Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - R.H. Anderson's Div. (5 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Pickett's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Hood's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- Second Corps (LTG Ewell / A.P. Hill)
- - - Early's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Johnson's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Rodes' Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
[- - - Heth's Provisional Bde (2 Infantry Bdes), from North Carolina]

Nevertheless, if the battle of Gettysburg still be fought, Longstreet has enough mapower to try his flanking on the Union left wing, while Lee can assign the Second Corps to the center and the reserve division to the right (originally, A.P. Hill's Third Corps on the center and Ewell's Second Corps confronting the Union right wing).
I think this also makes sense, you keep your best corps commander with the most divisions and there able to assert the most control of any lt. gen. You treat Hill like the leader of Napoleon's guard, and you give Ewell a smaller command and his corps becomes the v vanguard of any movement. A couple of notes though, I believe Rodes had 5 bds in his division. I would of possibly moved Heth's 2 bds to the Reserve and made two small demi divisions under Pender and Heth, and this make it a Reserve Corps not a reserve division. Each command better suits the commander. Also if treating it as a reserve division, hopefully the line of march would allow for Hill's troops to come up last, and it would have been Longstreet who comes in contact with Buford on day 1. Makes for an interesting scenario.
 

jackt62

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Location
New York City
However I disagree about Lee wanting Longstreet's council he was away for long periods of time either wounded of fighting with Bragg or on his own and their has to be a reason for that because one does not send his best commander away unless its to get him out of your hair imho.
It's hard to discern the extent to which Lee wanted Longstreet out of his hair, and therefore sent Longstreet to places like Suffolk and Tennessee. But I tend to think that it was mostly Longstreet's desire for independent command that led him to advocate such steps. I haven't actually come across evidence to indicate that Lee would happily depart from Longstreet's company. In contrast, Lee considered Longstreet his "war horse," and relied on Longstreet for advice about holding a parley with Grant in the days before the final surrender of the ANV.
 
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You treat Hill like the leader of Napoleon's guard, and you give Ewell a smaller command and his corps becomes the v vanguard of any movement. A couple of notes though, I believe Rodes had 5 bds in his division. I would of possibly moved Heth's 2 bds to the Reserve and made two small demi divisions under Pender and Heth, and this make it a Reserve Corps not a reserve division. Each command better suits the commander. Also if treating it as a reserve division, hopefully the line of march would allow for Hill's troops to come up last, and it would have been Longstreet who comes in contact with Buford on day 1. Makes for an interesting scenario.
Indeed, I forgot one brigade in Rodes' Division. And yes, I first hesitated to split A.P. Hill's Light Division in two parts, under Pender and Heth but I sticked to a formal two-corps formation. With a third corps created, I completely agree with your proposal (Ewell's Second Corps as the vanguard of the army with three divisions, Longstreet's First Corps as the core of the army with four divisions and A.P. Hill's Provisional Corps forming the reserve with two divisions). As you suggested, Longstreet could eventually fight in place of A.P. Hill on Day One at Gettysburg.
 

Wizard of Cozz

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As someone who views Longstreet favorably, he still had his issues. He wasn't always the easiest to deal with, and he didn't own up to his own mistakes, tending to blame others (Peninsula Campaign, Chattanooga, and Knoxville come to mind). At Chickamauga he launches the attack in depth, but what I find most interesting is you never hear him complaining about launching an attack, or that he wants to fight a defensive battle, yet at Gettysburg he is more malcontent about it, especially on day 3. I've always wondered if he had taken a more proactive view, and shaped the attack to his liking could it have been more successful. Now i'm not saying it still wouldn't of been a long shot, but Armistead's brigade does make it over the wall, mostly because he was in the 2nd line and didn't take as many casualties. What if Longstreet had organized the attack with 3 or 4 lines of infantry.

Looking back at the 3rd day assault. I've often wondered if better cooperation between Lee, Longstreet and Hill would have produced better efforts. Again not saying it wasn't a long shot, but a couple of points I'd like to make.
1.) The Choice of brigades in the assault was quite poor. Just looking at brigades with very light casualties going into Day 3, the first choices should have been Pickett's Division (Armistead, Garnett, and Kemper) Two brigades from Anderson (Mahone and Posey) and Two Brigades from Pender (Lane and Thomas). Somehow Mahone, Posey, and Thomas are not in the assault at all.
2.) The method of assault leaves much to be desired. Longstreet does not put much effort into the assault in my opinion. Imagine if he had created a 5 line assault column similar to Chickamauga. Garnett and Kemper in Line 1, Armistead in Line 2, Mahone and Posey in Line 3, and Thomas and Lane in Line 4. Use Pettigrew's division to protect the northern flank of the column, there job is to just make sure the attack column doesn't get flanked. Use Wilcox, Lang, and Wright from Anderson's division to protect the southern flank of the assault column.

Again, I understand the difficulties, but I think the Lee would have had a better chance of dislodging Meade this way. Now the question was could the assualt column have held their position from Meade's 6th corps if he had launched them against it. I don't know, but this would have had a much better chance at success then what actually happened IMO.
 

Scott1967

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Location
England
Just curious what are you basing your support on to the idea that Ewell and Hill were promoted so Lee could effect more direct control?? If that was the case Lee would have been more direct during the Gettysburg campaign, but that wasn't his style. He believed in marching the army and then directing his corps to battle, but leaving the battle up to them. The issues came when they both showed they weren't up to the task in the same way as Longstreet and Jackson. Afterwards Lee begins to take a more firm hand with those two. To be fair I don't disagree with the splitting of the army to 3 corps, Longstreet at times was commanding up to 5 divisions and any one time and becomes almost too wieldy to handle. I will say I have kept Longstreet's corps at 4 divisions and just kept the other two corps at 2 divisions, I know it wouldn't of happened, but I also think keeping JEB Stuart in command of one of the infantry corps may have been a solution, then you could promote Hampton to command the cavalry.
Well in nutshell the two major attacks at Gettysburg were Lee's idea and Longstreet objected to them both but was outvoted in a council of war because both Ewell and Hill sided with Lee no great shock their.

The fact that Lee failed miserably at Gettysburg and Longstreet was right in everything he said could only have put strain on their relationship even further regardless of Lee's silver tongue and the praise he heaped on Longstreet.

The hostility shown to Longstreet after the war mainly from Lee's most avid supporters like Early shows that not all was right and obviously something was festering between Longstreet and Lee not helped by Hill and Ewell two men who were beholding to Lee for their commands.

The fact that Longstreet pushed to get into the western war on numerous occasions ether thinking Johnston would take command or he could take command and that Longstreet wrote that many high ranking officers did not have faith in Lee when he took command might also have something to do with it.

Ether way the relationship between Lee and Longstreet took a turn for the worse after Gettysburg and when you read about Longstreet it always comes across he's telling everyone "I told you so" about Lee imho.
 

Belfoured

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
It's hard to discern the extent to which Lee wanted Longstreet out of his hair, and therefore sent Longstreet to places like Suffolk and Tennessee. But I tend to think that it was mostly Longstreet's desire for independent command that led him to advocate such steps. I haven't actually come across evidence to indicate that Lee would happily depart from Longstreet's company. In contrast, Lee considered Longstreet his "war horse," and relied on Longstreet for advice about holding a parley with Grant in the days before the final surrender of the ANV.
I agree. Regarding heading to Tennessee in September 1863, I think it's pretty clear that Lee (and Davis) actually resisted that but agreed on September 5 given what was happening in Tennessee. As I pointed out regarding what Ewell and Hill did at Gettysburg, I'd be shocked if Lee was so essentially stupid as to want Longstreet "out of his hair". That makes little objective sense and smells like something Early would cook up.
 

Belfoured

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Joined
Aug 3, 2019
Well in nutshell the two major attacks at Gettysburg were Lee's idea and Longstreet objected to them both but was outvoted in a council of war because both Ewell and Hill sided with Lee no great shock their.

The fact that Lee failed miserably at Gettysburg and Longstreet was right in everything he said could only have put strain on their relationship even further regardless of Lee's silver tongue and the praise he heaped on Longstreet.

The hostility shown to Longstreet after the war mainly from Lee's most avid supporters like Early shows that not all was right and obviously something was festering between Longstreet and Lee not helped by Hill and Ewell two men who were beholding to Lee for their commands.

The fact that Longstreet pushed to get into the western war on numerous occasions ether thinking Johnston would take command or he could take command and that Longstreet wrote that many high ranking officers did not have faith in Lee when he took command might also have something to do with it.

Ether way the relationship between Lee and Longstreet took a turn for the worse after Gettysburg and when you read about Longstreet it always comes across he's telling everyone I told you so about Lee imho.
Respectfuly, you put way too much reliance on Early's views - which are well-established as a load of post-war contrivances - and use a lot of unsupported speculation about the alleged discord between Lee and Longstreet. Early was consumed by showing that Lee made no mistakes and only lost the war because he had inferior manpower, etc etc. Longstreet was a convenient target because of his post-war affiliation with the Republican Party. What are the sources for these "councils of war" Lee held at Gettysburg and the "votes"?
 

Scott1967

First Sergeant
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Jul 11, 2016
Location
England
I agree. Regarding heading to Tennessee in September 1863, I think it's pretty clear that Lee (and Davis) actually resisted that but agreed on September 5 given what was happening in Tennessee. As I pointed out regarding what Ewell and Hill did at Gettysburg, I'd be shocked if Lee was so essentially stupid as to want Longstreet "out of his hair". That makes little objective sense and smells like something Early would cook up.
Their were other motives for Longstreet to head west mainly Roscrans his old roommate was leading the Union army and the fact that Bragg needed replacing with Johnston with Longstreet at his side or so he thought.
 

Belfoured

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
Longstreet's Tidewater Operations deprived the ANV of two divisions and, when Lee urged back his top-subordinate, Longstreet didn't managed to reach the battlefied of Chancellorsville in time. The expedition at Suffolk slightly damaged the trust between Lee and Longstreet.

The splitting of the army could have been made in November 1862 but D.H. Hill would have been next in rank to Longstreet and Jackson. So the army kept his two-corps structure until mid-1863, when Lee realized that he barely could fight the Army of the Potomac without his whole force. The Third Corps allowed Lee to reduce Longstreet's initiative while transferring a veteran division under A.P. Hill, one of his favorite officers.

There is already an existing thread about "No A.P. Hill's Third Corps", and therefore I think you can take a look on it by using the search bar. Douglas S. Freeman, Lee's biographer, explained quite well the situation Lee faced when organizing his army before the invasion of Pennsylvania : Stuart was kept at the head of cavalry because Lee thought no one could perform a better job, Ewell was chosen because of Jackson's praises and A.P. Hill deserved his command after having led the largest division of the ANV and for having saved Lee's force at Sharpsburg.

The solution could have been to keep a two-corps structure with a huge reserve division commanded by either Ewell of A.P. Hill and directly under Lee's command :

Army of Northern Virginia
- - - Reserve (Ewell's/A.P. Hill's) Division (6 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Cavalry Division (4 Cavalry Bdes)
- First Corps (LTG Longstreet)
- - - McLaws' Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - R.H. Anderson's Div. (5 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Pickett's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Hood's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- Second Corps (LTG Ewell / A.P. Hill)
- - - Early's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Johnson's Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
- - - Rodes' Div. (4 Infantry Bdes)
[- - - Heth's Provisional Bde (2 Infantry Bdes), from North Carolina]

Nevertheless, if the battle of Gettysburg still be fought, Longstreet has enough mapower to try his flanking on the Union left wing, while Lee can assign the Second Corps to the center and the reserve division to the right (originally, A.P. Hill's Third Corps on the center and Ewell's Second Corps confronting the Union right wing).
Lee is the one who dispatched Longstreet and two divisions to Suffolk, based primarily on supply problems for the ANV but with additional missions in mind, as well. He ordered Longstreet back on April 29 and Longstreet had completed that move by May 4.
 

Belfoured

1st Lieutenant
Joined
Aug 3, 2019
Their were other motives for Longstreet to head west mainly Roscrans his old roommate was leading the Union army and the fact that Bragg needed replacing with Johnston with Longstreet at his side or so he thought.
Hopefully you're not seriously suggesting that Pete was looking to hold a reunion with Rosey. I think I pointed out that Longstreet was looking to head west. That's a completely different issue from whether Lee wanted him "out of his hair". Lee resisted sending Longstreet away, with good reason - Ewell and Hill had each fallen short at Gettysburg. Lee relented (along with Davis) because it looked like Bragg was going to lose the rest of Tennessee. If you have a good source for your point, by all means feel free.
 

Wizard of Cozz

Private
Joined
Aug 20, 2021
Well in nutshell the two major attacks at Gettysburg were Lee's idea and Longstreet objected to them both but was outvoted in a council of war because both Ewell and Hill sided with Lee no great shock their.

The fact that Lee failed miserably at Gettysburg and Longstreet was right in everything he said could only have put strain on their relationship even further regardless of Lee's silver tongue and the praise he heaped on Longstreet.

The hostility shown to Longstreet after the war mainly from Lee's most avid supporters like Early shows that not all was right and obviously something was festering between Longstreet and Lee not helped by Hill and Ewell two men who were beholding to Lee for their commands.

The fact that Longstreet pushed to get into the western war on numerous occasions ether thinking Johnston would take command or he could take command and that Longstreet wrote that many high ranking officers did not have faith in Lee when he took command might also have something to do with it.

Ether way the relationship between Lee and Longstreet took a turn for the worse after Gettysburg and when you read about Longstreet it always comes across he's telling everyone "I told you so" about Lee imho.
Scott,

Thanks for the response. A couple of things from everything I've read. Lee's decision to attack was his, he didn't need Ewell and Hill to agree or not. His initial plan in fact was to pull Ewell out from the left and move him to the right, I actually think this initial though would have been the correct one. Lee didn't hold councils of war, he did talk with his corps commanders, but I digress. Lee only consented to leaving Ewell in place once Ewell seemed like he was going to be aggressive.

As for Longstreet's move around to the right. That would have been even more disastrous than what actually happened. The union had more cavalry on the field, and 6th corps was coming up in reserve. There were also no go roads that the Confederates actually controlled to do what Longstreet wanted to do. I again disagree that Longstreet was right on everything. I do agree that Pickett's charge in the way that it happened held no chance of success and that Lee should not have made the decision after his idea of a morning attack in concert with Ewell assaulting Culp's hill.

As for the 2nd day, I believe that the echelon attack was a good plan, and that it was working until Hill and Anderson botched it, and then Pender got injured. I think if Mahone, Posey, Thomas, and Lane attack that it dislodged Meade from his Cemetary hill position.

Lastly, the criticism of Longstreet after the war was very unfair. But most of this was coming from Early and Gordon, who had their own personal reasons for their attacks. I wouldn't say that Lee favored Early over Longstreet, considering he canned Early after the 64' Valley campaign. Also, when he met Longstreet before he left for the west, he told him to come back as soon as possible. I think Lee valued Longstreet very much, and considered him indispensable as a corps commander.
 
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