Longstreet Longstreet was a "defensive" General

Lee personally put Longstreet in command of Pickett/Pettigrew charge, yet he overlooked some fundamentals in that command.

Among those, I would mention the lack of observation regarding the level of difficulty of the twin fences at Emmitsburg Road. Nor was he aware of the relocation of McGilvery's reserve artillery now in prime position to pulverize the attacking troops.

I know he didn't have much time, but he could have sent scouts looking for just such things. Or even asked for observations from some of those in the July 2nd attack.

I suppose the faulty Richmond artillery fuses were more of Lee's concern, although Longstreet and his artillery commanders should have been aware of such wholesale inaccuracy during the massive bombardment or even sooner.

At Fort Sanders in Knoxville, he wasn't aware of the ankle high wire awaiting to trip up the charging troops. And, the height of the fort's slope would seem worthy of more detailed knowledge.

West Point would not have approved of such lack of awareness of obstacles to assaulting troops.
If we apply this standard to command at the corps level, Stonewall would have been a buck private.
 
Good points. And Johnston joined in the treatment of Huger. Much of the context for the snafus on May 31 was created by Johnston's ambiguous verbal orders. Converging movements by multiple forces were difficult enough if carefully put in writing. Seven Pines also illustrates one reason why gathering divisions into corps commands made sense.
Yup. Longstreet had Johnston's respect and unfortunately for Huger, he also had Johnston's ear. When Longstreet complained of Huger's movements... Johnston took Longstreet's side and Huger took the fall.
 
@Pete Longstreet

As we well know Longstreet was one of the most aggressive generals of the war and did more fighting on the offense than on the defense. He commanded 4 of the great assaults of the war and was the only general to drive a major force of veteran Western Yankees from the field.

I think this defensive canard comes from a certain overrated but influential work of fiction, that Killer Angels thing.
Well said! Before I knew much about Longstreet... I believed the "defensive" label that was put on him. As I began to read and study about him, I learned that it was not true. When Longstreet put an attack in motion, he kept the pressure on. He also did not stage reckless charges that would cause the unnecessary loss of life, which is why he was against charging the Union line on July 3rd.
 
From my take on Longstreet, he certainly understood the strength of the defense during the Civil War. That's why his offensives were so meticulously prepared (when given the time). Multiple lines of battle of assaulting troops either hitting a flank, or concentrating on a narrow front to breakthrough and exploit...
Agreed. I read the book: James Longstreet the Confederacy's Most Modern General

The author makes several points on how Longstreet learned modern defensive warfare tacfics during Fredericksburg.
 
My understanding is that Whiting was relieved because Lee was unhappy with his performance. I don't recall that Longstreet had much input although I could be misremembering.

Ryan
I don't recall Longstreet being involved in the removal/transfer of Whiting... but I could be wrong. My understanding is what you stated above... Lee was dissatisfied with Whiting after the Seven Days, and replaced him with Hood. Whiting was sent to North Carolina.
 
Yup. Longstreet had Johnston's respect and unfortunately for Huger, he also had Johnston's ear. When Longstreet complained of Huger's movements... Johnston took Longstreet's side and Huger took the fall.
I would add parenthetically that losing Huger's talents was not exactly a devastating blow to the ANV's military capabilities. His performance at Savage Station and Glendale (with the sound of tree-chopping as background) rated a "Gentleman's D" at best. Another Old Army officer who lacked the skill set to command larger bodies of troops. The rest of the war he spent as a staff officer - more suited to his skill set. Right or wrong regarding "blame" at Seven Pines, Johnston sided with the better officer.
 
It's also driven by ignorance. Think about it, the average person doesn't dive far enough in to the war, to get to minute details about every General, or Commander. It would take a person a lifetime to study every notable figure of the war in depth, if it's even possible. This is true even for some folks who fancy themselves Civil War Buffs.

Once most folks settle on their favorite person, or facet of the War, it's difficult to devote much time, or even interest, to other figures, or events. Most folks seem to have their "area of expertise" so to speak. It then becomes easy to defend your favorites, without full knowledge of others, so to speak.
I totally agree. I respect many experts on this forum and I keep quiet on many discussions as I havent studied even half the battles in the East to be able to comment.
 
I personally believe that the issue with the fences is somewhat overblown. While there were sections that were still up on July 3, large portions had been taken down along the Emmitsburg Road during the course of the battle. For example, some parts were pulled down on July 1 when the First Corps was rushing to Seminary Ridge and other parts were torn down to use as crude barricades on July 2 by the 15th Massachusetts and 82nd New York when they were posted just north of the Codori House. Where the fences were still up (mostly in front of Pettigrew and Trimble), the real problem was how close to the Union line the road runs so that as Pettigrew's men reached the road, they were met by a veritable wall of lead. Any delay in getting over the fences was time under intense fire and many men ended up not advancing past the road.

Ryan
Ryan,
Thank of it another way. If the pre charge bombardment had been partially or otherwise delayed until the fencing was eliminated by cannon fire, then adjustments could have been made for the faulty fuses.
 
Ryan,
Thank of it another way. If the pre charge bombardment had been partially or otherwise delayed until the fencing was eliminated by cannon fire, then adjustments could have been made for the faulty fuses.
Wait after 2 days battle the CSA Artillery fuses are suddenly faulty They didn't know this 2 days ago?.

Its quite well known that CSA arty had a problem with fuses since 1861 even the Union had problems but not to the extent of the CSA.

Although the fuse problem did exist it wasn't for all battery's just those that used the slow burn fuse.

The real issue was smoke and ranging remember the Union also overshot but lucky for them the Reb's were in the woods behind.
 
I would add parenthetically that losing Huger's talents was not exactly a devastating blow to the ANV's military capabilities. His performance at Savage Station and Glendale (with the sound of tree-chopping as background) rated a "Gentleman's D" at best. Another Old Army officer who lacked the skill set to command larger bodies of troops. The rest of the war he spent as a staff officer - more suited to his skill set. Right or wrong regarding "blame" at Seven Pines, Johnston sided with the better officer.
I honestly don't know much about Huger outside of his confrontation with Longstreet. Johnston sided with Longstreet and Lee was obviously not impressed with Huger, thus sending him to North Carolina... that has to say something about his abilities or lack thereof, to lead men into battle...
 
I totally agree. I respect many experts on this forum and I keep quiet on many discussions as I havent studied even half the battles in the East to be able to comment.
I concur. When I joined this forum, I was amazed at the knowledge of some members. It made me realize how much I don't know. But I do enjoy learning from members and learn something new everyday.
 
Wait after 2 days battle the CSA Artillery fuses are suddenly faulty They didn't know this 2 days ago?.

Its quite well known that CSA arty had a problem with fuses since 1861 even the Union had problems but not to the extent of the CSA.

Although the fuse problem did exist it wasn't for all battery's just those that used the slow burn fuse.

The real issue was smoke and ranging remember the Union also overshot but lucky for them the Reb's were in the woods behind.
It is my understanding that just prior to the Gettysburg campaign, it was learned that the usual supplier of fuses would not be able to furnish them just then.

The slower burning Richmond fuses were supplied in their stead; thus the overshots in the pre assault bombardment.
 
It is my understanding that just prior to the Gettysburg campaign, it was learned that the usual supplier of fuses would not be able to furnish them just then.

The slower burning Richmond fuses were supplied in their stead; thus the overshots in the pre assault bombardment.
General Lee assigned group of field officers to check all the fuses. This was done the middle of June according to the OR’s. This is the only time I have read about the fuses.
 
The two strongest Corp commanders Lee ever had were Longstreet and Jackson. The synergy of the three was greater than each alone — when they were in synch and agreed.

After Jackson died there was never a person capable of being a strong Corp commander again.

Or let me rephrase that, Davis would never, ever let Beauregard or Johnston have a try and Beauregard had actually done well earlier.

I dont think Johnston would have willingly served in a Corps under Lee in 1863 - never mind the fact that it would have been highly impractical to bring him to Virginia after Jackson's death when he'd only just arrived in Mississippi in the middle of the Vicksburg Campaign.

Beauregard would probably have been more willing to serve under Lee as he was unhappy in Charleston, but given how quickly he became dissatified serving under Lee in 1864 I wouldn't be confident in this being a happy arrangement for either man.
 
@Pete Longstreet

As we well know Longstreet was one of the most aggressive generals of the war and did more fighting on the offense than on the defense. He commanded 4 of the great assaults of the war and was the only general to drive a major force of veteran Western Yankees from the field.

I think this defensive canard comes from a certain overrated but influential work of fiction, that Killer Angels thing.
Actually, Longstreet was following Bragg's orders. Bragg should get the credit for Chickamauga, and for the charge that found the gap in the Yank line, which was opened up by the en echelon assault Bragg had been engaged in all day long before L's charge.
 
When he could pick his spots he did well. Gettysburg was not a Longstreet plan.
And according to Porter Alexander and others he made sure everyone knew that at the time and intentionally held back troops that were supposed to be included in the 2nd wave, long before the failure of the charge was self-evident.
 
Yea I agree with Tom 100% , Longstreet was ruthless on the offence 2nd Manassas and the Wilderness not to mention that great punching drive at Chickamauga which gave Bragg the slight if expensive victory he craved.

While Jackson was always thought of as Lee's most aggressive commander I consider Longstreet his best allrounder.
Chickamauga was not a slight victory. it was the 2nd largest victory of the entire war for the rebels?! What's with the inability to give credit where credit is due?
 
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