Longstreet Longstreet on Pickett's Charge: "thirty thousand men was the minimum of force necessary for the work"

I am inclined to prefer the Official Reports, if for no other reason than that they are virtually legal documents subject to not just peer review, but by subordinates, seniors; more the "commander-in-chief" (Lincoln/Davis), and the congresses, etc. Where officers insisted on contradicting or blaming each other, the result was hammered out in a court martial to review the evidence. No court-martial regarding Lee/Longstreet at Pickett's charge, and their O.R.s are in agreement the charge as given was a mistake, so I agree, most of the post-war speculation immaterial.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
They're definitely more reliable as a rule than post-war recollections (especially those made many years later or those that relate to a post-war dispute colored by other issues, such as this one). My point is that even post-battle reports are subject to scrutiny, because of the personal stake the writer might have in the public perception of what happened, unreliable sources of information, misunderstandings, etc. And there were plenty of disagreements that never rose to the level of a court-martial but continued during the war and afterwards. Just because somebody demanded a court martial didn't necessarily result in one - especially in the midst of a war, difficulty in assembling a board, etc. A commanding officer who thought that a court martial involving accusations between subordinates was a bad idea had ways of "burying" it or dragging it out.
 
They're definitely more reliable as a rule than post-war recollections (especially those made many years later or those that relate to a post-war dispute colored by other issues, such as this one). My point is that even post-battle reports are subject to scrutiny, because of the personal stake the writer might have in the public perception of what happened, unreliable sources of information, misunderstandings, etc. And there were plenty of disagreements that never rose to the level of a court-martial but continued during the war and afterwards. Just because somebody demanded a court martial didn't necessarily result in one - especially in the midst of a war, difficulty in assembling a board, etc. A commanding officer who thought that a court martial involving accusations between subordinates was a bad idea had ways of "burying" it or dragging it out.
Charles Marshall, himself a professional lawyer on Lee's staff, later stated regarding Lee's official report:

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In other words, by Marshall's account, General Lee was determined not to speculate on why an attack contrary to his orders ("unaware") was delivered, but to state "nothing but the truth..." in his own official report. I assume the same with Gen. Longstreet's official report, which Gen. Lee accepted as accurate (so far as he explains his purpose in making the attack without the planned artillery support). Marshall, Taylor, Longstreet, many historians, etc., have since attempted to append "material facts" to Lee's official statements. Many, perhaps most, might be true, but they cannot be proven.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
 
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Charles Marshall, himself a professional lawyer on Lee's staff, later stated regarding Lee's official report:

View attachment 403620
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In other words, by Marshall's account, General Lee was determined not to speculate on why an attack contrary to his orders ("unaware") was delivered, but to state "nothing but the truth..." in his own official report. I assume the same with Gen. Longstreet's official report, which Gen. Lee accepted as accurate (so far as he explains his purpose in making the attack without the planned artillery support). Marshall, Taylor, Longstreet, many historians, etc., have since attempted to append "material facts" to Lee's official statements. Many, perhaps most, might be true, but they cannot be proven.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
Another thing we don't (and cannot) know is the extent to which Lee's decisions at Gettysburg were affected by his significant health issues. Those were serious enough that they were prominent in his August 8, 1863 resignation letter to Davis. They could have had a negative impact on his judgment, etc.
 
Another thing we don't (and cannot) know is the extent to which Lee's decisions at Gettysburg were affected by his significant health issues. Those were serious enough that they were prominent in his August 8, 1863 resignation letter to Davis. They could have had a negative impact on his judgment, etc.

I wonder perhaps if his health/physical condition/exhaustion is an explanation why Gen. Lee stayed with Hill's Corps, etc. while Longstreet prepared and launched the attack; consequently unaware it was commenced without the artillery support he expected would make it succeed. However he does not explain why he did not oversee Longstreet on the occasion. It might just as easily been a trust that his orders would be obeyed.
Marshall, of Lee's staff, later noted:
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Longstreet's official report explains this error in judgement on his part (acting on a "feeling"). Had General Lee been notified of this fact before the charge, AND ALLOWED IT TO PROCEED AS DELIVERED then I would agree Lee's judgement was questionable.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
 
The problem with Walter Taylor's account written in the 1870s was that he was attempting to deflect criticism from Lee and shifting any blame elsewhere. His later statements have little relation to what was actually planned for July 3. There seems to have been little effort spent on what might be called follow-up assault waves beyond some VERY vague notions. For example, Anderson was ordered to support Pickett's right flank but given no real instruction as to what that support was supposed to look like (how much of his division to use, how far to advance in support, etc.) and Rodes was told to look for a breakthrough and support it but was never given an idea of what a breakthrough would look like and where his troops should be directed, not to mention that he only had 3 of his 5 brigades in the vicinity. Neither McLaws nor Law were in any kind of position and condition to advance without leaving the army's flank undefended.

In my opinion, the whole plan has the appearance of a hail-mary, ad hoc attempt with a decent chance of success if everything went right but that not enough thought was given to how the attack was going to succeed beyond break the Union line and hope that the AotP collapsed.

Ryan
Very solid points. Officer's reports written immediately or shortly after the battle tend to hold more weight than reports written years after. You bring up a good example regarding Walter Tayor's account. After the war, Taylor became part of the Anti-Longstreet faction. Taylor was faithful to his former commander and assisted Early, Pendleton and the others in putting the blame onto Longstreet.
 
Very solid points. Officer's reports written immediately or shortly after the battle tend to hold more weight than reports written years after. You bring up a good example regarding Walter Tayor's account. After the war, Taylor became part of the Anti-Longstreet faction. Taylor was faithful to his former commander and assisted Early, Pendleton and the others in putting the blame onto Longstreet.
Taylor and Longstreet certainly disagreed in their post-war accounts, particularly regarding the opinions on whether the attack as planned by Lee would have succeeded (Taylor yes/Longstreet maybe). Also if Lee's planned attack could have been delivered: Longstreet says no, and Taylor says maybe. But that attack was not delivered, so it is all speculation.

General Lee reported he was not aware of the conditions making the actual attack faulty (and by inference that others may have been remiss in not informing him in time). Longstreet reported (1863) that he made that attack because he "felt" he had to. Later he admits in hindsight his assignment to command of the attack was an error on Gen. Lee's part (from "Manassas to Appomattox" (1896):

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He says "no reason for putting the assaulting forces under my charge;" but earlier in his text he confirms that Lee expected the whole of the 1st Corps to spearhead the attack. He was the first corps commander, so Lee's idea seems evident. Where he says Lee should have put the plan of attack in charge of an officer with "more confidence" I suspect he is referring to Lee himself. Lee admitted in his report he should have been more involved/aware of the circumstances before the charge was attempted.

So to the charge that was delivered without the necessary artillery support.

In his official report (1863) Longstreet claims he allowed this faulty attack to proceed because he "felt" he was personally not "priviledged" to stop it, not because of orders, and in spite of his orders. He words this circumstance differently in his 1896 memoir, where he states that "feeling" manifested as a "hope" of carrying out Lee's "imperative" orders:

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Did Lee really "have his heart set" on the planned attack? Reminds; "The heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil." (Ecclesiastes 8:11).

General Lee did not report he planned the attack based on anything but his professional military knowledge and authority, and no one has any evidence to the contrary. Lee's plans were for no such attack as was made, he claimed he was unaware of it, and Longstreet (1896) still does not claim otherwise, but admits it was based on his hope of fulfilling Lee's "imperative" orders. That must have been a scanty hope, given he already knew the "necessary" artillery support was running out of ammo by the time the infantry moved.

What is a positive or an imperative order? From Webster's dictionary, 1828, "positive" is:

"Properly, set; laid down; expressed; direct; explicit; opposed to implied; as, he told us in positive words; we have his positive declaration to the fact; the testimony is positive. 2. Absolute; express; not admitting any condition or discretion. The commands of the admiral [or a general] are positive."

So Lee's "IMPERATIVE" orders were;

"Commanding; expressive of command; containing positive command, as distinguished from advisory, or discretionary. The orders are imperative."

Note that in Longstreet's 1890s statement he had GIVEN UP on fulfilling the imperative orders of Lee, when he developed instead an "unexpected hope" and launched the attack without artillery support. No contradiction to Lee's official report. Lee's imperative orders could not be carried out contrary to their own means. Longstreets feelings/hope were only valid so far as they conformed to the imperative orders; but they moved the troops without the planned and "necessary" artillery support ordered.

Here is where Longstreet (1896) describes the attack as delivered (based on his "feeling" (1863), and on "hope" (1896);
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So the infantry WAS properly "supported" by the suppression of enemy artillery fire, for a very brief period. Then the "smoke lifted..." Why did it lift? Because per the reports of Lee, Longstreet, etc. the Confederate guns were out of ammunition to support the infantry. What happened then? The infantry attack, so far as launched, failed because it came under enemy artillery fire as soon as it "appeared. "Longstreet confirms "every" enemy gun then pummelled them.

Gen. Longstreet states in his memoir he was not supported in the attack by Hill's infantry, and Lee and A.P. Hill "failed to order help." Accurate enough. But why would Lee or Hill "order help" to an officer charged with the authority to employ up to 2/3rds of the army in the assault? Even seeing the limited attack delivered, why would they have reinforced a faulty movement? Longstreet himself did not do so. He ordered Anderson's Division (of Hill's corps) to advance, but Stopped it himself, to prevent compounding the error of the attack without artillery support. He does admit withholding Hood and McLaws' divisions, of his corps, from supporting the attack. Longstreet withheld at least 1/3rd of Lee's army (by his own accounts) from supporting Pickett. Lee did not criticize him for this, and Longstreet was no doubt correct in doing so; because the attack as delivered was doomed to fail, being a faulty one made based on Longstreet's feelings/hopes rather than his orders; and Lee's lack of awareness in the prevailing conditions.

I am not attempting to promote any "anti-Longstreet" agenda. I believe what he says. More, I am of the opinion that his self-admitted error with Pickett's charge was a learning lesson that honed his skills of converting imperative orders into unstoppable combined arms action to the razor's edge. This manifested in his actions to carry the Horseshoe Ridge at Chickamauga a few months after. (Williams' artillery battalion, etc., fired heavily in support of the attacking infantry).

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL
 
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Longstreet’s delay on day two was the result of bad intelligence and faulty scouting beyond his control yet it was still one of the most devastating attacks of the war. With two divisions he mauled a large part of the Union Army that performed well. Where was Hill?

Longstreet being against the assault on day three only makes him smart. That he, Alexander, and the others tried their best is a testament to their commitment to Lee. Again, where was Hill?
I think Longstreet's performance on Day 2 has become overshadowed by Pickett's Charge. Cadmus Wilcox, a postwar critic of Longstreet said:

"In the fight that ensued, General Longstreet was vastly outnumbered, and yet he made his way over all obstacles of ground and superiority of numbers, and pushed back the heavy masses that confronted him."
 
I think Longstreet's performance on Day 2 has become overshadowed by Pickett's Charge. Cadmus Wilcox, a postwar critic of Longstreet said:

"In the fight that ensued, General Longstreet was vastly outnumbered, and yet he made his way over all obstacles of ground and superiority of numbers, and pushed back the heavy masses that confronted him."
Yes! Not enough appreciation there would have been none of the drama of the 3d day without Longstreet's incredible success late on the 2d. Lee states as much in one of his reports. He wanted to see where a continuation of that attack could go:

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J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
 
I think Longstreet's performance on Day 2 has become overshadowed by Pickett's Charge. Cadmus Wilcox, a postwar critic of Longstreet said:

"In the fight that ensued, General Longstreet was vastly outnumbered, and yet he made his way over all obstacles of ground and superiority of numbers, and pushed back the heavy masses that confronted him."
I agree. As I've posted elsewhere, for all the spin that Stonewall gets and for all the stereotyping Longstreet has gotten from Shaara, Maxwell, etc - colored by the Lost Cause crowd's attempts to defame him - Longstreet's attacks at Chinn Ridge, Gettysburg Day 2, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness were models of how to prepare and execute an attack in the Civil War. The fact that two of them did not succeed had nothing to do with Old Pete's performance. And I think Wilcox significantly exaggerated regarding the opposition but that doesn't take away from what was done.
 
I agree. As I've posted elsewhere, for all the spin that Stonewall gets and for all the stereotyping Longstreet has gotten from Shaara, Maxwell, etc - colored by the Lost Cause crowd's attempts to defame him - Longstreet's attacks at Chinn Ridge, Gettysburg Day 2, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness were models of how to prepare and execute an attack in the Civil War. The fact that two of them did not succeed had nothing to do with Old Pete's performance. And I think Wilcox significantly exaggerated regarding the opposition but that doesn't take away from what was done.
My tour guide at Chickamauga told us in the tour of the Battlefield Longstreet’s men had found the weak spot int the Union ranks and formed up waiting for the order to charge. Of course Longstreet gets credit for it even though he was late getting to the field.
 
My tour guide at Chickamauga told us in the tour of the Battlefield Longstreet’s men had found the weak spot int the Union ranks and formed up waiting for the order to charge. Of course Longstreet gets credit for it even though he was late getting to the field.
That may be the case, but after that breakthrough he subsequently applied Bragg's imperative orders in assaulting the Horseshoe ridge near the Snodgrass House (Longstreet commanding the left wing of Bragg's army for the purpose). One of the largest infantry attacks of the war was subsequently launched against the 1,000 yard long or so ridge by Longstreet's forces, maybe 14,000 to 20,000 plus men versus the ridge held by Granger's reserve corps, Brannan's and Wood's divisions, etc. supported by artillery, etc. under Thomas from 2 to 6 P.M. or so. This attack was supported by Williams' artillery battalion to the right turning the federal rear into a shooting gallery, and Everett's and Dent's batteries on the left striking continuously at Granger's line as the infantry pressed the attack to its successful conclusion.

After touring the ridge in the aftermath of dislodging Thomas, with Gen. Preston, it was said that Longstreet commented men that could take that ridge could take any ground... and of course he commanded them.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
 
My tour guide at Chickamauga told us in the tour of the Battlefield Longstreet’s men had found the weak spot int the Union ranks and formed up waiting for the order to charge. Of course Longstreet gets credit for it even though he was late getting to the field.
That he did. And there is no question that Tom Wood pulling his division out of line under Rosecrans's orders was "good timing" for the attack. But Longstreet competently orchestrated four large tactical attacks during the war. That's a pretty solid track record.
 
That may be the case, but after that breakthrough he subsequently applied Bragg's imperative orders in assaulting the Horseshoe ridge near the Snodgrass House (Longstreet commanding the left wing of Bragg's army for the purpose). One of the largest infantry attacks of the war was subsequently launched against the 1,000 yard long or so ridge by Longstreet's forces, maybe 14,000 to 20,000 plus men versus the ridge held by Granger's reserve corps, Brannan's and Wood's divisions, etc. supported by artillery, etc. under Thomas from 2 to 6 P.M. or so. This attack was supported by Williams' artillery battalion to the right turning the federal rear into a shooting gallery, and Everett's and Dent's batteries on the left striking continuously at Granger's line as the infantry pressed the attack to its successful conclusion.

After touring the ridge in the aftermath of dislodging Thomas, with Gen. Preston, it was said that Longstreet commented men that could take that ridge could take any ground... and of course he commanded them.

J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
Well I would say he earned his credits. 😉
 
I agree. As I've posted elsewhere, for all the spin that Stonewall gets and for all the stereotyping Longstreet has gotten from Shaara, Maxwell, etc - colored by the Lost Cause crowd's attempts to defame him - Longstreet's attacks at Chinn Ridge, Gettysburg Day 2, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness were models of how to prepare and execute an attack in the Civil War. The fact that two of them did not succeed had nothing to do with Old Pete's performance. And I think Wilcox significantly exaggerated regarding the opposition but that doesn't take away from what was done.
I think many think of Stonewall as the offensive general and Longstreet as a "defensive" general. But the attacks you've mentioned above, whether successful or not, were nonetheless devastating.
 
If Lee had sent 30,000 men across that field, would the charge have been successful?

Let's put aside all the what ifs, let's put aside all other battles, let's put aside all talk about artillery, and let's put aside everything official and unofficial written about the battle. Let's deal strictly with the above question and I think many forum members have been distracted from it.

While well read, I am not a Gettysburg scholar and there are forums members who know more about the battle then I ever will. I have read through this thread several times and hoped there would be more posts from combat veterans with infantry experience.

An assault force of 30,000 Confederates would have still failed.

Why?

-The Confederates couldn't have gotten across the field fast enough.
-Poor assessment of how affective the artillery barrage was.
-Poor intelligence on the Union Army's capabilities.
-Telegraphing one's intent with a pre assault artillery barrage.
-Going straight down the middle without the option of being able to maneuver.
-Upon reaching the Union center, there would have been loss of momentum, loss of unit integrity, loss of command structure and insufficient reserves to exploit the breach.
-The assault force were light infantry, not heavy infantry.

Sometimes fortune favors the bold as with the Australian Light Horse at Beersheba in October 1917, but that was a mounted charge.

The assault force was made up of combat veterans and some ****** their pants waiting to go in. Others knew it would be a lesson in futility and yet still made that charge because that's what soldiers do.

The ANV should thank their lucky stars that the Union Army didn't officially adopt a breech-loading rifle as the standard infantry weapon.

15,000 men, 30,000 men, the result would have still been the same, a waste of fine infantry. The casualty figures would have been staggering.

My experience and training is from a different era. I don't have the mind set of a Civil War officer. It was my responsibility to bring safely home as many of my men as possible. With that being said, some things don't change, and the infantryman has to go in with what he's got and get on with the dirty job of soldiering.

Just a few random thoughts.

***Note: While today's soldiers are better trained and equipped, some lack the mettle of what it took to be a Civil War soldier.
 
I think many think of Stonewall as the offensive general and Longstreet as a "defensive" general. But the attacks you've mentioned above, whether successful or not, were nonetheless devastating.
I actually think of Jackson as solid in operational maneuver but a mediocre tactician regardless of offense/defense. He consistently used inefficient or poor tactics, with very few exceptions. Longstreet was, in my opinion, a superior tactician on a consistent basis. Where Jackson was superior was in independent operations. That was not Pete's strong suit.l
 
If Lee had sent 30,000 men across that field, would the charge have been successful?

Let's put aside all the what ifs, let's put aside all other battles, let's put aside all talk about artillery, and let's put aside everything official and unofficial written about the battle. Let's deal strictly with the above question and I think many forum members have been distracted from it.

While well read, I am not a Gettysburg scholar and there are forums members who know more about the battle then I ever will. I have read through this thread several times and hoped there would be more posts from combat veterans with infantry experience.

An assault force of 30,000 Confederates would have still failed.

Why?

-The Confederates couldn't have gotten across the field fast enough.
-Poor assessment of how affective the artillery barrage was.
-Poor intelligence on the Union Army's capabilities.
-Telegraphing one's intent with a pre assault artillery barrage.
-Going straight down the middle without the option of being able to maneuver.
-Upon reaching the Union center, there would have been loss of momentum, loss of unit integrity, loss of command structure and insufficient reserves to exploit the breach.
-The assault force were light infantry, not heavy infantry.

Sometimes fortune favors the bold as with the Australian Light Horse at Beersheba in October 1917, but that was a mounted charge.

The assault force was made up of combat veterans and some ****** their pants waiting to go in. Others knew it would be a lesson in futility and yet still made that charge because that's what soldiers do.

The ANV should thank their lucky stars that the Union Army didn't officially adopt a breech-loading rifle as the standard infantry weapon.

15,000 men, 30,000 men, the result would have still been the same, a waste of fine infantry. The casualty figures would have been staggering.

My experience and training is from a different era. I don't have the mind set of a Civil War officer. It was my responsibility to bring safely home as many of my men as possible. With that being said, some things don't change, and the infantryman has to go in with what he's got and get on with the dirty job of soldiering.

Just a few random thoughts.

***Note: While today's soldiers are better trained and equipped, some lack the mettle of what it took to be a Civil War soldier.
I agree that 30k probably wouldn't have made much difference. Just walking that distance while the union was in good defensive position was enough to doom it, purely opinion though. I would add though, if the Confederate Cavalry had been able to get into the rear, it might have been enough to swing the tide.
 
When you think of other Confederate victories... for the most part (and I emphasize that lightly), whether it be the team of Lee, Longstreet and Jackson, they were firing on all cylinders. But Gettysburg was a misfire in more ways than one. If you add another 15k men to Pickett's Charge... you still have so many factors that go against the Confederates. It starts with Stuart. Then there's the actions or lack thereof, regarding A.P Hill and Ewell on day two. The poor reconnaissance, the artillery support and lack of ammunition. Lee's overall performnace. The marvelous defensive position of the Union Army and their ability to use interior lines, while the Confederates were spread out and in the open. One has to wonder if adding 15k more men... just makes for a more devastating defeat.
 
When you think of other Confederate victories... for the most part (and I emphasize that lightly), whether it be the team of Lee, Longstreet and Jackson, they were firing on all cylinders. But Gettysburg was a misfire in more ways than one. If you add another 15k men to Pickett's Charge... you still have so many factors that go against the Confederates. It starts with Stuart. Then there's the actions or lack thereof, regarding A.P Hill and Ewell on day two. The poor reconnaissance, the artillery support and lack of ammunition. Lee's overall performnace. The marvelous defensive position of the Union Army and their ability to use interior lines, while the Confederates were spread out and in the open. One has to wonder if adding 15k more men... just makes for a more devastating defeat.
Good point. I would note that your "light" emphasis is appropriate. For example, on August 30, 1862 Longstreet's crushing assault on Chinn Ridge - devastating as it was - might have been even more so had Jackson properly followed up. As John Hennessy, among others, has noted, he didn't.
 
Good point. I would note that your "light" emphasis is appropriate. For example, on August 30, 1862 Longstreet's crushing assault on Chinn Ridge - devastating as it was - might have been even more so had Jackson properly followed up. As John Hennessy, among others, has noted, he didn't.
He couldn’t. I would think those guys fighting by throwing rocks would explain it.
 
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