Very solid points. Officer's reports written immediately or shortly after the battle tend to hold more weight than reports written years after. You bring up a good example regarding Walter Tayor's account. After the war, Taylor became part of the Anti-Longstreet faction. Taylor was faithful to his former commander and assisted Early, Pendleton and the others in putting the blame onto Longstreet.
Taylor and Longstreet certainly disagreed in their post-war accounts, particularly regarding the opinions on whether the attack as planned by Lee would have succeeded (Taylor yes/Longstreet maybe). Also if Lee's planned attack could have been delivered: Longstreet says no, and Taylor says maybe. But that attack was not delivered, so it is all speculation.
General Lee reported he was not aware of the conditions making the actual attack faulty (and by inference that others may have been remiss in not informing him in time). Longstreet reported (1863) that he made that attack because he "felt" he had to. Later he admits in hindsight his assignment to command of the attack was an error on Gen. Lee's part (from "Manassas to Appomattox" (1896):
He says "no reason for putting the assaulting forces under my charge;" but earlier in his text he confirms that Lee expected the whole of the 1st Corps to spearhead the attack. He was the first corps commander, so Lee's idea seems evident. Where he says Lee should have put the plan of attack in charge of an officer with "more confidence" I suspect he is referring to Lee himself. Lee admitted in his report he should have been more involved/aware of the circumstances before the charge was attempted.
So to the charge that was delivered without the necessary artillery support.
In his official report (1863) Longstreet claims he allowed this faulty attack to proceed because he "felt" he was personally not "priviledged" to stop it, not because of
orders, and in spite of his orders. He words this circumstance differently in his 1896 memoir, where he states that "feeling" manifested as a "hope" of carrying out Lee's "imperative" orders:
Did Lee really "have his heart set" on the planned attack? Reminds; "The heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil." (Ecclesiastes 8:11).
General Lee did not report he planned the attack based on anything but his professional military knowledge and authority, and no one has any evidence to the contrary. Lee's plans were for no such attack as was made, he claimed he was unaware of it, and Longstreet (1896) still does not claim otherwise, but admits it was based on
his hope of fulfilling Lee's "imperative" orders. That must have been a scanty hope, given he already knew the "necessary" artillery support was running out of ammo by the time the infantry moved.
What is a positive or an imperative order? From Webster's dictionary, 1828, "positive" is:
"Properly, set; laid down; expressed; direct; explicit; opposed to implied; as, he told us in positive words; we have his positive declaration to the fact; the testimony is positive. 2. Absolute; express; not admitting any condition or discretion. The commands of the admiral [or a general] are positive."
So Lee's "IMPERATIVE" orders were;
"Commanding; expressive of command; containing positive command, as distinguished from advisory, or discretionary. The orders are imperative."
Note that in Longstreet's 1890s statement he had GIVEN UP on fulfilling the
imperative orders of Lee, when he developed instead an "
unexpected hope" and launched the attack without artillery support. No contradiction to Lee's official report. Lee's imperative orders could not be carried out
contrary to their own means. Longstreets feelings/hope were only valid so far as they conformed to the imperative orders; but they moved the troops without the planned and "necessary" artillery support ordered.
Here is where Longstreet (1896) describes the attack as delivered (based on his "feeling" (1863), and on "hope" (1896);
So the infantry WAS properly "supported" by the suppression of enemy artillery fire, for a very brief period. Then the "smoke lifted..." Why did it lift? Because per the reports of Lee, Longstreet, etc. the Confederate guns
were out of ammunition to support the infantry. What happened then? The infantry attack, so far as launched, failed because it came under enemy artillery fire as soon as it "appeared. "Longstreet confirms "every" enemy gun then pummelled them.
Gen. Longstreet states in his memoir he was not supported in the attack by Hill's infantry, and Lee and A.P. Hill "failed to order help." Accurate enough. But why would Lee or Hill "order help" to an officer charged with the authority to employ up to 2/3rds of the army in the assault? Even seeing the limited attack delivered, why would they have reinforced a faulty movement? Longstreet himself did not do so. He ordered Anderson's Division (of Hill's corps) to advance, but Stopped it himself, to prevent compounding the error of the attack without artillery support. He does admit withholding Hood and McLaws' divisions, of his corps, from supporting the attack. Longstreet withheld at least 1/3rd of Lee's army (by his own accounts) from supporting Pickett. Lee did not criticize him for this, and Longstreet was no doubt correct in doing so; because the attack as delivered was doomed to fail, being a faulty one made based on Longstreet's feelings/hopes rather than his orders; and Lee's lack of awareness in the prevailing conditions.
I am not attempting to promote any "anti-Longstreet" agenda. I believe what he says. More, I am of the opinion that his self-admitted error with Pickett's charge was a learning lesson that honed his skills of converting imperative orders into unstoppable combined arms action to the razor's edge. This manifested in his actions to carry the Horseshoe Ridge at Chickamauga a few months after. (Williams' artillery battalion, etc., fired heavily in support of the attacking infantry).
J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL