Longstreet at Vicksburg?

OldReliable1862

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In early 1863, it was suggested in discussion in Richmond that Lee send Longstreet with Pickett's and Hood's divisions west to aid Pemberton, but Lee objected. He (somewhat understandably) cited the use that Pemberton would make of his troops.

But let's say Lee sends (with great reluctance) Longstreet with the divisions of Pickett and Hood to Mississippi, rather than southern Virginia. Longstreet ranks Pemberton, so he will be in command of his force at least, and Davis could give him authority over Pemberton. If Chancellorsville is any indication, Lee didn't seem to be too hindered by the loss of men. My first instinct was that Grant could simply receive more reinforcements, and that the Confederates have no good options anyway you slice it, but I wanted to get others' opinions. Also, while I like Pete as much as the next guy, as I and others have pointed out, his performance in independent command was unspectacular.
 
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The following is what Longstreet himself had to say on the matter in his From Manassas To Appomattox: This starts on page 326, when Longstreet is en route from Suffolk back to Lee at Fredericksburg:

As soon as the trains were safely back, we drew off, marched back to the Blackwater, and thence en route for Richmond and Fredericksburg. Before we reached the former place a telegram came announcing the great battle and victory of Chancellorsville.​
Passing through Richmond, I called to report to Secretary of War Seddon, who referred to affairs in Mississippi, stating that the department was trying to collect an army at Jackson, under General Joseph E. Johnston, sufficient to push Grant away from his circling lines about Vicksburg. He spoke of the difficulty of feeding as well as collecting an army of that magnitude in Mississippi, and asked my views.​
The Union army under General Rosecrans was then facing the Confederate army under General Bragg in Tennessee, at Murfreesboro and Shelbyville.​
I thought that General Grant had better facilities for collecting supplies and reinforcements on his new lines, and suggested that the only prospect of relieving Vicksburg that occurred to me was to send General Johnston and his troops about Jackson to reinforce General Bragg's army; at the same time the two divisions of my command, then marching to join General Lee, to the same point ; that the commands moving on converging lines could have rapid transit and be thrown in overwhelming numbers on Rosecrans before he could have help, break up his army, and march for Cincinnati and the Ohio River ; that Grant's was the only army that could be drawn to meet this move, and that the move must, therefore, relieve Vicksburg.​
It was manifest before the war was accepted that the only way to equalize the contest was by skilful use of our interior lines, and this was so impressed by two years experience that it seemed time to force it upon the Richmond authorities. But foreign intervention was the ruling idea with the President, and he preferred that as the easiest solution of all problems.​
The only objection offered by the Secretary was that Grant was such an obstinate fellow that he could only be induced to quit Vicksburg by terribly hard knocks. On the contrary, I claimed that he was a soldier, and would obey the calls of his government, but was not lightly to be driven from his purpose.​
My march was continued, and we joined General Lee at Fredericksburg, where I found him in sadness, not withstanding that he was contemplating his great achievement and brilliant victory of Chancellorsville, for he had met with great loss as well as great gains. The battle had cost heavily of his army, but his grief was over the severe wounding of his great lieutenant, General Thomas Jonathan Jackson, the head of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia ; cut off, too, at a moment so much needed to finish his work in the battle so handsomely begun. With a brave heart, however, General Lee was getting his ranks together, and putting them in condition for other useful work.​
...​
After reporting to General Lee, I offered the suggestions made to Secretary Seddon, in regard to the means that should be adopted for the relief of Vicksburg. I thought that honor, interest, duty, and humanity called us to that service, and asked the aid of his counsels with the War Department, and reinforcements from his army for the West, to that end. I suggested that General Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army against General Grant, should be sent to reinforce General Bragg, then standing against the Union forces under General Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee ; that at the same time he should send my divisions, just up from Suffolk, to join Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's army ; that the combination once made should strike immediately in over whelming force upon Rosecrans, and march for the Ohio River and Cincinnati.​
He recognized the suggestion as of good combination, and giving strong assurance of success, but he was averse to having a part of his army so far beyond his reach. He reflected over the matter one or two days, and then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and so threatening Washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result. To that end he bent his energies.​
His plan or wishes announced, it became useless and improper to offer suggestions leading to a different course. All that I could ask was that the policy of the campaign should be one of defensive tactics ; that we should work so as to force the enemy to attack us, in such good position as we might find in his own country, so well adapted to that purpose, which might assure us of a grand triumph. To this he readily assented as an important and material adjunct to his general plan. His confidence in making moves threatening Washington and the invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania grew out of the known anxiety of the Washington authorities as to the safety of their capital and of quiet within the Union lines.​
 
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I suggested that General Johnston, instead of trying to collect an army against General Grant, should be sent to reinforce General Bragg, then standing against the Union forces under General Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee ; that at the same time he should send my divisions, just up from Suffolk, to join Johnston's reinforcements to Bragg's army ; that the combination once made should strike immediately in over whelming force upon Rosecrans, and march for the Ohio River and Cincinnati.
Might just have worked if indeed Rosecrans could have been decisively defeated with the reinforcements...
 
Might just have worked if indeed Rosecrans could have been decisively defeated with the reinforcements...

I suppose it might, but I would not have much faith in it. This was a constant idea with Confederate strategists throughout the war, essentially a turning movement on the Union in Middle Tennessee/Kentucky with a drive to the Ohio River forcing the Union to abandon their gains in the Mississippi Valley. Why there? Because it is essentially the area where the Union forces are most exposed, allowing Union advantages in naval power and RR support to be minimized or negated.

The first example of the idea is embodied in Bragg's Invasion of Kentucky in 1862. After initial success, it falls apart. IMHO, that is largely because of Confederate leadership issues (Bragg/E. Kirby Smith/Polk/Hardee/Price/Van Dorn and probably Jeff Davis) and inadequate resources, but it was still a general success in regaining much of Middle TN and saving Chattanooga for a year or so. Beauregard would offer at least one version of this idea as the war went along, as would Longstreet after Gettysburg and again in early 1864. Hood is trying to do the same thing late in 1864 (smash Thomas in Middle TN, then race to the banks of the Ohio, cross the Appalachians and join Lee for a Ragnarok type of struggle in Virginia against Grant). As the war went on, Confederate visions of this strategy tended to lose touch with real capabilities.

Longstreet in May 1863 is essentially looking for a better version of the 1862 Bragg Invasion of Kentucky, with Joe Johnston in overall command over Bragg and Longstreet and whoever else they can come up with. Longstreet was also closely associated with Joe Johnston before Lee took command in Virginia, so it is in some extent leaving Lee for a previous leader where Longstreet might expect a bigger voice.

Longstreet's plan here seems a bit over-optimistic. He is in Richmond talking to the Secretary of War after Lee wins at Chancellorsville, so that would be about May 7. That would put it after Richmond knew of the Battle of Port Gibson (May 1), but before Grant's victories at Raymond (May 12), Jackson (May 14), Champions Hill (May 16) and Big Black River Bridge (May 17). Even if Longstreet convinced Lee to endorse this plan after he got to Fredericksburg and the movement to Tennessee started immediately (say May 12), it would probably be at least May 25 before Longstreet could be joining Bragg in Middle TN.

Real life: it took 16 days for Longstreet's 2 divisions and Alexander's artillery to all get to Bragg's army outside Chattanooga. In May, they could have used the shorter route through Knoxville to Chattanooga, then gone west to join Bragg from there. Even then, Longstreet was without his organic transport (wagons, animals and teamsters), so they would have extreme logistics problems and be dependent on Bragg for transport and supplies.

So what is really being talked about is Bragg plus Longstreet (2 divisions+artillery) and whatever Johnston can bring from Jackson. The more he takes from Jackson, the less Grant has to worry about. By the end of the siege, Grant had about 103,000 troops (Vicksburg-Memphis) with Hurlbut commanding XVI Corps up at Memphis. Hurlbut wasn't much (he resigned July 7) and was replaced by Steele, who was much better. My guess is Steele gets promoted earlier if this Confederate movement happens, or maybe Sherman comes upriver from Vicksburg.

In any case, there will be troops available to send to Middle TN from Grant if there is no threat coming from Jackson to relieve Vicksburg. Probably with someone like Steele or Sherman leading them. Burnside is marshaling troops up near Cincinnati for the move he will soon make on Knoxville, so there will be another source of Union reinforcements there, available to move by RR and water to Nashville. As a result, it would be logical to think Rosecrans might get 10-20,000 reinforcements by the time Joe Johnston/Bragg/Longstreet can move against him in June.

Rosecrans was not an easy mark. He'd fight, and he had a strongly fortified Nashville to fall back on. While this thrust in Middle TN is a logical option for the Confederacy to try, pulling it off might require a lot more planning and logistical support than I see in the idea presented.
 
If Longstreet's plan is enacted, and a thrust through middle Tennessee is the order of the day, Lee would have to remain on the defensive in Virginia (honestly, not a bad option) while Longstreet, Bragg and Johnston all hammer out an agreement for a line of attack. While blunting Rosecran's historic Tullahoma Campaign would be a big break for the Confederacy, they would have to sincerely worry Lincoln for him to order Grant away from Vicksburg.

Say the campaign gets into full swing by late may early June, if the target is not Nashville, but instead a thrust into Kentucky, this will doubtlessly move Rosecrans army out of position, but can we be certain it would move Grant? Frankfort and portions of West Kentucky would as this combined army would have, what, 70,000 men under arms? If, if, it can be supplied and make progress it could certainly unsettle Washington, and would reduce the numbers available to besiege Vicksburg (shrinking it by a division maybe and offering slight relief) while the two sides duke it out in Kentucky.

However, even moving Rosecrans out of position and delaying Tullahoma, its a long shot for Vicksburg not to fall at this point. Portions of Kentucky might end up in Confederate hands again briefly in 1863, delaying the campaigns in Tennessee and Georgia till 1864, but Grant would be rampaging up the Mississippi unopposed and so some portion of this army would have to fall back.

Only if a decisive Chickamauga type victory can be inflicted on Rosecrans sometime in June 1863 would there be any benefit to this. You'd need him to lose a division and go streaming back to Nashville and then be under Confederate siege. That would cause enough panic in Washington to move Grant I think.
 
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