You're right
@redbob and since the discussion of Knoxville in that previous thread kind of got lost in the shuffle and mixed in with stuff about Suffolk and Chancellorsville, I decided to repost it here, since this thread is entitled "Longstreet & the Knoxville Campaign" - just so anyone interested doesn't have to wade through to find it. So here goes...
The Assault on Fort Sanders
Speaking strictly of the Assault on Fort Sanders (and not of the entire Knoxville/East TN campaign) I believe that Longstreet had a "dangerous confidence" -- ironically, something he accused Lee of in this 1893 interview
https://civilwartalk.com/threads/interview-longstreet-says-lee-had-a-dangerous-confidence.151641/
Before you rebut, let me explain. When Confederates controlled Knoxville, they had initiated construction of the earthworks they called "Fort Loudon." The CS Army left Knoxville and Burnside occupied it Sept 3, 1863. The fortification was later renamed "Fort Sanders" in honor of Col. William Price Sanders (5th KY US; born in KY; raised in MS; Sanders was mortally wounded November 18, 1863 by a bullet fired by a Confederate sharpshooter from the tower of the Bleak House.) This was 11 days prior to the CS assault on the fortifications at Knoxville, known as the Battle of Fort Sanders. Fort Loudon was renamed in his honor.
On November 24, a detail of 169 men from the 2nd Michigan made an attack on the Confederate rifle pit west of the fort. About 50-60 of the 2nd MI were killed and a number captured. Afterwards, a flag of truce was observed to retrieve the wounded. So L likely knew the approximate size of Burnside's garrison force (375 +/- infantry 2nd MI, 20th MI, 29th MA, 79th NY; 120+/- artillery Roemer's, Benjamin's, & Buckley's; about 500+/- TOTAL)
L lacked a large enough force to make an effective assault along the entire length of the fortifications, but certainly had a much larger force (than the garrison force.) The siege had been mostly successful in preventing supplies from reaching Burnside inside the Fort. From the prisoners, L also knew that Burnside had been without provisions for days. Danville Leadbetter, Bragg's engineer, had been sent to Knoxville. He claimed to know about the construct of Fort Loudon (now Fort Sanders.)
On Nov 27th, while scouting, L watched through field glasses as a Union picket walked out to the line. Longstreet commented that the ditch struck him about the waist, so he presumed it was shallow. Through the field glasses and across the distance, L could not see the plank the man walked on, stretched over the deep ditch. Based on the estimated strength of Burnside's force, the mile of open ground in front, and his reconnaissance, L eventually determined that the NW bastion was the best place to attack Fort Sanders.
Humphrey's Mississippians and Wofford's Georgians were selected as the brigades to make the assault, supported by Bryan's brigade. Morale was high in these brigades; their last major engagement had been at Gettysburg, where they met with some success in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield on July 2, 1863. Because of the superiority of his own force, the small size of Burnside's garrison force, the speed with which he intended the assault to occur, and the morale, courage, and devotion of the men in the selected brigades,
I honestly don't think L or McLaws thought there was any way they would fail. Will be interested to read the opinions of others in response to this theory.
...Not a cannon of the enemy had been fired from midnight up to this moment. When the command was given to charge, we rushed across the railroad up the hill, giving the rebel yell. Now the battle is on and up the hill we go, over brush and tree laps – for all the timber had been cut and felled down the hill, amidst shot and shell, grapes and canister. We have now reached the ditch at the foot of the fort. This was five feet deep and six feet wide, and along the edge the enemy had stretched telegraph wires to trip us and throw us in the ditch. We went up to it and saw that it was full of our men and that the enemy were throwing ten-second shells into the ditch killing the men who were in there. Now the top of this fort was about 15 feet above the bottom of the ditch, and the wall of the fort was covered with a sheet of ice, water having been thrown on it the previous night to freeze, that we might not be able to scale it. Finding that we were unable to take the fort, for everything was in such great confusion that we would not hear a single command for the roar of musketry and cannon, as the cannons in the fort were belching their contents of death through the port holes, mowing down our men, as we fell back leaving a number of dead and dying on the field.... ~Pvt. James W Lord (C/18GA) Wofford's Brigade
...The path in which the brigade charged over was obstructed by every impediment that could be thought of, by piles of brush, ditches, and a perfect network of wire, which was fastened to the stumps of trees in front of the fort. But inspite[sic] of all these impediments and a terrible fire both from the right and left as well as the fort, the brigade passed on until it came up to the fort, when the gallant band found that they could do no more. It was impossible for mortal man to get into it. It was surrounded by a ditch eight feet wide and ten feet deep. Our men got in this ditch and tried to climb up the sides, but as I said before, this was impossible. A few gallant men managed to reach the top of the fort, but they were shot dead instantly by the enemy from the inside. After remaining there for the space of fifteen minutes exposed to a most terrible fire, and finding it impossible to scale the fort, the brigade was ordered to fall back to its original position before the charge. Never did men act more gallantly, but the task was too great... ~ Pvt. Andrew Jackson Bell (C/18GA) Wofford's Brigade
....I thought during the fight, & still think, that my men suffered more from the Enemies line of breastworks on the right & left of the Fort, than from the Fort, I mean from the small arms, the greatest loss being from hand grenades. ~ Goode Bryan to Lafayette McLaws, January 16, 1864.
….The assault lasted about 15 minutes, and was one of the most disastrous in its results in the history of the war. The Confederate loss was 129 killed, 458 wounded, and 225 prisoners. Total 813. The Union loss in the fort was seven killed and eight wounded.….~ S. A. Ranlett, Adjutant, 36th Massachusetts