Little Mac, grand strategist

There was a standing force in Richmond. Lee's army and jackson's force. Plus garrisons on the coast. There was more than 115,000 men confederate men in Virginia. There was only forty k in d.c. Pope takes over the valley troops of another fifty k at most. He will make sixty five k with additions from the a.o.p. To be fair I imagine there are still Union troops in the valley here and there. H.F. And Frederick, Md.
 
Thanks for all of the posts and education on McClellan. As I read more about him and different perspectives, I've started to gain more appreciation for his capacities. I've read mostly Catton and Sears, are these guys known one way or the other as having McClellan bias?

Yes, I nice summary of the development of Antietam historiography is here for example.
 
There was a standing force in Richmond. Lee's army and jackson's force. Plus garrisons on the coast. There was more than 115,000 men confederate men in Virginia. There was only forty k in d.c. Pope takes over the valley troops of another fifty k at most. He will make sixty five k with additions from the a.o.p. To be fair I imagine there are still Union troops in the valley here and there. H.F. And Frederick, Md.
The 70K number for Pope is drawn from the June 30 1862 state.

As for the Confederate strength in Virginia, I was counting everything you mentioned except the coast garrisons - I'm pretty sure there weren't any big coast garrisons left in VA.

The fundamental problem with the Union dispositions in June-July 1862 is not total strength in theatre, at least not with who the commander of the AotP was. The fundamental problem with Union dispositions in June-July 1862 is that the force kept back to protect Washington was disproportionate to the potential threat.

Pope's army was larger than it needed to be to defend Washington. The force left around Washington in 1864, meanwhile, was smaller than it needed to be to defend Washington.
There's no reason to believe that 40K or 50K total (as in, garrison force at Washington plus covering force) would be inadequate to keep Washington safe - the amount of Confederate force that would need to be dispatched to overcome a defensive force of 50K troops would be significant enough that taking Richmond would become easy.
 
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There was a standing force in Richmond. Lee's army and jackson's force. Plus garrisons on the coast. There was more than 115,000 men confederate men in Virginia. There was only forty k in d.c. Pope takes over the valley troops of another fifty k at most. He will make sixty five k with additions from the a.o.p. To be fair I imagine there are still Union troops in the valley here and there. H.F. And Frederick, Md.

Harsh in Confederate Tide Rising estimated at the time of 2nd Bull Run the rebels had 96,400 PFD (as the rebels defined it, by inspection) in Virginia, excluding West Va (where two small forces are), and the national forces had 175,400 PFD (as the Federals defined it), excluding WV (and apparently 3,500 men detached).

For the Federals, by formation, modified from Harsh:

Pope's Army of Virginia
Sigel's 1st Corps: 9,700
Banks' 2nd Corps: 8,100
McDowell's 3rd Corps: 18,600
Cavalry: 6,900
Detached garrisons: 3,500 (2,500 under Milroy at Winchester, 1,000 at Front Royal)
= 46,800

Washington Garrison: 27,700
Baltimore and Harper's Ferry: 10,000
Fort Monroe and Norfolk: 9,600
= 47,300

Total defending Washington and approaches= 94,100

McClellan's Army
Pa Res Division: 5,700
2nd Corps: 11,100
3rd Corps: 14,100
4th Corps: 14,300
5th Corps: 12,000
6th Corps: 11,200
= 68,400

Reinforcements from elsewhere
Cox: 5,000 (2 bdes from WV)
Burnside: 11,400
= 16,400

Total: 178,900

Lee had 96,400 divided thus:

Jackson and Ewell's division, plus Stuart's cavalry: 18,200
AP Hill: 10,000
Longstreet and Anderson: 29,800
DH Hill, McLaws etc.: 28,400
Richmond garrison: 10,000

Thus, Lee had enough to overwhelm one of the two field armies, but was dead if they combined and struck him. McClellan and Halleck agreed that the whole force should be concentrated to strike Lee, but disagreed on whether it should be in front of Washington or Richmond.

As it was, Halleck chose Washington, and Lee was able to rapidly strike and overwhelm Pope (39,400 of McClellan's and Burnside's men had joined him, giving him 82,500 in the field). Whilst McClellan's troops were making their movement.
 
imho we are counting total Union vs. Confederate field strength.
So has 67th missed off units, or has he undercounted Confed units he's included?

If I say that someone hasn't got the right strength for the Yorktown line in April I am willing to go down to the level of individual regiments; if I say the Antietam Confederate casualties are incomplete I do the same. Surely if you say that the count of Confederate units in Virginia is incomplete you have an idea of which units are missing.


Of course, there are other Confederates, but most of them are either on the coast or fighting in the West (and thus not remotely available). So, who has 67th missed?
 
Guys, what I am saying is the south was notorious in its iffy troop count. That's all. 67th is only quoting what is going around, ya know Joe Friday way of just the facts. But in the background it's evident that they sandbagged the count.
And I did mention that the north has operations on a broader front. Coastal Virginia, northern Virginia,Virginia valley. South has interior lines of communications. Coupled with knowing the ground natively the South almost equals what the north brings?
 
I'm explicit that this misses what remains of the WV force, and maybe some minor forces. However, I also exclude the 2 brigades of Cox left to garrison WV etc.
 
Guys, what I am saying is the south was notorious in its iffy troop count. That's all. 67th is only quoting what is going around, ya know Joe Friday way of just the facts. But in the background it's evident that they sandbagged the count.
I don't doubt they were iffy in troop counts. But by what basis do you assert that the numbers 67th has provided are incomplete? They're based on Harsh's research which accounts for this Confederate undercounting.

So, is it your assertion that 67th has missed out on units, or that his estimates for the strengths of units he included are low?
 
I think the units can be under strength. With modifiers they are fairly balanced. Comes down to what's done with them I guess.
 
I think the units can be under strength. With modifiers they are fairly balanced. Comes down to what's done with them I guess.
Of course the units are under strength. That's what these estimates are of, actual available strength at the time rather than theoretical strength.

And the fact of the matter is that the Union had a larger force available in the Virginia theatre - Lee concentrated everything he could find for the Seven Days and achieved a small numerical superiority, but at the same time there was a large Union force under Pope up north (along with sundry defenders of Washington).

If the amount of strength under Pope had been reduced, and force shifted south to the Richmond area (which McClellan historically wanted but was unable to order) then the Union force around Richmond would be larger than the Confederate one. This would allow a battle of posts to break through the Richmond defences.
 
Of course the units are under strength. That's what these estimates are of, actual available strength at the time rather than theoretical strength.

And the fact of the matter is that the Union had a larger force available in the Virginia theatre - Lee concentrated everything he could find for the Seven Days and achieved a small numerical superiority, but at the same time there was a large Union force under Pope up north (along with sundry defenders of Washington).

If the amount of strength under Pope had been reduced, and force shifted south to the Richmond area (which McClellan historically wanted but was unable to order) then the Union force around Richmond would be larger than the Confederate one. This would allow a battle of posts to break through the Richmond defences.
My point being a field count is used for one side and total equipped basically is used for the other. And yes the north fielded more men. I agree with that. I must add though the south had mush better lines of communication and intelligence as opposed to the north. The north also fielded more incompetence at high level by default I guess see Pope.
And off topic, I say it's Lincoln's refusal to re~enforce McClellen at Hanover junction that led to the Penesula defeat. Lincoln said he would and did not. anyway...
I agree the south was outnumbered.
 
My point being a field count is used for one side and total equipped basically is used for the other. And yes the north fielded more men. I agree with that. I must add though the south had mush better lines of communication and intelligence as opposed to the north. The north also fielded more incompetence at high level by default I guess see Pope.
And off topic, I say it's Lincoln's refusal to re~enforce McClellen at Hanover junction that led to the Penesula defeat. Lincoln said he would and did not. anyway...
I agree the south was outnumbered.

What is the reason that the Union didn't open up a second front w/ the AoV troops while Mac was slogging it out on the Peninsula? Was there simply not enough time to organize a cohesive army to advance on Richmond?
 
My point being a field count is used for one side and total equipped basically is used for the other.
Normally, yes, but 67th has spent over a decade trying his best to deconflict them.

What is the reason that the Union didn't open up a second front w/ the AoV troops while Mac was slogging it out on the Peninsula? Was there simply not enough time to organize a cohesive army to advance on Richmond?
There was certainly time, but the problem was the high command (Lincoln, Stanton and then Halleck).
May and June:
Lincoln repeatedly promised to have McDowell's big corps march down from the north, but kept diverting it into chasing Jackson. Essentially the entirety of the AoV troops were trying to pin Jackson down and repeatedly failing, despite the fact he was far too small to threaten Washington - Jackson's actions basically tied up a huge chunk of the Union army, and just about everyone involved except Lincoln and Stanton could see it.
July:
This is harder to tell. It seems like Lincoln feared that marching troops down would allow Lee to use interior lines to hit Pope and then return to Richmond, which is a somewhat reasonable fear, but the sensible thing to do is then to send them by sea and reinforce McClellan as much as possible.
August:
Halleck deeply distrusted operations with a divided army and wanted the full striking power of the Union armies in the East in one place, and he wanted it in one place that wasn't on the James river. I'm not sure what his long-term plan to attack Richmond actually was, but he pulled McClellan away from the James without considering the time it would take to actually unify the forces.
We of course know that having the unified force together is no guarantee of being able to force the Rappahanock, historically it took four tries to succesfully get over that river.

And off topic, I say it's Lincoln's refusal to re~enforce McClellen at Hanover junction that led to the Penesula defeat. Lincoln said he would and did not. anyway...
Basically. It's actually very hard to find a period of time in the Peninsula when McClellan isn't being told by the government to expect reinforcements that he ultimately does not get.
 
Normally, yes, but 67th has spent over a decade trying his best to deconflict them.


There was certainly time, but the problem was the high command (Lincoln, Stanton and then Halleck).
May and June:
Lincoln repeatedly promised to have McDowell's big corps march down from the north, but kept diverting it into chasing Jackson. Essentially the entirety of the AoV troops were trying to pin Jackson down and repeatedly failing, despite the fact he was far too small to threaten Washington - Jackson's actions basically tied up a huge chunk of the Union army, and just about everyone involved except Lincoln and Stanton could see it.
July:
This is harder to tell. It seems like Lincoln feared that marching troops down would allow Lee to use interior lines to hit Pope and then return to Richmond, which is a somewhat reasonable fear, but the sensible thing to do is then to send them by sea and reinforce McClellan as much as possible.
August:
Halleck deeply distrusted operations with a divided army and wanted the full striking power of the Union armies in the East in one place, and he wanted it in one place that wasn't on the James river. I'm not sure what his long-term plan to attack Richmond actually was, but he pulled McClellan away from the James without considering the time it would take to actually unify the forces.
We of course know that having the unified force together is no guarantee of being able to force the Rappahanock, historically it took four tries to succesfully get over that river.


Basically. It's actually very hard to find a period of time in the Peninsula when McClellan isn't being told by the government to expect reinforcements that he ultimately does not get.

Thanks for the posts. This is a good education for me. I was previously under the impression that Mac was always kicking and screaming for reinforcements and writing angry and somewhat paranoid letters to his wife when he didn't receive them. And that these troops were unnecessary given his numerical superiority (based on his inflated estimates from Pinkerton, where perhaps he was the only person who believed he was greatly outnumbered). However, the data in these posts clearly shows he did not have clear numerical superiority on the Peninsula and leads me to believe I should read some other authors.
 
Normally, yes, but 67th has spent over a decade trying his best to deconflict them.


There was certainly time, but the problem was the high command (Lincoln, Stanton and then Halleck).
May and June:
Lincoln repeatedly promised to have McDowell's big corps march down from the north, but kept diverting it into chasing Jackson. Essentially the entirety of the AoV troops were trying to pin Jackson down and repeatedly failing, despite the fact he was far too small to threaten Washington - Jackson's actions basically tied up a huge chunk of the Union army, and just about everyone involved except Lincoln and Stanton could see it.
July:
This is harder to tell. It seems like Lincoln feared that marching troops down would allow Lee to use interior lines to hit Pope and then return to Richmond, which is a somewhat reasonable fear, but the sensible thing to do is then to send them by sea and reinforce McClellan as much as possible.
August:
Halleck deeply distrusted operations with a divided army and wanted the full striking power of the Union armies in the East in one place, and he wanted it in one place that wasn't on the James river. I'm not sure what his long-term plan to attack Richmond actually was, but he pulled McClellan away from the James without considering the time it would take to actually unify the forces.
We of course know that having the unified force together is no guarantee of being able to force the Rappahanock, historically it took four tries to succesfully get over that river.


Basically. It's actually very hard to find a period of time in the Peninsula when McClellan isn't being told by the government to expect reinforcements that he ultimately does not get.
And I like 67th's work. My only point being they were even matched at least. McClellen crossed to Hanover. With Lincoln's support it would at least slowed Jackson and the Crossing below Mechanicsville. Once stalled Pope can come in. Lincoln said he would support this move and didn't. I guess it would be Pope supporting Porter (?) supported by whoever is leading the Penn. Reserve's from D.C. I see it's it's a divided army, but is forming a new one on the north side of the river. It's like McClellen saw Lee's move ahead of time. j/k
 
Thanks for the posts. This is a good education for me. I was previously under the impression that Mac was always kicking and screaming for reinforcements and writing angry and somewhat paranoid letters to his wife when he didn't receive them.
The description of kicking and screaming is a tricky one, but I think McClellan can be excused the odd paranoid letter given the situation. To take the example of McDowell's corps:

McDowell's corps (then 1st Corps, AoP) was an integral element in McClellan's Peninsular plan of operations. It was his amphibious corps, containing the only division trained in making ampib landings, and IIRC he'd managed to pull together enough transport to keep the whole corps afloat at once. At the time McClellan left Washington, he had been promised by Lincoln that no more divisions would be removed from his command (after one of his corps was cut from three divisions to two).
As he was transferring his HQ to the Peninsula, the commander of the Washington defences (mendaciously) claimed he didn't have quite enough troops, and so McClellan's army was cut from four corps to three. Of the two corps that hadn't yet transferred to the Peninsula, he lost 1st Corps - the larger of the two formations that hadn't yet moved - along with all their transports, which were discharged as unnecessary. McClellan got this information while he was actively in the field with his troops, and after at least a fortnight of arguing he managed to get the amphib division (Franklin's) returned to his command, but by then it was too late and the Yorktown line was too strong for a single amphibious division to be able to outflank it.
McClellan continued to argue that he needed his force returned to the size it had been when he'd actually made his plans, and Lincoln came to the Peninsula in May. He didn't come ashore himself but sent a factfinding expedition ashore to see if McCellan really needed the extra troops represented by the rest of McDowell's corps (which had now expanded back to three divisions with the addition of Shields' division.)
The result of the factfinding expedition, which included cabinet members, was unanimously that McDowell's corps "with Shields' division" (i.e. all of it) should be sent by sea to join McClellan as soon as possible. (This result was returned about 24 May.)
Lincoln decided that sending McDowell by land would be better, and ordered McClellan to operate against the rail lines north of Richmond so that McDowell could come and join him. McClellan did this, but McDowell never arrived - the movement being repeatedly suspended but not actually cancelled, so McClellan had no idea whether McDowell would actually arrive.
(McDowell's opinion on all of this was that he should be sent to join McClellan as soon as possible.)

At the time McClellan's position was a bit precarious. He was spread over the Chickahominy river near Richmond, with his supply base north of the river while Richmond is south of it, so to attack Richmond while protecting his supply base he needed a large force both sides of the Chickahominy. Without McDowell's corps McClellan was essentially stuck either attacking Richmond or keeping a secure line along the Tolopatamoy Creek to stop Jackson coming down to attack him, and after weeks of waiting he eventually took a gamble and began attacking Richmond - possibly based on the idea that since McDowell was delayed trying to stop Jackson then hopefully Jackson wouldn't turn up, or possibly based on the idea that since the ground was now dry McDowell would finally be marching down to join him like had been promised for a solid month.
Jackson promptly turned up, which leads to days 2-3 of the Seven Days battle sequence and McClellan being pushed away from Richmond by quite possibly the largest Confederate attacking column of the entire war; certainly the army that Lee commanded during the Seven Days is the largest Confederate army to ever take the field of battle at the same time.

McDowell never arrived with McClellan, even in July.


Had McClellan had McDowell in late June, as he'd been promised a solid month before, the Seven Days battles would have been very different - Jackson's outflanking attempt would have run straight into McDowell's corps dug in along Tolopatamoy Creek, the supply base would have been safe, and the likelihood based on McClellan's historical actions (he'd begun his regular approach sequence) is that Richmond would have fallen in the summer of 1862.
Since McClellan knew that Lincoln had taken McDowell from him, and then not returned the corps despite a promise to do so, and since McClellan also knew that Lincoln's military advisors were telling him to send McDowell, one can see why McClellan would not have been happy with Lincoln about this.
 
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