Little Mac at Gettysburg

Mr. King

Sergeant Major
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Jan 15, 2014
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I have an account with audible.com, and enjoy the heck out of it. This month, I downloaded and am listening to "Hearts Touched by Fire", which is a collection of first hand accounts by surviving officers, all written in the 1880s. It's been great so far. It contains 48 solid hours of listening pleasure.
I am currently listening to Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt give his account of Gettysburg. He just related a story about him inspecting the positions on Culps Hill on the morning of July 2nd, and he found the men digging in with a jovial and happy manner. After watching them for a second, one private approached him asking if the news was true. On asking what he was referring to, the man said that twice that morning word has come down the line that McClellan was back in command, and the second time they heard it, it was said that he was on his way to the field to take the reins. He said "the boys are a jubilant, for they know if he takes command, everything will be alright."
Hunt then goes on to say that he was told a similar story by the commander of a 5th Corps battery having heard similar rumors on the night march in the evening of the 1st, and the men tossed their caps and hurrahed.
He said he did not set them straight, as it looked like it renewed their vigor.
The editor notes similar stories by Lt. O. S. Barrett of the 4th Michigan Infantry wrote about a similar story in the 2nd Corps.
 
General McClellan had his moments, but history tells his tales. Never figured out why we have a fort named for him here in Alabama? :nah disagree:
 
The rumor appears to have spread rapidly throughout the army. Here is the version described by Adj. Anthony W. McDermott of the 69th Pennsylvania, Second Corps, in his regimental history: On the evening of July 2, Gen. Webb asked that we should hold this position at all hazards until 4 the next afternoon when Gen. McClellan would be in Lee's rear with 40,000 men. This information raised the spirits of the men ...
 
The rumor appears to have spread rapidly throughout the army. Here is the version described by Adj. Anthony W. McDermott of the 69th Pennsylvania, Second Corps, in his regimental history: On the evening of July 2, Gen. Webb asked that we should hold this position at all hazards until 4 the next afternoon when Gen. McClellan would be in Lee's rear with 40,000 men. This information raised the spirits of the men ...
They had so much faith in the man. 150 year later, with all the anti-McClellan propaganda that I've been indoctrinated with, I can't imagine Little Mac leading 40,000 men to the rear of a Walmart.

I wonder if we are somewhat wrong about him. I find it hard, despite all the years of ridicule heaped on to McClellan, to just toss aside the faith the men in the AOP had for him. He definitely had his faults. He was an insolent man, almost child-like in his treatment of Lincoln and Stanton. I don't think that he actually believed all the hyped up Pinkerton numbers he was forwarding to the Government. I think he took them with a grain of salt in his own mind, but pronounced them as the gospel to his superiors in an effort to: A) have them send him more troops, and B) have the inflated Confederate numbers act as an excuse if & when he losses a battle.
 
McClellan was known and liked for his role in organizing and training the army, and he had commanded it in its greatest successes prior to July 1863. He had led them to the gates of Richmond, and the troops don't seem to have blamed him for the failure of that campaign. He had won at Antietam, an imperfect victory but the highlight of the AofP's war thus far. He had stopped Lee's first invasion only a short distance into Maryland, now here they were fighting in Pennsylvania. Under other commanders they had had Bull Run, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, the Mud March, and Chancellorsville. Is it that surprising that their view of Little Mac was different from history's?

Funny personal thing, for some reason it feels right to me to say Bull Run for the first battle, but Second Manassas for the second...
 
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McClellan was known and liked for his role in organizing and training the army, and he had commanded it in its greatest successes prior to July 1863. He had led them to the gates of Richmond, and the troops don't seem to have blamed him for the failure of that campaign. He had won at Antietam, an imperfect victory but the highlight of the AofP's war thus far. He had stopped Lee's first invasion only a short distance into Maryland, now here they were fighting in Pennsylvania. Under other commanders they had had Bull Run, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, the Mud March, and Chancellorsville. Is it that surprising that their view of Little Mac was different from history's?

Funny personal thing, for some reason it feels right to me to say Bull Run for the first battle, but Second Manassas for the second...
2nd Bull Run just does not roll off the tongue well.
 
I wonder if we are somewhat wrong about him. I find it hard, despite all the years of ridicule heaped on to McClellan, to just toss aside the faith the men in the AOP had for him.
I don't know the battle details like many of you do (heck, I'm still learning the battles themselves), but I find myself wondering about this too.
 
I don't know the battle details like many of you do (heck, I'm still learning the battles themselves), but I find myself wondering about this too.
If you stick with us, you'll be full of "useless knowledge" before long as well.

My interpretation of McClellan is that he loved his men too much to see them killed. He was overly cautious, and it cost him his job. If he had thrown caution to the wind a few times, Lincoln and Stanton would have had to accept his insolence. They could not have sacked a general who was winning battles, just as they didn't sack Grant when they heard rumors about him being drunk at Shiloh.
McClellan was a very able commander. During the Peninsula Campaign, he relocated his supply base across the peninsula in the midst of combat, with little difficulty. It does sound like a big deal to us, but it has been sited by some actual ACW commander's, E.P. Alexander being one, as a nearly impossible task for even the most adept army commanders. General Lee once claimed that McClellan was the best general the yankees put in his front. I'm certain Lee had no appreciation for a guy like Grant who was willing to lose 60,000 men in a couple months and keep going, but that's beside the point. If you look at Lee's boldness in the presence of Pope, Hooker, and Meade, vs his prudence when facing McClellan at Antietam, it's like night and day. Granted, there are many factors playing into each of those scenarios, but it still deserves consideration.

Antietam saw Lee w/ 40,000 vs McClellan w/ 85,000. That's better than 2 to 1 odds for McClellan, and Lee played a tight defensive battle, taking the least amount of risk as possible.

Chancellorsville saw Lee w/ 60,000 vs Hooker w/ 116,000. In this battle, Lee boldly split his army 3 ways, giving Hooker battle on 3 different fronts.
 
If you stick with us, you'll be full of "useless knowledge" before long as well.
It's all wonderful! :smile:

Thank you for your reply. Topics involving McClellan always catch my eye, and I appreciate hearing others' thoughts on him.
 
I have an account with audible.com, and enjoy the heck out of it. This month, I downloaded and am listening to "Hearts Touched by Fire", which is a collection of first hand accounts by surviving officers, all written in the 1880s. It's been great so far. It contains 48 solid hours of listening pleasure.
I am currently listening to Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt give his account of Gettysburg. He just related a story about him inspecting the positions on Culps Hill on the morning of July 2nd, and he found the men digging in with a jovial and happy manner. After watching them for a second, one private approached him asking if the news was true. On asking what he was referring to, the man said that twice that morning word has come down the line that McClellan was back in command, and the second time they heard it, it was said that he was on his way to the field to take the reins. He said "the boys are a jubilant, for they know if he takes command, everything will be alright."
Hunt then goes on to say that he was told a similar story by the commander of a 5th Corps battery having heard similar rumors on the night march in the evening of the 1st, and the men tossed their caps and hurrahed.
He said he did not set them straight, as it looked like it renewed their vigor.
The editor notes similar stories by Lt. O. S. Barrett of the 4th Michigan Infantry wrote about a similar story in the 2nd Corps.
He had rallied the army before and led it to victory. He might attack. either way, if he is victorious...should the lincolnites be worried? Lincoln doesnt seem to want to risk it to a potential dictatorship. After all-ish?
Mac is a peace democrat. The radicals want to influence that. At the end of a gun i guess. Stick em up florida!
 
My interpretation of McClellan is that he loved his men too much to see them killed.

Someone once wrote that the hardest thing about command was ordering the death of that which you love.

McClellan was a very able commander. During the Peninsula Campaign, he relocated his supply base across the peninsula in the midst of combat, with little difficulty. It does sound like a big deal to us, but it has been sited by some actual ACW commander's, E.P. Alexander being one, as a nearly impossible task for even the most adept army commanders.

Someone else said "amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics". I imagine the Union army being securely positioned just a day's march from Richmond was part of Lee's rationale for trying the assault at Malvern Hill.

I'm certain Lee had no appreciation for a guy like Grant who was willing to lose 60,000 men in a couple months and keep going

From what I've read, Lee had considerable respect for Grant, who pressed him harder than the generals who lost 80,000 men over the previous couple of years without accomplishing much of anything. After the war, he would not allow any disparagement of Grant in his presence. We might recall that every battle in the Overland campaign started with Grant trying to maneuver around Lee's flank, and Lee was fully aware of what a near-run thing it had been on occasions like Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.
 
Antietam saw Lee w/ 40,000 vs McClellan w/ 85,000. That's better than 2 to 1 odds for McClellan, and Lee played a tight defensive battle, taking the least amount of risk as possible.

You're mixing different strength categories.

Lee probably did have only around 40,000 effective infantry. Carman credits Lee with 29,222 effective infantry, but closer examination shows that 3 brigades were not engaged and so not counted (Armistead, Pender and Field) and notes by Carman and Hartwig show many brigades much stronger than Carman pegged. As an example, the typically quoted strength of Jackson's division is taken from a call immediately the division reached Sharpsburg on the 16th, with many stragglers not yet rejoined, but most came up later in that day. The infantry effective strength may have been 39,026.

Total range: 31,905 (add unengaged bdes) - 39,026 (of whom 3,914 arrived during the battle. This is exclusive of 5-6,000 stragglers reported to have come in during the battle)

For McClellan Carman gives 46,146 engaged infantry, but he admits he is highballing his numbers; for example Greene's Division reported "aggregate present" which Carman accepts as effective strength. It may be an overestimate of as much as 7,977 effective infantry in the 2nd, 9th and 12th Corps.

To this one should add the unengaged units thus estimated:
Morell's Division: 3,790 effectives
Unengaged regulars: 978
Warren's Brigade: 225
6th Corps (exc/ Irwin, already counted): 5,883
= 10,876 unengaged infantry

Total range = 49,055 - 57,022 (of whom 11,357 were not on the field on the morning, but arrived as reinforcements during the battle)

Rather than 2:1 the ratio of effective strength was likely about 5:4. The jibes with the claims of many Federal veterans that the two forces were about of equal strength.
 
[QUOTE

From what I've read, Lee had considerable respect for Grant, who pressed him harder than the generals who lost 80,000 men over the previous couple of years without accomplishing much of anything. After the war, he would not allow any disparagement of Grant in his presence. We might recall that every battle in the Overland campaign started with Grant trying to maneuver around Lee's flank, and Lee was fully aware of what a near-run thing it had been on occasions like Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.[/QUOTE]

I know he respected Grant. It'd be hard not too, but Lee probably saw how close McClellan got to Richmond by maneuver, without losing more than a handful of men in a few skirmishes. Grant absorbed 60,000 casualties to get to the same spot. I think that's what Lee was referring to.

The brute force Grant displayed there is respectable. It's actually kind of scary. How do you stop a general like that?
 
XBringing up ammo in the wildernes.
battle-of-the-wilderness-american-civil-war-ammunition-being-distributed-ERG8EN.jpg

the above is in hancocks area south of the brock rd.
For a hundred yards out the 2nd corps cleared the forrest. With the choppings they dug in. Abitis marked the perimeter.
14831426-mmmain.jpg

The 2nd Corps attacked Hill at dawn, who was slack in who dug in. Hancock pushed west, stalling out s w of the tapp feild. Longstreet rolls up hancock up on the left. The freshly opened gound catchers fire that spreads to the union trenches. The confederates follow behind and seize the intersection.
the-battle-of-the-wilderness-after-a-contemporary-sketch-this-scene-erg7ah.jpg

Union artillery, placed on a small rise, shell the confederates out.
cold-harbor-picture.jpg

The point being...hancock's preperation ensured victory.
 
You're mixing different strength categories.

Lee probably did have only around 40,000 effective infantry. Carman credits Lee with 29,222 effective infantry, but closer examination shows that 3 brigades were not engaged and so not counted (Armistead, Pender and Field) and notes by Carman and Hartwig show many brigades much stronger than Carman pegged. As an example, the typically quoted strength of Jackson's division is taken from a call immediately the division reached Sharpsburg on the 16th, with many stragglers not yet rejoined, but most came up later in that day. The infantry effective strength may have been 39,026.

Total range: 31,905 (add unengaged bdes) - 39,026 (of whom 3,914 arrived during the battle. This is exclusive of 5-6,000 stragglers reported to have come in during the battle)

For McClellan Carman gives 46,146 engaged infantry, but he admits he is highballing his numbers; for example Greene's Division reported "aggregate present" which Carman accepts as effective strength. It may be an overestimate of as much as 7,977 effective infantry in the 2nd, 9th and 12th Corps.

To this one should add the unengaged units thus estimated:
Morell's Division: 3,790 effectives
Unengaged regulars: 978
Warren's Brigade: 225
6th Corps (exc/ Irwin, already counted): 5,883
= 10,876 unengaged infantry

Total range = 49,055 - 57,022 (of whom 11,357 were not on the field on the morning, but arrived as reinforcements during the battle)

Rather than 2:1 the ratio of effective strength was likely about 5:4. The jibes with the claims of many Federal veterans that the two forces were about of equal strength.

Just because McClellan forgot to seriously engage a few of he army corps does not mean that they were not on the field.

Do you think Lee thought for one second on the morning of the 17th that McClellan was going to handicap himself? Heck no.

You went the long way around the barn to get to the widely accepted and stated number of 40,000 men in the ANV. Kudos.
 
Just because McClellan forgot to seriously engage a few of he army corps does not mean that they were not on the field.

They were on the field and counted as such above. McClellan used every single brigade for something, just not all of them for attacks. The only brigade kept in reserve was Barnes' brigade of Morell's Division.

Ack, I see Too Useful to Sacrifice has been put back again!
 
I know he respected Grant. It'd be hard not too, but Lee probably saw how close McClellan got to Richmond by maneuver, without losing more than a handful of men in a few skirmishes.

It was Retreating Joe, not maneuver. Once McClellan faced Lee, who started retreating?


Grant absorbed 60,000 casualties to get to the same spot. I think that's what Lee was referring to.

The brute force Grant displayed there is respectable. It's actually kind of scary. How do you stop a general like that?

My study of the Overland Campaign revealed a whole lot of maneuver involved, including one where Grant completely befuddled Lee.
 
They had so much faith in the man. 150 year later, with all the anti-McClellan propaganda that I've been indoctrinated with, I can't imagine Little Mac leading 40,000 men to the rear of a Walmart.

I wonder if we are somewhat wrong about him. I find it hard, despite all the years of ridicule heaped on to McClellan, to just toss aside the faith the men in the AOP had for him. He definitely had his faults. He was an insolent man, almost child-like in his treatment of Lincoln and Stanton. I don't think that he actually believed all the hyped up Pinkerton numbers he was forwarding to the Government. I think he took them with a grain of salt in his own mind, but pronounced them as the gospel to his superiors in an effort to: A) have them send him more troops, and B) have the inflated Confederate numbers act as an excuse if & when he losses a battle.

The Confederate troops also adored Leonidas Polk.
 
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