Lee's Plan, Day Three: What Do You Think?

elektratig

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I don't pretend to be a Gettysburg expert, but I've read some about it. I have never, however, heard the following. Can any of you who have studied the battle comment on the following:

"Is there anything new and important to say about Gettysburg? Perhaps so. Perhaps Lee's imagination and patience did not falter after the abortive attacks on the second day. Perhaps his plan for the third day was the most brilliant of all: he just kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale. That plausible plan concerns something everyone knows -- J.E.B. Stuart's belated return on July 2 -- and something many people may not know" the action Stuart's men fought on July 3 well behind Culp's Hill. It is always assumed that Stuart just meant to disrupt the federal troops' supplies and reinforcements or harry their expected retreat. But strong circumstantial evidence suggests that Lee sent Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Seminary Ridge from the rear in support of Pickett's charge from the front. Why didn't Stuart deliver that mortal blow? Because 2,700 cavalrymen from Michigan, in fighting trim thanks to Hooker's attention, defeated Stuart's gray ghosts about four miles short of their goal. The Union general who rallied his men with the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" was George Armstrong Custer."

The accompany footnote states, in relevant part, "On Lee's secret plan for the third day, see Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why It Failed (New York: Putnam, 2005)."

Walter A. McDougall, Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era 1829-1877 (New York: HarperCollins 2008) (emphasis added).

Have you heard this? Do you believe it?
 
I don't pretend to be a Gettysburg expert, but I've read some about it. I have never, however, heard the following. Can any of you who have studied the battle comment on the following:

"Is there anything new and important to say about Gettysburg? Perhaps so. Perhaps Lee's imagination and patience did not falter after the abortive attacks on the second day. Perhaps his plan for the third day was the most brilliant of all: he just kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale. That plausible plan concerns something everyone knows -- J.E.B. Stuart's belated return on July 2 -- and something many people may not know" the action Stuart's men fought on July 3 well behind Culp's Hill. It is always assumed that Stuart just meant to disrupt the federal troops' supplies and reinforcements or harry their expected retreat. But strong circumstantial evidence suggests that Lee sent Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Seminary Ridge from the rear in support of Pickett's charge from the front. Why didn't Stuart deliver that mortal blow? Because 2,700 cavalrymen from Michigan, in fighting trim thanks to Hooker's attention, defeated Stuart's gray ghosts about four miles short of their goal. The Union general who rallied his men with the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" was George Armstrong Custer."

The accompany footnote states, in relevant part, "On Lee's secret plan for the third day, see Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why It Failed (New York: Putnam, 2005)."

Walter A. McDougall, Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era 1829-1877 (New York: HarperCollins 2008) (emphasis added).

Have you heard this? Do you believe it?

I've seen it claimed before; I have never thought it likely.

What makes far more sense is simple, normal, military tactics. Stuart is not in position to make such a successful assault -- but he is in perfect position to follow up on a successful breaking of the Federal position.

If you look at what was actually in position to resist Stuart that day, you'll see that even if he had swept Custer and the rest of the cavalry off in a rout, he would have had to charge through lots of infantry and massed artillery batteries, all in place. His cavalry would have been slaughtered if he tried. Lee may or may not have had such a plan -- but it would not have worked.

What this does look like is the prepositioning of Stuart's force for a finishing stroke in pursuit if Pickett's Charge had actually worked. Then Stuart might have fallen upon a panicked Union army attempting to retreat down the Baltimore Pike. That is classic use of cavalry in Napoleonic tactics, and Lee was very much a student of Napoleonic warfare.

Tim
 
I have heard assertions to the fact that Lee had sent Stuart around to the rear in order to support Pickett's attack, which is always the way that I had seen the movement in the first place. Lee wasn't intent on disrupting supplies, I don't think; he wanted to get into the rear and hit them there at the same time as Pickett hit the front, hoping to rout the Union forces on Cemetery Ridge. However, the Union cavalry isn't the inept, ill-trained force that it had been in the first two years of the war. I think Brandy Station should have proven that already, and shown Stuart that he needed to be wary when taking on the Union cavalry. The Union troopers were now a force to be reckoned with.
 
If you accept
...strong circumstantial evidence suggests ...
then I guess it could make sense. Had anyone there told the same story, I'd sit up and listen.

Lee might have felt comfortable now that Stuart was back. (We're mostly agreed that Lee was likely overconfident already.) In his eyes, on that day, he could see a possibility.

Just a thought.

ole
 
Lee was positioning him there so when Pickett's attack succeeded and the AoP broke and ran, the cavalry would be there to reap panic on the fleeing army. Stuart's force was not to actually be part of the attack in conjunction with Pickett.
 
Dear Elektratig and List Members,

I will add to the choir voices; that I do not claim expertise` on anything Civil War.

I have consulted the Official Records of the Rebellion and Col. Walter H. Taylor's accounts in his book Four Years with General Lee-Chapter VIII which is dedicated to Gettysburg.

First, I wish to present that the Confederates had come into Pennsylvania around Gettysburg and Cashtown on October 11, 1862. General B.T. Johnson and General T. Jackson with General Stuart head of Cavalry proceeding before the main body. So, General Stuart already had a familiar understanding of Gettysburg, Cashtown and Chambersburg.

Now, Lee was heading up to Pennsylvania to the same area but, using the mountains to screen his movements. Stuart was sent by Lee with the orders of using his (Stuart's) judgment. According to Col. Taylor; it was disturbing to Lee that Stuart did not send any word as to his location, actions and most of all 'intelligence.'

Union General McClellan and Pleasonton (Head of Cavalry) as well as General Buford had previous knowledge of Stuart's travel on Stuart's skirmish in Gettysburg in October of 1862 and thus a potential route of Stuart's retreat and potential return targets on this June-July mission.

Stanton (SecretaryofWar) telegraphs all the generals in upper Maryland and around Gettysburg and vicinity; that a note was captured; first sending it to Rosecrans who was stationed in Maryland and Corps commanders Butterfield and a few others. Pleasonton aware alerts General Gregg and Kilpatrick and they are haunting the areas where Stuart raided once before. Stanton tells of President Davis' letter to Lee that he is unable to send support--pretty much telling Lee he is on his own. So, General Lee is now without support as of July 2nd-3rd.

General Stuart returns, according to Col. Taylor (AAG/CofS) to General Lee at the evening of July 2nd and had engagements. His cavalry had not been fed and had previously hard skirmishes with the Union Cavalry. By time July 3rd comes, according to Taylor; Stuart's cavalry was below strength, tired, hungry and horses not fed.

General Longstreet in his battle designs, assigned General Wilcox to support Pickett's flanks. General AP Hill was suppose to support Trimble and Pettigrew; but--he did not do so. Longstreet needed to hold some troops as to attack if the Federals came; this fell on McLaws and Hood's brigades; as they had lost half their strength on the previous day's battle.
(This is what I got in summary from Col. Taylor's accounts). Although Taylor's personal opinion was that, if McLaws and Hood's brigade had marched with Pettigrew, Trimble (Heth's), Pickett it may have been successful. But, Taylor does not say who could have served as defense to replace Hood and McLaws if they moved in with Pickett. Lee had deployed the other Corps elsewhere. And, Lee giving Longstreet the control of the charge; well--to me; the reports after the battle is what Taylor had to work with; as well as the official reports.

Taylor did mention that General Lee was confident as the progress on July 1 and 2 was built on near success. Longstreet presented his case for not conducting a charge but was overruled by Lee and Taylor said Longstreet did his duty fully; from what I gathered from reading the chapter on Gettysburg.

General Ewell was to have 'demonstrated' on the northern portion of the 'fish-hook' configuration of the Union Forces.

With Brig. General Ingalls, with 25 trains at Westminster on the Baltimore Branch; near the battlefield brought into place; Buford would later guard this with his shattered force along with artillery.

I did not find anything to support or not support Stuart being in support of Pickett's Charge -- only General Wilcox's cavalry; according to Col. W. Taylor's book Four Years with General Lee Wilcox was on Pickett's flanks

It is known that Stuart's calvary tangled with Union Cavalry, to which General Farnsworth; to which perished in the battle near Gettysburg; known as "Cavalry Field;" I will also mention that Farnsworth was on General Pleasonton's staff. So, it is possible Farnsworth was aware of Stuart's previous moves from his staff position with Pleasonton. General Killpatrick was also engaged, General Gregg and General A. Custer as well. I believe General Lee leading a separate Cavalry unit was also engaged; on the CSA side.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
toLee's original plan for Day Three was apparenbtly to disengage Longstreet's corps from around the RT's and move it further north to support Pickett's planned assault on the Union Center. With Ewell concurrently completing the occupation of Culps Hill and securing control of the nearby Baltimore Pike. With Stuart at Hanover to support the expected breakthrough of Pickett's force.
When Lee dismisses Longstreets final plea for moving around the AoP and maneuvering them to attack the ANV, Longstreet then insists that it is too dangerous to disengage Hood and McLaws Div's and Lee reluctantly changes his plan (Day Two Redux), necessitating the early morning attack to be postponed to 10:00 A.M. By which time Ewell's battle for Culp's Hill, which has been raging since early morning, has been lost.
The New plan has Pickett reinforced by troops from Hill's corps and although the majority of the assaulting force is now to be from 2d Corps, the reluctant Longstreet remains in charge of the attack.
When Pickett cracks the Union line, Longstreet and Hill remain firmly in their places and there is no support to hold the initial penetration open and Stuart abandons the field at Hanover to the smaller Union cavalry force that fought him to a draw.
If Stuart's movement were vital to the success of the ANV's attack, he did not put up much of a fight, to remain in place to deliver the presumed surprise attack.
Personally, If I were going for a revisionist answer I like Troy D. Harman's theory that Lee's Plan for all Three Days of battle was the taking of Cemetary Hill and that Lee's planned target for Pickett was not the copse of tree's on Hancock's front by Ziegler's Grove on Cemetary Hill.
 
Whatever Stuart intended to do

on July 3rd, he failed to do. Plus his troopers and horses were in no condition to do a sustained attack.

The devil is in the details, and there probably are few modern students of the Civil War who have any knowledge of horses, the care and feeding.

Anyone else ever spend eight hours on a saddle in one day? Stuart was continually on the move since he left Virginia; had several skirmishes-Hanover and Carlisle. Few moderns would grasp the significance of that fact.

I'd recommend the Stuart OR report, with the caveat to ask yourself -how worn out are the troopers and horses - fairly frequently?
 
Role Play!

I do not agree with Mr. Carhart assumption of what Lee's plan was on day 3.

Whitworth is correct that Stuart's cavalry was exhausted form his mindless vanity ride. If Stuart had a major roll on day 3 he would had given Custer a better fight then he did.

There is a counter argument that if Stuarts horses were so exhausted. Why did Stuart's cavalry preform so well during the retreat of Lee's army from PA.

In the Lee's Official reports he never to hardly mentions Stuart in his reports on Gettysburg. If Stuart would have had a major role Lee would have mention it.

Some thoughts...
 
Lee's Plan, Day Three: What Do You Think?

Assuming Lee is as knowlegeble about the care and feeding of horses as Stuart, it would be logical that Lee would not ask the impossible from his cavalry or that Stuart would not have informed Lee of the capablities of his force. That being the case, gaining a position where he (Stuart) could protect the left of Ewell's Corps and also be able to observe the Union rear and attack in case the Confederate assault (Pickett's Charge) was successful, would be all that could be reasonably expected from Stuart's command on the 3d Day.
 
Dear List Members,

According to 1865 CUSTOMS of SERVICE for Officers of the Army - A Handbook of the Duties of Each Grade - Lieutenant to Lieut.-General;
Article # 694- Reference to Cavalry on Marches; It in summary says that it is better for the Cavalry to walk 24 hours, then to trot and get to the same place in 12 hours. The reasoning in this article; is that the weight of rider,saddle and gear is easier on the horse at a walk then a trot.

According to Article #697--Halts in a day's march can be two to three times a day. If the Cavalry is caused by obsticles that require the Cavalry to halt; riders should dismount and check their horse over, readjust the saddle, allow the horse to graze and water given as refreshment. On forced marches, for each hour they must have 15 minutes rest/halt. On force marches a rest for Cavalry, is the dismounting of the rider for 15 minutes and leading the horse at a walk.

General Lee was deemed an expert horseman. He was also very kind to his horses and put their welfare and all horses welfare in his concerns.

The above articles would probably apply to the Confederates as much as the Union Cavalry. Another thing about the Confederate Cavalry--the soldiers owned these horses--not the Cavalry; as well as those in Artillery owned the horses--not the Confederacy. Unlike the Union which provided horses--the soldiers were easily given another horse from the remount station. Exhausted horses were sent to farms to recover and those too damaged from their service, were sold for public consumption.

I am one that can admit to riding a horse for 12 hours on several occasions and driving a horse for around 10 hours, as my buggy or wagon was fitted with battery operated headlights/tail-lights w/turn signals. But, for the sake of Cavalry operations; being on a horse for 12 hours isn't so bad at a walk but, one needs to dismount to stretch legs, attend to nature's callings which requires dismounting--if over rough ground, its necessary to check to see if horseshoes have loosened or been pulled and or bent. At a trot, I can assure one and all; with the amount of equipment that I had to carry in a rescue posse; it was similar to cavalry weight but; in a trot a horse with flapping weight, e.g. sabers, canteens, rifles, feed bag, rolled blanket, four spare horse shoes and 36 horseshoe nails; picket rope and grooming supplies--that makes a horse work harder keeping you the rider, the weight flapping around/giggling inside the bags; from tipping him (the horse) off balance. Plus it takes energy to trot. So, I agree with the above articles from the 1865 handbook.

Another tid bit for non-equestrians - there is a difference between Dragoon riding style --the rider never rose up at the trot--they sat in the saddle -- at times this could jar the teeth and body of the rider, as well as fatigue the horse's back. The 1862 U.S. Cavalry Tactics do not mention 'trotting' and rising as a rider to that motion--so they remained trained in the Dragoon style. Bouncing hard on a horse's back was uncomfortable for both rider and horse--the English posting at a trot pace perhaps would be introduced later more out of comfort verses regulations.

Personally, for the distance traveled from where Stuart was allegedly found and given orders by Lee to report to Gettysburg Headquarters; I must assume by Col. Walter H. Taylor's report, previously posted--that Stuart had to have several hours of rest for horses as to arrive back to Lee's headquarters, even if on a forced march of 24 hours. To not be mentioned in the 3rd Day's events--seems to me that the horses were seriously exhausted and useless; only thing possible is to have Stuart's men mounted on staff officer's horses, artillery horses and any horse that was available within the ranks. That would pose it's own dangers--as if these horses were lost/killed/captured it would affect the artillery, etc.

There may also be cases where some horses were more sturdy than others. I do know that Morgan horses and Quarter Mile Racing horses (to be known later as the American Quarter Horse) stood up better as far as endurance than saddle horses, Thoroughbreds and others. These may have been the only horses able to enter into action after a brief rest at Lee's Headquarters --

As for my 12 hour rides during rescue searches--my beehind was numb my legs were stoved up. It was a few minutes before I could walk normal. My horse would be my first priority, loosen the girth, even take off the saddle and blanket--check for back soreness; check the hooves-for stones lodged in the foot--painful to the horse; see if shoes were still snug or if bent or shifted. Make repairs if needed. Water the horse--even if it was from my canteen; graze the horse if possible--then sit and rest and let the horse doze off. I will also add, horses can sleep with their eyes open --day dreaming. But, most times they will close their eyes. Horses have a locking mechanic to their legs so they can sleep standing up. So, at times they will lay down and times will stand. This is why horse's names are said as to wake 'em up or else they could be startled and kick. The Cavalry saddle blanket was rather long rectangle; as to use it to lay over a sweaty horse's back and walk them until cooled down if they have had to gallop and sweaty. The horse will get very ill if not cooled down before eating and drinking water. The horse can get ill from drinking cold water when hot and sweaty, so a few gulps then pull them from the water and walk around and then allow a few gulps and continue this until the water is gone. If the horse drank the entire bucket the horse will get stomach cramps/ill. So, the rider had to take care of the horse first--not just because it was regulation--it was to keep the horse 'able.' On missions that were mountain like; grass isn't always available. For one day's search, 12 pounds of grain was carried. Hay would be nice but, not always available--hay was required in US Army regs. If there was a three day march; the Cavalry required rations for three days.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
1862 Army Officer's Pocket Companion-A Manual for Staff Officers..

Dear List Members;

I thought I would add more 'manual' information (sorry for the delay, had to type all of it up first from the book/manual) -- But, may help understanding marches.

The 1862 Army Officer’s Pocket Companion
A Manual for Staff Officers in the Field

-----------------------------------
Article 42 - Marches Executed to Assemble Armies

Page 91

Marches Executed to Assemble Armies


To assemble armies, route marches are executed. Generally these are made by battalions, distant on day’s march from each other; the cavalry the most of the time proceeding by the side roads, usually the less direct, but it is difficult to make a numerous cavalry corps march together during a whole campaign without interfering with the rapidity of its own movements, and without great difficulty in subsisting it, this corps should not exceed 6,000 horses. The artillery follows the cavalry, or if it has a very long train, it may proceed by itself on a separate road.

The troops begin their concentration on the base of operations: when operations are beginning, the successive bodies draw towards each other, and the army encamps in lines a day’s march from each other upon getting near the enemy, columns are formed, especially if the country presents parallel roads of debouche. It is always advantageous to march a corps de armee by several roads, its divisions at distances apart suitable for deployment, and in order of battle; but if there is but one communication, distances of 200 yards should be left between the different arms, and the cavalry more in the rear of the column.

In thee marches, when a defile is to be passed, the order in which the troops shall successively pass, should be arranged beforehand, and made known. The general rule is never pile up the troops in such a manner that their movements shall be difficult, and their action parallelized; but they must be kept sufficiently near, so that the enemy may not by a rapid movement fall upon isolated bodies and beat in detail.

To arrive at the point of general concentration, which is always selected out of the reach of the enemy, [Page 93] too short as well as too long marches are to be avoided. A mean average of twenty miles is the proper measure to adopt, remembering that cavalry can, from time to time, clear as much as thirty miles, and that infantry ought never to march less than fifteen miles. For both infantry and cavalry one day of rest is sufficient after six or eight days of consecutive marching. It is of importance, when far from the enemy, not to regulate the march of the cavalry by that of the infantry, for it would be prematurely injuring the former. The departure should take place neither too early nor to late. One hour between the reveille and the assembling of troops will enable everyone to make easily all the preparations for departure. The men eat their soup and keep the meat for the halt. The horses take a feed of oats. A guide, either civilian or military, well acquainted with all the particulars of the road, accompanies the commander of the troop, if he is not himself familiar with them. Let us now suppose a march of twenty miles is to be made, and see how cavalry and infantry will perform it.

Cavalry- Departure at six o’clock, march of forty-five minutes, halt of ten minutes, reckoned from the moment when the last division has closed up to its distance (the troops forming, then halting, whatever may be the order adopted for the march to the trumpet’s call. The vanguard stops at the same time as the head column; and the rear guard keeps at a proper distance from the rear. During the halt the horses have their girths tightened and their feet looked to. Some two and a half miles having been passed over in this first period of the march, the [Page 94] detachment will clear six or seven miles without any new halt, alternatively walking and trotting, in about 100 minutes; then it will halt in a proper situation in close column, if possible, and half an hour will be allowed the men to breakfast on the meat kept for that purpose. The second half of the distance will be preformed in two intervals of time, divided by a rest of five or six minutes, alternatively walking and trotting, so as to make five miles in an hour. The destination will thus be reached at eleven o’clock in the forenoon, five hours after departure. If the distance be more: or less that twenty miles, the halts would almost always be the same in number and length as above mentioned, but the duration of each march would be lengthened or shortened by a few minutes. If the cavalry has any baggage, this should start so as to arrive, at the latest one hour after the column.
A horse or mule carries 200 pounds, harness included; two wheeled one horse carriages (the only sort that should be tolerated) can receive a load of 800 pounds. Above these limits is impossible to depend on a regular speed of two and a half miles an hour, at a walk, halt incuded, an average which should be obtained.

Infantry- Departure at six o’clock. After forty-five minutes, a halt of ten minutes, reckoned from the moment when the rear subdivision has closed up (the companies forming as they halt) to the movement of resuming the march. Afterward a halt of five minutes for every hour of march. When half the distance, rather more or less, is accomplished, the men rest thirty minutes, to eat the morning’s meat, and the march is resumed, halting for a short time [Page 95] every hour. An hour is the limit of any uninterrupted march, unless by continuing for a few minutes more, the destination, or the destination, or the place of the great halt can be reached, but this increase should not exceed twelve minutes. Reckoning two and a half miles per hour, short halts included, as is ordinarily done, it is found that a column of infantry starting in the morning at six o’clock, will arrive at two in the afternoon, which allows sufficient time for resting until the next day. [Page 95] Should the infantry have any baggage, this should start at the same time, and both will arrive together. A detachment that might be obliged to go and seek for beds or stables at a distance, on the right or left of the direction to be followed the next day, would be better to bivouac near the corps to which it belongs, especially if the weather is fine. It would thus avoid useless fatigues, and accustom itself to the necessities of war; besides it is sometimes far better to sleep on straw in a barn than two in a bad bed. [Page 95]

Sometimes the assembling is performed very near the enemy: it becomes necessary in such cases to calculate accurately the distances to be passed over, and to combine the marches in souch a way that the columns arrive together at the point of assembly. In this case, special use is made of forced marches, and hastening some of the troops by transporting them in carriages, or otherwise--railroads will be much employed for this purpose in war, and will have a great influence upon the art. In forced marches, the number of halts is sometimes doubled, and then a half ration out of each alternative halt; cavalry does not generally make more than thirty miles a day when the march is to be long. [Page 96] A train of 250 wagons takes, at the rate of twelve yards to a carriage, a space of 3,000 yards in a file, and may transport from 2,000 to 2, 500 in a body. When the troops are moved partly on foot and partly by carriage, care should be taken that while those on foot are passing over a given space between two halts, those in the carriage shall pass over twice as much. The same carriages do not pass over the entire route traveled, fresh relays of vehicles being provided at intervals of two or three days. When an army is assembling, the generals of divisions send forward to the rendezvous, in advance, a staff officer to receive the corps; the brigades and isolated regiments also send an officer to the same point. These officers from the troops upon the ground in compact order ready for battle, and according to rank.

[Note: I copied it word for word]
------------------------------------------
Now, that said -- I am still looking through the Official Records as to find when Stuart was finally located time wise and location --then, using this afore stated system attempt to place distance traveled. Then--hopefully, if extended time for rest/travel--maybe get an idea how wretched his horses were.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
Believe you've aready made the point, M.E. -- at least with me. The way I figure it, Stuart's horses were neither well-rested nor well fed by the time he turned back to Gettysburg.

As you've amply shown, the horse was a delicate creature and not at all like the gallop-all-day-shoot-'em-up westerns many of us grew up on. If one wants to ride every day, one must doggone well take care of his horse. Getting the horse shot would have been bad enough, getting put afoot because of carelessnes would have been tragic.

ole
 
As usual, M. E. a very informative post.

David
Hello All - I am new to this forum, but from what I've been reading, many very interesting points are being made. I've often wondered, just how much Lee's health effected some of his decisions. That, combined with the loss of Jackson at Chancellorsville and now not even being able to consult with Stuart at the opening of the battle. I am sure this combination must have been very difficult when making such critical decisions. Bob
 
Lee's plan third day

Hello all. What a wonderful forum. I am impressed with the depth of CW knowlege by the posters. I live in N.VA not far from many CW battlesites, I have visited many of them including Gettysburg and Antietum. I am of advanced age and enjoy reading CW history.

I have always been curious about Lee's motives (strategy) involving Picketts charge. Why did he do it?

Things we can all agree on, I think, include that Lee was not an impulsive man and certainly not stupid. Stuart was behind enemy lines with his Brigades sent there for some reason, certainly not R&R. He must have been charged with a mission. The condition of his horses and men is irrelevant except as to their fighting abillity. Although the Manual does provide guidelines for moving men and material, in many many cases it was ignored either by poor leadership or because of the expediancy of the moment. Someone, either Lee or Stuart, must have thought that Stuarts Cavalry was in good enough condition to make that move behind Cemetary ridge. We can all agree, again, I think, with those suppositions.

Now the question that causes disagreement is ;why was Stuart there? Some have said that perhaps he was there as a mop up for after the Confederate breakthrough. Merely a support operation after the fact. Though possible, I have a hard time believing this theory for it adds nothing to the battle plan, or very little. As we agree, Lee was not a stupid man, so to dash his men against a stone wall makes little sense to me. There must have been more to the plan than that. Longstreet has been blamed for not attacking the flank, or slow too, causing the attack to fail. Hess, in his book,"Picketts Charge" give little credence to that theory saying that a flanking attack would have been doomed to failure. I agree. Picketts charge was no surprise attack, the Union was expecting it and had made good preparations. They were ready.

It has been said that Stuart would have been destroyed by the Reserve Union forces if he had attacked, perhaps, but I wonder how much attention was being given to the Unions rear considering what was happening on their Front. To their knowlege, there was no-one in the rear and considering the threat to the front, and the shelling of the Confederates going over the heads of the Unions frontline troops and causing destruction behind the lines, attention would natually have been to the advancing Rebels. As in many things, timing can be all. As the Rebels got to within small arms range and the Confederate artillery paused, if Stuart had come out of nowhere with his Cavlalry charge at that moment it may well have caused a rout. Considering that Picketts charge by itself was heroic and not without some success, maybe Stuart would have been all that was needed to turn the tide.
 
Lee's Plan, Day Three, What Do You Think?

H.B. McClellan, the Asst-Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff of the Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Va. in his "The Life and Campaigns of Major-General JEB Stuart"
writes that "Stuart's Object was to gain position where he would protect the Left of Ewell's corps, and would also be able to observe the enemy's rear and attack in case the Confederate assault on the Federal Lines were successful. He proposed, if opportunity offered, to make a diverson, which might aid the Confederate infantry to carry the heights held by the Federal Army."
In the end Stuart was only able to do his main misson cover Ewell's flank, Custer and Kilpatrick negated any chances of the "diverson.
 
Lee

After the battle , by the account of Gen. Imboden in a 1:00am meeting quoted Lee as saying " I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Picketts Division did today in that grand charge; and if they were supported as they were to have been- but for some reason not fully explained to me, were not-we would have held that position, and the day would have been ours." After a moments pause he added in a loud voice, in a tone almost of agony, "Too bad! Too bad! OH! Too bad!
I do not believe the complexities of Lee's battle plan for that day are known even today. Stuart must have had a place in that attack, not as, after the fact support, but in the actual execution.
 
Lee's Plan, Day Three; What Do You Think?

According to McClellan, Stuart, proposed (presumeably to Lee) to attempt a diverson to aid the infantry assault "if opportunity offered". Kilpatrick and Custer gave no such opportunity.
We have already discussed the sad state of Stuarts horses and men and it is likely that what McClellan reports was about all that could be reasonably expected from the Cavalry with one days rest.
As indicated by Lee, it was inadequate support from his artillery and Hill and Longstreet, that sealed Pickett's fate.
 
Dear David1941 and List Members;

According to Colonel Walter H. Taylor, in his book Four Years with General Lee; concerning the Pennsylvania Campaign; pg. 102-103;
In summary, said that General Lee's plan to attack on July 3rd remained unchanged although he was aware that General Longstreet's commanders were having doubts to the attack planned. "Thus General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected." General Ewell was to cooperate with General Longstreet; General Johnson who's division was on the extreme left overnight, was ordered forward early the next morning--before Longstreet's delay was to be an issue; Ewell wasn't able to communicate these changes to Johnson as he became hotly engaged thus Johnson was engaged before the whole 'plan' of attack was measured and could be 'a big fist.' General Johnson having this hot engagement couldn't carry the hill as hoped via Lee's plan. Johnson was forced to retreat to his old position.

Colonel Taylor further comments, [Ref. page 108]; that Lee and Longstreet were debating on the mode of attack and the troops to make the charge. General A. P. Hill was on Longstreet's right; to support Longstreet. And this is interesting to me--> "Orders were sent to General Hill to place Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's at General Longstreet's disposal, and to be prepared to give him further assistance if requested. It should be mentioned, General AP Hill had challenged General Longstreet to a duel earlier in the war.

In the footnotes of Four Years with General Lee-pg. 103; Colonel Venable is to be quoted- "They were terribly mistaken about Heth's division in this planning. It had not recuperated, having suffered more than was reported on the first day. Heth had suffered heavily on the 1st, before Pender and Rodes got up. He had gone almost into Gettysburg. Rodes found dead Mississippians on the wooded hill just above the town. C.S.V.

On page 104, Four Years with General Lee; Taylor writes--4th paragraph; "To one who observed the charge, it appeared that Pettigrew's line was not a continuation of that of Pickett's, but that it advanced in echelon. It seems that there was some confusion in forming the troops, for Captain Louis G. Young, of General Pettigrew's staff says:
[excerpt]--> Talking about Pettigrew -->"who (Longstreet) directed him (Pettigrew)to form in the rear of of Pickett's Division, and support his advance upon Cemetery Hill, which would commence as soon as the fire from our artillery should have driven the enemy from his guns..etc."

On page 107, it is written that Pettigrew's troops faltered--so; there is a lot of little nuggets that explains the failure of support for Pickett's charge.

There is also the explaination of the ground where the troops had to walk exposed to Federal guns. Apparently a 'dip' in the ground wasn't known and this effected distance and timing. [Ref. pg. 107] So, much like the canal at Fredericksburg; Lee's troops in a reverse situation would have such ground--not a fluid slope upwards but a dip that apparently didn't effect the entire line--just some of it.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
 
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