Lee's - Last Chance To Save A Nation.

I guess I just dont see how the North could control every mile of the river and not let some supplies get snuck across. But maybe they patroled the river more than I'm aware of.
 
Mississippi

tackitt27 said:
Just a couple questions on Vicksburg if I may. I for one dont think saving Vicksburg would have saved the war for the South, and there is no way to get a significant amount of troops to do so very quickly. My questions are this: Was there actually a idea to send Longstreet to Mississippi, and who's idea was it? Also to what significance was the defeat at Vicksburg? I know there were plenty of cannon on the hills surrounding there to keep Northern ships getting to New Orleans. What was the North needing to ship from say St. Louis to New Orleans that was so important?

My impression is the south thought by controlling the Mississippi river, it could keep northern grain from the Midwest off the international markets. Before the war the Midwest grain was shipped down the Mississippi river and then shipped out of New Orleans.

During the war the Midwest farmers were able the use the northern train system to get their grain to the eastern ports and onto the international markets.

The north wanted the Mississippi for they were just slowly putting their stranglehold on the south.
 
5fish said:
Read about those months leading up to that faithful days at Gettysburg and you will see Lee was completely frustrated with Pres. Davis and his mismanagement of the war.

Please post what you believe is Lee "completely frustrated with" Davis.

Regards,
Cash
 
whitworth said:
Well Lee didn't speak very highly of the Confederate deserters, late in the war, and those giving them aid and comfort at home.

Nor did he speak highly of confederate congressmen.

"Well Mr. Custis, I have been up to see the Congress, and they do not seem to be able to do anything except to eat peanuts and chew tobacco while my army is starving." [R. E. Lee to G. W. Custis Lee, March 1865]

There seem to be quite a few folks he said a discouraging word about.

Regards,
Cash
 
cash said:
Nor did he speak highly of confederate congressmen.

"Well Mr. Custis, I have been up to see the Congress, and they do not seem to be able to do anything except to eat peanuts and chew tobacco while my army is starving." [R. E. Lee to G. W. Custis Lee, March 1865]

There seem to be quite a few folks he said a discouraging word about.

Regards,
Cash

Lee was apparently a good judge of character.
 
tackitt27 said:
I guess I just dont see how the North could control every mile of the river and not let some supplies get snuck across. But maybe they patroled the river more than I'm aware of.
It was called "The Thousand Mile Front" and it was defended with a series of Union forts and from Wikipedia:
"After the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863, it became impossible for units to cross the Mississippi since Union gunboats constantly patrolled it. The South thus lost use of its western regions."
 
Prewar Vicksburg figured significantly in river commerce. It served central Mississippi as a supply line. From west of the river, it served northern Louisana and some commerce from Arkansas and Texas but, it was not as important a river port as Memphis and St. Louis.

Without St. Louis and Memphis, Vicksburg couldn't handle the volume needed by the confederacy. Although taking it hurt, it served more as a psychological symbol than a tactical necessity.

Most certainly some supplies leaked across the river. The south no longer had steamers, so what made it was rowed across at night. How much could that be?

ole
 
cash said:
"Well Mr. Custis, I have been up to see the Congress, and they do not seem to be able to do anything except to eat peanuts and chew tobacco while my army is starving." [R. E. Lee to G. W. Custis Lee, March 1865]

I love that quote. It is so real.

-
 
Last Hope

I think a coup was the only hope if Lee or the Military was going to salvage the war effort from Davis incompetent hands...new ideas out there
 
Lee the Tyrant....Most likely I think Lee would have put some other General in charge to run the daily operation of state...Who would he have picked....
 
A very large Amen! Lee gave his allegiance but once. It didn't shift or move about. Just one of the admirable things about Marse Lee.

ole

Wait, didn't Lee first give his allegiance to the Union, then moved against it?

I'd consider that a major shift in allegiance.
 
Sorry, but the whole notion is preposterous.

Regards,
Cash

Yes. You are concise. The whole thing is silly and that is being kind. Not even 1 mention of black slavery or how that was to be dealt with. THE ISSUE. Geeze I tend to freak when that is just left out. What in the hell do people think was going down?
 
After the battle of Chancellorsville the two foes resumed their former positions on the opposite sides of the Rappahannock. The Union armies moral was very low, after suffering another defeat, the Confederates hopes were, in the words of General Alexander, hopes had reached the highest point attained since the beginning of the war.
Lee's force had been increased by a large force of conscripts (The Conscription Act of 16 April).
Longstreet and his two divisions which had been absent at Chancellorsville had rejoined Lee, giving him 272 guns and 76,000 men.
The Army of the Potomac was reduced to 105,000 by battle losses and expiration of terms of service. Grant's force of 75,000 men had Pemberton's 30,000 men bottled up in Vicksburg, while Johnston's 25,000 men was at Canton.
Unless Johnston could be reinforced, or some action taken to force Washington to recall part of Grant's army, Vicksburg was doomed and the Mississippi would be lost.
On May 15 Beauregard suggested to Johnston a plan to submit to the War Department for a "brilliant" summer campaign. About the same date Longstreet when passing through Richmond on his way to rejoin Lee met Sec. of War Seddon with a similar plan.
Longstreet proposed that to take advantage of the interior lines of the Confederacy by transferring his two divisions, 13,000 men, via Lynchburg, Knoxville and Chattanooga along with Johnston's 25,000 from Mississippi and Buckner's 5,000 men from Knoxville to Murfreesboro where Bragg with his 45,000 men were engaged with Rosecrans and his 60,000 Yankees. Longstreet's plan then called for Lee to go west in person, take command and defeat Rosecrans, then to march on Louisville and Cincinnati.
General Alexander in his writing said he believed that if anything would cause Grant's recall from Vicksburg "it would have been this."
" The plan had greater chances of success then those involved crossing the bridgeless Potomac into the heart of the enemy's country, where ammunition and supplies would have to travel 200 miles by wagons, exposed to raids by enemy cavalry from either west or east. In this position, a drawn battle or a victory would leave us compelled to soon find our way back across the Potomac."
Davis was against Longstreet's plan from the start. Davis was obsessed in obtaining foreign intervention and believed that required a decisive victory of the AotP. .
After Longstreet reported to Lee he made the same suggestion, in Longstreet's own words "He reflected over the matter for several days and then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and so threatening Washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result."
Lee and Jackson had planned to try another invasion of Maryland, Jackson had gone so far as to prepare a large scale map of the country from Winchester to the Susquehanna, he even marked the location of farm houses with the names of owners, and if they were slave holders.
So there you have it, it wasn't Lee's plan, it was Longstreet's and will go down as another "what if?" question.
 
After the battle of Chancellorsville the two foes resumed their former positions on the opposite sides of the Rappahannock. The Union armies moral was very low, after suffering another defeat, the Confederates hopes were, in the words of General Alexander, hopes had reached the highest point attained since the beginning of the war.
Lee's force had been increased by a large force of conscripts (The Conscription Act of 16 April).
Longstreet and his two divisions which had been absent at Chancellorsville had rejoined Lee, giving him 272 guns and 76,000 men.
The Army of the Potomac was reduced to 105,000 by battle losses and expiration of terms of service. Grant's force of 75,000 men had Pemberton's 30,000 men bottled up in Vicksburg, while Johnston's 25,000 men was at Canton.
Unless Johnston could be reinforced, or some action taken to force Washington to recall part of Grant's army, Vicksburg was doomed and the Mississippi would be lost.
On May 15 Beauregard suggested to Johnston a plan to submit to the War Department for a "brilliant" summer campaign. About the same date Longstreet when passing through Richmond on his way to rejoin Lee met Sec. of War Seddon with a similar plan.
Longstreet proposed that to take advantage of the interior lines of the Confederacy by transferring his two divisions, 13,000 men, via Lynchburg, Knoxville and Chattanooga along with Johnston's 25,000 from Mississippi and Buckner's 5,000 men from Knoxville to Murfreesboro where Bragg with his 45,000 men were engaged with Rosecrans and his 60,000 Yankees. Longstreet's plan then called for Lee to go west in person, take command and defeat Rosecrans, then to march on Louisville and Cincinnati.
General Alexander in his writing said he believed that if anything would cause Grant's recall from Vicksburg "it would have been this."
" The plan had greater chances of success then those involved crossing the bridgeless Potomac into the heart of the enemy's country, where ammunition and supplies would have to travel 200 miles by wagons, exposed to raids by enemy cavalry from either west or east. In this position, a drawn battle or a victory would leave us compelled to soon find our way back across the Potomac."
Davis was against Longstreet's plan from the start. Davis was obsessed in obtaining foreign intervention and believed that required a decisive victory of the AotP. .
After Longstreet reported to Lee he made the same suggestion, in Longstreet's own words "He reflected over the matter for several days and then fell upon the plan of invading the Northern soil, and so threatening Washington as to bring about the same hoped-for result."
Lee and Jackson had planned to try another invasion of Maryland, Jackson had gone so far as to prepare a large scale map of the country from Winchester to the Susquehanna, he even marked the location of farm houses with the names of owners, and if they were slave holders.
So there you have it, it wasn't Lee's plan, it was Longstreet's and will go down as another "what if?" question.

The proposal that got to Lee from Secretary of War Seddon was to send Pickett's division to the west, which Lee opposed for some very good reasons.

http://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2012/08/03/evaluating-lee-at-gettysburg-part-6-in-a-series/

http://studycivilwar.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/evaluating-lee-at-gettysburg-part-7-in-a-series/

Dick Taylor wrote of Longstreet and Lee: “That any subject involving the possession and exercise of intellect should be clear to Longstreet and concealed from Lee, is a startling proposition to those having knowledge of the two men.” [Richard Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction: Personal Experiences of the Civil War, p. 231]
 
Very good post cash. Is that you in the picture? Richard Taylors' memoir has some very pointed observations of his contemporaries.
 
Lee(and Davis?) were willing to risk a whole army in Pa. and only a Div. in Ms.? If true, then the War was truly lost.
 
Lee(and Davis?) were willing to risk a whole army in Pa. and only a Div. in Ms.? If true, then the War was truly lost.

The Eastern Theater was the most important theater of the war. It was where the confederates could win the war.
 
My post was based on the writings of Gen. Edward Porter Alexander.
http://www.civilwarsignals.org/1st/epalexander/epalexander.html
Perhaps he was mistaken?
I would suggest that Lee's adventure north that ended up at Gettysburg was not an example of good generalship. The whole idea that victory would be theirs if they just defeated the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil was proved wrong at Antietam (which was a draw), and dare I say at Chancellorsville (which was a Southern victory on southern soil). It is obvious that even with a victory the South would still have to retreat to Virginia, just as they did after both previous attempts.
 
My post was based on the writings of Gen. Edward Porter Alexander.
http://www.civilwarsignals.org/1st/epalexander/epalexander.html
Perhaps he was mistaken?
I would suggest that Lee's adventure north that ended up at Gettysburg was not an example of good generalship. The whole idea that victory would be theirs if they just defeated the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil was proved wrong at Antietam (which was a draw), and dare I say at Chancellorsville (which was a Southern victory). It is obvious that even with a victory the South would still have to retreat to Virginia, just as they did after both previous attempts.

Antietam was a draw, as you say, so it cannot be claimed that Antietam proved wrong the idea that "victory would be theirs if they just defeated the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil." Chancellorsville was not on "Northern soil," so it also doesn't disprove that idea. An ANV victory in the campaign would more than make up for the loss of Vicksburg.

Given that the Seddon wanted to only transfer Pickett's division to the west, without Lee, what you wrote was not going to happen anyway. If Alexander thought it would, he was wrong. What Alexander talks about in Fighting for the Confederacy was Longstreet taking his corps west with Longstreet in command. Alexander certainly doesn't consider the raid into Pennsylvania not to be an example of good generalship. He did believe moving Longstreet to the west was a better move, but it is arguable whether it really was better or not. Given that Hooker had recently gotten a reinforcement of 30,000 troops, how is weakening the ANV the better move?
 
Exactly! Even a victory the size of Chancellorsville on Southern soil did not bring about the
victorious end result! Lee did not have the logistical ability to carry out a prolonged pursuit of a already defeated Union army when that army was retreating from Virginia to Washington!
But somehow he thought he did have the logistical ability to invade Pennsylvania or Maryland and do what?
By the time of Antietam the North had already invaded and occupied many Southern cities.
Surely a man as smart as Lee knew his limitations, if he didn't then he wasn't a man as smart as Lee, was he? After all, isn't that one of Napoleons maxims?
Or was it, never believe your own press clippings? I always get them mixed up. ;-)
 
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