- Joined
- Feb 27, 2017
- Location
- Ohio
Robert E. Lee knew that the Confederacy's chances of winning the war and establishing independence grew less as time went by. He also knew that his best chance of gaining a military victory was the seize and maintain the initiative. Lee understood that the invasion of Maryland (or liberation, if you prefer) provided his best chance of victory.
Lee held the initiative in Maryland up until McClellan's attacks at South Mountain on September 14. Lee withdrew from South Mountain on the 15th fully intending to recross the Potomac where he could reunite his scattered commands in Virginia. However, upon receiving word from Jackson that Harper's Ferry would surrender, Lee reconsidered his options.
Lee decided to make a stand at Sharpsburg on the 15th in the belief that he could reunite his army there and then move north on the road to Hagerstown. This would allow him to resume his campaign of maneuver in Maryland and Pennsylvania. In a campaign of maneuver, Lee knew he and his army held the advantage.
Lee surely made this decision with a full appreciation of his opponent, knowing the deliberate McClellan would not rush into any attack against his strong defensive position on the hills around Sharpsburg. It is also likely that he underestimated the time it would take to reunite his army at Sharpsburg. Similarly, he had underestimated the amount of time it would take Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry.
Lee's decision to make a stand at Sharpsburg allowed him to reseize the initiative (or, probably more accurately, the initiative hung in the balance). Lee has been criticized for making a stand with a river at his back. Defeat at Sharpsburg could be disastrous for the Army of the Northern Virginia and the Confederate cause. Lee's decision to make a stand were influenced by several other factors:
1. Lee likely did not fully understand how weak his army had become due to struggling, nor it's level of exhaustion.
2. Lee did understand that Antietam Creek provided an important barrier between his army and McClellan's, one that would slow down his already cautious opponent.
3. Lee was confident that if he could reseize the initiative from McClellan, he had an excellent chance to resume his campaign, which he believed was the best chance for Confederate victory in the war.
Lee's decision to stand and fight was a calculated gamble, but his calculations were based on faulty information regarding the combat readiness of his own army.
Lee held the initiative in Maryland up until McClellan's attacks at South Mountain on September 14. Lee withdrew from South Mountain on the 15th fully intending to recross the Potomac where he could reunite his scattered commands in Virginia. However, upon receiving word from Jackson that Harper's Ferry would surrender, Lee reconsidered his options.
Lee decided to make a stand at Sharpsburg on the 15th in the belief that he could reunite his army there and then move north on the road to Hagerstown. This would allow him to resume his campaign of maneuver in Maryland and Pennsylvania. In a campaign of maneuver, Lee knew he and his army held the advantage.
Lee surely made this decision with a full appreciation of his opponent, knowing the deliberate McClellan would not rush into any attack against his strong defensive position on the hills around Sharpsburg. It is also likely that he underestimated the time it would take to reunite his army at Sharpsburg. Similarly, he had underestimated the amount of time it would take Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry.
Lee's decision to make a stand at Sharpsburg allowed him to reseize the initiative (or, probably more accurately, the initiative hung in the balance). Lee has been criticized for making a stand with a river at his back. Defeat at Sharpsburg could be disastrous for the Army of the Northern Virginia and the Confederate cause. Lee's decision to make a stand were influenced by several other factors:
1. Lee likely did not fully understand how weak his army had become due to struggling, nor it's level of exhaustion.
2. Lee did understand that Antietam Creek provided an important barrier between his army and McClellan's, one that would slow down his already cautious opponent.
3. Lee was confident that if he could reseize the initiative from McClellan, he had an excellent chance to resume his campaign, which he believed was the best chance for Confederate victory in the war.
Lee's decision to stand and fight was a calculated gamble, but his calculations were based on faulty information regarding the combat readiness of his own army.