Lee's Desicion to Stand & Fight at Sharpsburg

Andy Cardinal

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Robert E. Lee knew that the Confederacy's chances of winning the war and establishing independence grew less as time went by. He also knew that his best chance of gaining a military victory was the seize and maintain the initiative. Lee understood that the invasion of Maryland (or liberation, if you prefer) provided his best chance of victory.

Lee held the initiative in Maryland up until McClellan's attacks at South Mountain on September 14. Lee withdrew from South Mountain on the 15th fully intending to recross the Potomac where he could reunite his scattered commands in Virginia. However, upon receiving word from Jackson that Harper's Ferry would surrender, Lee reconsidered his options.

Lee decided to make a stand at Sharpsburg on the 15th in the belief that he could reunite his army there and then move north on the road to Hagerstown. This would allow him to resume his campaign of maneuver in Maryland and Pennsylvania. In a campaign of maneuver, Lee knew he and his army held the advantage.

Lee surely made this decision with a full appreciation of his opponent, knowing the deliberate McClellan would not rush into any attack against his strong defensive position on the hills around Sharpsburg. It is also likely that he underestimated the time it would take to reunite his army at Sharpsburg. Similarly, he had underestimated the amount of time it would take Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry.

Lee's decision to make a stand at Sharpsburg allowed him to reseize the initiative (or, probably more accurately, the initiative hung in the balance). Lee has been criticized for making a stand with a river at his back. Defeat at Sharpsburg could be disastrous for the Army of the Northern Virginia and the Confederate cause. Lee's decision to make a stand were influenced by several other factors:

1. Lee likely did not fully understand how weak his army had become due to struggling, nor it's level of exhaustion.

2. Lee did understand that Antietam Creek provided an important barrier between his army and McClellan's, one that would slow down his already cautious opponent.

3. Lee was confident that if he could reseize the initiative from McClellan, he had an excellent chance to resume his campaign, which he believed was the best chance for Confederate victory in the war.

Lee's decision to stand and fight was a calculated gamble, but his calculations were based on faulty information regarding the combat readiness of his own army.
 
McClellan dealt a major blow to Lee's intentions when he ordered Hooker to cross the Antietam on September 16. Hooker's movement threatened Lee's intended movement north along the Hagerstown Pike, which he would undertake once his army was reunited.

The early morning attack by Hooker's and Mansfield's corps on September 17 shifted the initiative back to McClellan. Summer's march into the West Woods could have been a decisive moment, but the very successful counterattack by McLaws and the other Confederate reinforcements sent north ended this threat and shifted the initiative back into the balance. The attack on the Sunken Road represented another opportunity for McClellan to seize the initiative once and for all, but the Confederates hung on, McClellan did not or could not press his opportunity, and the initiative remained in the balance.

It was at this point that Lee planned an attack on the Federal right. This attempt came to naught, in large part to the overwhelming artillery force Sumner had organized on the northern end of the field. Lee still did not give up, however, and his decision to stay in position on September 18 was made in part because he fully intended to make such a move on the 18th. It was only when Lee acknowledged the impossibility of making such a move that he finally decided to retreat across the Potomac -- although at this point he intended to recross the river at Williamsport and resume his campaign.
 
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Lee's decision to stand and fight at Sharpsburg has been criticized as foolhardy, especially by E. Porter Alexander (for example), who in hindsight called the battle unnecessary and one that risked the "utter destruction of his army." "So he fought when he could have avoided it," Alexander wrote, "& where he had nothing to make & everything to lose -- which a general should not do."

My point in all this.... I was reading about another battle in another war which called Lee's intentions to mind. The situation is not completely the same, of course, but George Washington made a similar stand with his back to a river on January 2, 1777. He held the British army at bay, his own army taking position behind Assunpink Creek. On the night of the 2nd, Washington put his army in motion, moved around Cornwallis's flank, and struck at Princeton the next morning. This audacious move likely saved the Revolutionary cause.

I am not suggesting that Lee had this particular episode in mind when he decided to make a stand at Sharpsburg. However, Lee's decision has been criticized more often than not as unnecessary, even foolish. My point is more to the effect that what Lee planned could have worked, as it had in the past. The biggest difference between the two situations, aside from the size of the armies, was that Washington and the American cause was at its lowest point at the end of 1776. Washington gambled knowing he had to do so or the cause was lost. In contrast, the Confederate cause was at its arguable peak in September 1862. It is a measure of Lee's belief that time was not on his side, I believe, that convinced him that it was necessary to take such an audacious gamble.
 
Lee's decision to stand and fight at Sharpsburg has been criticized as foolhardy, especially by E. Porter Alexander (for example), who in hindsight called the battle unnecessary and one that risked the "utter destruction of his army." "So he fought when he could have avoided it," Alexander wrote, "& where he had nothing to make & everything to lose -- which a general should not do."

My point in all this.... I was reading about another battle in another war which called Lee's intentions to mind. The situation is not completely the same, of course, but George Washington made a similar stand with his back to a river on January 2, 1777. He held the British army at bay, his own army taking position behind Assunpink Creek. On the night of the 2nd, Washington put his army in motion, moved around Cornwallis's flank, and struck at Princeton the next morning. This audacious move likely saved the Revolutionary cause.

I am not suggesting that Lee had this particular episode in mind when he decided to make a stand at Sharpsburg. However, Lee's decision has been criticized more often than not as unnecessary, even foolish. My point is more to the effect that what Lee planned could have worked, as it had in the past. The biggest difference between the two situations, aside from the size of the armies, was that Washington and the American cause was at its lowest point at the end of 1776. Washington gambled knowing he had to do so or the cause was lost. In contrast, the Confederate cause was at its arguable peak in September 1862. It is a measure of Lee's belief that time was not on his side, I believe, that convinced him that it was necessary to take such an audacious gamble.

Interesting set of posts. Here are a few comments and thoughts.

Lee studied military history, more than most West Pointers did. While he was Superintendant at West Point in the 1850s, Lee was an active member of the Napoleonic discussion group there. He would have been familiar with a number of actions that might look familiar to his decision at Antietam; the holding action of Saint-Cyr at Dresden in 1813 against the Austrians and Russians, with Napoleon arriving to counterattack on the second day, might look similar. He would also have been familiar with Washington's action at Trenton.

Lee's position at Antietam is very strong. While I am impressed by his audacity in holding on the 16th, no one speaks about how that position looked from the other side. There is no easy way to attack it at an advantage. It is hard to know how strong Lee actually was if you are sitting over on the other side of Antietam Creek. There are woods and rough terrain between his front line and the Potomac: any number of reserves might lie hidden there. Lee, standing there undaunted, daring the AoP to attack him, was an imposing sight from the Union ranks.

In September 1862, the Confederate military was in flood:
  • Lee had just driven McClellan from the gates of Richmond and smashed Pope at 2nd Manassas
  • Bragg and Kirby Smith had invaded Kentucky, driving the Union back on Louisville and Cincinnati.
  • Van Dorn and Price had advanced, threatening Corinth and Nashville
Instead of being at the brink of disaster as the Rebel cause seemed at Christmas 1776, the Confederacy seemed to be sweeping to victory. Lee's thinking would have included the possibility that a daring victory North of the Potomac at just that time might actually have won the war for the Confederacy, or brought about some sort of negotiated settlement through British/French intervention/mediation.
 
In light of Lee's actions throughout the war, his stand at Antietam is probably not surprising. He had recently finished a brilliant campaign at Manassas, in which he took the risky decision to divide his forces, caused havoc in the enemy's rear, and ultimately concentrated his corps to deliver a powerful blow to a befuddled enemy led by John Pope. In the Maryland campaign, Lee once again divided his forces, in part to deal with the garrison at Harpers Ferry and secure his supply lines. The difference with Manassas is of course, the unanticipated movement by McClellan to the South Mountain passes after discovering Special Order 191. Nevertheless, Lee once again concentrated his corps at Sharpsburg and eked out a tactical split decision in the nick of time.
 
At the Seven Days, Lee defeated McClellan’s army primarily because Lee’s audacity inhibited McClellan by projecting a false image of an enormous confederate army.

As long as McClellan believes that Lee outnumbers him, then McClellan will be cautious and timid, but if he thinks that Lee’s army is significantly inferior to his own, then McClellan will be more aggressive.

In Maryland, if Longstreet and D.H. Hill rush back across the Potomac to reunite with the rest of the army, then it might suggest to McClellan that the confederates are not as numerous as he had feared, so he will be more aggressive when they eventually do battle again, but if Lee stays in Maryland with a huge river at his back, after just having been defeated at South Mountain, then he must still have a formidable force, so McClellan will be more cautious, giving Lee an advantage.

This strategy worked successfully at the Seven Days, and would have worked in Maryland if Lee’s army had fought better at Antietam.
 
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At the Seven Days, Lee defeated McClellan’s army primarily because Lee’s audacity inhibited McClellan by projecting a false image that the confederate army was enormous.

McClellan's estimates are much more accurate than thought. There is a reference in Fyre to the number of rations issued to Lee's army at Richmond on 21st June 1862 (i.e. after Lee sent reinforcements to Jackson, but before Jackson arrived). It was 128,000 rations. Having run regression curves of every trimonthly strength report in the OR, this fits perfectly.

Jackson arrived, not only with his two divisions, but also Whitings' Division and Lawton's brigade, detached from Richmond. These totaled ca. 30,000 present (which was the estimate).

Hence, Lee's army at the time of the Seven Days really was much larger than McClellan's.

Lee's initial success was because Jackson's 30,000 came from the north and crossed the Totopotomoy "behind" Porter's defensive line in such strength that it couldn't be blocked because Lee had fixed Porter at Beaver Dam Creek. Once this happens there is very little that could have been done to keep McClellan in place, because the supply base is untenable, and the army has to be moved to a place it can be fed.

As long as McClellan believes that Lee outnumbers him, then McClellan will be cautious and timid, but if he thinks that Lee’s army is significantly inferior to his own, then McClellan will be more aggressive.

McClellan had an estimate in hand that essentially said Lee's force was roughly equal to what he had.

In Maryland, if Longstreet and D.H. Hill rush back south of the Potomac to unite with the rest of the army, then it might suggest to McClellan that the confederates are not as numerous as he had feared, so he will be more aggressive when they eventually do battle, but if Lee stays in Maryland with a huge river at his back, after being defeated at South Mountain, then he must still have a formidable force, so McClellan will be more cautious, giving Lee an advantage.

McClellan knew Lee was divided, and he'd caught a fragment of it before it could reconcentrate. Hence McClellan was extremely aggressive once a large part of his army had arrived, launching his attacks well before his own army had concentrated. His aggression is of course a source of criticism in a "damned if you do and damned if you don't" manner.

This strategy worked successfully at the Seven Days, and would have worked in Maryland if Lee’s army had fought better at Antietam.

During the Seven Days Lee did have a larger army, and had leveraged this into breaking the Federal supply lines and forcing they to move to a river where food (and bullets) can be landed. Now, McClellan of course advanced to Antietam out of supply because Lee's troops had trashed the bridge over the Monocacy. This severely impacted on his ability to conduct operations, as his artillery essentially ran out of ammunition and his infantry had little food.

Once Lee is at Sharpsburg, the best he can hope for is to reopen the Hagerstown Pike and march north.
 
Antietam was basically the real high water mark of the Confederacy in the East second only to Perryville in the West given that they were in Maryland and Kentucky as well as attempts to retake the Mississippi cities of Iuka and Corinth and the upcoming operations in western Tennessee coupled with Britain and France watching on the sidelines whether to meditate in the conflict depending on the military prospects and if another great defeat is inflicted on the Union.

I don't think Antietam could be won by Lee because by this point McClellan will have had the full idea of the extant of the Army of Northern Virginia thanks to Special Order 191 (before that only the cavalry gave him a clue about the ANV) and the Battle of South Mountain was already fought.
 
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Lee's move into Maryland was part of a coordinated move by the South across all fronts.
At Antietam he has his right at Harper's Ferry. He needs the supplies for the expected sympathizers from Maryland and the conscripts he has received. This will take time.
On Lee's left is Longstreet and and the army's baggage and wagons. They are poised to move into Pennsylvania.
Lee has a thin screen across his front in the South Mountain.
McClellan has no idea until handed primo info. He wisely hits Lee's center, the weak spot. Lee's reaction speed from here?
 
Had Lee withdrawn the army back into Virginia the moment Harper's Ferry fell, the whole campaign would have had the appearance of a very successful raid.
The confederates needed the House to flip Democratic. I don’t think a successful raid would have been enough. Lee’s army had to be on union soil on Election Day.
 
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The confederates needed the House to flip Democratic. I don’t think a successful raid would have been enough. Lee’s army had to be on union soil on Election Day.
Yeah that's why Antietam was important because it along with subsequent battles in Mississippi and Kentucky stopped the House of Representatives from flipping fully to Democrat although there was fair amount of dissatisfaction by voters over the progress of the war and leadership.
 
McClellan's estimates are much more accurate than thought. There is a reference in Fyre to the number of rations issued to Lee's army at Richmond on 21st June 1862 (i.e. after Lee sent reinforcements to Jackson, but before Jackson arrived). It was 128,000 rations. Having run regression curves of every trimonthly strength report in the OR, this fits perfectly.

Jackson arrived, not only with his two divisions, but also Whitings' Division and Lawton's brigade, detached from Richmond. These totaled ca. 30,000 present (which was the estimate).

Hence, Lee's army at the time of the Seven Days really was much larger than McClellan's.

Even using those modern, high-end estimates of Lee’s numbers, McClellan was still over-reporting southern forces. During the Seven Days, he told Lincoln that he was facing 200,000 confederates. He must have either been intentionally overestimating the size of Lee’s army to Washington, or he had been tricked into believing that Lee’s army was much bigger than it really was.

McClellan had an estimate in hand that essentially said Lee's force was roughly equal to what he had.

When? Where? On September 11, three days before the battles of South Mountain, McClellan reports to Washington that he’s facing 120,000 confederates in Maryland.

McClellan knew Lee was divided, and he'd caught a fragment of it before it could reconcentrate. Hence McClellan was extremely aggressive once a large part of his army had arrived, launching his attacks well before his own army had concentrated. His aggression is of course a source of criticism in a "****ed if you do and ****ed if you don't" manner.

If you’re referring to Antietam, then “extremely aggressive”, to me, would mean launching all four corps simultaneously at dawn instead of holding back two corps until the fighting looked favorable. When the battle began, five of McClellan’s six corps were in the vicinity of Antietam creek, and the 6th Corps was about 4 or 5 hours away. That’s pretty close to fully concentrated.

If you’re referring to South Mountain, McClellan’s whole army was concentrated at Frederick (or west of it) on the night of the 13th. My idea of “extremely aggressive” would be sending more than a fraction of one corps across the Catoctin mountains that night.
 
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Even using those modern, high-end estimates of Lee’s numbers, McClellan was still over-reporting southern forces. During the Seven Days, he told Lincoln that he was facing 200,000 confederates. He must have either been intentionally overestimating the size of Lee’s army to Washington, or he had been tricked into believing that Lee’s army was much bigger than it really was.

He was overestimating, and the estimates contained two errors:

1. 36 extra regiments.

There were 36 infantry regiments listed in Pinkerton's dossiers that weren't at Richmond. These served to inflate the estimate by around 25,000 present. The estimate of the force drawing 128,000 rations was 150,000, and that force included the extra regiments.

2. Beauregard

They'd been a longstanding rumour out of Washington that Beauregard's army from Corinth was going to Richmond, at least in part. Federal intelligence had lost track of it, only knowing it had entrained eastwards. Of course, we know with hindsight it stopped at Chattanooga, which is on the line to Richmond (or rather Petersburg) via the Tennessee and Virginia RR. Beauregard himself was confirmed to be in Richmond, adding fuel to the rumours.

McClellan himself doubted this, which is why he qualified the estimate of 200,000 (150,000 at Richmond, 30,000 under Jackson and 20,000 from Beauregard) to Lincoln and later rolled back on it when it was clear it wasn't true.

What is true is that McClellan was absolutely outnumbered at Richmond. The question is by what margin?

When? Where? On September 11, three days before the battles of South Mountain, McClellan reports to Washington that he’s facing 120,000 confederates in Maryland.

Which is consistent with the estimate of 96,445 PFD he had in hand. Conversion to aggregate present, the figure normally reported, was x6/5ths. This estimate of 96,445 (120,000) is actually reasonably good, although it has a flawed input. What it misses is that Lee left a large division behind at Richmond under GW Smith to defend the city.

If you’re referring to Antietam, then “extremely aggressive”, to me, would mean launching all four corps simultaneously at dawn instead of holding back two corps until the fighting looked favorable. When the battle began, five of McClellan’s six corps were in the vicinity of Antietam creek, and the 6th Corps was about 4 or 5 hours away. That’s pretty close to fully concentrated.

The battle began on the early afternoon of the 16th, with orders to Burnside to attack with his 9th Corps against the bridge ASAP, and for Hooker to attack the enemy left with his 1st Corps. At that time McClellan's forces on the field were roughly:

1st Corps on the right
Sykes' Division and Richardson's Division in the centre
9th Corps on the left
Sedgwick's and French's divisions in reserve

The 12th Corps, Morell's Division, 6th Corps, Couch's Division and Humphreys' Division were still marching towards the Antietam. The van was 12th Corps, which arrived mid-afternoon and was immediately sent to reinforce Hooker. Morell and the 6th Corps arrived during the 17th, and Couch and Humphreys arrived on the 18th.

Launching simultaneously is essentially impossible, because there are defiles to cross. It takes roughly an hour to pass one division over a bridge. The Burnside Bridge is defended. West of the Porter Bridge is a bare killing area, where attackers have to march over a mile to reach the enemy under heavy artillery bombardment. Hence McClellan pushed much of his assault over the Pry Bridge, which was in near constant use from the afternoon of the 16th (1st and 12th Corps) though to early afternoon on the 17th (2nd, then 6th Corps).

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If you’re referring to South Mountain, McClellan’s whole army was concentrated at Frederick (or west of it) on the night of the 13th. My idea of “extremely aggressive” would be sending more than a fraction of one corps across the Catoctin mountains that night.[/QUOTE]

Nope, only 9th Corps was west of Frederick. The dispositions were:

9th Corps: 2 divisions had crossed the Catoctins via the Braddock Pass into the Catoctin Valley and camped at Middletown behind Catoctin Creek. A third division didn't get through the pass before nightfall, and encamped awaiting enough light to ascend the mountain. Rodman's division had seized the Jefferson Pass and, after being relieved by the advance elements of 6th Corps, had gone back though Frederick towards the Braddock Pass.

1st Corps: East of Frederick, awaiting 9th Corps to clear the roads. The Corps is awakened at 0300 on the morning of the 13th, and around 0500 Rodman's division has cleared the road and 1st Corps starts following, first through Frederick, then via the Braddock Pass etc.

Sykes' regulars and the artillery reserve: East of Frederick. Their march orders were to follow 1st Corps, which they did on the morning of the 14th.

2nd Corps: The 2nd Corps was southeast of Frederick (at Frederick two roads merge) and had to wait for the 1st Corps, Sykes and the artillery reserve to get through Frederick. At 0900 (14th) the tail of that column got through Frederick, and Sumner started moving. He was redirected via the smaller Shookstown Road over the Catoctins to get around the traffic jam at the Braddock Pass, but this road was so small that it delayed him considerably.

12th Corps: Behind the 2nd Corps SE of Frederick at the Ijamsville Crossroads. It's movement on the 14th was constrained by waiting for 2nd Corps to get out of the way, and they didn't get past Frederick on the 14th. They marched through Frederick on the morning of the 15th, reaching South Mountain that day. On the 16th they went through SM and reached the vicinity of the creek mid- to late afternoon. They were immediately tasked to reinforce Hooker on arriving on the field.

6th Corps: On the 13th the 6th Corps started marching for the Jefferson Pass at 2000 hours. They relieved Rodman's division around 2200, which then marched through Frederick to rejoin 9th Corps.
 
Which is consistent with the estimate of 96,445 PFD he had in hand. Conversion to aggregate present, the figure normally reported, was x6/5ths. This estimate of 96,445 (120,000) is actually reasonably good, although it has a flawed input. What it misses is that Lee left a large division behind at Richmond under GW Smith to defend the city.

According to Stephen W. Sears (George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, page 321), McClellan’s estimate of 97,445 confederates came after the battle was over.

The battle began on the early afternoon of the 16th, with orders to Burnside to attack with his 9th Corps against the bridge ASAP, and for Hooker to attack the enemy left with his 1st Corps.

Strange that neither McClellan nor Burnside would mention this September 16 attack order for the 9th Corps in any of their reports.

Nope, only 9th Corps was west of Frederick. The dispositions were:

9th Corps: 2 divisions had crossed the Catoctins via the Braddock Pass into the Catoctin Valley and camped at Middletown behind Catoctin Creek. A third division didn't get through the pass before nightfall, and encamped awaiting enough light to ascend the mountain. Rodman's division had seized the Jefferson Pass and, after being relieved by the advance elements of 6th Corps, had gone back though Frederick towards the Braddock Pass.

1st Corps: East of Frederick, awaiting 9th Corps to clear the roads. The Corps is awakened at 0300 on the morning of the 13th, and around 0500 Rodman's division has cleared the road and 1st Corps starts following, first through Frederick, then via the Braddock Pass etc.

Sykes' regulars and the artillery reserve: East of Frederick. Their march orders were to follow 1st Corps, which they did on the morning of the 14th.

2nd Corps: The 2nd Corps was southeast of Frederick (at Frederick two roads merge) and had to wait for the 1st Corps, Sykes and the artillery reserve to get through Frederick. At 0900 (14th) the tail of that column got through Frederick, and Sumner started moving. He was redirected via the smaller Shookstown Road over the Catoctins to get around the traffic jam at the Braddock Pass, but this road was so small that it delayed him considerably.

12th Corps: Behind the 2nd Corps SE of Frederick at the Ijamsville Crossroads. It's movement on the 14th was constrained by waiting for 2nd Corps to get out of the way, and they didn't get past Frederick on the 14th. They marched through Frederick on the morning of the 15th, reaching South Mountain that day. On the 16th they went through SM and reached the vicinity of the creek mid- to late afternoon. They were immediately tasked to reinforce Hooker on arriving on the field.

6th Corps: On the 13th the 6th Corps started marching for the Jefferson Pass at 2000 hours. They relieved Rodman's division around 2200, which then marched through Frederick to rejoin 9th Corps.

I said, “McClellan’s whole army was concentrated at Frederick (or west of it) on the night of the 13th.” From McClellan’s Final Report:

“On the night of the 13th the positions of the different corps were as follows:

Reno's [9th] corps at Middletown [west of Frederick] except Rodman's division at Frederick. Hooker's [1st] corps on the Monocacy, 2 miles from Frederick. Sumner's [2nd] corps near Frederick. Banks' [12th] corps near Frederick. Sykes' division [of 5th Corps] near Frederick. Franklin's [6th] corps at Buckeystown [3 miles south of Frederick]. Couch's division [of 4th Corps] at Licksville [12 miles south of Frederick].”
 
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According to Stephen W. Sears (George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, page 321), McClellan’s estimate of 97,445 confederates came after the battle was over.

No, the copy in the OR was made later by a staffer.

Strange that neither McClellan nor Burnside would mention this September 16 order for the 9th Corps to attack in any of their reports.

McClellan was Burnside's friend. He engaged in a cover-up after Antietam trying to protect his friend, although his writings to his wife make it clear he considered not doing this and letting Burnside take the blame for his failures. Burnside and Cox, reacting to an oral order given to Burnside during his 1100-1200 meeting with McClellan, didn't even start to move units forward until 1530 hrs (16th), and they were still not on the LD at dawn on the 17th. This lead to an official rebuke out of McClellan's HQ for his failure to carry out his orders, but it was not mentioned in either AAR. McClellan was protecting his friend, and Burnside was protecting himself.

I said, “McClellan’s whole army was concentrated at Frederick (or west of it) on the night of the 13th.” From McClellan’s Final Report:

“On the night of the 13th the positions of the different corps were as follows:

Reno's [9th] corps at Middletown [west of Frederick] except Rodman's division at Frederick. Hooker's [1st] corps on the Monocacy, 2 miles from Frederick. Sumner's [2nd] corps near Frederick. Banks' [12th] corps near Frederick. Sykes' division [of 5th Corps] near Frederick. Franklin's [6th] corps at Buckeystown [3 miles south of Frederick]. Couch's division [of 4th Corps] at Licksville [12 miles south of Frederick].”

Yes, and apart from 9th Corps all had not yet passed through Frederick. At Frederick the roads converge and become a defile. It took Lee three days to move his army through Frederick, and now it took McClellan's similarly sized force also three days to pass through it.
 
No, the copy in the OR was made later by a staffer.

That was when it was first calculated, according to Sears. Do you have evidence that proves it was compiled before Antietam?

McClellan was Burnside's friend. He engaged in a cover-up after Antietam trying to protect his friend, although his writings to his wife make it clear he considered not doing this and letting Burnside take the blame for his failures.

On what evidence are you basing this conspiracy theory?

Yes, and apart from 9th Corps all had not yet passed through Frederick. At Frederick the roads converge and become a defile. It took Lee three days to move his army through Frederick, and now it took McClellan's similarly sized force also three days to pass through it.

The head of McClellan’s army arrived in Frederick at midday on September 13. 18 hours later, only 3 small divisions of the 9th Corps were west of Frederick. That’s quite a bottleneck.
 
The head of McClellan’s army arrived in Frederick at midday on September 13. 18 hours later, only 3 small divisions of the 9th Corps were west of Frederick. That’s quite a bottleneck.

Yes, it is. One narrow road, going through a town. Beyond that town is a mountain to climb and pass over...

Here are the rebels marching through Frederick:

768px-Confederates_marching_through_Frederick%2C_MD_in_1862.jpg
 
... although his writings to his wife make it clear he considered not doing this and letting Burnside take the blame for his failures.

I vaguely remember reading this before but don't know where. Do you recall the source for this letter? If it's from Sears' collection of McClellan's papers, do you have a page number/time frame? Thanks.
 
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