Lee north of the Potomac until September 1863?

Joined
Jul 30, 2020
Hi all! This is my first thread, apart from the greetings in the section of New Recruits. I have read in an old thread (https://civilwartalk.com/threads/pipe-creek-line-what-if.11919/) that during the Gettysburg campign Lee intended, if Meade did not attack him, to continue foraging in Pennsylvania, behind South Mountain and up-and-down the Cumberland Valley, and that he thought it possible to remain north of the Potomac until September. In this thread it is said that Lee had spoken about that, but I have been unable to found any source about that possibility and plan. So any information would be wellcome.

Best regards,
Juan de Mariana
 
That seems very unlikely. First of all, it is hard to conceive of a scenario where Lee and the ANV are foraging through Pennsylvania from July to September without any serious resistance by Meade and the AOTP. That situation would have been untenable to Lincoln and the administration. Secondly, despite the availability of food and forage locally for some sustenance, Lee would still need to maintain a viable supply line to Virginia for ammunition and needed supplies, a line that would be subject to constant attack and disruption. Finally, placing the ANV north of the Potomac for any length of time would expose northern Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley to possible Union turning movements, which would threaten the rear of the ANV.
 
In his letters to Jefferson Davis in the weeks before the incursion into Pennsylvania Lee’s intentions were made crystal clear.

Wandering around Pennsylvania waiting for the fall harvest was not even mentioned. July is growing time, not harvest time. Hogs were slaughtered in the fall, so farmers were nearing the end of their stored up meat. Grazing horses on green pastures takes hours. Anybody with even a shallow knowledge of farming would have known that subsisting an army for months at a time by foraging was impossible.

Lee’s declared goal was to defeat the AoP, capture Washington & force Lincoln to sue for peace. Wandering around Pennsylvania or fighting a pitched battle in nowhere Pennsylvania was never his plan. All you have to do is read the documentation. It is all there in black & white for all to see.
 
Lee’s declared goal was to defeat the AoP, capture Washington & force Lincoln to sue for peace. Wandering around Pennsylvania or fighting a pitched battle in nowhere Pennsylvania was never his plan. All you have to do is read the documentation. It is all there in black & white for all to see.

In the film Gettysburg perhaps, but not in reality. His reports and correspondence show he had 4 aims:

1. Pull Hooker off the Rappahanock and prevent any offensive by him into central/ SE Va
2. Reoccupy Winchester and restore the food supply from the Shenandoah
3. Force the Federals to pull forces from other areas to reinforce Hooker
4. Supply the army from Pennsylvania, allowing Virginian farmers to stockpile their harvest

There was no general idea of fighting a general engagement in the north at all. In fact Lee wished to avoid an engagement against the enemy main body. Gettysburg happened because Lee thought he'd caught a wing of the enemy army and could destroy it.
 
Not long before the Gettysburg Campaign began, rations for the Army of Northern Virginia were being reduced. In spite of its tactical victory at Chancellorsville, the Confederates on the south side of the Rappahannock were in serious need of supplies. The farms in Virginia had been the scene of considerable Southern success, but after two years of warfare, they were also devastated. In his fine work "A Study in Command" Edwin Coddington says, ". . . y luring the Army of the Potomac out of Virginia Lee would give his people a respite from the ravages of war and a chance to harvest their crops free from interruption by military operations." Coddington cites Armistead Long and also the Papers of Charles Marshall, a member of Lee's staff. If there was an intent to allow Virginia farmers a chance to harvest some crops, then it seems reasonable to infer that Lee intended to keep the federals entertained north of the Potomac much longer than he was able to do.

Clearly, whether it was harvest season or not, Lee intended to obtain supplies north of the Potomac. And he did. His benignly worded General Order 72 did nothing to prevent Confederate procurement officers from establishing whatever price they thought was the current market price, and local merchants and farmers were in no position to negotiate with a procurement officer backed up by armed soldiers. Moreover, the Confederates could offer to pay any price, no matter how high, as they paid in either Confederate scrip (which was printed on an as needed basis) or paid with a voucher to be paid by the Confederates States of America at some future time (which for all practical purposes had no chance whatsoever of being redeemed). By way of example, Lee wrote to Confederate President Davis on June 23 indicating that sufficient supplies were in hand north of the Potomac to support Ewell's Corps for a week, and another 1700 barrels of flour were available for the rest of the army. He did say that forage was scarce, but that they would have all the salt they would need. While it is true that harvest time was many weeks away, wheat at least was nearly ripe, and many animals were procured, as were medicines and other stores. Of course there was one item that the Confederates did not pay for along the way, and that was slaves. It is estimated that 100's of black citizens, many born free in Pennsylvania, were seized and sent south to be sold into slavery.

None of this suggests that Lee did not intend to win a significant victory in the North. The overall strategic aim of the Confederate government at this point was to support anything that would induce Northerns to vote Lincoln out of office in 1864, and elect a President that would negotiate a peace with the Confederacy as a separate country. Moreover, a victory over the Army of the Potomac would be the best way to ensure that it did not interfere with Virginia farmers in the summer and fall of 1863.
 
Back
Top