Lee Lee Never Won a Battle Outside of Virginia

Regarding the Peninsula Campaign in the area of Richmond, the base map available was an 1853 map of Henrico County that left out a lot about local roads, etc. Ironically, the Federals probably had better cartography that was prepared by the Topo Engineers during the campaign, using the base map. some other material, and information generated by reconnaissance. During the battles around Richmond late May-July 1, the Army of the Potomac exhibited less confusion about road networks than Lee's army.
And that was one of the lessons Grant had to learn in the west. The roads had to be scouted and at times an order had to specify which road the officer was to follow with his command. Many fewer errors in the Vicksburg campaign.
And by 1864, one of the objects of Sheridan's raid to the outskirts of Richmond was to finish out a map between the wilderness and Richmond. The roads Meade and Grant were going to use for the next 3 weeks had to be located precisely. And the Army of the P had to know all the roads so that they wouldn't be in each others way.
 
And what number does Carman give for Union effectives at Antietam? Because it's not 71,000...


Carman was actually giving effectives engaged (meaning he discounts the unengaged troops on both sides), but in some cases he uses Union numbers which are clearly based on PFD or rejects Confederate numbers to use lower ones without a clear explanation.

For 9th Corps, for example, Carman gives 11,714, while the PFD strength was 13,819. This would indicate a PFD-to-effectives deduction of 15%, much less than the 37% that 1st Corps had (for which we have actual solid data about straggling rate.)

Similarly, Lee's army at Antietam had about 2,000 companies in it, and at 38,000 that would mean 19 men per company - but McClellan's army at Antietam had 2040 companies in it, and at 71,000 that would mean 35 men per company.
Going through Carman's numbers for Lee regiment by regiment produces a figure more like 47,000 effectives on the field, which means more like 23.5 men per company, and using the known 1st Corps PFD to Effectives for the whole Union force produces 26.5 men per company.
Pre-campaign strength for Lee is up around 75,000 PFD by Union definitions, if not more, which puts Lee at around 37 men per company (and McClellan's pre-campaign strength for the units at Antietam on the 17th is around 85,000, putting him around 42 men per company).

There's certainly evidence that some number of men dropped out of Lee's army before it crossed the Potomac, but the evidence that nearly half the army refused to cross is effectively zero. Literally none of the observations we have of the Confederate army in Maryland have a strength lower than 21 men per company (and all the ones which are lower than 30 men per company are Jackson) while if half the army had refused to cross Lee could not have failed to notice it and it would have affected his plans - courting a battle, as he did, would have been monumentally foolish under those circumstances.
You can use what ever numbers you want but the fact remains that McClellan new the disposition and intent of Lee's army before the Battle of Antietam, McClellan had more troops available than Lee at the Battle of Antietam and yet Lee fought a skillful battle that McClellan should have won. That makes for a great general.
 
You can use what ever numbers you want but the fact remains that McClellan new the disposition and intent of Lee's army before the Battle of Antietam, McClellan had more troops available than Lee at the Battle of Antietam and yet Lee fought a skillful battle that McClellan should have won. That makes for a great general.
McClellan did not know the disposition and intent of Lee's army at Antietam. He did know their rough positions for South Mountain, but by Antietam the data from Special Order 191 was no longer predictive of Lee's movements or positions, and certainly not of his intent.


Now, yes, McClellan did have more troops available than Lee (with McClellan's advantage composed of his green troops). Lee was on the defensive.
The outcome of this battle was that Lee suffered more casualties than McClellan, in spite of McClellan suffering from some pretty serious errors in his corps commanders; on a strategic level Lee was unable to continue the invasion of the North. About the main thing you can say is that Lee's army was not either destroyed or outright forced off the field that same day; in this respect Lee actually does worse at Antietam than he does at (say) Spotsylvania.
 
McClellan did not know the disposition and intent of Lee's army at Antietam. He did know their rough positions for South Mountain, but by Antietam the data from Special Order 191 was no longer predictive of Lee's movements or positions, and certainly not of his intent.


Now, yes, McClellan did have more troops available than Lee (with McClellan's advantage composed of his green troops). Lee was on the defensive.
The outcome of this battle was that Lee suffered more casualties than McClellan, in spite of McClellan suffering from some pretty serious errors in his corps commanders; on a strategic level Lee was unable to continue the invasion of the North. About the main thing you can say is that Lee's army was not either destroyed or outright forced off the field that same day; in this respect Lee actually does worse at Antietam than he does at (say) Spotsylvania.
"About the main thing you can say is that Lee's army was not either destroyed or outright forced off the field that same day; in this respect Lee actually does worse at Antietam than he does at (say) Spotsylvania."

Sure. Of course, on the other hand, after Spotsylvania Lee was unable to get away from his opponent to rest and re-fit. Instead, the inexorable movement southward continued until Lee was besieged at Petersburg ....
 
"About the main thing you can say is that Lee's army was not either destroyed or outright forced off the field that same day; in this respect Lee actually does worse at Antietam than he does at (say) Spotsylvania."

Sure. Of course, on the other hand, after Spotsylvania Lee was unable to get away from his opponent to rest and re-fit. Instead, the inexorable movement southward continued until Lee was besieged at Petersburg ....
Which is about the strategic environment that follows, not the outcome of the battle itself. There's a whole separate discussion about what the possibilities are post-Antietam versus the possibilities offered post-Spotsylvania (and the difference between the opportunities for a state and the opportunities for a specific commander), but if we confine ourselves to the battle outcome then a battle can be a victory for these reasons (which I do not claim are exhaustive):


- inflicting more casualties on your opponent and achieving favourable attrition.
Antietam does not qualify (as the casualties were roughly even on both sides). Spotsylvania may qualify (Lee inflicted more casualties but it depends how one defines the attrition rate to be favourable).
- retaining control of the battlefield the day after the fighting.
Both qualify.
- furthering the operational goals of a campaign (yours) or prevnting the goals of an enemy campaign.
Antietam does not qualify because Lee's invasion of the North could not continue after the campaign by that route. Spotsylvania qualifies because it closed off a Union line of advance that the Union had been fighting for (though not the only one available to them).
- furthering the strategic goals of a nation.
Antietam does not qualify because the outcome of the battle, at the very least, did not advance European intervention and did not result in a collapse of Union morale. It furthered none of the ways the Confederates could win the war.
Spotsylvania qualifies in some respects. It caused some of the decline in Union morale which later manifested more fully at Cold Harbor, making it more likely that the Confederates could "run out the clock".

There may be other ways.
 
It would be nice if at least one thread did not go so predictably off the rails.

The OT was Lee never winning a battle outside of Virginia - not everyone's opinion of everyone else's favorite bailiwicks.

Since I'm not the moderator, I merely request we keep the focus of each thread as tight as possible.

Merely a request.

Thanks.
 
Which is about the strategic environment that follows, not the outcome of the battle itself. There's a whole separate discussion about what the possibilities are post-Antietam versus the possibilities offered post-Spotsylvania (and the difference between the opportunities for a state and the opportunities for a specific commander), but if we confine ourselves to the battle outcome then a battle can be a victory for these reasons (which I do not claim are exhaustive):


- inflicting more casualties on your opponent and achieving favourable attrition.
Antietam does not qualify (as the casualties were roughly even on both sides). Spotsylvania may qualify (Lee inflicted more casualties but it depends how one defines the attrition rate to be favourable).
- retaining control of the battlefield the day after the fighting.
Both qualify.
- furthering the operational goals of a campaign (yours) or prevnting the goals of an enemy campaign.
Antietam does not qualify because Lee's invasion of the North could not continue after the campaign by that route. Spotsylvania qualifies because it closed off a Union line of advance that the Union had been fighting for (though not the only one available to them).
- furthering the strategic goals of a nation.
Antietam does not qualify because the outcome of the battle, at the very least, did not advance European intervention and did not result in a collapse of Union morale. It furthered none of the ways the Confederates could win the war.
Spotsylvania qualifies in some respects. It caused some of the decline in Union morale which later manifested more fully at Cold Harbor, making it more likely that the Confederates could "run out the clock".

There may be other ways.
I can explain how Pearl Harbor was a masterful stroke by FDR to convert the USN to the new religion of Naval air power and away from the fossilized Big Gun Club, leading directly to the surrender in Tokyo Bay. Anything can be the subject of goal-oriented spin. One only needs to be the gatekeeper for what is included and what is excluded.
 
Grant sent Sherman through Georgia, but nobody calls it Grant's March through Georgia. Harper's Ferry was Jackson's rodeo. Lee was miles away and not directing the battle.
Not trying to be a nitpicker, but, I am reading Mark L. Bradley's "Last Stand In the Carolinas: The Battle of Bentonville". On Page 53 the author writes: "Sherman found that selling Grant on the March to the Sea was a difficult proposition..." So it appears that Grant needed convincing for the March to the Sea.
 
Not trying to be a nitpicker, but, I am reading Mark L. Bradley's "Last Stand In the Carolinas: The Battle of Bentonville". On Page 53 the author writes: "Sherman found that selling Grant on the March to the Sea was a difficult proposition..." So it appears that Grant needed convincing for the March to the Sea.
Nit pick away! That is what we are all here for 😉
I don't think Grant was the only one that needed convincing. My defense for my statement would be that as his commanding officer, Grant had to (order, command, approve) Sherman's idea. But just because it happened on Grant's watch didn't by default make it Grant's march.
I've been looking for a good book on Bentonville. Would you recommend Bradley's?
 
Out of Virginia. We're talking about a miniscule sample size. Two in fact--Antietam and G'burg.

Regarding the first, you cannot evaluate the battle without the "Lost Order". Personally I believe that a day or two before the battle, the best course of action for Lee would have been to recross the Potomac and reinvade the North either seeking recombine his army and either attempting to impose himself back across the river between Lil Mac and DC or using his superior mobility to turn his opponents right flank a la G'burg.

In this specific instance demonstrating the North's inability to defend its own territory could and might probably would have generated European especially British intervention (France was already ready willing and able, but feared to do so without GB concurrence)

G'burg on the other hand exposes Lee's greatest vulnerability, his command style. Prior to this campaign, he could give general order about general goals to Jackson and trust him to find the best way to carry them out. In the meantime he could remain with Longstreet and personally supervise his actions. (I know this is an unpopular opinion, but I have always and still remain wedded to the opinion that Longstreet thrived best when closely supervised by Lee.)

To understand this you first have to realize that Lee knew that he had absolutely no chance to penetrate the Union defenses around DC. NONE. NADA. ZIP. BUBKES. Lee did not have the equipment to conduct such a siege.

What he could do was to relive the pressure on his beloved Virginia. But just as importantly by invading and rampaging Pennsylvania he could again demonstrate to Europe that the North was not able to protect its own territory and did not deserve recognition.

Given that this was his goal, feel free to heap blame on him for not decisively drumming it into his subordinates
head's that avoid battle meant AVOID ANY BATTLE, ANYWHERE.

Nothing emphasizes this more than the change in Lee's command procedures following G'burg. Whereas before he had couched his order as mere suggestions, which a subordinate using his individual judgement could follow or no. Beginning at the Wilderness and continuing through the Overland Campaign, his order were specific and peremptory. You will go to X and do Y.
 
Nit pick away! That is what we are all here for 😉
I don't think Grant was the only one that needed convincing. My defense for my statement would be that as his commanding officer, Grant had to (order, command, approve) Sherman's idea. But just because it happened on Grant's watch didn't by default make it Grant's march.
I've been looking for a good book on Bentonville. Would you recommend Bradley's?
Thank you for accepting my nitpicking ways. (I have been on the Fox News user forum too long.)

For me the book is well written, it has numerous maps and a forward by the late Edwin Bearss does not hurt. I found my copy at a Mobile, AL flea market last October. The seller was asking $12.00 for it, but I got her down to $6.00 because the book smelled a little mildewy.
 
Both belligerents in the US Civil War had difficulty invading the other's territory. But the US had both water based logistics to supply its forward depots, and a domestic railroad industry to build a military railroad deep into the Confederacy. The riskiest invasion, Sherman's march to the coast, was a march to a coast patrolled by the US navy. He had at least two points at which he could contact the navy. He eventually captured a fort in which the guns all faced the sea.
The Confederates successfully raided the US with cavalry units. The US mounted much larger cavalry raids, following the Confederate example.
General Lee did not have the logistical support necessary to successfully invade the US. The manpower and livestock base just did not exist.
 
Both belligerents in the US Civil War had difficulty invading the other's territory. But the US had both water based logistics to supply its forward depots, and a domestic railroad industry to build a military railroad deep into the Confederacy. The riskiest invasion, Sherman's march to the coast, was a march to a coast patrolled by the US navy. He had at least two points at which he could contact the navy. He eventually captured a fort in which the guns all faced the sea.
The Confederates successfully raided the US with cavalry units. The US mounted much larger cavalry raids, following the Confederate example.
General Lee did not have the logistical support necessary to successfully invade the US. The manpower and livestock base just did not exist.
As far as I read Lee‘ s incursions were not planned as invasions - they more resembled kind of a raid - because you are absolutely right: the logistical fundament just didn‘ t exist - and Lee was pretty much aware of that...
 
Grant sent Sherman through Georgia, but nobody calls it Grant's March through Georgia. Harper's Ferry was Jackson's rodeo. Lee was miles away and not directing the battle.
Lee was clearly the architect of the plan:

SPECIAL ORDERS, HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
Numbers 191.
September 9, 1862.

III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson’s command will from the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry.

V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at harper’s Ferry and vicinity.

VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek’s Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys’ Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

By command of General R. E. Lee:
R. H. CHILTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Indeed it took the initiative of Jackson and others to complete the maneuver, but it's just not fair to give Lee no credit for this significant victory. As a matter of fact he gets criticism for dividing his army which led directly to the capture. It was actually a plan that rarely gets the praise it deserves. Taking 13,000 Union troops off the table was arguably a greater victory than C-ville or Second Manassas.
 
As far as I read Lee‘ s incursions were not planned as invasions - they more resembled kind of a raid - because you are absolutely right: the logistical fundament just didn‘ t exist - and Lee was pretty much aware of that...
So at Gettysburg Lee was not trying to score a victory over the AOP, reach Washington and give a wavering Union a chance to accept a peace plan from Jefferson Davis? I guess it comes down to how you define a raid.
 
Lee was clearly the architect of the plan:

SPECIAL ORDERS, HDQRS. ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
Numbers 191.
September 9, 1862.

III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. General Jackson’s command will from the advance, and, after passing Middletown, with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday morning take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such of them as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry.

V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Anderson, will follow General Longstreet. On reaching Middletown will take the route to Harper’s Ferry, and by Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy at harper’s Ferry and vicinity.

VI. General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek’s Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudoun Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, Keys’ Ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with Generals McLaws and Jackson, and intercept retreat of the enemy.

IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws, and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

By command of General R. E. Lee:
R. H. CHILTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Indeed it took the initiative of Jackson and others to complete the maneuver, but it's just not fair to give Lee no credit for this significant victory. As a matter of fact he gets criticism for dividing his army which led directly to the capture. It was actually a plan that rarely gets the praise it deserves. Taking 13,000 Union troops off the table was arguably a greater victory than C-ville or Second Manassas.
Lee was not on the battlefield. So he does not get credit for winning the battle. That is the criteria I'm using. I think that is the criteria historians use too. (I'm not claiming to be a historian 😁) Corrections are welcome and I'm loving all the details this thread is producing.
 
So at Gettysburg Lee was not trying to score a victory over the AOP, reach Washington and give a wavering Union a chance to accept a peace plan from Jefferson Davis? I guess it comes down to how you define a raid.
As far as I understood an invasion is an attempt to occupy enemy territory permanently or at least for a longer duration.
A raid is - as far as I know - a temporary move into the territory of the enemy to throw him somehow out of balance, to disrupt somehow his plans and look out for a chance to do as much damage as possible (in a short period of time).
I‘d say Lee had the latter in mind.

But this is - admittedly - maybe just some kind of hairsplitting....
 
As far as I understood an invasion is an attempt to occupy enemy territory permanently or at least for a longer duration.
A raid is - as far as I know - a temporary move into the territory of the enemy to throw him somehow out of balance, to disrupt somehow his plans and look out for a chance to do as much damage as possible (in a short period of time).
I‘d say Lee had the latter in mind.

But this is - admittedly - maybe just some kind of hairsplitting....
But it's fun isn't it?
 
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