Lee Lee and Washington

Yes, and in this sense both Washington and Lee were quite similar in that neither one could directly control whether foreign assistance would be forthcoming. That would depend on forces beyond the control of either commander. Washington of course, was fortunate to have a Benjamin Franklin in Europe working on behalf of his cause whereas Mason and Slidell just did not have the credibility (or guile) of a Ben Franklin for theirs.
I have a thread where I argue that it is unfair to blame the lack of foreign recognition on the earnest if unsuccessful attempts by Slidell and Mason to obtain foreign recognition.
No doubt Benjamin Franklin had diplomatic skills. On the other hand France was in competition with the UK for the Indian Subcontinent. Spain had long standing grievances against the UK and the Netherlands long an ally of the UK had a temporary falling out just at the right time for the Colonial Rebels. In diplomacy as in life timing is everything.
By 1861 France and the UK had recently concluded a war as allies against Russia and were a bit war weary. Spain was in decline and not looking for a foreign military confrontation.
My main point is that Washington received indispensable aid from at least three foreign nations vs the Confederacy which received no foreign troops or naval support.
Leftyhunter
 
The number is unknown but the Continental army had a fearsome desertion rate, some of it right to the British Army, especially during the Valley Forge winter. Also the British had attracted something like 10,000 Americans into British service as Provincial troops. Considering the size of whole armies in that war,10,000 Loyalist troops compares favorably to Southern Unionist troops as a percentage of the whole.
It would be interesting if we had some numbers to compare. Of course the caveat is most likely the Union Army kept better records then the Continental Army. If the Continental Army suffered a high rate of desertions and defections then the role of THE French Army and Spanish Navy becomes more critical to the military success of Washington.
Leftyhunter
 
In a sense it almost seemed to me that Lee was the reincarnation of Washington in so many ways.

I think in Robert E. Lee's own eyes, you could not have paid him a greater compliment!

I'm not even sure if Lee's courtship of Mary Custis and the subsequent marriage wasn't the ultimate expression of adoration for George Washington.
Michael Jackson married Lisa Marie Presley because he adored Elvis and wanted to come nearer to him in any way - I always thought that it might have been the same with Lee and Mary Custis.
 
It would be interesting if we had some numbers to compare. Of course the caveat is most likely the Union Army kept better records then the Continental Army. If the Continental Army suffered a high rate of desertions and defections then the role of THE French Army and Spanish Navy becomes more critical to the military success of Washington.
Leftyhunter
There is an interesting podcast on this subject, rates of desertion in the Revolutionary War (Military History Podcast), Desertions in the Revolutionary War. The conclusion, admittedly tough to reach from the lack of data, and not including desertion from militia units, is that about 20-25 % of Continentals deserted. How does this compare to Civil War desertions from both sides?
 
There is an interesting podcast on this subject, rates of desertion in the Revolutionary War (Military History Podcast), Desertions in the Revolutionary War. The conclusion, admittedly tough to reach from the lack of data, and not including desertion from militia units, is that about 20-25 % of Continentals deserted. How does this compare to Civil War desertions from both sides?
Good question. I would have to do some research. That's quite a high desertion rate compared to any military force.
Leftyhunter
 
Yes, and in this sense both Washington and Lee were quite similar in that neither one could directly control whether foreign assistance would be forthcoming. That would depend on forces beyond the control of either commander. Washington of course, was fortunate to have a Benjamin Franklin in Europe working on behalf of his cause whereas Mason and Slidell just did not have the credibility (or guile) of a Ben Franklin for theirs.

I don’t think it quite fair to place this blame on Mason & Slidell and their abilities. Not even a sage such as Franklin would have been able to enlist European intervention for the Confederacy given the stated cause of their rebellion. In this comparison, Washington was fortunate that the French were looking for reasons to hurt the British and that the cause of the American Revolution wasn’t repugnant to French sensibilities. Lee was unfortunate in that the cause of secession and thus rebellion in the CSA’s case was repugnant to the British.
 
I don’t think it quite fair to place this blame on Mason & Slidell and their abilities. Not even a sage such as Franklin would have been able to enlist European intervention for the Confederacy given the stated cause of their rebellion. In this comparison, Washington was fortunate that the French were looking for reasons to hurt the British and that the cause of the American Revolution wasn’t repugnant to French sensibilities. Lee was unfortunate in that the cause of secession and thus rebellion in the CSA’s case was repugnant to the British.
I'm of the opinion, the CSA wasn't as far from foreign aid as presented. I believe a decisive victory, say.... at Gettysburg, may have given the fellars across the pond, reason to assist. The CSA never really had total military victory in sight. I view Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania as a last real chance of, A: getting foreign aid, & B. putting the idea of negotiating into the head of the Lincoln Admin.

I imagine the concerned foreign entities wanting to be sure their lot was cast with the winners. IF victory was viewed at least plausible by the CSA, we may very well have seen some ships headed this direction loaded down with arms, & men. There would've been a loud, "uh oh" in Washington. While, I don't see a total military victory for the CSA being ever possible, I do see scenarios where the US would've come to the negotiating table, & the CSA surviving separately if even temporary.

I believe Lee was aware of this, & his mindset similar to Washington in that, total military victory was never really possible for either. Yet, a war of attrition, & forcing the dominant power to tire of war was possible.
 
I'm of the opinion, the CSA wasn't as far from foreign aid as presented. I believe a decisive victory, say.... at Gettysburg, may have given the fellars across the pond, reason to assist. The CSA never really had total military victory in sight. I view Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania as a last real chance of, A: getting foreign aid, & B. putting the idea of negotiating into the head of the Lincoln Admin.

I imagine the concerned foreign entities wanting to be sure their lot was cast with the winners. IF victory was viewed at least plausible by the CSA, we may very well have seen some ships headed this direction loaded down with arms, & men. There would've been a loud, "uh oh" in Washington. While, I don't see a total military victory for the CSA being ever possible, I do see scenarios where the US would've come to the negotiating table, & the CSA surviving separately if even temporary.

I believe Lee was aware of this, & his mindset similar to Washington in that, total military victory was never really possible for either. Yet, a war of attrition, & forcing the dominant power to tire of war was possible.
The only way to prove any nation would actively send military forces to aid the Confederacy would be if we had written evidence such has dairies,letters, parliamentary debate etc that stated "If the Confederacy wins a significant military victory we shall sent military forces to aid the Confederacy".
Nations most definitely intervene militarily in Civil War's. However they have significant reasons for doing so.
Leftyhunter
 
There is an interesting podcast on this subject, rates of desertion in the Revolutionary War (Military History Podcast), Desertions in the Revolutionary War. The conclusion, admittedly tough to reach from the lack of data, and not including desertion from militia units, is that about 20-25 % of Continentals deserted. How does this compare to Civil War desertions from both sides?
Per my thread on Confederate Desertion that's about on par with Continental Army desertions. In the other hand Jefferson Davis did give a speech in Macon,Georgia where Davis claimed two thirds of the Confederate Army was AWOL during the critical summer fighting season. Both Rice and Cornnel University have that speech online.
If 10k Continental soldiers defected to the British Army that would be quite a manpower blow to the Continental Army.
Leftyhunter
 
I don’t think it quite fair to place this blame on Mason & Slidell and their abilities. Not even a sage such as Franklin would have been able to enlist European intervention for the Confederacy given the stated cause of their rebellion. In this comparison, Washington was fortunate that the French were looking for reasons to hurt the British and that the cause of the American Revolution wasn’t repugnant to French sensibilities. Lee was unfortunate in that the cause of secession and thus rebellion in the CSA’s case was repugnant to the British.
Also the only reason for France and the UK to intervene is economic. This is offset by loosing the far more valuable trade with the Union especially in needed grain imports. Also Egyptian and British Indian cotton imports somewhat offset the kids of Southern cotton. The Union itself exported cotton to Western Europe via the Seaward Islands of South Carolina and also from Louisiana. War's are expensive and the British and French had just fought a war with Russia so they weren't raring for a new war.
Leftyhunter
 
@kevikens ,
We haven't had any evidence presented that if Lee had won at Antietam therefore a major military power would intervene on the side of the Confederacy. I forgot if it was from the Memoirs of Mason or Slidell but very early in the war British Foreign Ministry officials grilled one of them on the question of Missouri and Kentucky joining the Confederacy.
The British along with Lincoln were aware of how vital the border states were to the Confederacy becoming a viable independent nation. Once they saw that both states would be more or less loyal to the Union it cooled enthusiasm for recognizing the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter
 
Actually, if Lee had prevailed at Antietam, sympathy for recognizing or at least acknowledging the Confederacy, would have been strengthened in Great Britain. After 2nd Manassas, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston tentatively scheduled a cabinet meeting to discuss a proposal for British mediation of the conflict. That meeting never took place, squashed after news reached England of Lee's strategic defeat at Antietam.
 
Actually, if Lee had prevailed at Antietam, sympathy for recognizing or at least acknowledging the Confederacy, would have been strengthened in Great Britain. After 2nd Manassas, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston tentatively scheduled a cabinet meeting to discuss a proposal for British mediation of the conflict. That meeting never took place, squashed after news reached England of Lee's strategic defeat at Antietam.
As jgoodguy argued we really don't know what mediation would exactly imply. If the US rejected mediation now the ball is in the UK's court.
1. Does the UK declare economic sanctions on all US trade including vital grain imports?
2. Does the Royal Navy escort British merchant ships into Southern ports which would be an act of war?
3. Is the British public really on board with points one and two?
Definitely an interesting what if.
Leftyhunter
 
As jgoodguy argued we really don't know what mediation would exactly imply. If the US rejected mediation now the ball is in the UK's court.
1. Does the UK declare economic sanctions on all US trade including vital grain imports?
2. Does the Royal Navy escort British merchant ships into Southern ports which would be an act of war?
3. Is the British public really on board with points one and two?
Definitely an interesting what if.
Leftyhunter
Sure have a fetish with using banned posters as sources. :O o: That aside, mediation would've been foreign recognition of the CSA, even if rejected by the Union.
 
Sure have a fetish with using banned posters as sources. :O o: That aside, mediation would've been foreign recognition of the CSA, even if rejected by the Union.
How does said recognition actually work in practice? Would the UK implement the two options I listed or some third way if that's possible.
Leftyhunter
 
Let's look at it from a few perspectives...

As men. . . Lee and Washington had much in common. This is largely because Lee took Washington as a model of behavior to emulate (rather than his own father, who was essentially an example of how not to live one's life). Both lost their fathers at an early age and looked to other male members of their families for guidance. Both were men of enormous dignity and poise who impressed almost everyone they met. They were both kindhearted and tender with their families and close friends but somewhat distant with others. Both observed almost flawless etiquette in their personal behavior. Both seemed to enjoy female company and attention while always remaining true to their wives. Lee had a much warmer and closer relationship with his mother than Washington did with his, but the evidence would clearly put the blame for this squarely on the shoulders of Washington's mother. Personally, I think that the young men of the modern world (such as the students who fill my classroom every day) would do well to look upon both these men as examples of personal behavior to follow.

As military commanders. . . they also have much in common but have important differences. Both were very aggressive and took risks - anyone who describes Washington as cautious and wanting to avoid battle needs to reread accounts of Trenton, Germantown, Monmouth, and, of course, Yorktown. Both were experienced fighting men before they were army commanders, but Lee's experience was in the same kind of conventional war he would fight again during the Civil War, whereas Washington's consisted entirely of bush fighting with Native Americans. Lee was masterfully educated in the art of war, whereas Washington was not. Both learned as they went along, Lee making serious mistakes during the Seven Days and Washington making almost catastrophic mistakes during the New York Campaign. Washington was more aware of the wider war than was Lee, detaching forces for the northern theater for the Saratoga and the southern theater after Camden, whereas Lee always insisted on concentrating as much force as possible in Virginia. But then Washington was commander-in-chief through most of the war, whereas Lee only was briefly and when it didn't matter.

And then, of course. . . Washington was loyal to the Union above all, whereas Lee placed his loyalty to Virginia over that of his loyalty to the United States. Washington never had to make the choice that Lee did, of course, but anyone who reads the Farewell Address can plainly see that Washington would have regarded secession as treason and put his Continental Army back on to whip the rebels back into shape.

Lee was an admirable man in many ways. He was obviously a great general. Many men could learn to be better fathers, husbands, and sons by studying Lee's life. Had he accepted Lincoln's offer to command the Union army against the Confederates and then won the war (had he done what his friend George Thomas did, in other words), he would have been one of the greatest men in American history.
 
I'm of the opinion, the CSA wasn't as far from foreign aid as presented. I believe a decisive victory, say.... at Gettysburg, may have given the fellars across the pond, reason to assist. The CSA never really had total military victory in sight. I view Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania as a last real chance of, A: getting foreign aid, & B. putting the idea of negotiating into the head of the Lincoln Admin.

I imagine the concerned foreign entities wanting to be sure their lot was cast with the winners. IF victory was viewed at least plausible by the CSA, we may very well have seen some ships headed this direction loaded down with arms, & men. There would've been a loud, "uh oh" in Washington. While, I don't see a total military victory for the CSA being ever possible, I do see scenarios where the US would've come to the negotiating table, & the CSA surviving separately if even temporary.

I believe Lee was aware of this, & his mindset similar to Washington in that, total military victory was never really possible for either. Yet, a war of attrition, & forcing the dominant power to tire of war was possible.

Great idea for a “what it” thread.
 
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