Lee and Longstreet's 'Disagreement' on Day Two

It is difficult to describe the results of Longstreet's attack on III Corps, as a tactical success(seredipitous or not). The result was a tactical defeat for Lee's plan for Day 2.(as was the result of Longstreet's attack on Day 3)
I was, in fact, referring to the attack on Culp's Hill and Longstreet's on Sickle's(the attack was intended to be upon Cemetary Ridge, had not Sickle's movement effectively aborted it).
In the CW large scale night attacks were to be avoided almost at any cost, as was proved on Day 2, when local success could not be ffectively exploited, as at the end of Day 1. Longstreet and Ewell both were following by rote, orders from Lee, long out of date because of the passage of time and events.
Was Longstreet(or Ewell) under orders to get into position and await further orders to attack? Because that seems to have been exactly the attitude of Longstreet.


P.S. Lee's laxness and Longstreet's reluctance are not moot points, they cannot be separated from results of the Battle of Gettysburg, on Day 2(and Day 3, also)

Attacking with 1:2 odds and suffering 2,000 fewer casualties indicates a tactical success to me. Day 3 is different, of course. Regarding what Sickles aborted - he needlessly aborted the lives of better than 8,000 Union troops from his corps as well as the Fifth and Second Corps.

Regarding large scale night attacks, yes, ideally one would want to avoid them because of the attendant confusion and loss of command and control. They were still executed, though.

Lee's orders to Ewell on the late afternoon of July 1 would seem contradictory when he wanted Ewell to attack, but not bring on a general engagement. It would give the impression that the latter proviso was still in effect. I would refrain from calling that laxity, though - just poorly written orders.

You are attributing to Longstreet something that you cannot prove. That is not a good way of looking at things, unless you state that your opinion is mere conjecture. We both know that is not what Longstreet did (await further orders).

Finally, I completely disagree that Lee's laxity and Longstreet's reluctance are major contributing factors to the Confederate loss at Gettysburg. It appears that will have to agree to disagree on the matter.
 
Right now I do not have time to argue in depth. I still go with Hunt's assessment. Second, the point about Early recommending an attack is from his postwar writings in the SHSP. These have long ago been dismissed as BS. His actions on that afternoon and evening belie his later claims. He even was in a sharp argument with Johnson about who should have to attack the heights south of town. In fact, it is thought that Early (with considerable help from Rodes and Ewell) was the one who steered Lee away from attacking in those heights as the main effort. As you can tell from my earlier post, where I copied the ORs, it appears that the Confederate leaders of Second Corps became quite reticent about attacking those heights - including Lee.

Regarding Twelfth Corps, it is still speculated that quite possibly, what Extra Bill Smith saw was Williams' Division of Twelfth Corps. So, they likely were in the area, if not yet in position.

It has always been my understanding that the XII Corps did not occupy the ground until 9:00 pm or afterwards.
 
It has always been my understanding that the XII Corps did not occupy the ground until 9:00 pm or afterwards.

According to what I just read (in the most recent issue of Gettysburg Magazine) the lead elements (Williams' division) were there by as early as 5:25 - 6:00 pm on July 1.
 
Actions are the proof of words. Longstreets actions are in agreement with his words concerning his not being on board with Lee's strategy and tactics of the Pa. Invasion. His actions clearly show he was not in any effectual agreement with Lee Plans for the battle at Gettysburg at any time.
We have the facts of historical actions, that the main failure of Lee, during the battle was his complete inability to get any concernt of actions from his corps commanders for three straight days. We can only hope that Laxness, is the least offensive of other adjectives available.
 
Actions are the proof of words. Longstreets actions are in agreement with his words concerning his not being on board with Lee's strategy and tactics of the Pa. Invasion. His actions clearly show he was not in any effectual agreement with Lee Plans for the battle at Gettysburg at any time.
We have the facts of historical actions, that the main failure of Lee, during the battle was his complete inability to get any concernt of actions from his corps commanders for three straight days. We can only hope that Laxness, is the least offensive of other adjectives available.

But Longstreet's actions on July 2 are in accordance with what Lee had ordered. Whether he was on board with Lee's concept for the battle is besides the point - he followed orders on July 2, period! Part of the problem that Lee had in getting concerted action rested with the fact, that on the first day he was lax (you are correct there), but also hampering him was the fact that he was trying to coordinate the actions of an attacking army which suffered from exterior lines, making timely movement a nightmare while the enemy could watch most of what he was trying to do.
 
That Longstreet complied with Lee's orders(wishes?) is not proof of his 'agreement' with them. We have his words that deny that he was in agreement at all. The point is, Longstreet had to be forced to comply with Lee's orders, against his will.
In fact, Lee was in direct contact with all his corps comanders(including Ewell's Div. cmdrs) on Day 2 and all of them were reluctant to agree to any of his offensive plans that involved their bearing the brunt of the offensive.
The fact is, Lee's main problem was his seeming reluctance to enforce his will on faltering or recalcitrant subordinates. He could not(or would not) will his army to victory.



P.S. that Lee confronted his commanders separately, rather than together, says more about Lee's command style, that it does about the hearts and minds of his subordinates.
 
Actions are the proof of words. Longstreets actions are in agreement with his words concerning his not being on board with Lee's strategy and tactics of the Pa. Invasion. His actions clearly show he was not in any effectual agreement with Lee Plans for the battle at Gettysburg at any time.
We have the facts of historical actions, that the main failure of Lee, during the battle was his complete inability to get any concernt of actions from his corps commanders for three straight days. We can only hope that Laxness, is the least offensive of other adjectives available.
So,then,it's all Longstreet's fault?
 
So,then,it's all Longstreet's fault?

All he had to do was have somebody to tutor him in left handed pensmanship after getting shot in the throat along the Orange Plank Road.
Never give Jubal Early an opening, lest he may sieze and pounce sustaining his "Bad Old Man" apellative.
 
That Longstreet complied with Lee's orders(wishes?) is not proof of his 'agreement' with them. We have his words that deny that he was in agreement at all. The point is, Longstreet had to be forced to comply with Lee's orders, against his will.

Longstreet didn't have to be forced. He did as was ordered. Disagreeing with orders, and disobeying them are two different things.

In fact, Lee was in direct contact with all his corps comanders(including Ewell's Div. cmdrs) on Day 2 and all of them were reluctant to agree to any of his offensive plans that involved their bearing the brunt of the offensive.
The fact is, Lee's main problem was his seeming reluctance to enforce his will on faltering or recalcitrant subordinates. He could not(or would not) will his army to victory.

P.S. that Lee confronted his commanders separately, rather than together, says more about Lee's command style, that it does about the hearts and minds of his subordinates.


While Longstreet's performance was not up to his usual standards, he could hardly be referred to as recalitrant at Gettysburg. Lee did not have to force his will on Longstreet to get him to do his duty on July 2, he did it and did as well as he could under the circumstances, period. It has been brought up several times that Lee was in direct contact with his corps commanders, and he was, although he spoke with Ewell separately. Ewell had good reason for not wanting to bear the brunt of the attacks, Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill were daunting obstacles, especially for troops who had fought and marched so hard on July 1. He spoke with his subordinates separately because of how distant they were from each other, again a factor of the exterior lines. Lee could not will his army to victory because of all the negative circumstances they faced. The law of averages finally caught up with the ANV at Gettysburg.
 
It was not Longstreet's fault, that Lee kept importuning him to execute plans and strategies that he was in fundamental disagreement with. Disagreements that he directly communicated to Lee more than once.
On the early morning of Day 2, Lee met with Ewell to discuss resuming the offensve on his front, but from extant evidence, it was Ewell's Div. commanders who did most of the talking(protesting), with Ewell's concurrence with their protests.
Did or did not Lee have to premptorily order Longstreet to begin the main assault on Day 2. I have already asked if Lee's plan was in two parts; first get your force in place and then await further orders?
Lee's will could have been better made known if he had met all his Lts. at one time to impress upon then what exactly, was his plan in detail and fix lines of communications and times and what was expected from each man and when, etc.
Lee was anxious to end the battle as soon as possible, but little of that anxiety was , aparently, not communicated to his corps commanders.
Having all his corps commanders meet him in one place, in the early morning hrs. would have been no more onerous or dangerous, than Lee riding the entire length of his battle line.
The problem was, as already noted, that all the corps commanders, including Longstreet, had very good and, possibly valid, reasons for not wanting to do what Lee planned. A situation that precisely required the ability to overcome the weaknesses of your commanders or even your army, by willing them to do what they do not necessarily want to do. It is considered one of the marks of Great Captains, throughout history.
 
It was not Longstreet's fault, that Lee kept importuning him to execute plans and strategies that he was in fundamental disagreement with. Disagreements that he directly communicated to Lee more than once.
On the early morning of Day 2, Lee met with Ewell to discuss resuming the offensve on his front, but from extant evidence, it was Ewell's Div. commanders who did most of the talking(protesting), with Ewell's concurrence with their protests.

We agree there.

Did or did not Lee have to premptorily order Longstreet to begin the main assault on Day 2. I have already asked if Lee's plan was in two parts; first get your force in place and then await further orders?
Lee's will could have been better made known if he had met all his Lts. at one time to impress upon then what exactly, was his plan in detail and fix lines of communications and times and what was expected from each man and when, etc.

I do not believe that Lee's orders were in two parts. I believe that he wanted Longstreet to move to his assigned jump off position and attack as per his instructions as related during the 11 am meeting with Longstreet, McLaws and Hood.

Lee was anxious to end the battle as soon as possible, but little of that anxiety was , aparently, not communicated to his corps commanders.

Perhaps he was anxious to finish off the Federals as quickly as possible, but seldom does anything go entirely as planned - especially in warfare. He had to understand that it would take time for Longstreet to get to his assigned position: We're not talking a couple of yards here, or even a couple hundred yards - we're talking miles, plural. As it was, though, Longstreet couldn't have attacked at a better moment for Lee's purpose.

Having all his corps commanders meet him in one place, in the early morning hrs. would have been no more onerous or dangerous, than Lee riding the entire length of his battle line.
The problem was, as already noted, that all the corps commanders, including Longstreet, had very good and, possibly valid, reasons for not wanting to do what Lee planned. A situation that precisely required the ability to overcome the weaknesses of your commanders or even your army, by willing them to do what they do not necessarily want to do. It is considered one of the marks of Great Captains, throughout history.

We agree about the point about Lee meeting his corps commanders simultaneously, this would also help them to realize each others' issues. The point about willing your subordinates to do as you order is also fine, if their reasons for not attacking are not as valid as you state. As it was, they (Lee's subordinates) surveyed the ground and the conditions they suffered from and found those circumstances not to their liking for attack. That said, once committed to the attack on July 2, they fought very hard and, on Longstreet's front actually won a tactical victory, which was about as good as they could expect under the circumstances.
 
Each corps commanders reluctance were based on what immediately faced their commands, not on how their part in Lee's overall plan might advance that plan.
1100 hrs to approx. 1700 hrs, would be considered a very long time when compared to the distance to be traveled, by any competent army commander, of less ability than Lee; as it was in fact, when Lee had to order Longstreet to begin his attack.
Whatever, their other deficiencies, Lee's corps commanders were competent commanders of hard fighting troops and that they fought hard and well, says nothing about how a major disagreement about strategy and tactics between the commanding general and his chief lieutentant may have doomed those battle field qualities to ultimate failure.
It is, in fact, precisely the location of those 'circumstances' that made Lee's plan for a strategic victory only a tactical 'success'.
 
Each corps commanders reluctance were based on what immediately faced their commands, not on how their part in Lee's overall plan might advance that plan.
1100 hrs to approx. 1700 hrs, would be considered a very long time when compared to the distance to be traveled, by any competent army commander, of less ability than Lee; as it was in fact, when Lee had to order Longstreet to begin his attack.
Whatever, their other deficiencies, Lee's corps commanders were competent commanders of hard fighting troops and that they fought hard and well, says nothing about how a major disagreement about strategy and tactics between the commanding general and his chief lieutentant may have doomed those battle field qualities to ultimate failure.
It is, in fact, precisely the location of those 'circumstances' that made Lee's plan for a strategic victory only a tactical 'success'.

Again, you have your times screwed up. Lee had just begun his second conference with Longstreet at 1100 hrs. After it was over he gave Longstreet permission to wait for Evander Law's brigade. That took until 1200 hrs. So Longstreet began his march to the southern flank of the Federal army about noon. His attack began at 1600 hrs. If Longstreet was guilty of anything, it was not making sure that Captain Johnston actually knew a concealed route there, and then when he McLaws discovered that they could be spotted from LRT, he forced a countermarch so McLaws would maintain his position in the march. All in all, Longstreet cost them about an hour. But as Coddington (bottom of page 445) stated (and I have repeated numerous times here) that is a moot point, because, Longstreet couldn't have attacked at a more propitious time for Lee than when he did at 1600 hrs.

The true circumstances that made the Confederate success merely a limited one, had little to do with Lee and Longstreet's disagreement, and more to do with 1) exterior lines, 2) the fact that Meade proved equal to the task of adjusting to Sickles mistake, 3) that the Federal soldiers fought with equal brovado, 4) that Longstreet didn't enjoy adequate support from Hill and Anderson and, 5) that Ewell didn't begin his attack at Culp's Hill until 1900 hrs.
 
It was not Longstreet's fault, that Lee kept importuning him to execute plans and strategies that he was in fundamental disagreement with. Disagreements that he directly communicated to Lee more than once.
On the early morning of Day 2, Lee met with Ewell to discuss resuming the offensve on his front, but from extant evidence, it was Ewell's Div. commanders who did most of the talking(protesting), with Ewell's concurrence with their protests.
Did or did not Lee have to premptorily order Longstreet to begin the main assault on Day 2. I have already asked if Lee's plan was in two parts; first get your force in place and then await further orders?
Lee's will could have been better made known if he had met all his Lts. at one time to impress upon then what exactly, was his plan in detail and fix lines of communications and times and what was expected from each man and when, etc.
Lee was anxious to end the battle as soon as possible, but little of that anxiety was , aparently, not communicated to his corps commanders.
Having all his corps commanders meet him in one place, in the early morning hrs. would have been no more onerous or dangerous, than Lee riding the entire length of his battle line.
The problem was, as already noted, that all the corps commanders, including Longstreet, had very good and, possibly valid, reasons for not wanting to do what Lee planned. A situation that precisely required the ability to overcome the weaknesses of your commanders or even your army, by willing them to do what they do not necessarily want to do. It is considered one of the marks of Great Captains, throughout history.
Lol. Come on,OC. You gotta quit reading the "power of positive thinking" books. You can't "Will" the impossible.
 
Longstreet had to be forced to attack on Day 2, by Lee's Direct order and on Day 2, and by circumstances(he had no good excuse) on Day 3. Those were the direct effects of the Disagreement between Lee and Longstreet and few doubt it affected the execution and success of Lee's strategy and tactics.
The attack late in the afternoon, was obviously impossible(it failed) but that is not proof that an all out attack much earlier, as planned by Lee, was impossible.
Lee obviously thought that the attack should have been earlier or why did he feel compelled to order Longstreet to the attack. Coddington, may have agreed with Longstreet, but did Lee?
 
The attack is impossible within any reasonable,earlier time. At least Lee was smarter than Burnside. He tried these direct assaults fewer times than did Burnside.
 
Bumping your question up 30K feet, imagine how the "war" would have been different had Longstreet, the most brilliant mind on either side, been in command from the start. A military victory was not possible for the South. Lee never understood that. Longstreet did. Had the South waged a battle of recognition, and not warfare, the land you and I know today would look far different.
 
So,then Longstreet's reluctance is the reason the attack fails? P. S. One look at the ground was enough to convince,first,Longstreet,then, Hood,that an attack was inadviseable.
 
Longstreet had to be forced to attack on Day 2, by Lee's Direct order and on Day 2, and by circumstances(he had no good excuse) on Day 3. Those were the direct effects of the Disagreement between Lee and Longstreet and few doubt it affected the execution and success of Lee's strategy and tactics.

You make it seem like Longstreet had to be led out of the meeting with Lee kicking and screaming. He disagreed with Lee, but did not let it stop him from following his orders issued by Lee like the good soldier he was, whether Lee was correct or incorrect. Circumstances that I have brought up so often (and listed in the above post) is what doomed the attack, not the disagreement of the two main Confederate leaders at Gettysburg.

The attack late in the afternoon, was obviously impossible(it failed) but that is not proof that an all out attack much earlier, as planned by Lee, was impossible.

No, but at least Sickles would have been in a much better position to receive the attack than the one in which he placed his corps at 1500 hrs. Also, the attack failed on the operational scale, but succeeded in throwing Meade's defensive scheme out of whack and may very well have denied him the opportunity to counterattack Lee at a later moment. The attack took out thirteen Union brigades and rendered them useless for varying periods of time.

Lee obviously thought that the attack should have been earlier or why did he feel compelled to order Longstreet to the attack. Coddington, may have agreed with Longstreet, but did Lee?

Lee had one valid point in wanting to attack earlier - the fact that the Federal strength was growing by the hour, but his was not. Unfortunately, he failed to realize certain other realities which denied him success (again those I listed in the post above). The question is how much sooner could Lee have wanted the attack to take place? 1100 hrs? Not physically possible, and he did not finalize his orders till then. 1200 hrs? Then he had no concept of the length of time that it took to march two tired divisions about 4 miles south on a 90 degree day. Also, then why did he allow Longstreet to wait for Law?
 
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