The thread has been a discussion of ballistics and, in particular, a discussion of the article posted by the OP in which the author appeared to be hopelessly confused regarding why projectiles follow the trajectory that they do. There has been an all too common erroneous belief among many authors that somehow a minie ball fired from a rifle-musket followed some weird path that created a safe zone that was not a previous problem associated with smoothbore muskets. This thread has been a discussion attempting to explain that the physics remains the same for both weapons, regardless of whatever actual impact the two weapons had on the fighting.
No one has made any claims about the tactics changing during the war, so I'm not really certain why you feel you need to make a "BIGGER EFFORT" to discuss Hagerman's book regarding tactics. Nonetheless, you quoted me in particular, so I will respond. Please forgive me if I have misunderstood your intent.
If you will refer to my post #12 you will see that I specifically stated that rifle-muskets were not always used to full-advantage. The soldiers usually lacked training in basic marksmanship and range estimation, and as you have pointed out, the officer's didn't always give orders that took advantage of the potential range of the rifle-musket. The works of Hess and Bilby have been mentioned in this regard, but only in the context of the confusion that they caused amongst other authors, not because anyone was disputing the validity of their work. There is no doubt that the majority of the time the soldiers and officers failed to use the new weapon to full advantage.
That said, there were, however, instances when the increased range of the rifle-musket did, in fact, play a role in the fighting. Here is an example from the official records, I have edited it down to the relevant portion:
Reports of Brig. Gem. J. H. Hobart Ward, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade and First Division.
HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST Div., THIRD CORPS,
August 4, 1863.
... The supports of the first two lines of the enemy were now coming up in columns en masse, while we had but a single line of battle to receive the shock. Our skirmishers were now forced to draw back. My line awaited the clash. To the regiments on the right, who were sheltered in a wood, I gave directions not to fire until they could plainly see the enemy; to those who were on the left, not to fire at a longer distance than 200 yards.
The enemy had now approached to within 200 yards of my position, in line and en masse, yelling and shouting. My command did not fire a shot until the enemy came within the distance prescribed, when the whole command fired a volley. This checked the enemy's advance suddenly, which gave our men an opportunity to reload, when another volley was fired into them. The enemy now exhibited much disorder, and, taking advantage of this circumstance, I advanced my right and center with a view of obtaining a position behind a stone wall, about 160 yards in advance, and which the enemy was endeavoring to reach.
This is just one example, but it clearly is an instance of effective volleys being delivered at a range of 200 yards in spite of what Hagerman found. I would also add that the trenches around Petersburg that two armies spent nearly a year ensconced in would appear to me to be a testament to a change in tactics, but I could be wrong.