In the Field Killing Zones

Thank you, and, yes, I have been shooting for close to 40 years now. I can't claim to be particularly good at it, but I have at least understood what was going on.

I'm glad you added that about Hess's book. I was aware of it being the source of much of this and generally familiar with the arguments he makes, but I don't think I ever read it. I have read Joseph Bilby's books and figured they cover the same territory, so didn't bother with Hess. That Hess did a poor job explaining the "ballistic arch" makes a great deal of sense to me in explaining why there seems to be so much confusion ab found it easier to out this.
The idea of a "ballistic curve" is still not understood very well by many people, even people who should know better.
I was drafted into the Army in 1972. While learning to shoot the M16, we were told by our drill sergeant that the M16's bullet travels so fast that the bullet would rise (aerodynamic lift?) after going 100 yards to about 2 inches high at 200 yards, and then back down to the same height at 300 yards as it was when at 100 yards.

It sounded logical, and perhaps the drill sergeant found it easier to spout such BS rather than try to explain what was really going on to a bunch of trainees, many of whom had never shot before.
 
Whoever wrote this never fired a rifle. Sounds like an academic making a "logical conclusion" that is anything but.
You can find the same argument made by experienced officers around 1860.

It is a often noticed in civil war sources (that poorly trained) men usually shoot high. And if you, as the officer want to shoot a volley at 300 yards, and you men don't know how to compensate if the range is a bit longer or shorter, then you need to time the order to "fire" pretty well. If you delay and give the order at at say 250 yards and many men also aim a bit high, then there is a very reel risk that it will be a complete waste of powder...

And no mater what the next volley will be done with fewer guns. (misfires, men who mess up the loading and so on) and if there is no wind the smoke can make the next volley less effective as well.

One of the Austrian conclusions after the 1859 war was that long range firing was ineffective against the French attack columns... and basically concluded that a battalion in attack column with some skirmisher to screen it will not be stopped by the firepower of an enemy battalion in line. So they changed back to a bayonet focus tactical system... with a quicker rate of movement then earlier.

But the real issue was lack of marksmanship training and the fact that the defending Austrian battalions was often already shaken up by French skirmishers... and finally an attack column have an ability to keep going forward by more mass of men... even if it take a lot of casualties.

In comparison the British infantry in the Crimean was shooting Russian columns to pieces at 500 yards and driving artillery off at the same range. And they where able to do so, because of an extensive marksmanship training program first on Malta and later at Varna. So each soldier had plenty of experience hitting (large) targets at 600 and even 800 yards.
(even the men who at the start was armed with smoothbores got this training, so when they later got riflemuskets, they where already training for its use)

So the rifle musket as a "weapon system" was certainly able to effectively engage enemy formations at very long range...

But only if the army spend the money on training each soldier to actually shoot... and few armies did that to the extent needed.
(I Would say the brits was the only one... The Prussians also did a lot of marksmanship training... but since the needle gun had a more limited range, they did most shooting at closer ranges.)
 
With rifle-muskets of the 1850s-60s, the LONGER the range, the more ARC to the trajectory of the ball (as using the rear sight brings the muzzle up).

The LONGER the range, the SHORTER/NARROWER the DANGEROUS SPACE.

The dangerous space is the distance where the ball in its progress (given the effect of gravity) would strike just over the top of a man's head, to the point where it would strike just in front of another's toes; meaning anyone standing in it MIGHT be struck and injured...

Here is a crude drawing...
1634088798777.png


The Confederate Army reported on the dangerous space as follows in 1862 (from the field manual for officers on ordnance duty...)

1634089235394.png


Consequently, when being fired at any other than very close range, the soldiers (particularly those using Hardee's and Casey's tactics, who could move at double-quick, or at a run) might get out of this "dangerous space." I believe some in the 20th Century called this the "beaten zone".
 
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Here are some crude diagrams showing the situation with period muskets as I understand it.
Below is the mechanism of a common muskets, like the flint or percussion smoothbores without significant rear sights...

The line of projection being a line from the very center of the bore of the gun barrel, as if one put a bore laser in the barrel and let it beam outward...

The line of metal (sometimes called the line of sight, particularly with the old muskets with no rear sights) is a direct line running over the top of the barrel as if it had no sights. Barrels were slightly conical, not a perfect cylinder. Consequently, the ball in flight, even thought dropping, passes ABOVE this line... but never above the line of projection.

1634124509583.png


So to continue,

The Line of Sight (here) being a direct line from the eye through and over the sights, shown below as the blue Blue line.
The Trajectory of the ball in red.

1634093934863.png

The point-blank is essentially the intersection of the trajectory with the line of metal (or line of sight). The point-blank for the old muskets was about 140 yards (see 1825 Scott's tactics...)
Since the ball (trajectory) starts dropping below the line of projection immediately due to the effects of gravity; the ball does not rise. But what it does do, is fly above the "line of metal" which would be the line of sight if sighting along the barrel...

A particular disadvantage of the old flintlock muskets was that the firer had to adjust or "level" the barrel by actually aiming above or below the target to strike it at given ranges. (again, see the target firing in Scott's 1825 manual, particularly the Militia abstract edition). This contributed a good deal to their innacuracy beyond 100 yards (and sketchy even at close range being smoothbores, etc.)

So jump to the 1860s Rifle muskets with folding rear sights; now the firer CAN aim directly at his target regardless of the range...
Below, the rear-sight brings the trajectory (red line) above the line of sight (blue line) and extends the point blank...

1634094621130.png


My point being simply that an advantage of the rifle-musket (besides being rifled, etc.), is that the line of sight over the sights can be altered to suit the range. As noted above, the longer the range, the greater the flight/drop/arc of the ball's trajectory, and the smaller the dangerous space.

Any corrections or comments? I would like to be able to describe this accurately.


J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.
 
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Any corrections or comments? I would like to be able to describe this accurately.


J. Marshall,
Hernando, FL.

I think it appears to be accurate, but I will share with you that I had to go back and read through it a second time to understand what you were getting at. I found it pretty confusing, particularly the part about "line of metal." I would like to think I already have a working knowledge of the subject, so I'm not sure this would all be very clear to someone that didn't.

The point-blanc is essentially the point where the ball's actual trajectory intersects the line of metal for old smoothbore muskets that is.

I don't know how many times I read this trying to figure out what you were saying. If your goal is to explain the value of having rear sights, why even say it? No one needs to understand the definition of point-blanc to grasp the advantage of using sights to adjust the point of impact. Just my two cents; keep it simple.
 
Just for the record, Hagerman's 1988 well received book made a careful study of changes in tactics that occurred during the ACW and concluded, based on considerable then recently collected evidence that the new rifled muskets, firing the famous Minié ball, had virtually zero impact on rifle tactics, that while troops might have been more inclined to take cover of any kind, certainly after the first 18 mths of war, the troops rarely opened fired on each other until they were within 50 yards of each other, which is apparently precisely what troops typically did during the Napoleonic Era, when they were only using unrifled muskets with round bullets?!
 
I think it appears to be accurate, but I will share with you that I had to go back and read through it a second time to understand what you were getting at. I found it pretty confusing, particularly the part about "line of metal." I would like to think I already have a working knowledge of the subject, so I'm not sure this would all be very clear to someone that didn't.



I don't know how many times I read this trying to figure out what you were saying. If your goal is to explain the value of having rear sights, why even say it? No one needs to understand the definition of point-blanc to grasp the advantage of using sights to adjust the point of impact. Just my two cents; keep it simple.

Just for the record, Hagerman's 1988 well received book made a careful study of changes in tactics that occurred during the ACW and concluded, based on considerable then recently collected evidence that the new rifled muskets, firing the famous Minié ball, had virtually zero impact on rifle tactics, that while troops might have been more inclined to take cover of any kind, certainly after the first 18 mths of war, the troops rarely opened fired on each other until they were within 50 yards of each other, which is apparently precisely what troops typically did during the Napoleonic Era, when they were only using unrifled muskets with round bullets?!
I've taken the time to read all of the earlier above postings, and it seems I should have perhaps made a BIGGER EFFORT to point out that the work of Hagerman (1988), citing much of the then recent analysis of ACW firing tactics, concluded that during the entirety of the war, in all actions, N & S, big and small, early and late, the vast majority of the time, the troops did not open fire until they were w/i 50 YARDS of each other (!), despite the theoretical 500 yard "danger zone" of the standard rifled musket of the era.
 
One of the things I’ve noted while reading letters and diaries over the years was how religious many of the men were. As an example one young man of the 4th MN noted he was proud he had never killed a man until Allatoona Pass. He’d been in combat multiple times. The young man was also an accomplished squirrel hunter favoring a .36 cal rifle at home. It was pure religious conviction.
For whatever guilt or sin can be laid upon a man for killing in war time, if any, I am not sure this young man could be absolved, even if he had hadn't killed the man at Allatoona Pass. How less guilty is the logistics officer that supplies the means of killing, or the teamster who brings the ammo up, or the general who never fires a shot yet orders the men to the attack than the grunt who actually pulls the trigger?
 
I've taken the time to read all of the earlier above postings, and it seems I should have perhaps made a BIGGER EFFORT to point out that the work of Hagerman (1988), citing much of the then recent analysis of ACW firing tactics, concluded that during the entirety of the war, in all actions, N & S, big and small, early and late, the vast majority of the time, the troops did not open fire until they were w/i 50 YARDS of each other (!), despite the theoretical 500 yard "danger zone" of the standard rifled musket of the era.

The thread has been a discussion of ballistics and, in particular, a discussion of the article posted by the OP in which the author appeared to be hopelessly confused regarding why projectiles follow the trajectory that they do. There has been an all too common erroneous belief among many authors that somehow a minie ball fired from a rifle-musket followed some weird path that created a safe zone that was not a previous problem associated with smoothbore muskets. This thread has been a discussion attempting to explain that the physics remains the same for both weapons, regardless of whatever actual impact the two weapons had on the fighting.

No one has made any claims about the tactics changing during the war, so I'm not really certain why you feel you need to make a "BIGGER EFFORT" to discuss Hagerman's book regarding tactics. Nonetheless, you quoted me in particular, so I will respond. Please forgive me if I have misunderstood your intent.

If you will refer to my post #12 you will see that I specifically stated that rifle-muskets were not always used to full-advantage. The soldiers usually lacked training in basic marksmanship and range estimation, and as you have pointed out, the officer's didn't always give orders that took advantage of the potential range of the rifle-musket. The works of Hess and Bilby have been mentioned in this regard, but only in the context of the confusion that they caused amongst other authors, not because anyone was disputing the validity of their work. There is no doubt that the majority of the time the soldiers and officers failed to use the new weapon to full advantage.

That said, there were, however, instances when the increased range of the rifle-musket did, in fact, play a role in the fighting. Here is an example from the official records, I have edited it down to the relevant portion:

Reports of Brig. Gem. J. H. Hobart Ward, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade and First Division.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST Div., THIRD CORPS,
August 4, 1863.

... The supports of the first two lines of the enemy were now coming up in columns en masse, while we had but a single line of battle to receive the shock. Our skirmishers were now forced to draw back. My line awaited the clash. To the regiments on the right, who were sheltered in a wood, I gave directions not to fire until they could plainly see the enemy; to those who were on the left, not to fire at a longer distance than 200 yards.
The enemy had now approached to within 200 yards of my position, in line and en masse, yelling and shouting. My command did not fire a shot until the enemy came within the distance prescribed, when the whole command fired a volley. This checked the enemy's advance suddenly, which gave our men an opportunity to reload, when another volley was fired into them. The enemy now exhibited much disorder, and, taking advantage of this circumstance, I advanced my right and center with a view of obtaining a position behind a stone wall, about 160 yards in advance, and which the enemy was endeavoring to reach.


This is just one example, but it clearly is an instance of effective volleys being delivered at a range of 200 yards in spite of what Hagerman found. I would also add that the trenches around Petersburg that two armies spent nearly a year ensconced in would appear to me to be a testament to a change in tactics, but I could be wrong.
 
There is also the evident case, that on the overwhelming majority of the battlefields of the war, (America being principally wooded at the time) the antagonists just could not see each other until at the closest of ranges. Beyond woods/brush, there are units making use of defilade, as in reverse slopes (be they ever so shallow), etc. in their defenses, and even attacking approaches, etc.

The rifle-musket could be used at any range at which it could cast the ball, but it still required a direct line of sight to actually strike something aimed at... and aimed fire is only possible where the opponent is visible. Otherwise shoot at the area, or the smoke, etc.

I recall Col. McMahon of the 21st Ohio explaining that on the afternoon of Sept. 20, '63 at Chickamauga how his regiment held their position so long on the forward slope of the Horseshoe ridge, while the bulk of the defenders were in line on the crest or reverse slopes. He said the smoke and trees confused the attacking Confederates below, who, discerning only the tree tops for the shape of the hill, fired high for hours while his men laid down under it. Being on the sloping and uneven ground, the 21st could only fire directly at their antagonists coming uphill when they were very close, as when their hats were visible, etc.
 
While theoretically a rifled musket could range out to 350 yearns with lethal effect, the usefulness of that ability on many Civil War battlefields was negligible.

Think about the conditions within the field of fire during any kind of significant engagement. On a warm calm day after one or two discharges from muskets and or artillery, your front will obscured by smoke. If the enemy is firing back, they will be obscured by smoke also. Taking a carefully aimed shot under those conditions is sketchy at best. That is why infantrymen were trained to volley fire when in line of battle. Under poor visibility the best thing you can do is put as much lethality downrange as quickly as possible and as closely as reasonable. Long range fire by small arms was a waste of time and ammunition in the musket age. There are numerous examples of soldiers who stated they they never really were certain that they hit anybody. Even modern soldiers with our advanced small arms rarely have a confirmed kill.
Harry Caudill wrote a memoir about practicing law in the old days in Kentucky, and he described one character discuss service in the Kentucky troops in the Spanish American War - he said the man told me the men were given wide brim soft hats so they could take off those hats after firing, and use them to fan the black smoke away so they could see if they hit anything!
 
The thread has been a discussion of ballistics and, in particular, a discussion of the article posted by the OP in which the author appeared to be hopelessly confused regarding why projectiles follow the trajectory that they do. There has been an all too common erroneous belief among many authors that somehow a minie ball fired from a rifle-musket followed some weird path that created a safe zone that was not a previous problem associated with smoothbore muskets. This thread has been a discussion attempting to explain that the physics remains the same for both weapons, regardless of whatever actual impact the two weapons had on the fighting.

No one has made any claims about the tactics changing during the war, so I'm not really certain why you feel you need to make a "BIGGER EFFORT" to discuss Hagerman's book regarding tactics. Nonetheless, you quoted me in particular, so I will respond. Please forgive me if I have misunderstood your intent.

If you will refer to my post #12 you will see that I specifically stated that rifle-muskets were not always used to full-advantage. The soldiers usually lacked training in basic marksmanship and range estimation, and as you have pointed out, the officer's didn't always give orders that took advantage of the potential range of the rifle-musket. The works of Hess and Bilby have been mentioned in this regard, but only in the context of the confusion that they caused amongst other authors, not because anyone was disputing the validity of their work. There is no doubt that the majority of the time the soldiers and officers failed to use the new weapon to full advantage.

That said, there were, however, instances when the increased range of the rifle-musket did, in fact, play a role in the fighting. Here is an example from the official records, I have edited it down to the relevant portion:

Reports of Brig. Gem. J. H. Hobart Ward, U. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade and First Division.

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST Div., THIRD CORPS,
August 4, 1863.

... The supports of the first two lines of the enemy were now coming up in columns en masse, while we had but a single line of battle to receive the shock. Our skirmishers were now forced to draw back. My line awaited the clash. To the regiments on the right, who were sheltered in a wood, I gave directions not to fire until they could plainly see the enemy; to those who were on the left, not to fire at a longer distance than 200 yards.
The enemy had now approached to within 200 yards of my position, in line and en masse, yelling and shouting. My command did not fire a shot until the enemy came within the distance prescribed, when the whole command fired a volley. This checked the enemy's advance suddenly, which gave our men an opportunity to reload, when another volley was fired into them. The enemy now exhibited much disorder, and, taking advantage of this circumstance, I advanced my right and center with a view of obtaining a position behind a stone wall, about 160 yards in advance, and which the enemy was endeavoring to reach.


This is just one example, but it clearly is an instance of effective volleys being delivered at a range of 200 yards in spite of what Hagerman found. I would also add that the trenches around Petersburg that two armies spent nearly a year ensconced in would appear to me to be a testament to a change in tactics, but I could be wrong.
I'm not disputing the ballistics, just its importance, i.e., my point is that the Minie Ball rifled musket had zero impact, likely, on total casualties & the war's outcome, if Hagermann's analysis and data are correct.
 
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