larry_cockerham said:
Beauregard continued to run the show until the end in North Carolina. How much direction he was getting from Richmond is unknown to me, but I suspect not much near the end. Hood is more famous because of his tendency to get a bit 'agressive' at times of combat. There are other words for 'agressive', but I will refrain from using them. It was Beauregard who "accepted" Hood's resignation and placed Taylor temporarily in command of the AOT 23 Jan 1865. Taylor remained in Alabama/MS with Forrest waiting for the onslaught from Wilson. I believe AP Stewart assumed tactical command on the way to NC under Beauregard's supervision until Johnston was re-instated. Please let me know if I'm confused?
Maybe we are both confused
-after all here we are in the "eastern Theater section in a thread titled 'Joe Johnston' and we are discussing Hood and Beauregard in Tennessee!
Oh well, here's why I got he idea that PGT was not so involved in that campaign. I've been reading
Jefferson Davis's Generals, ed. Gabor Boritt, and in one essay which I just read yesterday '
Jeff Davis Rules: General Beauregard and the Sanctity of Civilian Authority in the Confederacy' by T. Michael Parrish I read the following:
"In early October 1864, ... Meeting face-to-face in Augusta, Georgia, Davis and Beauregard ... conversed for several hours, exchanging information and making decisions. .... Widely considered as the likely candidate to take command of the western army prior to Davis's choosing Hood instead, Beauregard gave his willing approval to Hood's planned attempt to lure Sherman northward, away from Atlanta. At the same time, Davis gave Beauregard command of a new Military Division of the West, an area covering five states ... Fully realizing his lack of real authority as an advisor to Hood, who would report directly to Davis, Beauregard accepted his rather strange role and vowed to carry out his assignment."
Parrish cites Alfred Roman's
The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War between the States 1861-1865.
As your comments piqued my curiosity, I found a book by that same T. Michael Parrish,
Richard Taylor, Soldier Prince of Dixie, in which I found this:
"On September 27 Taylor met Davis in Montgomery. ... They discussed at length the concept of Hood moving the army north into Tennessee to lure Sherman away from Atlanta. Davis considered Hood's force strong enough to warrant the strike, but Taylor disagreed .... Taylor also suggested, as had Hardee and others, that Davis transfer General P.G.T. Beauregard from his duties at Charleston to take command of the army. ... Taylor believed he had persuaded the president to adopt his recommendations. But Davis decide upon only a superficial course of action. Instead of replacing Hood with Beauregard, he set up a new administrative structure called the Military Division of the West, with Beauregard in command. .... Taylor discovered the true ramifications of the arrangement when he met with Beauregard two weeks later at Blue Mountain. Beauregard had not replaced Hood. Instead, he exercised only an uncertain, almost advisory authority. Davis still had ultimate control over Hood's movements. By elevating Beauregard, the president obviously meant to deflect the public outcry against Hood while also leaving him in command of the army. .... when Beauregard conferred with Hood on October 21, he discovered the dauntless Texas had decided that in order to lure Sherman out of Georgia, he would have to seize a new initiative: a diversionary campaign into Tennessee. .... Returning to explain matters to Taylor, Beauregard confessed that, after making a heated protest, he had finally "declined to interfere" in Hood's audacious campaign, especially when no objection came from Davis."
Not to rely on one author, I tore the shrink wrap off my copy of Wiley Sword's
The Confederacy's Last Hurrah. Some excerpts:
"Hood outlined a proposal for Davis. ... Hood advocated a bold new plan ... Hood had learned from his earlier close association with Jefferson Davis that the best way to deal with the president was to flatter him and bow to his strong convictions. ... Davis, of course, was desperately looking for an acceptable practical solution. He had long sought to wage offensive warfare, even to carry the war into Tennessee and Kentucky. ... Hood was playing to Davis's most vulnerable side. ....
As for the public outcry for a change in army leadership, Davis would circumvent criticism by a ploy. ... The entire matter would thus be resolved practically and politically. On paper the theater commander would be in control and responsible. Yet in practice there would be little change in the actual operations of the army. ...
When Jefferson Davis summoned him to a conference in Augusta, Georgia, on October 3, 1864, Beauregard hoped to assume again an important field command. ... Davis wanted Beauregard in the role of a theater commander, with little more than supervisory authority. ...
Beauregard began to have serious misgivings about Hood's operational concepts. ... Beauregard thus demanded Hood's concise statement of his plans for future operations. Yet, being well aware of Jefferson Davis's posturing with Beauregard as a defacto commander with little authority, Hood didn't bother to reply for four days.
Thereafter, Hood rarely deigned to with Beauregard or his staff, instead sending his communications directly to Richmond authorities."
Etc., etc., etc.
From this account, Beauregard was largely 'out of the loop' in regard to Hood's actions!