Joe Johnston

larry_cockerham said:
The Duck river to the south was impassable and he had been ordered north by Beauregard who should receive considerable credit for the mess he created.

It was my impression that the campaign was Hoods Idea, and that Beauregard ('passively'?) gave him the go ahead.
 
Beauregard continued to run the show until the end in North Carolina. How much direction he was getting from Richmond is unknown to me, but I suspect not much near the end. Hood is more famous because of his tendency to get a bit 'agressive' at times of combat. There are other words for 'agressive', but I will refrain from using them. It was Beaugregard who "accepted" Hood's resignation and placed Taylor temporarily in command of the AOT 23 Jan 1865. Taylor remained in Alabama/MS with Forrest waiting for the onslaught from Wilson. I believe AP Stewart assumed tactical command on the way to NC under Beauregard's supervision until Johnston was re-instated. Please let me know if I'm confused?
 
larry_cockerham said:
Beauregard continued to run the show until the end in North Carolina. How much direction he was getting from Richmond is unknown to me, but I suspect not much near the end. Hood is more famous because of his tendency to get a bit 'agressive' at times of combat. There are other words for 'agressive', but I will refrain from using them. It was Beauregard who "accepted" Hood's resignation and placed Taylor temporarily in command of the AOT 23 Jan 1865. Taylor remained in Alabama/MS with Forrest waiting for the onslaught from Wilson. I believe AP Stewart assumed tactical command on the way to NC under Beauregard's supervision until Johnston was re-instated. Please let me know if I'm confused?

Maybe we are both confused :angel: -after all here we are in the "eastern Theater section in a thread titled 'Joe Johnston' and we are discussing Hood and Beauregard in Tennessee!

Oh well, here's why I got he idea that PGT was not so involved in that campaign. I've been reading Jefferson Davis's Generals, ed. Gabor Boritt, and in one essay which I just read yesterday 'Jeff Davis Rules: General Beauregard and the Sanctity of Civilian Authority in the Confederacy' by T. Michael Parrish I read the following:

"In early October 1864, ... Meeting face-to-face in Augusta, Georgia, Davis and Beauregard ... conversed for several hours, exchanging information and making decisions. .... Widely considered as the likely candidate to take command of the western army prior to Davis's choosing Hood instead, Beauregard gave his willing approval to Hood's planned attempt to lure Sherman northward, away from Atlanta. At the same time, Davis gave Beauregard command of a new Military Division of the West, an area covering five states ... Fully realizing his lack of real authority as an advisor to Hood, who would report directly to Davis, Beauregard accepted his rather strange role and vowed to carry out his assignment."

Parrish cites Alfred Roman's The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War between the States 1861-1865.

As your comments piqued my curiosity, I found a book by that same T. Michael Parrish, Richard Taylor, Soldier Prince of Dixie, in which I found this:

"On September 27 Taylor met Davis in Montgomery. ... They discussed at length the concept of Hood moving the army north into Tennessee to lure Sherman away from Atlanta. Davis considered Hood's force strong enough to warrant the strike, but Taylor disagreed .... Taylor also suggested, as had Hardee and others, that Davis transfer General P.G.T. Beauregard from his duties at Charleston to take command of the army. ... Taylor believed he had persuaded the president to adopt his recommendations. But Davis decide upon only a superficial course of action. Instead of replacing Hood with Beauregard, he set up a new administrative structure called the Military Division of the West, with Beauregard in command. .... Taylor discovered the true ramifications of the arrangement when he met with Beauregard two weeks later at Blue Mountain. Beauregard had not replaced Hood. Instead, he exercised only an uncertain, almost advisory authority. Davis still had ultimate control over Hood's movements. By elevating Beauregard, the president obviously meant to deflect the public outcry against Hood while also leaving him in command of the army. .... when Beauregard conferred with Hood on October 21, he discovered the dauntless Texas had decided that in order to lure Sherman out of Georgia, he would have to seize a new initiative: a diversionary campaign into Tennessee. .... Returning to explain matters to Taylor, Beauregard confessed that, after making a heated protest, he had finally "declined to interfere" in Hood's audacious campaign, especially when no objection came from Davis."

Not to rely on one author, I tore the shrink wrap off my copy of Wiley Sword's The Confederacy's Last Hurrah. Some excerpts:

"Hood outlined a proposal for Davis. ... Hood advocated a bold new plan ... Hood had learned from his earlier close association with Jefferson Davis that the best way to deal with the president was to flatter him and bow to his strong convictions. ... Davis, of course, was desperately looking for an acceptable practical solution. He had long sought to wage offensive warfare, even to carry the war into Tennessee and Kentucky. ... Hood was playing to Davis's most vulnerable side. ....
As for the public outcry for a change in army leadership, Davis would circumvent criticism by a ploy. ... The entire matter would thus be resolved practically and politically. On paper the theater commander would be in control and responsible. Yet in practice there would be little change in the actual operations of the army. ...
When Jefferson Davis summoned him to a conference in Augusta, Georgia, on October 3, 1864, Beauregard hoped to assume again an important field command. ... Davis wanted Beauregard in the role of a theater commander, with little more than supervisory authority. ...
Beauregard began to have serious misgivings about Hood's operational concepts. ... Beauregard thus demanded Hood's concise statement of his plans for future operations. Yet, being well aware of Jefferson Davis's posturing with Beauregard as a defacto commander with little authority, Hood didn't bother to reply for four days.
Thereafter, Hood rarely deigned to with Beauregard or his staff, instead sending his communications directly to Richmond authorities."

Etc., etc., etc.

From this account, Beauregard was largely 'out of the loop' in regard to Hood's actions!
 
I understand and essentially agree with the information you have presented. Nice research. I perhaps jumped to a bit of a conclusion earlier regarding PGT's role, but I figured my statement might get a rise out of a good authority and provide me with some information. That seems to have worked. What I suspect was the main problem was Davis trying to command via remote control plus the headstrong Hood, pain and drugs non-withstanding. The more I learn about Hood's brief period in Middle Tennessee and his communications with Forrest and others, he wasn't as dumb or disoriented as he is often protrayed. However, he certainly sent 15,000 men into a very dangerous situation at Franklin. Local folks haven't forgotten that one. As we have discussed before, attacking Nashville was not going to be productive regardless of the source of the order. US Army too big and too well supplied with professional soldiers. Sherman had already stated that he wasn't worried about TN or Hood's invasion. He was about to 'win' the war in North Carolina or Virginia.
 
Old topic, but I am fresh after JEJ biography.

ewc said:
His other worthy accomplishment in the war is his face-off with General Sherman in Georgia in the spring and summer of '64.

What was worthy in this accomplishment I ask? He did nothing more then to bring Sherman to the gates of Atlanta without serious resistance.

ewc said:
That winter taking over from the ineffective and dispiriting Bragg, he restored the Army of Tennessee to fighting trim and high morale.

He was good in that, but this was the only thing he was good at. Like McClellan, he knew how to organize, train and love his troops, but he didnt know or perhaps he didnt have moral courage to use his troops like R.E.Lee or Grant had.

ewc said:
His formidable defensive positions and deft touch to Sherman's moves has Shelby Foote poetically calling this campaign between Sherman and Johnston the 'Red Clay Minuet' and the 'Grand Waltz'. And such it is, a campaign which is a thing of beauty.

Snake Creek Gap speak for itself. He failed to make proper defence in terrain he was encamping since february 1864. This was not the first time when he did not know the terrain he was defending. I understand if he was offensive general, but he was not and it is suprising that he did not care about that gap.

ewc said:
Here is where we see Johnston best applying his principles of warfare- stout fortified places, concentration of strength, commit only to advantage, yield space for time, and take advantage of opponents' errors by thrusts of a highly mobile force.

And NOT to stop Sherman at all. He would give up Atlanta and retreated all the way to Atlantic Coast to save his army. That would not help McClellan to be elected in november elections, which many Southerners believed were their only chance to win in 1864.

Retreating and givinig up territory which was supplying both Confederate armies was not the way to win. Sorry. Confederate could lose Tennesse, but to lose Georgia (and make country to be cut in half again) it was to lose the war completely.

Problem with Jospeh E.Johnston aka "I`ll retreat instead" was that he was afraid to lose his reputation. He was afraid to make ANY decesive decision. The man who makes no mistakes does not usually make anything. That was true in case of J.Johnston. He was waiting (not looking!) for perfect occasion. He was given such occasion twice in his life - at Seven Pines and Bentoville. Both times he failed.
R.E.Lee, Bragg, A.S.Johnston, Beauregard and Hood were not waiting, they were searching (looking) for occasion. If R.E.Lee was passive like J.E.J. he would not gain many of his victories. I prefer Bragg, ASJ, Bo and Hood over JEJ cause they were trying to do something at least.

Joe Johnston should not be given any field task, he should be sent to defend some coastal province, to command Trans-Mississippi department or be given a clerk job.
 
Very true Nico. whether attacking (very rare) or defending, he always ended up retreating.
Johnston would probably have been much more comfortable (thus more aggressive) if he had been in command of a large well supplied Union Army.
In the end, he would have been more of a benefit to the Union cause, whether he fought for the South or North.
 
In his only modern biography, there is a nice story at the end of the book. It has happened in 1880s.

"The elderly couple were resting on the verandah of their cottage at Sweet Chalybeate Springs, where they went regularly in the summer for the sake of Lydia`s (Johnston`s wife) poor health. They were chatting with Dabney Maury, who had come by for a visit, when they heard a shriek. Johnston went to investigate and found a young girl confronted by a turkey that was blocking her path. She stood there obstinately shrieking while the turkey ignored her. Disgusted, the old general remarked, "Why don`t you run away?" Mischeviously, Dabney Maury remarked, "That is the fine advice to come from a great commander." "Well, sir," Johnston responded, "if she won`t fight, the best she can do is run away, isn`t it?" Without missing a beat, Lydia replied, "That used to be your plan, I know, sir." The white-haired old general fixed his wife with a bemused stare, then burst out laughing."
 
I think Joe Johnston

played the hand of the army, outnumbered and out supplied.

He wouldn't destroy his army; couldn't destroy the enemy.
 
Mary Boyd Chestnut recorded an interesting observation on Uncle Joe. She had guests who went hunting with Joe. Joe enjoyed a reputation for being an excellent marksman but would not risk a shot if he thought it would ruin his reputation. Applied to him as a field commander, he would not risk a battle unless absolutely assured of success. Joe would fight, but only if he was entirely confident of the outcome. Sounds a lot like Montgomery of WW II fame (who claimed never to have lost a battle but called Operation Goodwood a distraction that allowed Patton's Operation Cobra to succeed and also Market Garden which was supposed to capture Antwerp and gain that valuable port to shorten the Allies' supply line but got whipped real bad).
 
Seems to me there's something to be said for a man playing reality civil war and returning home under his own steam and in an upright position? Joe Johnston could make that claim.
 
Enough! Tired of picking on JEJ. He was a decent and caring man and would have made a superb peacetime general officer, happily shuffling papers and rotating units in a timely manner. And monitoring their supplies and morale.

ole
 
I've never noticed any particular criticism of Joe when it came to his last battle at Bentonville? The AOT put up a helluva fight while it lasted. He was still out there pitching after Lee had folded his tent.
 
The AOT had some very solid performing generals but was always cursed with a mediocre commander. Too bad there was not another general of Lee's ability to head the AOT.
 
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