Joe Johnston

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Shane: You mentioned Joe Johnston as a "great." Why? What did he accomplish? He is one of the most difficult CSA achievers to nail down. Steven Woodward, one of the most prolific writers on the CW has little good say on JJ. In fact, it is amusing to read Woodward as he rarely criticizes Bragg while never missing an opportunity to slam JJ. Anyway, what did JJ accomplish? Where and when did he strut his stuff and demonstrate the right to have "great" put in front of his name?
 
As I stated just recently on the 'Lee's Legacy' thread, all the great leaders are subject post-bellum to all types of adulation, criticism, admiration, blame, and are co-opted for just about any obscure, obtuse, and 'Oh boy!!' theory anyone wished to present. Here we have a publishing historian who lambastes Johnston and he is not unique on that score. I recently bought the "North & South Journal" (vol.5 No.6) with an article by Steven H Newton which presents a very good case for Old Joe. Newton presents an argument which I had earlier used in some Johnston threads in this forum. The basis of the argument is the philosophical differences between General Johnston and President Davis of conducting warfare in the Civil War. Newton goes into the principles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, which if anyone is interested, (and it is fascinating reading,) I refer you to the magazine.

As Davis is responsible for military affairs in the Confederacy, Johnston is beholden to his chief to carry out his assignments. Needless to say, Johnston disagreed markedly with Davis's war plans and aims. Briefly, Johnston believed in the necessity of husbanding men and resources, yield space for opportunity and concentration, and fortresses to buttress mobile armies. Davis believed in taking the war to the enemy, holding territory, thus dispersing men & resources, and in using interior lines to create opportunity. The friction between the two leaders led to misunderstanding, lost opportunities, and finally personal animosity serious enough to adversely affect the Confederacy.

Joe Johnston is high on my list of great commanders of the Civil War. Was he a complete general? The answer is no- there were none in the Civil War, if there are ever any. Johnston was unable to cooperate with his Nation's leader and implement his leader's plans, much like what hobbled General McClellan's effectiveness for the Union. The responsibilty for this must be placed on Johnston's shoulders, alike for McClellan. The failure of the relief of Vicksburg and the loss of an army, a vital fortified city, and the gathering of troops which could have been effectively used elsewhere points directly to this conflict between the philosophies of our protagonists.

That is the negative. Two events illustrate the greatness of Johnston. The first is his deception of General Patterson in front of Harper's Ferry while moving his command by stealth and by train to the developing battlefield along Bull Run in July of '61. Forget not that although Patterson's performance here did not redound to his credit, (and he was besieged by conflicting and confusing orders,) he was none-the-less one of the very few Union commanders experienced in leading large commands in active campaign. Johnston's use of the railroad to move large bodies of troops from one front to engage in another was at that time innovative. He was the first ever to do it, a major achievement, which became almost a calling card for the ACW. Had he been knocked out of the war at this battle, he would be remembered as a great commander of this war for this feat alone, although winning the battle helps in this regard.

His other worthy accomplishment in the war is his face-off with General Sherman in Georgia in the spring and summer of '64. That winter taking over from the ineffective and dispiriting Bragg, he restored the Army of Tennessee to fighting trim and high morale. His formidable defensive positions and deft touch to Sherman's moves has Shelby Foote poetically calling this campaign between Sherman and Johnston the 'Red Clay Minuet' and the 'Grand Waltz'. And such it is, a campaign which is a thing of beauty. Here is where we see Johnston best applying his principles of warfare- stout fortified places, concentration of strength, commit only to advantage, yield space for time, and take advantage of opponents' errors by thrusts of a highly mobile force. Given Sherman's preponderance of numbers, Johnston's strategy proves both effective and, I believe, mandatory. Of course, it ultimately doesn't jive with Davis's wishes (and thinking:wink: Johnston is removed before Atlanta and a Davis style fighter, the pugnacious Hood, placed at the helm of the Army of Tennessee. I will only say about this that God (and the Yankees) allowed one or two AoT veterans to live to tell the tale of those dreadful few months. In it, I see Johnston's policy vindicated. Later on, as Sherman's legions were plowing north through the Carolines, who was there best able to put before Sherman's blue tide but Johnston? Any hope left to the Confederates then rested on what the wily generals, Lee and Johnston could do to unite their armies before the opposing Union juggernauts engulfed them. Alas, it was not to be. Could it have been done, these were the men who could have done it. The last great hope of the Confederate Nation was Lee and Johnston.

(Message edited by Ewc on January 14, 2003)
 
Wow... I can't add anything to that. I've always thought that Johnstons Georgia Campaign should be written of in textbooks when it comes to facing a vastly superior force. What he did might be best realized by traveling the path and viewing some of the battlefields. I think no leader of the CW realized the use of terrain like Johnston.

His actions at the time of Vicksburg I think can be laid at the door of Jeff Davis and an inept CSA General at Vicksburg. Grant certianly didn't help matters any either.
 
Excellent ecw and the first time I have seen a good analysis of JJ. However, I have a couple of comments and/or questions.

I agree Johnston was efficient at organizing his men and placing them correctly and I assume that his grand strategy of a defensive/offensive would have better than the patchwork quilt the CSA used that was more reactionary than proactive and was certainly uncoordinated at every stage.

However, Johnston was his own worst enemy in allowing himself to become embroiled in political antics with Louis T. Wigfall. As you said Johnston is to blame here. It was not his job to set war goals or dictate military strategy.

Beyond that my problem is that Johnston seemed completely wedded to Jomini's theory of having an ideal system in place before committing to battle. Problem was Johnston could not move unless it was a "perfect system." And like McClellan, he also had a multiplication fetish and kept increasing enemy numbers. IMO Joe Johnston became over concerned with having the perfect system before moving. “He [Johnston] would neither initiate a battle nor stand and receive an enemy attack unless everything was perfect.” [Jefferson Davis and His Generals, Woodward pg 177]. I think he made the perfect system the goal rather than targeting victory.

I also think that JJ comes out on the plus side of history because he is always compared to Hood. I can recall a thousand comments about Johnston usually coming down to, "He was right. Look what Hood did?" or "Johnston would never have ordered the suicide attacks at Franklin." or "Johnston would never have turned to Tennessee instead of following Sherman." Johnston thus becomes the quintessential “what if?”

I think that I have decided that Johnston's reputation is veneer rather than substance. He didn't risk defeat and therefore avoided it. In my mind Johnston's image rests on inertia, evasion, diversion, and distraction. He didn't screw up like Hood therefore he must have been good. His complaints against Davis were accurate; therefore he was a savvy general. Never mind that Hood's actions have nothing to do with Johnston's achievements or lack thereof or that Davis' business was not Johnston's.

I also can't resist your conclusion that there was "no complete general." I believe that Grant was the ultimate "complete general" as T. Harry Williams called him. He comprehended grand (global today) strategy; understood that he took direction from his Commander in Chief and didn't mess with politics; was a good organizer and ran his armies efficiently; knew how to select and work with subordinates; didn't dabble in sideline spats; had excellent leadership qualities; good tactical sense; was a brilliant theater strategist; his skills during a battle couldn't be equaled (Shiloh); was decisive; kept moving and fighting; had a well honed geographical acuity; and he succeeded where others failed. Shees, what did he lack?
 
Connie,

Shilo? Shilo? Connie, you have to be kidding me! Grant and Sherman were anything but skilled during Shilo. They where lucky not be selling firewood and recieving medication after that fiasco.
 
Sean: Before sticking to that statement, I think you better reread Larry Daniels or Wiley Sword to review just how brilliant Grant's onsite battlefield skills were at Shiloh. I think most believe that Grant's calm demeanor and quick decision making during the first day saved he day for Union. While there is great room for criticizing his prebattle decisions, from the moment he jumped on the riverboat Grant's orders and battlefield skill leaves little room for second guessing.
 
Connie,

Grant was about as brilliant at Shilo as Lee was at Malvern Hill!

Regardless, You cannot excuse Grant or Shermans actions. A commander is in command and is held responsible for the safety, security, morale, and fighting condition of the troops. This responsibility is just not granted to them on the first day of the battle.

With this in mind, both Grant and Sherman were questionable during Shilo. Grant and Sherman both made poor decisions that could have cost them the day. Grant's bacon was saved by men who took to their own course of action. Grant formed a defensive line of troops on the run. If you have ever been to Shilo, that defensive line though formidable, is not very large.

Read the Shilo question and answer in the Western Thread of the Dispatch post.
 
In Reference to Sherman,Grant, I mean before the battle of Shilo began.

Though Grant was tenacious, I due find him lacking like Lee in many instances. Grant was on the ropes after Shilo and the Union was lucky Lincoln made the decision allowing him to stay.

Lincolns decision cannot be judged in light of 64. Johnston was in command in Virginia (Lee was still the desk jockey) and what evidence did Lincoln have Grant was destined for greatness? Lincoln made a gamble that would eventually pay off without him really knowing it. Lincoln made similiar decisions with other commanders and look what it led to!

I think Grant staying was more a part of providence or blind luck then Lincoln having a keen eye for leadership. I think Grant like Lee gets credit where it is not deserved and both men have failure swept under the rug.

They always said Grant was cool under fire, I wonder if it was because he was tone deaf? I have heard of men stating shells were exploding around him has he went on about his work like nothing was occurring. I am not doubting he could focus on the task at hand however, if he was tone deaf that may have been a silly little asset. Cant hear the shell, cant duck and cover! LoL! Any truth to this?
 
Wellll, Sean, being tone deaf is not the same as being stone deaf.
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Grant's hearing was fine as far as I know, but he couldn't distinguish musical notes, which is why he didn't end up in the fife and drum corps. I think the quote attributed to him was that he knew two tunes, one was Yankee Doodle and the other one wasn't.

His not being rattled by shells may have come from selective hearing, similar to my pug dog's. She can't hear me calling her to come in, even when she's sitting on the front step, but if I whisper 'treat' she can hear it from across the lawn!

Zou
 
Agreed Zou, there was absolutely nothing wrong with Grant's hearing. His nervous system, however, was a little different than the rest of us. Music, he claimed was like a physical scrapping along his nerves and even as a child in church, he would be almost in pain when the choir sang. At Sackett's Harbor he would flee Julia and his new son rather than endure the regimental band as it played each evening in front of their quarters. According to the Georgetown neighbors he was that way even as a child.

Lloyd Lewis relates one telling incident in his book. While carrying the 4 year old Ulysses through town, Jesse was stopped by some older boys who thought it would be amusing to shoot a black powder pistol off near the boy's ear. Jesse told them to go ahead. According to the neighbors, Ulysses didn't so much as blink when the loud rapport of the muzzleloader went off. Yet he fully absorbed the impact. A week later while ill, Ulysses was told by the neighbor lady who came to help nurse him that she would prepare a packet of powder for him to drink. He began to cry inconsolably screaming that it he drank the powder it would blow him up.

The Rev. O.H. Tiffany who was Grant's pastor in New York claimed that Grant told him that music of all kinds tortured his nerves and "that in church he always experienced a feeling of relief as each stanza of the hymn was sung and so disposed of." It was probably why Jesse and Hannah, who indulged him in all things, did not make him attend church constantly as a boy and why he was never baptized. According to his biographer Lloyd Lewis, "His nervous system was curious one -- not twitching so much as an eyelid when shells or cannon went off right beside his head, yet raw and sore when brass bands, church congregations or the finest operatic talents or symphonic orchestras made music. Georgetown neighbors tell about this in his babyhood, his son, his aides and friends remark it in his middle and later life. It may hold the key to his incredible imperturbably at Shiloh and the Wilderness. He was not a dumb or insensitive man at all . . . and he was an 'iron man,' but how much of it was an odd nervous system?" [Letters from Lloyd Lewis, page 79]
 
Sean: The idea that Lincoln saved Grant's bacon is exaggerated. Lincoln, like Stanton, was very upset over the losses at Shiloh and reacting to the resounding chorus of criticism from the newspapers, he had Stanton wire Halleck April 23 asking if there was any truth to drinking or neglect. Halleck true to his practice of sticking up for West Pointers plus having Sherman (who Halleck had always mentored) talking in one ear, dismissed the accusations and reported, "the conduct of the battle and all the details meet his entire approval." And, of course, later it was Halleck's behind the scenes machinations that would outwit McClernand's grab for power in the Vicksburg campaign.

Even the "I can't spare this man," quote has come under recent fire. "With the benefit of hindsight, people would later say that Abraham Lincoln stood behind Grant at this critical juncture. 'I can't spare this man; he fights,' he reportedly told Alexander McClure, a Pennsylvania politician. But a cursory investigation of McClure's account of this conversation reveals it is a creative exercise bearing at best a tangential relationship to fact." {<u>Ulysses S. Grant</u> by Brooks Simpson page 136] It should be noted, however, that Dr. David Herbert Donald does include the quote in his book <u>Lincoln.</u>

Now back to Shiloh. Can you point out specifically of how Grant failed on the field once the battle began? The prebattle situation is another topic altogether. IMO once the battle commenced Grant demonstrated extraordinary tactical talent by issuing rapid fire orders and dispatches that held the first day in check and led to the second day win.

By the way Buell was dilatory in getting there. In short he was damned late, but for now I will not go there. This is a Joe Johnston thread, remember?
 
Here's another thing to think about regarding Joe Johnston. According to Gary Gallagher, Johnston's passive defensive strategy resulted in the same attrition rate as Lee's aggressive offensive strategy. "During his retreat up the Peninsula in the spring of 1862, for example, a young Georgian complained that 'General Joseph Johnston, from whom we were led to expect so much, has done little else than evacuate, until the very mention of the word sickens me . . ."

One of the complaints was that Johnston left vast stretches of territory exposed and in essence handed it over to the Union troops by default, but gained only meager long term results. Manpower also was sacrificed. During his retreat to Atlanta the CSA lost 10,000 to Sherman's 11,000. Yet, Johnston gained nothing except time delay.

I'm not saying that Hood did any better with his pitbull attacks that gained nothing more substantial than a poodle gnawing at Uncle Billy's leg would have achieved. In fact what Hood did was just lose more quickly than Johnston.

The big question remains. What exactly would Johnston have achieved if he had not been removed? Could he have held Atlanta? And remember Atlanta, as a producer and supplier to the war effort, was essential. I doubt it. I doubt he would have tried. I think that Johnston would have continued to retreat in the hope that he could find the perfect set of circumstances to turn and fight and he wouldn't have found it.
 
Connie,


I am referring to the pre-battle conditions. He was held somewhat accountable for that. Like I said, a commander does not take command the day the battle begins. He and Sherman are up for much debate on the pre-battle conditions. If they had been more pro-active with the intelligence the Confederate attack might have ground to a halt before even starting.

As for Grants hearing, "At Sackett's Harbor he would flee Julia and his new son rather than endure the regimental band as it played each evening in front of their quarters." If you had heard that band play you would have fled also!!!! Julia was trying to be kind!!! Grant was simply being a "Man of Action"!!!

If only Lee would have known "Music" was his weakness!! He might have sent Longstreet on a ride around the Wilderness with a Corps of musical soldiers singing show-tunes. Heck, he might have surrendered the entire force or fled to Washington.
 
We might want to remember, re. Grant's being indifferent to shellfire, that, in CW times, leadership was often by example. Senior officers walking around erect while under fire to inspire the troops was not uncommon. Grant was like many other officers in that respect.
On Johnston's Atlanta campaign: I believe Johnston was trying, not really to defeat Sherman, but to delay any success by Sherman until after the election of 1864 in the North. The Confederacy held great hope that Lincoln would be defeated, and that McClellan would have negotiated a peace with the South.
 
Sean, regarding Lee sending brass bands to make Grant flee to Washington... what likely would have happened was that Grant would have sent the sharpshooters in to pick them off toot by toot. He couldn't do that to guys in his own army... his name wasn't Forrest.
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Zou, who knows a few more tunes than two
 
In trying to swing this thread, back to Johnston, from a greatness of Grant thread, which I don't buy. I would have to list Johnston certainly as good, maybe not great. I was reading, in Shermans book, about the problem he was having with Johnston, at Atlanta. Johnston, was moving his forces around, to where if Sherman attacked, he would be going into well defended entrenched positions. Then, they got hold of a newspaper, stating that Johnston, was being replaced by Hood. After talking to his other officers, that knew Hood, how happy they were, for that change, and orders were given to all the union troops, to be prepared for an attack, which would be on open ground, which Sherman wanted. Sure enough, that's what Hood did, and suffered a sound defeat for it. That, does make Johnston, look pretty good.
 
When taking the measure of a commander, it is profitable to consider the estimation of those who faced him. Both Grant and Sherman consider Johnston to be first rate. Thus spoke those in a position to know of what they speak. It is historians of a much later time (mid 20th century)(besides of course one Jeff Davis) who have had opportunity to examine the war from many sides and points of view who have postulated differently. But what of it- every commander made errors, every commander had problems with which he had difficulty or was unable to overcome. So it is with Johnston, we can see through history his errors, but we do so through the luxury of time and scholarship and many resources,(and no one shooting at us!). In other words, with many of the advantages unavailable to the commander in the field in real time- all the more valid the opinion of a commander's opposite number.

And again, as to Hood's unfortunate elevation to command in place of Johnston, the reaction of his peers in the opposing army tell the whole story. Not only were Sherman, Thomas, Schofield and the army before Atlanta delighted, relieved too was Grant bogged down at Petersburg upon receiving the good news from Sherman by wire. Grant's objective before Lee and his incomparable veterans was to get them into the open where the Eastern armies' numbers would tell. Of course, he had to settle for locking Lee into his trenches about the James and Appomattox, which ultimately proved to be effective. But effective due to Johnston no longer being in charge to keep Sherman and his buddies out of Atlanta. And that because the Army of Tennessee was coming out finally into the open- and that right into the teeth of the Yankee strength. A sad story- one which Johnston would not have allowed to happen.
 
I believe that after his wounding at the seven days battle, Johnston was never really givin a chance at a real command. When he had command of the armies of the west they were already in shambles. What did he have at Vicksburg? 30,000 men yes, but some had not even been trained at that point, some were new recruits, and they faced an army that was vastly supperior. Johnston was always meant to lead the armies of Virginia, and had he been restored his previous command the outcome of the civil war may have differed
 
He was certainly one of the CSA's most capable generals and heads and shoulders above Bragg. But he was never popular w/ Davis, whihc is what one needed to make it to the top in the CS Armies.
 
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