As I stated just recently on the 'Lee's Legacy' thread, all the great leaders are subject post-bellum to all types of adulation, criticism, admiration, blame, and are co-opted for just about any obscure, obtuse, and 'Oh boy!!' theory anyone wished to present. Here we have a publishing historian who lambastes Johnston and he is not unique on that score. I recently bought the "North & South Journal" (vol.5 No.6) with an article by Steven H Newton which presents a very good case for Old Joe. Newton presents an argument which I had earlier used in some Johnston threads in this forum. The basis of the argument is the philosophical differences between General Johnston and President Davis of conducting warfare in the Civil War. Newton goes into the principles of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, which if anyone is interested, (and it is fascinating reading,) I refer you to the magazine.
As Davis is responsible for military affairs in the Confederacy, Johnston is beholden to his chief to carry out his assignments. Needless to say, Johnston disagreed markedly with Davis's war plans and aims. Briefly, Johnston believed in the necessity of husbanding men and resources, yield space for opportunity and concentration, and fortresses to buttress mobile armies. Davis believed in taking the war to the enemy, holding territory, thus dispersing men & resources, and in using interior lines to create opportunity. The friction between the two leaders led to misunderstanding, lost opportunities, and finally personal animosity serious enough to adversely affect the Confederacy.
Joe Johnston is high on my list of great commanders of the Civil War. Was he a complete general? The answer is no- there were none in the Civil War, if there are ever any. Johnston was unable to cooperate with his Nation's leader and implement his leader's plans, much like what hobbled General McClellan's effectiveness for the Union. The responsibilty for this must be placed on Johnston's shoulders, alike for McClellan. The failure of the relief of Vicksburg and the loss of an army, a vital fortified city, and the gathering of troops which could have been effectively used elsewhere points directly to this conflict between the philosophies of our protagonists.
That is the negative. Two events illustrate the greatness of Johnston. The first is his deception of General Patterson in front of Harper's Ferry while moving his command by stealth and by train to the developing battlefield along Bull Run in July of '61. Forget not that although Patterson's performance here did not redound to his credit, (and he was besieged by conflicting and confusing orders,) he was none-the-less one of the very few Union commanders experienced in leading large commands in active campaign. Johnston's use of the railroad to move large bodies of troops from one front to engage in another was at that time innovative. He was the first ever to do it, a major achievement, which became almost a calling card for the ACW. Had he been knocked out of the war at this battle, he would be remembered as a great commander of this war for this feat alone, although winning the battle helps in this regard.
His other worthy accomplishment in the war is his face-off with General Sherman in Georgia in the spring and summer of '64. That winter taking over from the ineffective and dispiriting Bragg, he restored the Army of Tennessee to fighting trim and high morale. His formidable defensive positions and deft touch to Sherman's moves has Shelby Foote poetically calling this campaign between Sherman and Johnston the 'Red Clay Minuet' and the 'Grand Waltz'. And such it is, a campaign which is a thing of beauty. Here is where we see Johnston best applying his principles of warfare- stout fortified places, concentration of strength, commit only to advantage, yield space for time, and take advantage of opponents' errors by thrusts of a highly mobile force. Given Sherman's preponderance of numbers, Johnston's strategy proves both effective and, I believe, mandatory. Of course, it ultimately doesn't jive with Davis's wishes (and thinking
Johnston is removed before Atlanta and a Davis style fighter, the pugnacious Hood, placed at the helm of the Army of Tennessee. I will only say about this that God (and the Yankees) allowed one or two AoT veterans to live to tell the tale of those dreadful few months. In it, I see Johnston's policy vindicated. Later on, as Sherman's legions were plowing north through the Carolines, who was there best able to put before Sherman's blue tide but Johnston? Any hope left to the Confederates then rested on what the wily generals, Lee and Johnston could do to unite their armies before the opposing Union juggernauts engulfed them. Alas, it was not to be. Could it have been done, these were the men who could have done it. The last great hope of the Confederate Nation was Lee and Johnston.
(Message edited by Ewc on January 14, 2003)