On the occasion of Longstreet's visit to Antietam in 1893, a correspondent of the Washington Post recorded the General's opinions on a number of topics. In this part of the interview, General Longstreet discusses controversies after Gettysburg. ...The general then proceeded to discuss some of the controversies at the South concerning Gettysburg, and said with some feeling that a deliberate attempt had been made by ignorant demagogues to mislead the people as to his relations with Lee at the battle and afterward. He stated positively that Lee personally had never criticized or found fault with his operations on that field. I therefore asked: "I have heard it intimated, general, by some prejudiced people, that Lee, on account of coldness growing out of Gettysburg, to be rid of you, brought about your transfer to the West." General Longstreet smiled at this suggestion and answered promptly: "On the contrary, he was at first strongly opposed to my going, and suggested another advance into Maryland that fall instead. I first proposed going West in the Spring of 1863, after Chancellorsville. I firmly believed up to Gettysburg and Vicksburg that we could win by concentrating an overwhelming force suddenly against Rosecrans. After whipping him and establishing ourselves on the Ohio, I held that the Mississippi Valley would instantly have cleared itself up to the Ohio's mouth, as Grant would have been withdrawn to defend Ohio and Indiana. This would have saved to the Confederacy some sixty thousand men lost at Vicksburg, Port Hudson and Gettysburg. "The proposal was coldly received by the Richmond authorities. They preferred to meet the enemy in the West with detachments; always with the weaker force at the point of contact. After Vicksburg and Gettysburg, when the darker clouds began to gather, I suggested it again to Lee, and wrote urging it upon Secretary Seddon. General Lee eventually went down to Richmond upon this business, and the Western concentration was finally agreed upon. Something had to be done. In fact, it was then too late; we were too weak everywhere to effect the concentration of the forces I considered necessary to accomplish Rosecrans's[sic] destruction." Interview: Reprinted from the Washington Post of June 1893, the interview appeared in The Times Dispatch. (Richmond, VA.), November 12, 1911, page 3. Image: http://porterbriggs.com/james-longstreet/ Note: This post is Part 16 of a series on Longstreet's opinions of various Generals, expressed during an interview with a Washington Post corespondent in 1893. Longstreet's opinions on various generals are posted in separate threads so they can be easily located - Bragg, Jackson, A P Hill, Early, Ewell, Pickett, Sheridan, Joe Johnston, Beauregard, Hood, Jeff Davis, Lee, McClellan, and more. Here are the links to Parts 1-15, posted previously: Part 1 - Intro to the article Part 2 - Longstreet on Bragg Part 3 - Longstreet on Jackson Part 4 - Longstreet on AP Hill Part 5 - Longstreet on Ewell & Early Part 6 - Longstreet on Pickett, Sheridan, Five Forks & the Timing of the Surrender Part 7 - Longstreet on Joe Johnston Part 8 - Longstreet on Beauregard Part 9 - Longstreet on Hood Part 10 - Longstreet on Lee's military attributes Part 11 - Lee's Best Battle Part 12 - Lee's Poorest Generalship Part 13 - Lee's greatest weakness as tactical commander Part 14 - Lee's tactical weakness at Gettysburg Part 15 - Meade's Lost Opportunity <Up next - Longstreet on his relationship with Lee post-Gettysburg.> @Eleanor Rose @Union_Buff @FarawayFriend @War Horse @novushomus @GELongstreet @LeesWarhorse @Tom Elmore @Coonewah Creek @Yankeedave @Andy Cardinal @PeterT @Zella If you aren't tagged and would like to receive notification when these are posted, let me know and Ill tag you in future ones.