Breechldrs Influence of repeating rifles in the Civil War

All OR references are to vol. 30, part II.

Walker's Reserve Corps camped the previous night near Leet's Tan-yard and Rock Springs (e.g., OR p. 261), well to the south. Powell's Maps of Chickamauga show it marching north up the first road east of Chickamauga on the 18th, which makes sense and would be the most direct route (pp. 33-35). The map from the LOC that Jantzen provided in post #515 also shows the Confederates coming up this road and it is the only road on the various maps that has a long 45+ degree left hand turn in the right place to have caused a line of troops guiding on it to do the left wheel that threw Walthall's right hand regiments (24th & 27th MS) into such confusion that they essentially missed the fight. So that seems to settle the question of the approach road.

What caused the two regiments on the left (30th & 34th MS) to advance west of the road into the cleared field? It may be that skirmisher fire from the field drew them west or northwest. Or, it may be they continued more or less straight ahead and not only the road but the field turned to the right so that they entered the field more or less going straight ahead but continued farther north than the rest of the brigade, thus opening the interval between them and the 29th Miss., and also putting them on the left (upstream) of the bridge.

Gen. Walthall says he was ordered to form his brigade "when the head of General Walker's column reached a point about a half mile from Alexander's Bridge." (p. 271) If we take that as the point where Walthal formed, that would be a little south of where the LOC map locates Wilson and Ector's brigades at 3 pm. (Senior Capt. Smith of the 24th MS says they formed "about 1 mile from the river" (p. 277) and Col. Campbell of the 27th MS says the battle line was formed "about three-quarters of a mile from Alexander's Bridge (p. 279). The other three regimental reports do state the distance. However, since we know they formed in dense woods, it had to have been north of the field shown on the right of the road on the LOC map and therefor "about a half mile" looks right.)

Walthall formed "almost at right angle to the road, the right slightly retired," and with skirmishers 200 yards in front. (p. 271)."[A]fter advancing abut a quarter mile [i.e., about half-way to the bridge] the enemy's skirmishers were encountered in front of my left and center." That would seem to be about where the cleared field to the left of the road begins, and suggests at least the left of the left hand regiment (34th MS) became visible and began to take skirmisher fire there. Within about 100-150 yards north from that point (and about 350 yards south of the bridge) the road from the east intersects the bridge road and continues into the field, according to the LOC map. By that point perhaps the skirmisher fire had become annoying enough, or perhaps it was thought they were shielding the main enemy line, such that the left two regiments diverged leftward into the field in pursuit of the skirmishers, after which at least the 34th swung back around to the right. Or, they continued more or less straight ahead but, due to a bend in the creek, were able to advance further north than the rest of the brigade, thereby opening up the interval:
  • Col. Benton (34th MS, on the extreme left of the brigade line): "The command moved across an old field, in which the enemy's skirmishers were encountered and driven back. Advancing toward the stream at a point above the bridge [i.e., to the left of the bridge], a destructive fire was received from the enemy's main line, under cover of a skirt of timber and dense undergrowth." (pp. 284-85)
  • Maj. Johnson (30th MS, next to the 34th): "after advancing about half a mile we crossed the road which led to the bridge. This road here made an abrupt turn to the right, forming a complete right angle. [the intersection perhaps, or a dogleg in the road not shown on the maps?] The regiment advanced some 300 or 400 yards through an open field under the fire of the enemy, who were posted on a hill immediately in our front [unclear if skirmisher or artillery fire]. Here it was found that this regiment, with the 34th (the regiment on our immediate left), had become separated from the balance of the brigade, and the order was given to the men to lie down behind an abrupt hill in the field. Here Colonel Scales ordered the men to cease firing (the enemy having disappeared)[likely means the federal skirmishers have finally left and crossed the creek] and dispatched the adjutant to the brigadier-general to report the position and the situation of the regiment. The brigadier-general arriving on the ground, ordered the colonel to press forward his skirmishers and occupy the hill, which was done. The skirmishers had hardly occupied the hill when the brigadier-general ordered them to be withdrawn, and the regiment to move back and join the balance of the brigade, which was immediately done. " (pp. 282-83)
  • Gen. Walthall: "The road on which my left rested in the beginning of the movement turns to the right at a point 200 or 300 yards from the bridge, forming a right angle. At this point the [34th MS and 30th MS], in advancing passed across the road into an open field, and the Twenty-ninth Mississippi Regiment, Colonel Brantley (the center regiment), being immediately opposite the bridge was stubbornly resisted for about fifteen minutes, and in the meantime the regiments to the left of this, driving the skirmishers of the enemy before them, swung round under the enemy's artillery fire through an open field until the line they formed was nearly at right angles to that formed by the other three regiments, conforming in the main to the general direction of the creek....The [34th and 30th MS], after swinging to the right as above mentioned, in the field, had been halted by their commanders and the men ordered to lie down, the enemy having disappeared in their front [i.e., the enemy skirmishers]. I then directed the skirmishers of these regiments...to be recalled and the regiments to move by the right flank until they closed up an interval between the [30th and 29th MS] near the angle in the line." (p. 272)
The Reports of Govan's regiments also shed light:
  • Lt. Col. Murray (5th Ark.): "[T]he regiments, with the rest of Liddell's brigade, were posted on General Walthall's left, and two companies were thrown forward as skirmishers on a line with those of General Walthal's brigade. The skirmishers were immediately pressed forward and soon became engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy, who were posted on the south side of the creek....After a spirited skirmish of abut an hour and a half,...the enemy retired to the north bank of the creek...." (p. 262-63)
  • Capt. Meek (2nd Ark.): "Our skirmishers wee advance through an open field near the above-named bridge." (p. 261)
  • Maj. Watkins (8th Ark.): "We were soon ordered to form on the left of Walthall's brigade and to cover the front with skirmishers. The skirmishers engaged the enemy, who were concealed in the woods on the opposite bank of the river." (p. 268)
The LOC map provided by Jantzen (attached again below), the sketch map included with Gen. Walker's report (p. 242a, fourth attachment below (photo)), the sketch map included with Liddell's report and appearing in the O.R. Atlas (Plate 30, no. 6, fifth attachment below) (photo)), the Bragg map in the O.R. Atlas (Plate 46, no.4, sixth attachment (photo), the Ruger/Merrill map, sheet no.1, in the O.R. Atlas (Plate 46, no.1, seventh attachment below (photo)) and the more detailed map included in Baumgartner's Blue Lightning (1st & 2d attachments below), all show Walthall's brigade engaging above (i.e. to the left from the Confederate perspective) as well as at and below the bridge. The Walker sketch map may also actually show the dogleg, covered up by the right hand half of Walthall's brigade (note how the line of the road coming up from the south connects to the left center of Walthall's brigade but then emerges from near the brigade right to continue on to the bridge.) Unfortunately few maps show much topographical, road or vegetation detail on the south side of the creek (Jantzen's LOC map shows the most) and none trace the route of Walthall's individual regiments. The Baumgartner, Walker and Ruger/Merrill maps may best show regimental locations during the heaviest fighting.

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Thanks much, Limberbox for compiling this; it does seem to hang together, particularly when one recalls (as I often forget) that Wilder had some skirmishers on the southern/eastern side of the creek (not just foragers). I want to study some more before I can contribute any further. Please keep your research together; you may want to consider writing up an article/monograph for something like Civil War Times on this.
 
All OR references are to vol. 30, part II.

Walker's Reserve Corps camped the previous night near Leet's Tan-yard and Rock Springs (e.g., OR p. 261), well to the south. Powell's Maps of Chickamauga show it marching north up the first road east of Chickamauga on the 18th, which makes sense and would be the most direct route (pp. 33-35). The map from the LOC that Jantzen provided in post #515 also shows the Confederates coming up this road and it is the only road on the various maps that has a long 45+ degree left hand turn in the right place to have caused a line of troops guiding on it to do the left wheel that threw Walthall's right hand regiments (24th & 27th MS) into such confusion that they essentially missed the fight. So that seems to settle the question of the approach road.

What caused the two regiments on the left (30th & 34th MS) to advance west of the road into the cleared field? It may be that skirmisher fire from the field drew them west or northwest. Or, it may be they continued more or less straight ahead and not only the road but the field turned to the right so that they entered the field more or less going straight ahead but continued farther north than the rest of the brigade, thus opening the interval between them and the 29th Miss., and also putting them on the left (upstream) of the bridge.

Gen. Walthall says he was ordered to form his brigade "when the head of General Walker's column reached a point about a half mile from Alexander's Bridge." (p. 271) If we take that as the point where Walthal formed, that would be a little south of where the LOC map locates Wilson and Ector's brigades at 3 pm. (Senior Capt. Smith of the 24th MS says they formed "about 1 mile from the river" (p. 277) and Col. Campbell of the 27th MS says the battle line was formed "about three-quarters of a mile from Alexander's Bridge (p. 279). The other three regimental reports do state the distance. However, since we know they formed in dense woods, it had to have been north of the field shown on the right of the road on the LOC map and therefor "about a half mile" looks right.)

Walthall formed "almost at right angle to the road, the right slightly retired," and with skirmishers 200 yards in front. (p. 271)."[A]fter advancing abut a quarter mile [i.e., about half-way to the bridge] the enemy's skirmishers were encountered in front of my left and center." That would seem to be about where the cleared field to the left of the road begins, and suggests at least the left of the left hand regiment (34th MS) became visible and began to take skirmisher fire there. Within about 100-150 yards north from that point (and about 350 yards south of the bridge) the road from the east intersects the bridge road and continues into the field, according to the LOC map. By that point perhaps the skirmisher fire had become annoying enough, or perhaps it was thought they were shielding the main enemy line, such that the left two regiments diverged leftward into the field in pursuit of the skirmishers, after which at least the 34th swung back around to the right. Or, they continued more or less straight ahead but, due to a bend in the creek, were able to advance further north than the rest of the brigade, thereby opening up the interval:
  • Col. Benton (34th MS, on the extreme left of the brigade line): "The command moved across an old field, in which the enemy's skirmishers were encountered and driven back. Advancing toward the stream at a point above the bridge [i.e., to the left of the bridge], a destructive fire was received from the enemy's main line, under cover of a skirt of timber and dense undergrowth." (pp. 284-85)
  • Maj. Johnson (30th MS, next to the 34th): "after advancing about half a mile we crossed the road which led to the bridge. This road here made an abrupt turn to the right, forming a complete right angle. [the intersection perhaps, or a dogleg in the road not shown on the maps?] The regiment advanced some 300 or 400 yards through an open field under the fire of the enemy, who were posted on a hill immediately in our front [unclear if skirmisher or artillery fire]. Here it was found that this regiment, with the 34th (the regiment on our immediate left), had become separated from the balance of the brigade, and the order was given to the men to lie down behind an abrupt hill in the field. Here Colonel Scales ordered the men to cease firing (the enemy having disappeared)[likely means the federal skirmishers have finally left and crossed the creek] and dispatched the adjutant to the brigadier-general to report the position and the situation of the regiment. The brigadier-general arriving on the ground, ordered the colonel to press forward his skirmishers and occupy the hill, which was done. The skirmishers had hardly occupied the hill when the brigadier-general ordered them to be withdrawn, and the regiment to move back and join the balance of the brigade, which was immediately done. " (pp. 282-83)
  • Gen. Walthall: "The road on which my left rested in the beginning of the movement turns to the right at a point 200 or 300 yards from the bridge, forming a right angle. At this point the [34th MS and 30th MS], in advancing passed across the road into an open field, and the Twenty-ninth Mississippi Regiment, Colonel Brantley (the center regiment), being immediately opposite the bridge was stubbornly resisted for about fifteen minutes, and in the meantime the regiments to the left of this, driving the skirmishers of the enemy before them, swung round under the enemy's artillery fire through an open field until the line they formed was nearly at right angles to that formed by the other three regiments, conforming in the main to the general direction of the creek....The [34th and 30th MS], after swinging to the right as above mentioned, in the field, had been halted by their commanders and the men ordered to lie down, the enemy having disappeared in their front [i.e., the enemy skirmishers]. I then directed the skirmishers of these regiments...to be recalled and the regiments to move by the right flank until they closed up an interval between the [30th and 29th MS] near the angle in the line." (p. 272)
The Reports of Govan's regiments also shed light:
  • Lt. Col. Murray (5th Ark.): "[T]he regiments, with the rest of Liddell's brigade, were posted on General Walthall's left, and two companies were thrown forward as skirmishers on a line with those of General Walthal's brigade. The skirmishers were immediately pressed forward and soon became engaged with the skirmishers of the enemy, who were posted on the south side of the creek....After a spirited skirmish of abut an hour and a half,...the enemy retired to the north bank of the creek...." (p. 262-63)
  • Capt. Meek (2nd Ark.): "Our skirmishers wee advance through an open field near the above-named bridge." (p. 261)
  • Maj. Watkins (8th Ark.): "We were soon ordered to form on the left of Walthall's brigade and to cover the front with skirmishers. The skirmishers engaged the enemy, who were concealed in the woods on the opposite bank of the river." (p. 268)
The LOC map provided by Jantzen (attached again below), the sketch map included with Gen. Walker's report (p. 242a, fourth attachment below (photo)), the sketch map included with Liddell's report and appearing in the O.R. Atlas (Plate 30, no. 6, fifth attachment below) (photo)), the Bragg map in the O.R. Atlas (Plate 46, no.4, sixth attachment (photo), the Ruger/Merrill map, sheet no.1, in the O.R. Atlas (Plate 46, no.1, seventh attachment below (photo)) and the more detailed map included in Baumgartner's Blue Lightning (1st & 2d attachments below), all show Walthall's brigade engaging above (i.e. to the left from the Confederate perspective) as well as at and below the bridge. The Walker sketch map may also actually show the dogleg, covered up by the right hand half of Walthall's brigade (note how the line of the road coming up from the south connects to the left center of Walthall's brigade but then emerges from near the brigade right to continue on to the bridge.) Unfortunately few maps show much topographical, road or vegetation detail on the south side of the creek (Jantzen's LOC map shows the most) and none trace the route of Walthall's individual regiments. The Baumgartner, Walker and Ruger/Merrill maps may best show regimental locations during the heaviest fighting.

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Just as an aside, I see that on that page from Baumgartner there are references to Sgts. Barnes and Stewart of the 72nd Indiana. They're the two from Co. A whose notes about the lunette and the effects of the Spencers were used by McPhee in 1882.
 
At Hoover's Gap, Wilder listed 61 casualties, Bate recorded 146. The numbers engaged changed dramatically as the day went on, at a certain point Wilder withdrew, so none of he men were present. The five books I have at hand on the Tullahoma Campaign do not run to bean counting, so exact numbers are not listed. Of course, what is important is the fact that unlike a conventional cavalry unit, Wilder was able to hold his position until Thomas could send infantry to his support. Authorities agree that over all, CSA returns & casualty figures for the Tullahma Campaign are on the vague side. At Liberty Gap, for example, CSA losses are listed at 0 because there are no returns.

For the purposes of this thread, namely the influence of repeaters, Hoover's Gap & the left flank of the cavalry attack on Shelbyville are sterling examples. General Thomas was deeply impressed. General Stanley who had derisively called Wilder's mounted infantry "tadpole cavalry" & predicted failure, was proved wrong.
Wilder's brigade was able to get into position before the rest of the infantry arrived. They were able to hold the position long enough to be reinforced. The brigade's rate of fire was probably highly influential on Confederate tactics. Both Thomas and Rosecrans were pleased with the result. Probably that result made it back to the War Department where Lincoln frequently sampled the telegraph messages. Since it was a result and not a plan, Rosecrans probably gave the news to reporters who were able to transmit it to their papers in Illinois and Indiana.
After Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Lincoln most likely had time to investigate what all the fuss was about. Indiana and Illinois were important states. He may considered it an embarrassment that the soldiers were buying weapons with their own money.
Spencer took a chance that the financial backers would pay him. Because payment was not a simple matter. Wilder's people took a chance that the weapons would work in the field.
By the time Lincoln tested the Spencer, Ripley was getting a bit long in the tooth. And Ripley's commitment to the federal works at Springfield was restricting the money flowing to the private companies.
Both Burnside and Spencer had very substantial sales in 1863. '64 and '65.
And in direct answer to the question, most US cavalry units had Spencer repeaters by August of 1864. They didn't lose any battles after that point.
So while the number of Spencer carbines available may have been about 90,000, by the last year of the US Civil War they gave US cavalry units a dominant and independent offensive power.
 
By the time Lincoln tested the Spencer, Ripley was getting a bit long in the tooth. And Ripley's commitment to the federal works at Springfield was restricting the money flowing to the private companies.
This doesn't hold; pretty much anyone who could put together something capable of going bang was getting big contracts. Spencer in particular had to ask for the size of the contract to be reduced (from 10,000 weapons to 7,500) and he was late starting deliveries.


In fact, of weapons contracted for in 1861 (and possibly early 1862), less than a quarter were ever delivered. Ripley if anything overloaded the private sector with contracts they could not fulfil.
 
There was a tremendous amount of foreign purchases in 1862. Naylor & CO of New York closed many of their contracts in 1863. The Springfield armory may have been the only armory that perfected interchangeable parts and assembly line methods. That was a major accomplishment for Ripley. But by 1863 the private companies were starting to produce. Sharp had sales every year, but Spencer and Burnside and the other New England companies were stronger in 1863 and thereafter.
I think there was also some disagreement with Ripley's choices in heavy ordnance. But that's not germane here.
 
With respect to both small arms and rifled heavy ordnance, the smaller companies and smaller contracts had their impact late in the war. The new weapons helped the US close out the war before the financial cost became unbearable.
 
The war ended. The belligerent that distributed repeating weapons and breach loaders prevailed. The US particularly prevailed in the Tennessee and Georgia campaigns starting in the Summer of 1863. By December of 1864 the westerners had destroyed the Confederate army of Tennessee and Wilson's cavalry and its flanking tactics were a large part of that success. The US cavalry gained an advantage over the Confederate cavalry by the August of 1864 and was thereafter decisively involved in actions that shortened the war.
 
In '64 and '65 Spencer and Burnside were the dominant private small arms suppliers. That's also the period in which the US Cavalry and the US western armies became dominant. By the end of the war Sec'y Stanton was in the process of making the repeating rifles standard issue. The evidence is that the experiments with repeating rifles were successful. By the last 8 months of the war results were moving the US to order more such weapons.
 
In '64 and '65 Spencer and Burnside were the dominant private small arms suppliers. That's also the period in which the US Cavalry and the US western armies became dominant. By the end of the war Sec'y Stanton was in the process of making the repeating rifles standard issue. The evidence is that the experiments with repeating rifles were successful. By the last 8 months of the war results were moving the US to order more such weapons.
The phrase "was in the process of making the repeating rifles standard issue" seems a bit woolly to me. Did those arms become standard issue or did they not? They certainly did not become the standard infantry weapon.


Have you got good figures for the number of Spencers delivered in 1864, versus, say, the number of Starr's carbines? Executive Document 99 enumerates the lot but Starr's appears to have delivered 15,000 carbines in 1864, exclusive of the number of pistols they also delivered. Savage Arms delivers five-figure numbers of rifled muskets in 1864.

There's also a lot of pistols delivered by, e.g., Remington.
 
The war ended. The belligerent that distributed repeating weapons and breach loaders prevailed.
That doesn't actually prove anything when that belligerent also had a much stronger economy, larger population, and more access to foreign markets; a breechloader is certainly an upgrade over a muzzle loader, especially if your accuracy is poor enough that they don't really have any significantly distinct performance (i.e. you can't hit with a ML rifle at the range a repeater stops being as effective) but it's not really sufficient to make it a war-winner unless the argument is basically that the Confederates could otherwise have won a given campaign despite pretty bad odds.
 
Franklin, Nashville, Five Forks, Sailor's Creek, Wilson's Alabama cavalry raid, the evidence is sufficient.
Nashville sees a Union victory at 2:1 odds with the cavalry dismounted to make a final attack; a famous part of Five Forks was a cavalry charge. Franklin meanwhile sees the Confederates take the defences at roughly even odds.

Given Franklin and Nashville, if you're ascribing Union performance at both of those to the repeater, you end up arguing that without the repeater 27K Confederates could beat 27K Union troops but 55K Union troops couldn't beat 27K Confederates. It's an argument that the repeater only somewhat made up for massive Confederate individual superiority.
 
This thread is becoming unwieldy. In addition, one of the purposes of the more expensive repeating weapons was to convince the Confederates to disengage on particular battlefields and to surrender generally. The object was to shorten the war by spending more in 1864 and 1865. I think the US accomplished its goal.
 
That doesn't actually prove anything when that belligerent also had a much stronger economy, larger population, and more access to foreign markets; a breechloader is certainly an upgrade over a muzzle loader, especially if your accuracy is poor enough that they don't really have any significantly distinct performance (i.e. you can't hit with a ML rifle at the range a repeater stops being as effective) but it's not really sufficient to make it a war-winner unless the argument is basically that the Confederates could otherwise have won a given campaign despite pretty bad odds.
Saphroneth,
This was all explained up post months ago. The Spencers provided the Union cavalry fire superiority on the battlefield, the veterans described it in period reports and correspondence as did the Confederates.
 
This was all explained up post months ago. The Spencers provided the Union cavalry fire superiority on the battlefield, the veterans described it in period reports and correspondence as did the Confederates.
And what I specified is that a breechloader is an upgrade, but that it doesn't prove (as wasusabob was claiming) that they were consequential to the ending of the war in the timeframe it did. (Well, strictly he said that the side which distributed breechloaders prevailed which suggests that they were responsible for the Union's victory).

To be able to demonstrate that they were important to the victory, we should need to demonstrate an example of a campaign won only because of the Union's cavalry breechloaders, as in, one where otherwise we should expect the Confederates to win the campaign as a whole.

Wasusabob mentions for example Franklin and Nashville, but I don't think it's really possible to claim that those battles would have been CS victories without the Spencer (i.e. if the Union troops had been armed with more conventional carbines).
 
And what I specified is that a breechloader is an upgrade, but that it doesn't prove (as wasusabob was claiming) that they were consequential to the ending of the war in the timeframe it did. (Well, strictly he said that the side which distributed breechloaders prevailed which suggests that they were responsible for the Union's victory).

To be able to demonstrate that they were important to the victory, we should need to demonstrate an example of a campaign won only because of the Union's cavalry breechloaders, as in, one where otherwise we should expect the Confederates to win the campaign as a whole.

Wasusabob mentions for example Franklin and Nashville, but I don't think it's really possible to claim that those battles would have been CS victories without the Spencer (i.e. if the Union troops had been armed with more conventional carbines).
As mentioned multiple times up post, Wilson's Selma campaign and particularly the cavalry assaults carrying the works at Selma and the works at Columbus meet your narrow, specific criteria.
 
As mentioned multiple times up post, Wilson's Selma campaign and particularly the cavalry assaults carrying the works at Selma and the works at Columbus meet your narrow, specific criteria.
It's my understanding that at Selma you have an assault by somewhere around 10,000 troops against a city held by ~4,000 troops total, and significantly fewer in the sector actually attacked. Is it normally expected that this kind of attack would fail?

ED: I should also point out that the idea that a campaign in March-April 1865 was vital to winning the war seems... unlikely? But that's not strictly relevant to the engagement at Selma.
 
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From memory, I believe you've overstated the Union and undercounted the Confederates considerably.

Also ignored the usual rule of thumb for attacker vs. defender

Also ignored the usual outcome of cavalry vs. infantry

Also ignored the almost unheard of outcome of cavalry vs. infantry behind breastworks (pulled off in this campaign not once but twice).

And your extremely narrow criteria, which seem to require an all-Spencer force of significant size. The examples are late war because Ripley's dallying in providing Spencer a large enough contract to justify leasing a manufacturing facility, hiring skilled workmen, ordering raw materials and tooling up delayed production 9+ months resulting in Spencers not being available in quantity until relatively late war.

You also ignore the many examples included up post of battles, skirmishes and the opinions of the men on both sides who fought. (see, e.g., posts 220, 227, 232, 248, 263, 276, 283, 291, 315, 317, 325, 342, 347, 349, 36s, 365-66, 375, 426,429, 433, 482, 486, 492, 501)
 
That doesn't actually prove anything when that belligerent also had a much stronger economy, larger population, and more access to foreign markets; a breechloader is certainly an upgrade over a muzzle loader, especially if your accuracy is poor enough that they don't really have any significantly distinct performance (i.e. you can't hit with a ML rifle at the range a repeater stops being as effective) but it's not really sufficient to make it a war-winner unless the argument is basically that the Confederates could otherwise have won a given campaign despite pretty bad odds.
That's an absurd argument. Did the advanced weapons shorten the war? Did they reduce US casualties? Did they reduce Confederate casualties by helping to convince the Confederates to surrender during combat, and to accept the surrenders that occurred in April 1865?
If the repeating rifles shortened the war they helped end it before the cost became prohibitive and they probably also made the post war peace period more stable.
 
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