The speed of sound in fps (feet per second for those unfamiliar) is approx 1125 fps, the 56-56 Spencer round has a muzzle velocity of approx 1200 fps, so it is supersonic, though just barely, at the muzzle. How much this affects accuracy when the bullet quickly becomes subsonic, I have no idea. And yes, I have fired plenty of muzzle loaders, presently I own an PH P53 Enfield, a mutt of an 1858 Enfield two bander that Lodgewood did up as a Confederate import, and a 1803 Harpers Ferry rifle.
Yes, they were innovative and yes they were tactically important, in a very limited way, on engagements where they were used, however; the technology was in its infancy, the infrastructure was not yet there to manufacture them or the ammo in the large quantities required to have a real bearing on the outcome of the war, nor were the logistics of the time able to deal with the ammo requirements if it had been possible to arm large units of men with them.
Maybe I extrapolated too much from your earlier posts regarding the repeaters and their influence, It seemed like you were headed where you have been before, intimating that had the ordnance dept not resisted them, the war could have been shortened by years.
All good points, CowCavalry, though I would argue your assessment of "tactically important, in a very limited way" understates their impact.
Marcot provides additional insight. As recently as June 10, 1863 Ripley had written Spencer that "The original contract for Spencer rifles was made by Order of the Secretary of War, contrary to the views of this office. No more of your rifles are wanted. " However, by August 18th, after the news of Hoover's Gap and Gettysburg, Ripley wrote Spencer requesting terms for rifles "in the number of 2500 or upwards...to be done in the speediest possible moment...," and in early September replied to General S.W. Rousseau's request for Spencer rifles to arm his mounted infantrymen: "[W]e shall proceed with every effort to to obtain them and with every disposition to furnish them as you suggested and desired." Here is what Marcot says about Ripley's apparent about face:
"As news of the success of units armed with the Spencer seven-shot repeater spread through the Army, commanders continued to pressure the Ordnance Department for the rifles.... Rifles were needed by Ripley to arm the ever increasing number of mounted infantry units in the Union Army. Mobility, combined with the firepower of a repeating firearm and the shock effect of rapid engagement, were the traits of this new strike force. The seven-shot Spencer repeater was the arm the troops wanted most. The demand was real and the Ordnance Department continued to be besieged with requests." (p. 65)
Here is the view of Maj. Gen. James H. Wilson, commanding the Cavalry Corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi, as expressed Jan. 2, 1865, regarding the impact of the Spencers:
"
There is no doubt that the Spencer is the best fire-arm yet put into the hands of the soldier, both for economy of ammunition and maximum effect, physical and moral. Our best officers estimate one man armed with it, equivalent to three with any other arm.
I have never seen anything else like the confidence inspired by it in the regiments or brigades which have it. I have seen a large number of dismounted charges made with them against cavalry, infantry, and breast works, and never knew one to fail.
The confidence in the arm is so widely spread that I now have applications from every regiment in the corps, not already supplied with them." (quoted in Marcot, p. 75)
Wilson commanded the cavalry that rolled up the Rebel left flank at the battle of Nashville and would lead three Spencer-armed divisions through Alabama and Georgia in his Spring 1865 campaign.
Regarding manufacturing capacity, that also could have been increased and much more rapidly with better leadership.
The Chickering Piano-Forte Building Spencer moved into at the beginning of 1862, once he received the December 26, 1861 Army contract for 10,000 rifles, was "a structure less than eight years old and large enough to contain production facilities for
thousands of rifles a month. Machinery was purchased, tooling manufactured and skilled workmen hired." (p.37) However, the company nearly failed. Ripley continued to throw up roadblocks, cutting the initial contract to 2201 on March 2d, 1863, and additional orders were not yet forthcoming. Spencer himself spent the early months of 1863 touring Navy and Army posts in the West, giving instruction, putting on demonstrations and seeking orders. However, the only clear success was Wilder's March order for 1400-- "too few to have made the arduous trip a financial success" and the company "was in grave danger of bankruptcy if it failed to secure immediate, sizeable government contracts." (p. 51) General Rosecrans had also been impressed, and his petitions to Ripley for 2000 Spencer rifles (the very ones ultimately delivered to Wilder's troops) may have caused Ripley to relent, because the Army resumed accepting deliveries in April (taking 2500 that month and 1500 more in each of May and June for a total of 7502 on the 12/26/81 contract). Help also came from the State of Massachusetts, which placed an order for 2000 rifles in May (these would later be taken over by the Government, replaced by Spencer from later production, then taken over again). That and retooling to make carbines kept Spencer's workmen busy in the summer after the Army rifles contract ended in June. Ripley begrudgingly approved in June Spencer's request to provide 11,000 carbines, "because we are in want of Cavalry carbines," though the contract was not signed until mid-July. Spencer also replied affirmatively to Ripley's August 18 for "2500, or upwards" of rifles, quoting 2500 at $35@, but also offering to provide 80 rifles per day thereafter at $35@ for a total order of 5000 rifles, $34@ for 10,000 rifles, $33@ for 15,000, $32@ for 20,000 and $31@ for 25,000. Ripley evidently passed the opportunity to obtain the greater quantities.
Hoover's Gap, Gettysburg and Ripley's replacement by Ramsay in September changed the Government attitude. Ramsay was besieged with requests for the repeaters and grew impatient for the delivery of carbines. The first 1000 were delivered October 3 with another 1000 every 2-2 1/2 weeks thereafter. On Nov. 14 Spencer wrote offering to increase production to 100 carbines per 10-hour workday, and offering further:
"If our rifles and carbines meet with sufficient favor with the Government and you are induced to offer us a new contract... we can increase our production from its present capacity, in proportion to the inducement offered by the Government." In mid-December the Government increased the contract to 34,500 carbines, with deliveries at the rate of 2500/month beginning in January 1864 and increasing to 3500/month in July. Not until mid-April 1864 did the Government offer "to accept all that you can make in 1864, with the reference to the specified monthly deliveries" in the December contract. By early May 1864 Spencer was producing 2700 firearms per month and the "outlay of capital for raw materials, precision machinery, and wages for experienced workmen was substantial enough to concern the proprietors regarding the necessity for continuing government orders." (p. 71) As a result Spencer wrote the Ordnance Department "suggesting the expediency of giving them large orders for carbines, to enable them to to increase their facilities for manufacture." In his endorsement of the proposal to the Secretary of War, Ramsay wrote:
"
There are no doubts from the reports received at this office that this is the most effective arm we have in the service. The price is $5.00 less than was paid in 1861 and 1862 for the best shooting paper cartridge carbine and gives 8 shots in succession.
It is most desirable to arm all the cavalry with them as soon as possible. I have no hesitation in recommending the acceptance of this proposition." (p. 71)
As a result, a new contract was signed May 24th accepting all of Spencer's carbine output through September 1, 1865. Production reached 4000 a month during much of the winter 1864-65. Still, demand for the Spencer continued to outpace production, and about this time
Ordnance turned to the Burnside Rifle Company, who agreed to cease production of their carbine and retool to supplement Spencer production.
The Government also planned to begin manufacturing Spencers itself, "[a]s soon as the armory authorized to be built at Rock Island can be put in operation," and to change over all the national armories to the production of breechloaders, as new Ordnance Chief A.B. Dyer wrote to Stanton in October 1864.
One can only wonder at what levels of production might have been attained with more enlightened leadership at Ordnance earlier. Large early contracts so a company can invest in capacity expansion without risk of bankrupting itself, fabrication by other manufacturers on a royalty basis, and expansion of the National Armories including their beginning to manufacture breech-loading guns. All of these eventually occurred but could have occurred years sooner. Shave years off the war? Probably not. Shave months off? Seems likely.